JUDGMENT - V.P. TIPNIS, J.:---By way of this writ petition, the Assessment Order Nos. 139 and 613 dated 14-6-1995 and 6-8-1996, as also the order of the Hon'ble Minister for Urban Development passed in the appeal on 3-1-1997, are impugned. 2.The respondent-CIDCO is a Development Authority for the purposes of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, (for short, the M.R. T.P. Act) in respect of an area under its jurisdiction. On 8-7-1991, the petitioner applied to the CIDCO for development permission in respect of Survey Nos. 259 to 267, 269 to 271, 273, and 276 to 279 under section 44 of the M.R.T.P. Act, 1966. By letter dated 30-8-1991, the C.I.D.C.O. informed the petitioner that the development permission, as requested, is refused under section 41(i) and (iii) of the M.R.T.P. Act. The reasons given were that: (1) the Development Plan for the area under reference was not ready, (2) the existing infrastructural facilities are inadequate and (3) water supply scheme has not been submitted by the applicant. It was also mentioned in the last para that the applicant's case be processed further only after compliance of the above. 3.By letter dated 12-7-1992 addressed to the C.I.D.C.O. by the petitioner, it was pointed out that the High Court, by its interim order, mentioned that the C.I.D.C.O. should give development permission as per the B.M.R. Plan Report, 1973 with 1.5 km. distance from railway station on western railway and along with the existing road, and since the scheme is within 1.5 km. distance and along with the existing road, the first objection should not be raised. Regarding inadequate infrastructure facilities, it was mentioned that the fresh plans with necessary infrastructure according to the D.C. Rules are provided and revised plans are submitted. Further it was mentioned that for the water supply scheme, the report is submitted along with the letter. In the last para, it was requested that by fulfilling the queries mentioned in the letter under reference, the petitioner requested the C.I.D.C.O. to grant development permission for the aforesaid plans. 4.It requires to be stated that to the aforesaid letter dated 12-7-1992, the CIDCO sent a reply dated 6-8-1992 to the petitioner mentioning that the water scheme proposed by the petitioner for the said project requires certification (approval) from the G.S.D.A. in respect of quality and quantity of potable water. 4.It requires to be stated that to the aforesaid letter dated 12-7-1992, the CIDCO sent a reply dated 6-8-1992 to the petitioner mentioning that the water scheme proposed by the petitioner for the said project requires certification (approval) from the G.S.D.A. in respect of quality and quantity of potable water. On 10-8-1992, the amendments were carried out to the M.R.T.P. Act and Chapter VI-A was added. Subsequently, by different letters in the years 1993 and 1994, the C.I.D.C.O. was informed about the change of Architect and structural Engineers. On 12-4-1994, the petitioner made fresh application for permission for much larger area including the area which was the subject matter of earlier application. Along with the said application, the petitioner also gave an undertaking to pay development charges and submit certificate from G.S.D.A. On 29-4-1994, the petitioner submitted certificate of G.S.D.A. which certificate is dated 15-2-1994. On 26-5-1994, the commencement certificate was granted to the petitioner. On 14-6-1995, the petitioner applied for sanction to amended layout which was duly sanctioned. On 14-6-1995 the first Assessment order of development charges bearing Order No. 139 was passed. By letter dated 29-7-1996, the petitioner asked for instalments to pay development charges. On 6-8-1996, the second Assessment Order No. 613 was passed under which the petitioner is liable to pay an amount of Rs. 1.06,83,295-00 towards development charges for both residential and commercial users in instalments mentioned therein. The petitioner challenged these orders by filing Writ Petition No. 6144 of 1996. However, the petition was allowed to be withdrawn with liberty to file an appeal as provided by the Act. By order dated 22-9-1997, the Minister concerned who is the appellate authority rejected the appeal of the petitioner. Hence this petition. 5.Shri Chinoy, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, firstly, contended that if one looks at the wording on section 124-E of the M.R.T.P. Act, it is clear that the liability to pay the development charges is only when the person intends to carry out any development or institute or change any use of any land or building after the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Act, 1992 which date is 10-8-1992. In the submission of the learned Counsel, in as much as the application by the petitioner was made as back as on 8-7-1991, the intention to develop was very clear and as such the petitioners are not liable at all. Shri Chinoy, in any case, he submits that the letter dated 30-8-1991 by the C.I.D.C.O. to the petitioner is in the form of I.O.D. and in as much as, as evidenced by letter dated 12-7-1992 by the petitioner to the C.I.D.C.O., the petitioner had complied with all the objections and in any case the petitioner was entitled to grant of permission as on 12-7-1992 which is much prior to 10-8-1992 and as such the petitioner cannot be assessed or no development charges can be levied on the petitioner in respect of the land. Shri Chinoy further submitted that levy of assessment is also unlawful in as much as the permission was granted to the adjoining plot of land belonging to the petitioner, as also to one other society, by name, the Citizen Co-operative Society. In the submission of Shri Chinoy, permission initially was refused in respect of the adjoining plots belonging to the petitioner himself on the very grounds, however, in appeal the Hon'ble Minister directed the C.I.D.C.O. to grant permission and accordingly the permission was granted. In the submission of the learned Counsel, refusal of permission on identical grounds is a clear case of discrimination. 6.Shri Sawant, learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the C.I.D.C.O., on the other hand, has pointed that the letter dated 30-8-1991 clearly refuses the permission under section 45(1)(iii) of the Act. If that be so, the petitioner ought to have appealed against the said refusal as provided by section 47 of the Act. The petitioner having not appealed against the same, that order has become final. With reference to letter dated 12-7-1992 under which the petitioner allegedly complied with the objections, Shri Sawant points out that by letter dated 6-8-1992, the petitioner was informed that the certificate of G.S.D.A. is required and permission was once again refused against which no appeal was preferred by the petitioner. Shri Sawant emphasized the point that as a matter of fact, thereafter, on 10-12-1993 new Architects were appointed by the petitioner. Shri Sawant emphasized the point that as a matter of fact, thereafter, on 10-12-1993 new Architects were appointed by the petitioner. On 10-4-1994, new structural engineer was appointed by the petitioner which is a requirement of any development permission and, by fresh application dated 12-4-1994, not only the petitioner applied again for permission to develop in respect of much larger area including the area which was the subject matter of the earlier application, but also undertook to pay development charges and also produce the certificate from G.S.D.A. The petitioner, thereafter, produced the certificate of G.S.D.A. on 29-4-1994 and thereafter a necessary certificate was granted on 26-5-1994. The petitioner applied for sanction to amended lay out. The Assessment Order No. 139, which is one of the Assessment Orders challenged herein, was passed on 14-6-1995. By letter dated 29-7-1996 the petitioner asked for instalments to pay development charges. Shri Sawant, therefore, contended that the orders of refusal not having been challenged in the appeal, have become final and, therefore, there is no question of any deemed permission or any permission being granted to the petitioner, as contended by the petitioner. Shri Sawant contended that the provisions of section 124-A are taxing provisions and in taxing provisions, there is no question of any discrimination as such. Whether the petitioner is liable to payment of development charges as per the law, is the only question. Secondly, Shri Sawant contended that if the petitioner had any grievance with refusal of permission on the ground of discrimination etc. he ought to have filed and agitated the same. Without challenging the refusal as provided by the Act, in these proceedings challenging the assessment, it is impermissible for the petitioner to raise those points. 7.After having considered the rival contentions, it is clear to us that section 124-A of the M.R. T.P. Act provides that the Planning Authority or the Development Authority shall levy within the area of its jurisdiction development charge on the institution or use or change of use of any land or building, or development of any land or building, for which permission is required under this Act at the rates specified by or under the provisions of this Chapter. Thus, this is a charging section and it is obligatory for the Development Authority to levy such development charges. Thus, this is a charging section and it is obligatory for the Development Authority to levy such development charges. Sub-section (2) provides that the development charges shall be leviable on any person who institutes or changes the use of any land or undertakes or carries out any development. There is a proviso to this sub-section which states that :-- "no such development charge shall be leviable under the provisions of this Chapter in respect of use or change of use of any land or building, or development of any land or building; or both, for which a development permission has had already been granted or deemed to have been granted by the Planning Authority or the Development Authority either by way of commencement certificate or by way of any other mode of permission for development granted under this Act or any other law for the time being in force or by way of approval subject to condition in the form of a written notice (Intimation of Disapproval) by the Commissioner under section 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act before the 10th day of August 1992 being the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Act, 1992 (Mah. XVI of 1992), irrespective of whether or not the institution of use or change of use or actual development work, of land or building or both, has been effected or commenced or completed, as the case may be, and whether or not the completion certificate for any such use, change of use or development is granted by the Planning Authority or Development Authority, before the said date". In our opinion, the proviso makes things abundantly clear. So far as the liability to pay the development charges is concerned, in our opinion, it clearly arises by virtue of provision of section 124-A. The proviso makes it clear who shall not be liable by virtue of the amendment which clearly states that no such development charges shall be leviable in respect of the development etc. of the land or building for which a development permission has had already been granted or to have been granted by the Planning Authority or the Development authority. Admittedly, in this case not only that, no development permission was granted prior to 10-8-1992 but, in fact, twice over the development permission was expressly refused. of the land or building for which a development permission has had already been granted or to have been granted by the Planning Authority or the Development authority. Admittedly, in this case not only that, no development permission was granted prior to 10-8-1992 but, in fact, twice over the development permission was expressly refused. We are not impressed by the submission of Shri Chinoy that the letter 30-8-1991 should be read as I.O.D. As far as the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act are concerned, there is no such procedure of giving I.O.D., as is obtainable under the provisions of section 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. On proper reading of the provisions of section 124-A and the proviso, it is clear to us that the phrase or by way of approval subject to condition in the form of a written notice (Intimation of Disapproval) by the Commissioner under section 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, is applicable only to the permission under section 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and cannot be by implication read in the permission, either granted or refused, expressly under section 44 of the M.R. T.P. Act. 8.Shri Chinoy emphasized the provisions of section 124-E. In our opinion, so far as the liability to pay the development charges are concerned, it arises out of provisions of section 124-A which, as already stated, is a charging section. Section 124-E provides for assessment and recovery of development charge which states that; "(1) Any person who, after the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Act, 1992, intends to carry out any development or institute or change any use of any land or building for which permission is required under this Act, whether he has applied for such permission or not, or who has commenced carrying out any such development or has carried out such development or instituted or changed any such use, shall apply to the Authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, for the assessment of development charge payable in respect thereof". Sub-section (2) provides that : "the Authority shall, on such application being made or if no such application is made, by a person instituting or changing any use of any land or building, then after service a notice in writing on the person liable to such payment and after calling for a report in this behalf from the concerned officer of the Authority, after taking into consideration the report aforesaid, determine whether or not and if so, what development charge is leviable in respect of that development or, institution of use or change of use...etc" Thus, in our opinion, section 124-E is relevant only as regards the actual assessment and determination of the development charges and in that behalf it enjoins the person of description therein to apply to the Authority and upon failure empowering the authority to do the needful. The liability of payment of development charge must be determined with reference to provision of section 124-A and as demonstrated in the earlier part of the judgment in as much as the petitioner's case does not fall in the proviso, the petitioner is clearly liable for development charges. 9.Apart from the aforesaid legal position, in the facts of the case before us, there should be no manner of doubt regarding the petitioner's liability. As stated earlier, the petitioner's application for permission was expressly refused. The petitioner did not file any appeal. Not only that, admittedly, on 12-4-1994 the petitioner filed a fresh application for permission and he came on the express undertaking to pay development charges as also submit certificate from G.S.D.A. on 29-4-1994 and commencement certificate was granted on 26-5-1994. Even after the first Assessment Order No. 139 on 14-6-1993, by letter dated 29-7-1996 the petitioner asked for instalments to pay the development charge. Under the aforesaid circumstances, we do not find any merits in the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner is not liable to development charges. 10.So far as the point of discrimination is raised, in our opinion, it is misconceived. Assuming that for identical reason, the permission was refused in respect of adjacent plot belonging to the petitioner, it is relevant to notice that the said refusal was challenged under appeal by preferring an appeal and in appeal the refusal was set aside. 10.So far as the point of discrimination is raised, in our opinion, it is misconceived. Assuming that for identical reason, the permission was refused in respect of adjacent plot belonging to the petitioner, it is relevant to notice that the said refusal was challenged under appeal by preferring an appeal and in appeal the refusal was set aside. So far as other Societies are concerned, the material before us does not indicate as to what were the reasons for refusal in respect of the Citizen Cooperative Society and what reasons impelled the appellate authority to reverse that decision. However, the petitioner before us, not having appealed against the order of refusal twice, this question need not detain us they further. We are also in agreement with the submission of the learned Advocate General to the effect that so far as Taxing Statute is concerned, the liability of person to pay taxes shall depend on the legal provisions and there cannot be any question of discrimination. 11.On consideration of rival submissions and in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of legal provisions to which we have made a detailed reference, we do not find any merits in the petition and the petition is rejected. Petition dismissed. *****