Judgment :- K.K. Usha, J. Defendants 1,3 and 4 in O.S.19/78 before the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kozhikode and appellants in A.S.383/81 before this Court are the appellants in this appeal. Respondents 1 and 2 were the plaintiffs. The suit was filed for partition of property which originally belonged to one Janaki, grand-mother of plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 6. Preliminary decree for partition was passed in favour of the plaintiffs. Judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the appeal filed by defendants 1, 3 and 4 was dismissed, is under challenge in this appeal. - 2. As mentioned earlier, the properly which is sought to be partitioned, namely, plaint B schedule property, belonged to one Janaki. She had two daughters, Kamalakshi and Meenakshi. Plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6 are children of Kamalakshi whereas defendants 1 to 4 are the children of Meenakshi. Defendants 7 to 10 are assignees of a portion of the plaint schedule property. Janaki had executed a Will Ext. Al dt. 7.1.1941 bequeathing A schedule property therein to Krishnan and Madhavan, her two sons and Kousalya, daughter of Meenakshi, B Schedule property was bequeathed to her daughters Meenakshi and Kamalakshi. Kamalakshi pre-deceased Janaki leaving plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6 and deceased Sikandar and Krishnakumar as her legal heirs. Janaki died in the year 1948. Meenakshi died in the year 195 7 leaving defendants 1 to 4 as her legal heirs. Plaintiffs contended that half share which Kamalakshi would have obtained had she survived Janaki, had devolved on the plaintiffs, defendants 5 and 6, Sikandar and Krishnakumar. Half right in B schedule property which Meenakshi had, devolved on her children who are defendants 1 to 4. It is contended that the partition deed executed between defendants 1 to 4 taking in the properties which devolved on the legal heirs of Kamalakshi and also the assignment deeds executed in favour of strangers, are fraudulent documents brought about, without the knowledge of plaintiffs and defendants 5 to 6 and therefore, not binding on them. It is also contended that the entire compensation received from Calicut Municipal Corporation in respect of 2.57 cents of 1 and acquired, was received by defendants 1 to 4 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6. It is also contended that the entire compensation received from Calicut Municipal Corporation in respect of 2.57 cents of 1 and acquired, was received by defendants 1 to 4 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6. Defendants 1,2 and 4 filed a joint written statement contending that since Kamalakshi died during the life time of Janaki, bequest in favour of Kamalakshi was lapsed and whatever right Kamalakshi would have had under the Will in the B Schedule property devolved on Meenakshi and therefore plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 6 had no right to plaint B schedule property. Their case was supported in the written statement filed by defendants 7 and 10. 10th defendant raised a further contention that he was a bonafide transferee and that even if the plaintiffs had any right in the property, it was barred by adverse possession and limitation. Defendants 5 and 6 filed a joint written statement adopting the plaint averments. 3. Trial Court came to the conclusion that on the death of Kamalakshi, the bequeath in favour of Kamalakshi did not lapse, but it devolved on her legal heirs as if she was alive at the time of death of Janaki. On the appeal filed by the aggrieved defendants, learned Single Judge affirmed the view taken by the Trial Court and also held that the plea of adverse possession has to fail. Learned single judge took the view that the provisions of law that has to be applied in the facts of this case is contained in S.109 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and not S.106 or S.107. 4. The main attack on the above view taken by the learned single judge by the appellants is on two grounds. Firstly, it was contended that Kamalakshi and Meenakshi are joint legatees under the Will of their mother Janaki, that the decision of the Allahabad High Court relied on by the learned single judge is not applicable to the facts of this case and that it is the provision contained under S.106 that has to be applied in this case. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the word used in S.109 is 'any child or lineal descendant of the testator', the provisions contained therein cannot be applied in interpreting a Will where there are more than one child or lineal descendant are legatees. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the word used in S.109 is 'any child or lineal descendant of the testator', the provisions contained therein cannot be applied in interpreting a Will where there are more than one child or lineal descendant are legatees. Secondly, it was contended that since a contrary intention appears in the Will, S.109 cannot be applied in the facts of this case. According to the appellants, the recital in the Will that no other heir of the testator than the heirs specified in the Will should be benefitted by the separate items set apart to each of the heirs would show a contrary intention on the part of the testator not to devolve the properties set apart to Kamalakshi on her legal heirs. 5. S.105 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 provides that if a legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the Will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. S.106 provides that if a legacy is given to two persons jointly, and one of them dies before the testator, the other legatee takes the whole. S.107 deals with a legacy given to legatees in distinct shares. In such cases, if any legatees dies before the testator, so much of the legacy as was intended for him shall tall into the residue of the testator's property. S.109 reads as follows: "109. When be quest to testator's child or lineal descendant does not lapse on his death in testator's life time: - Where a bequest has been made to any child or other lineal descendant of the testator, and the legatee dies in the life time of the testator but any lineal descendant of his survives the testator, the bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of the legatee had happened immediately after the death of the testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the will." 6. The contention raised by the appellants that Kamalakshi and Meenakshi are joint legatees, was not found favour with the learned single Judge. In coming to the above conclusion, reliance was placed on the decision in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal. 670 (PC) and Boddu Venkatakrishna Rao & Ors. The contention raised by the appellants that Kamalakshi and Meenakshi are joint legatees, was not found favour with the learned single Judge. In coming to the above conclusion, reliance was placed on the decision in Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chandra Dutt, ILR 23 Cal. 670 (PC) and Boddu Venkatakrishna Rao & Ors. v. Smt. Boddu Satyavathi & Ors., AIR 1968 SC 751. In the first of the above two decisions, Privy Council took the view that the principle of joint tenancy appears to be unknown to Hindu Law, except in the case of co-parcenary between the members of an undivided family. The-above view was approved by the Supreme Court in the latter decision. In this case, the Will provided that the entire property of the testatrix should pass to her two minor foster children that they should enjoy the property throughout their lifetime, without powers of gift, transfer and sale and that after their death, the children that may be born to them should enjoy the same, with powers of gift, transfer and sale. The question arose as to whether the grand children of the testatrix should take the vested remainder per stirpes or per capita. Affirming the finding of the High Court that they should take it per stirpes and not per capita, Supreme Court observed that "the donees of the life estate were minors at the date of the will and there was no knowing when they would get married and how many children each would have. It would therefore, be reasonable to expect that the testatrix would so arrange her affairs that each of the foster children should get half of the income of the property for life and that their children should succeed to the respective interest of their parents. It is hardly likely that the testatrix would know the difference between joint tenants and tenants in common and she would naturally be eager to treat the foster children as her own children so that the heirs of the foster children would take share and share alike the properties being divided per stirpes among them". It is hardly likely that the testatrix would know the difference between joint tenants and tenants in common and she would naturally be eager to treat the foster children as her own children so that the heirs of the foster children would take share and share alike the properties being divided per stirpes among them". Construing the recital in the Will that the entire property should be in the possession of both of the foster children and that they should enjoy throughout the life time the said property and that after their death, the children that may be born to them should enjoy the same, Supreme Court took the view that the testatrix will never intend the foster children to take the property as joint tenants but as tenants in common. 7. In Sinnaraj Filial & Ors. v. Ramayee Ammal & Ann AIR 1979 Madras 96, a Will executed by a Hindu testator giving the properties referred therein t<*> his wife for her maintenance and for his minor daughter for her Stridhana, 'seer' and other expenses, came up for consideration. It was also provided that after the testator's lifetime, the above two persons shall take items 1 and 2 absolutely and enjoy the same with powers of gift, sale etc. They themselves shall discharge the debts specified in the Will. The question arose whether the mother and daughter are to enjoy the property as joint tenants. Learned Judges of the Madras High Court took the view that joint tenancy is unsuitable in the case of beneficial owners like a Hindu widow and her unmarried minor daughters, who has to be married and provided with stridhana and seer etc. 8. Under Ext. Al Will, when B Schedule property was set apart to Kamalakshi and Meenakshi who were married at that time, the testatrix who was their mother, would not have intended them to enjoy the property as joint tenants. Taking into consideration the social set up in all probability, Janaki would have intended her married daughters to enjoy the property as tenants in common. There is no contra-indication in the working of the Will. In Koppula Surareddy (died) and Ors. v. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi & Ors., AIR 1960 AP 368, a decision relied on by learned counsel for the appellants, the question arose whether the testator intended his minor son and wife to enjoy the property as joint tenants. There is no contra-indication in the working of the Will. In Koppula Surareddy (died) and Ors. v. Koppula Venkata Subbareddi & Ors., AIR 1960 AP 368, a decision relied on by learned counsel for the appellants, the question arose whether the testator intended his minor son and wife to enjoy the property as joint tenants. In that case, the recital in the Will showed that the minor son, aged 3 years, had been suffering from very serious illness which prompted the testator to make the Will providing that both his wife and son shall enjoy the entire immovable and movable property etc., which belonged to the testator. The minor son died within two years of the date of the Will and the testator died six years later. Interpreting the recitals as mentioned above, in the light of the facts of the case, its was held that the intention of the testator was that his property should be enjoyed by his wife and son as joint tenants. This decision cannot have any application in the facts of the present case. We therefore, hold that Kamalakshi and Meenakshi were to take their legacy under Ext. Al Will as tenants in common and not as joint tenants. 9. We will now consider the next question regarding the applicability of S.107 of the Indian Succession Act to the facts of the case as contended by the appellant. As mentioned earlier, it is the case of the appellants that even if Kamalakshi and Meenakshi are to take their legacy as tenants in common on the death of Kamalakshi, her share of the legacy should fall into the residue of the testator's property and that the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants would be entitled to claim a share. We are not able to accept the above contention. According to us, learned Single Judge has correctly held that the provision that has to be applied is that contained in S.109 where devolution of the property on the death of a legatee who is a child or a lineal descendant of the testator has been specifically provided. S.109 is an exception to Ss.105, 106 and 107. Legislature has intended that the bequest shall not lapse due to the death of the legatee during the life time of the testator when the legatee is a child or other lineal descendant of the testator. S.109 is an exception to Ss.105, 106 and 107. Legislature has intended that the bequest shall not lapse due to the death of the legatee during the life time of the testator when the legatee is a child or other lineal descendant of the testator. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in J.C. boaz & Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs) Dorothy Ruth Masih Afzal & Ann, 1982 All. LJ 1461. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants made a further submission that since a contrary intention appears from the Will, the provisions of S.109 cannot be applied to Ext. Al. Reference is made to the following recital. : (None of my other heirs shall have any right to the properties set apart to each of the legatees under the schedule). We do not understand the above recital as expression of an intention that the lineal descendant of Kamalakshi who pre-deceased the testatrix shall not inherit the legacy of Kamalakshi. A Bench of this Court had occasion to consider a similar contention in Vasudevan Nambiar v. Krishnan Nambiar & Ors., 1987 KLJ 82. This Court took the view that the statement in the Will that none other than the legatee shall take her share, is only an affirmation of an exclusive right of the legatee for her share viz-a-viz other legatees under the Will. It is not an expression of any contra-intention on the part of the testator that the bequest should lapse if the legatee pre-deceased him. This Court held that S.109 is an exception to the general rule. The intent of the Section appears to be to prevent a lapse unless the testator had evinced a clear intention that the legacy should lapse on the death of the legatee before the, succession opened. We do not find any such recital in Ext. Al which would evince an intention on the part of the testatrix that the legacy of Kamalakshi shall lapse on her death during the lifetime of Janaki. 11. During the pendency of the appeal, first appellant as well as 7th respondent died. Their legal representatives are impleaded as additional respondents 10 to 15 in the appeal. No other contention was raised before us by the appellants. In the result, the judgment of the trial court as well as learned single judge are affirmed and the appeal stands dismissed with costs.