G. PATRI BASAVANA GOUD, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-employer, in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeks quashing of Annexure-A by which the 1st respondent-State Government referred the dispute to the additional Labour Court, Bangalore,under Section 10 (l) (c) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('act' for short) for adjudication. The industrial dispute relates to the termination of services of two workmen-respondents 2 and 3. ( 2 ) THE points of reference at Annexure-A are two: one is as to whether the termination of services of respondents 2 and 3 with effect from 10-5-1982 is justified; the second point is, if so, that is, if the termination is justified, then, bearing in mind the delay of 9 years in raising the dispute, what relief could be given to the workmen concerned. ( 3 ) THERE is no doubt that there has been inordinate delay on the part of respondents 2 and 3, the workmen concerned, in raising an industrial dispute. They are guilty of this delay and latches on their part in spite of having earlier been told that they could avail of the benefit of Section 10 (4-A) of the Act introduced in the meantime. ( 4 ) IT is a settled position that the appropriate Government has to apply its mind as to the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case. If the dispute is so frivolous as not to merit adjudication by a labour forum, then it would be within its rights to decline to make reference, of course, setting out the reasons where Section 12 (5) of the Act would be applicable and intimating the parties concerned. Quashing of Annexure-A in this case is sought on the ground that there is inordinate delay on the part of the workmen concerned in raising the dispute and that the Government was duty bound to decline to make reference, because where there is such delay, not only that it would be open to the Government to decline to make a reference, but that even the workman concerned would lose the remedy. ( 5 ) IN support of the above said contention, Sri B. C. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer, refers to several decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 5 ) IN support of the above said contention, Sri B. C. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner-employer, refers to several decisions of the Supreme Court. One is in M/s. Shalimar Works Limited v Their Workmen , wherein the supreme Court held that, though there is no limitation prescribed for the reference of an industrial dispute to an industrial Tribunal, even so, it is only reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particular when the dispute relates to whole sale discharge of workmen as in the case being dealt with by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was dealing with the two appeals by special leave against the same decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India arising out of a dispute referred to the 6th Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Sri B. C. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, then refers to another decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay union of Journalists and Others v State of Bombay and another. The appropriate Government concerned therein had declined to make reference of the dispute concerned therein. The trade Union concerned of the workmen moved the Bombay High court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of Bombay, urging that refusal by the State Government to refer the dispute under Section 12 (5) of the Act was illegal. The said writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court. The Division bench also agreed with the view taken by the learned Single judge. It was then that the Supreme Court was seized of the matter. As stated at the very out set, the Supreme Court was concerned therein with regard to the construction of Section 25-F (c) of the Act. In course of it, the Supreme Court observed with regard to scope of the appropriate Government in the matter of referring or declining to make a reference of an industrial dispute as follows:"it is true that if the dispute in question raises questions of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under section 10 (1) read with Section 12 (5) or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore, be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be said to be foreign to the enquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under Section 10 (1) and so, the argument that the appropriate government exceeds its jurisdiction in expressing its prima facie view on the nature of termination of services of appellants 2 and 3 cannot be accepted". (emphasis supplied) sri B. C. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, particularly referring to the portion underlined in the above said extract, urges that, the Supreme Court categorically held that even where a claim is belated, the appropriate Government would be within its right to make a reference. Sri B. C. Prabhakar then refers to another decision of the supreme Court in Ratan Chandra Sammanta and Others v union of India and Others. Casual labourers of South Eastern railway, alleged to have been appointed between 1964-69 and retrenched between 1975-78, had approached the Supreme court for a direction to the Union of India and others to include their names in the live casual labourer register after due screening, and give them re-employment according to their seniority and to restrain the opposite parties to the said writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution from filling up vacancies from open market. The Supreme Court said thus in paragraph 6 of the judgment:"two questions arise, one, if the petitioners are entitled as a matter of law for re-employment and other if they have lost their right, if any, due to delay. Right of casual labourer employed in projects, to be re-employed in railways has been recognized both by the Railways and this Court. But unfortunately the petitioners did not take any step to enforce their claim before the Railways except sending a vague representation, nor did they even care to produce any material to satisfy this Court that they were covered in the scheme framed by the Railways. It was urged by the learned Counsel for petitioners that they may be permitted to produce their identity cards etc. , before opposite parties who may accept or reject the same after verification. We are afraid it would be too dangerous to permit this exercise. A writ is issued by this Court in favour of a person who has some right. And not for sake of roving enquiry leaving scope for maneuvering. Delay itself deprives a person of his remedy available in law. In absence of any fresh cause of action or any legislation, a person who has lost his remedy by lapse of time loses his right as well. From the date of retrenchment if it is assumed to be correct, a period of more than fifteen years has expired and in case we accept the prayer of petitioner, we would be depriving a host of others who in the meantime have become eligible and are entitled to claim to be employed. We would have been persuaded to take a sympathetic view but in absence of any positive material to establish that these petitioners were in fact appointed and working as alleged by them, it would not be proper exercise of discretion to direct opposite parties to verify the correctness of the statement made by the petitioners that they were employed between 1964 to 1969 and retrenched between 1975 to 1979". Sri B. C. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner refers to the observations of the Supreme Court in the above said extract to the effect that delay itself deprives a person the remedy available in law and submits that, in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the decision earlier referred to, it needs to be concluded that the workmen concerned viz. , respondents 2 and 3 having lost the remedy available to them in law, the 1st respondent-State Government ought to have declined to make a reference. ( 6 ) IN the first decision of the Supreme Court viz. , Shalimar works Limited's case, supra, as noticed earlier, the matter had arisen out of the award by the 6th Industrial Tribunal in West bengal. The matter was being considered on merits. The question of Government declining to make a reference solely on the ground of delay had not directly arisen for consideration. It was in the context of the facts of that case that the Supreme court observed that though no limitation had been prescribed for reference of disputes to an Industrial Tribunal, it was reasonable that disputes should be referred as soon as possible after they had arisen and after conciliation proceedings had failed. In the second decision of the Supreme Court referred to above viz. , in the Bombay Union of Journalists case, the particular point of law which had arisen for decision of the Supreme Court as set out at the very out set was the question of construction of section 25-F (c) of the Act. The Supreme Court, dealing with the scope of the appropriate Government in making or declining to make a reference observed that, if the claim was patently frivolous or if it was clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. It could not be taken as the ratio of this decision that wherever there is delay, the government has to automatically decline to make a reference. In the last of the decisions of the Supreme Court that is referred viz. , Ratan Chandra Sammanta's case, supra, the scope available to the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) in making reference or in declining to make reference had not arisen for consideration before the Supreme Court. In the last of the decisions of the Supreme Court that is referred viz. , Ratan Chandra Sammanta's case, supra, the scope available to the appropriate Government under Section 10 (1) in making reference or in declining to make reference had not arisen for consideration before the Supreme Court. The Supreme court was dealing with a writ petition under Article 32 of the constitution filed by certain casual labourers of South Eastern railway. Not only that the Supreme Court held their approach as highly belated, but, also doubted their very entitlement, in as much as the Supreme Court failed to notice any positive material to establish that the writ petitioners were in fact employed and working as alleged by them. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court pointed out that delay itself deprives a person the remedy available in law. ( 7 ) THE question as to whether delay would be a ground for the appropriate Government to decline to make a reference had directly arisen before this Court in A. Gurumurthy v State of karnataka and Another. The learned Single Judge of this court, Justice Kumar Rajaratnam, referred to a decision of division Bench of this Court in L. Narayanappa v State of karnataka and Another, wherein this Court had inter alia held that, it was not open to the Government to reject the reference on the ground of delay. ( 8 ) THIS question once again arose before a Division Bench of this Court in My power Mazdoor Welfare Union v The Secretary and Commissioner, Social Welfare and Labour Department, government of Karnataka, Bangalore and Another. The division Bench was dealing with the scope of Section 10 of the act in relation to power of the appropriate Government in making reference to Labour Court/industrial Tribunal, etc. Referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court, the division Bench, in paragraph 6 of the Judgment, set out seven points, which, in its opinion, could be safely held to have been decided by the various decisions of the Supreme Court referred to therein. The sixth point therein is to the following effect:"as no period of limitation is prescribed for making the reference, the appropriate Government has no power to reject a claim merely on the ground of the same being belated or stale". The sixth point therein is to the following effect:"as no period of limitation is prescribed for making the reference, the appropriate Government has no power to reject a claim merely on the ground of the same being belated or stale". With reference to the facts of the particular case being dealt with by the Division Bench, it observed in Paragraph 8 that a perusal of the Government order would clearly indicate that the government had ventured to adjudicate the dispute itself and declined to make reference on the ground of delay and laches which Was the duty and function of the Labour Court, Board or tribunal. ( 9 ) DIVISION Benches of this Court on two occasions viz,, in narayanappa's case, supra and in Mypower Mazdoor Welfare union's case, supra, as referred to above, having taken the view directly on this question viz. , as to whether it is open to the appropriate Government to decline to make a reference on the ground of delay, and the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above, though holding to the effect that the Government may decline to make a reference on. the ground of delay, still not being directly on the question as to whether solely on the ground of delay the Government is duty bound to decline to make a reference. I have to follow the two decisions of the Division benches of this Court in Narayanappa's case, supra and mypower Mazdoor Welfare Union's case, supra and shall have to conclude that the 1st respondent Government could not have declined to make a reference solely on the ground of delay. ( 10 ) WRIT petition is dismissed. ( 11 ) NEEDLESS to say, it is open to the petitioner to urge before the Labour Court concerned as to the impact of 9 years on the part of respondents 2 and 3 workmen in raising the dispute. This aspect, by itself, is subject-matter of second point of reference as already noticed. --- *** --- .