Judgment : .1. The defendant, who has been successful before the trial Court and unsuccessful before the first appellate court, is the appellant in this second appeal. The respondent instituted the suit in O.S. No.405 of 1981 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thiruthuraipoondi against the appellant herein for the recovery of the amount due on accounts. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the suit claim is neither true nor correct and that the defendant is not liable to pay the suit claim. The trial court also held that the suit claim is barred by limitation. On appeal by the plaintiff, the first appellate court found that there were dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant and that the defendant is liable to pay a sum of Rs.9,5361. On the question of limitation also, the first appellate Court held that the suit claim is not barred by limitation. Being aggrieved, the defendant has preferred this second appeal. 2. The parties in this second appeal will be referred as arrayed before the trial court. The learned counsel for the appellant advanced arguments on the plea of limitation while reserving his rights to raise the contention in respect of merits of the suit claim. .3. At the time of admission, the following substantial question of law was framed by this court: - .Whether it is not erroneous on the part of this court to give to the plaintiff the favour of the presumption of good faith when the plaintiff himself admitted that he know that the defendant was not entitled to the Debt Relief Act?" 4. Even according to the plaint averments, the cause of action for the suit arose on 4. 1974 when the account commenced and on 33. 1977 when the balance was struck, and from 1. 1975 when the Ordinance 1 of 1975 came into force and the plaintiff bona fidely believed that he could not prosecute the claim and on 20.2.1980, when the plaintiff issued a lawyers notice and on 22. 1990, the defendant repudiated the liability. Admittedly, the suit plaint has been presented on 1st April, 1980. 5. 1975 when the Ordinance 1 of 1975 came into force and the plaintiff bona fidely believed that he could not prosecute the claim and on 20.2.1980, when the plaintiff issued a lawyers notice and on 22. 1990, the defendant repudiated the liability. Admittedly, the suit plaint has been presented on 1st April, 1980. 5. One more averment in the plaint which is relevant, reads thus:- "The defendant is a Mirasudar (landlord) and he owns a rice mill also." In paragraph 4 of the Plaint, it has been stated thus:- "The plaintiff submits that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the various Debt Relief Acts and therefore did not come forward with the suit earlier. The claim therefore in any event is not barred by limitation." .6. The plaintiff had examined P.Ws.1 and 2, while the defendant had examined himself as D.W.1. The plaintiff had marked Exs.A-1 to A-52. Admittedly, this is a suit on accounts. According to the plaintiff the defendants father had taken certain advances which he had failed to repay. The acknowledgement if any by the defendant is by .Ex.A.38, which is the account book for the year 1975-76. The defendant had affixed his signature on Ex.A.38 on 24. 1975. After 24. 1975 there had been no acknowledgment by the defendant. As such the plaint which has been presented on 4. 1980 is definitely barred by limitation. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that Ex.A.38, acknowledgement is dated 24. 1975 and the suit not having been filed within three years from that date, the suit claim is barred by limitation. Per contra, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the defendant is a debtor against whom institution of suits under various debt relief enactments have been barred and that the plaintiff was under the bona fide belief and therefore the suit claim is not barred by limitation. 8. It was further contended that the period covered by the debt relief enactments have to be excluded and if the period is excluded, the suit claim is within time and it is not barred by limitation. It was also further contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that as per the accounts maintained by the plaintiff the balance was struck during the year 1976-77 and 1977-78 and therefore the suit claim is not barred by limitation. It was also further contended by the counsel for the plaintiff that as per the accounts maintained by the plaintiff the balance was struck during the year 1976-77 and 1977-78 and therefore the suit claim is not barred by limitation. This contention cannot be sustained at all. Merely because the plaintiff carries over the entries for the subsequent years in the plaintiff’s books of accounts, it cannot be assumed that the suit claim is not barred by limitation in the absence of any acknowledgment. As pointed out already, the last of the acknowledgment being on 24. 1975 as seen from Ex.A-38 as found by the trial Court, the suit instituted on 4. 1980, beyond three years is barred by limitation. 9. The only other question requires to be considered is whether the defendant is a debtor and whether the plaintiff was under the bona fide belief that no suit could be instituted in view of various debt relief enactments. Basically this Court has to refer to the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief enactments which were in force during the relevant period, which bar the institution of the suit against the debtors. However, on the facts of this case, it may not be necessary. .10. This Court is also aware of the limitation prescribed under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to interference findings. However, this Court hastens to add that it has got the powers in terms of section 103 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure to determine the issue when it has been wrongly determined by the court below. Normally this Court will not interfere with the findings of facts. This court will have jurisdiction to interfere with the findings if the court below had determined the issue wrongly either by misreading the evidence or by failure to advert and consider the material evidence. .11. As already pointed out, the trial court held that the suit claim is barred by limitation as the defendant is not a debtor. It is to be pointed out even according to the plaint averments, the defendant is a landlord and he owns a rice mill. P.W.1 who is a partner of the plaintiff’s firm while in the witness box deposed thus:- .The above material portion of the evidence had obviously been overlooked by the first appellate court. It is to be pointed out even according to the plaint averments, the defendant is a landlord and he owns a rice mill. P.W.1 who is a partner of the plaintiff’s firm while in the witness box deposed thus:- .The above material portion of the evidence had obviously been overlooked by the first appellate court. This admission of P.W.1, a partner of the plaintiff’s firm is fatal to the plaintiff’s suit claim. This evidence is more than sufficient to reject the plaintiff’s plea that he was under the bona fide belief that the defendant was a debtor and entitled to the benefits of various debt relief enactments in force during the relevant period. 12. Even according to the plaint averments, the defendant is a landlord and he owns a rice mill. If that be so, the defendant being a landlord and owning a rice mill is definitely excluded from the definition of the term debtor as found in all the Debt Relief enactments. That apart, from the above deposition, which is an admission of the plaintiff’s witness, a partner of the plaintiff’s firm would establish beyond doubt that the defendant is not a debtor and none of the debt relief enactments would apply to the defendant. 13. P.W.1 has also admitted that for more than five years, there had been no acknowledgment, nor had there been a demand by the plaintiff on the defendant. Merely because the plaintiff’s firm carried forward the debit entries to next accounting year or consecutively for five years, the same will not save limitation. This aspect of the matter has been lost sight of by the first appellate court while it has been rightly taken into consideration by the trial court. The above material portion of the evidence an d the plaint averments which are nothing but admission on the part of the plaintiff, would show that the suit claim is barred by limitation. The judgment of the first appellate court has to be set aside as the learned first appellate Judge has miserably failed to advert and consider the material portion of the evidence, which is a clear admission. In the circumstances, this Court has no other alternative except to interfere with the findings of the first appellate court and hold that the suit claim is barred by limitation. 14. In the circumstances, this Court has no other alternative except to interfere with the findings of the first appellate court and hold that the suit claim is barred by limitation. 14. The plea of good faith put forward by the plaintiff cannot be entertained at all as the plaintiff was very much aware that the provisions of the Debt Relief enactments in force during the relevant time was not applicable to the defendant as admitted by P.W.1 apart from the plaint averments. It is not necessary to go into the other plea once it is held that the suit claim is barred by limitation. 15. In the circumstance, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the first appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored, but without costs. Consequently, .C.M.P. Nos.5387, 8257 and 14611 of 1996 are closed. E. Padmanabhan, J. Today, judgment has been delivered by this Court allowing the Second Appeal. It is now represented that the appellant had deposited certain amounts as per the orders of this Court in C.M.P. No.5387 of 1986 dated 4. 1986 pending the Second Appeal. Since the appellant has succeeded in the Second Appeal, he will be entitled to refund of the same.