Judgment 1. C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998 arises against the grant of ad-interim injunction in I.A.No.11940 of 1998 in O.S.No.5083 of 1998, on the file of XI Assistant, Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, C.R.P.No.2418 of 1998 also arises against an ad-interim order passed by the very same Court in I.A.No.10962 of 1998 in O.S.No.4721 of 1998. Both these revisions are filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, and the person affected by the interim Order is the same, viz., National Council of Y.M.C.As. of India represented by its General Secretary 2. In C.R.P.NO.2417 of 1998, the impugned Order has been passed in I.A.No.11940 of 1998. In that I.A., petitioner Plaintiff (Dr.C.Raja Singh Warrior) prayed for the grant of an-interim injunction restraining-National Council of Y.M.C.As. from convening the Executive Committee Meeting at Y.M.C.A. College of Physical Education, Nandanam, Chennai-35. In that case, petitioner claims that he has been elected as Regional Chairman. According to him, the reason for filing the suit, is the National Council is going to convene an Executive Committee Meeting for appointing Correspondent for Y.M.C.A. College of Physical Education, Nandanam, without inviting him for the meeting. It is also said that person who is proposed to be appointed as correspondent is not eligible to be appointed, and for the said purpose, the Executive Committee meeting also should not be held. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the cause of action for filing the suit is mentioned as follows: “The cause of action for the suit arose at Chennai within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court on 20.6.1998 when the plaintiff was elected as the chairman of the Regional Council of the Southern Region of the Defendant, and on 20.6.1998 the plaintiff became a Member of the Executive Committee of the defendant, and on 25.7.1998 when the defendant call for the meeting of the Defendant for considering the appointment of the correspondent and when the plaintiff did not receive any notice for the schedule meeting and subsequently.” The ad-interim injunction is also for the very same relief which is sought for in the plaint. 3. Plaintiff, who claims to be the Regional Chairman on the basis of an election, cannot plead ignorance about By laws of Y.M.C.A of which he is a Member. The Memorandum and Rules and Regulations, of the Y.M.C.A. of India provide for settlement of disputes and jurisdiction of courts, and Art.XIII(1) provides for the same. 3. Plaintiff, who claims to be the Regional Chairman on the basis of an election, cannot plead ignorance about By laws of Y.M.C.A of which he is a Member. The Memorandum and Rules and Regulations, of the Y.M.C.A. of India provide for settlement of disputes and jurisdiction of courts, and Art.XIII(1) provides for the same. It reads thus: “All disputes arising out of, or in relation to, any proceedings or decision of the National Council, the National Board or the National Executive, or any action taken pursuant to any proceedings or decision of any one of these three bodies, including disputes, if any, regarding election of persons to any post or office in any one of the said three bodies, shall be decided by arbitration by a Board of Arbitrators consisting of three members in accordance with the provisions hereinafter contained.” A reading of the above shows that the dispute is to be decided by an arbitration, and even if a suit is maintainable, suit could be maintained only by courts where the Registered Office of the petitioner is situated. Knowing fully well about these facts, filing a suit in a court at Madras and obtaining an interim order, is really an abuse of process of court. 4. In A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. S.A.P.Agencies, Salem A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. S.A.P.Agencies, Salem A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another v. S.A.P.Agencies, Salem , (1989)2 S.C.C. 163 : A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1239. Their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court considered the scope of Sec.28 of the Indian Contract Act which deals with agreement excluding courts jurisdiction. Bye-laws of a Society which govern the parties is also in the nature of an agreement. In that case, in paragraphs 8 to 10, their Lordships held thus: “The next question is whether clause 11 is valid, and if so, what would be its effecte As clause 11 formed part of the agreement it would be valid only if the parties could have validly agreed to it. It is common knowledge that the law of contract only prescribes certain limiting principles within which parties are free to make their own contracts. An agreement enforceable at law is a contract. An agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. It is common knowledge that the law of contract only prescribes certain limiting principles within which parties are free to make their own contracts. An agreement enforceable at law is a contract. An agreement which purports to oust the jurisdiction of the court absolutely is contrary to public policy and hence void. Each of the citizens has the right to have his legal position determined by the ordinary tribunal except, of course, in a contract (a) when there is an arbitration clause which is valid and binding under the law, and (b) when parties to a contract agree as to the jurisdiction to which disputes in respect of the contract shall be subject.” It has long been established“, say Cheshire and Fifoot,” that a contract which purports to destroy the courts is contrary to public policy and is void pro tanto. “ However, arbitration is a statutory mode of settlement and as a matter of commercial law and practice parties to a contract may agree as to the jurisdiction to which all or any disputes on or arising out of the contract shall be subject”. Sec.28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunal, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent. This is subject to exceptions, namely, (1) contract to refer to arbitration and to abide by its award, (2) as a matter of commercial law and practice to submit disputes on or in respect of the contract to agreed proper jurisdiction and not other jurisdictions though proper. The principles of private International Law that the parties should be bound by the jurisdiction clause to which they have agreed unless there is some reason to contrary is being applied to municipal contracts. In Lee v. Showmens Guild of Great Britain, Lord Denning said: Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction. They can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the domestic tribunal. In Lee v. Showmens Guild of Great Britain, Lord Denning said: Parties cannot by contract oust the ordinary courts of their jurisdiction. They can, of course, agree to leave questions of law, as well as questions of fact, to the decision of the domestic tribunal. They can indeed, make the tribunal the final arbiter on questions of fact, but they cannot make it the final arbiter on questions of law. They cannot prevent its decisions being examined by the courts. If parties should seek, by agreement, to take the law out of the hands of the courts and put it into the hands of a private tribunal, without any recourse at all to the courts in cases of error of law, then the agreement is to that extent contrary to public policy and void. Under Sec.23 of the Indian Contract Act the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is opposed to public policy. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Hence there can be no doubt that an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy. Ex dolo malo non oritur actio. If therefore it is found in this case that clause 11 has absolutely ousted the jurisdiction of the court it would be against public policy. However, such will be the result only if it can be shown that the jurisdiction to which the parties have agreed to submit had nothing to do with the contract If on the other hand it is found that the jurisdiction agreed would also be a proper jurisdiction in the matter of the contract it could not be said that it ousted the jurisdiction of the court. This leads to the question in the facts of this case as to whether Kaira would be proper jurisdiction in the matter of this contract. It would also be relevant to examine if some other courts than that of Kaira would also have had jurisdiction in the absence of clause 11 and whether that would amount to ouster of jurisdiction of those courts and would thereby affect the validity of the clause. It would also be relevant to examine if some other courts than that of Kaira would also have had jurisdiction in the absence of clause 11 and whether that would amount to ouster of jurisdiction of those courts and would thereby affect the validity of the clause. In the very same decision, Their Lordships further considered as to what is meant by “cause of action”, and where suits will have to be instituted under Sec.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, and finally, in paragraph 16, Their Lordships said thus: “So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the jurisdiction of all the courts which would otherwise have jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law it cannot be said that the parties have by their contract ousted the jurisdiction of the court. If under the law several courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or others of them it cannot be said that there is total ouster of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a proper jurisdiction under the law their agreement to the extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdiction cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on the other hand, the jurisdiction they agreed to submit to would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void being against public policy… … ..” The said decision was followed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. and another Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. and another Angile Insulations v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. and another , (1995)4 S.C.C. 153 . Relevant portion of paragraph 5 reads thus: “… an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under Sec.23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of clause (21) of the contract pleaded in this case. Relevant portion of paragraph 5 reads thus: “… an agreement to oust absolutely the jurisdiction of the court will be unlawful and void being against the public policy under Sec.23 of the Contract Act. We do not find any such invalidity of clause (21) of the contract pleaded in this case. On the other hand, this court laid that where there may be two or more competent courts which can entertain a suit consequent upon a part of the cause of action having arisen therewith, if the parties to the contract agreed to vest jurisdiction in one such court to try the dispute which might arise as between themselves, the agreement would be void. If such a contract is clear, unambiguous and explicit and not vague, it is not hit by Secs.2, 3 and 28 of the Contract Act. This cannot be understood as parties contracting against the statute. Mercantile law and practice permit such agreements. [Italics supplied] It is, therefore, clear that courts at Madras have no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 5. It must also be remembered that this is not an innocent litigation as sought to be shown in the plaint. A writ petition was filed as W.P.No.11513 of 1998 by the Branch Secretary of Young Mens Christian Association, by name Ebenesan, for the very same relief. I disposed of the same on 7.8.1998, with a direction that the Appointing Authority will look into all requisite qualifications of each and every applicant before taking a final decision. When there is such a direction, what was the necessity for filing a suit, by another Member of the very same Y.M.C.A. It is really an abuse of process. 6. According to me, plaintiff has also suppressed material facts. The very same Counsel who has filed the plaint in O.S.No.5083 of 1998, which is the subject matter of C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998, has already filed a suit as O.S.No.4721 of 1998 before the very same court, and C.R.P.No.2418 of 1998 arises against an interim order granted in that case. Plaintiff therein has narrated as to what happened at the meeting held at Nagercoil. In the plaint it is said that the election was postponed by second defendant in that suit against the Rules and thereafter the Delegates assembled in some other place and held and election. Plaintiff therein has narrated as to what happened at the meeting held at Nagercoil. In the plaint it is said that the election was postponed by second defendant in that suit against the Rules and thereafter the Delegates assembled in some other place and held and election. Plaintiff in O.S.No.5083 of 1998 respondent in C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998 claims to have been elected as Regional Chairman only on the basis of that alleged election. Nothing is stated in the plaint in O.S.No.5083 of 1998 about the change of venue or the adjournment or postponement of the election, etc. Plaintiff cannot plead ignorance about this things, because he himself was a participant in all the proceedings, and it could also be seen from the plaint filed in the other case that plaintiff also opposed the adjournment of the election. His status as Regional Chairman is itself in doubt. Whether he was properly elected or whether there was any election at all is a matter in dispute. How some of the delegates can shift the venue of the election to some other place without notice to others and declare themselves as office bearers, is not explained anywhere in the plaint. What is their authority to hold an election in some other place, is also not notified, nor stated anywhere in the plaint. The Constitution or by laws of the Y.M.C.As. also do not empower the holding of an election at another place without notice. They also do not provide for election is invalid, and the plaintiff would not have been elected as Chairman. Only because of these defects about which plaintiff is well aware, plaintiff filed the suit in a wrong forum and wanted to get an interim relief. All these circumstances show that the plaintiff has not come to court with clean hands, but has obtained an unfair advantage against the petitioner herein. 7. I have already extracted paragraph 12 of the plaint. The lower court should have atleast considered whether it has got jurisdiction to grant interim orders, and whether the allegations made in paragraph 12 of the plaint will give a cause of action to the plaintiff. As held in , A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1239: (1989)2 S.C.C. 163 . A cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. As held in , A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1239: (1989)2 S.C.C. 163 . A cause of action is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. ‘If this is the meaning of a cause of action, I do not think that paragraph 12 will give a cause of action for the plaintiff to institute a suit. 8. Therefore, in C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998, I am constrained to set aside the impugned Order. The suit has been filed in a wrong forum, fully knowing that the plaintiff has no cause of action to institute the suit before the lower court, and the lower court has also blindly passed the impugned order as a matter of course. 9. In this connection, learned counsel for petitioner also submitted that O.S.No.3099 of 1998 is also pending before the same court and the plaintiff therein is also one of the persons who claims himself to be the elected Vice-Chairman in the same Election. He filed a suit against the petitioner herein along with others, and I have held that the suit itself is not maintainable before the lower court, and the suit ought to have been filed in the competent court at Delhi, if at all a suit is maintainable, and the remedy is only by way of arbitration. This fact was also brought to the notice of the very same trial court, and it was fully aware that any court at Madras, has no jurisdiction. In spite of it, the lower court was interested in granting interim relief not only in this case but also in other cases also wherein the petitioner herein is a party. 9A. I find force in the said contention. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents is also not in a position to explain the circumstances under which the cases against the petitioner happened to be filed before the same Presiding Officer, and he also has the habit of passing interim orders. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents submitted that he has no objection for transferring all the cases from that court. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents is also not in a position to explain the circumstances under which the cases against the petitioner happened to be filed before the same Presiding Officer, and he also has the habit of passing interim orders. Learned Senior Counsel for respondents submitted that he has no objection for transferring all the cases from that court. 10. I do not want to transfer this case from that court since I hold that the very institution of the suit was an abuse of process and it was also the result of suppression of material facts. I direct the lower court to strike off the plaint in O.S.No.5083 of 1998 from its file. C.R.P. No.2417 of 1998 is allowed, as indicated above. 11. C.R.P.No.2418 of 1998: C.R.P.No.2418 of 1998 relates to O.S.No.4721 of 1998 wherein plaintiff wants to get a declaration that the Regional Council Meeting held on 20.6.1998 is valid and office-bearers elected are the only elected office -bearers of the Regional Committee, Southern Regional of National Council of Y.M.C.As, and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from conducting another General Council meeting for the year 1998 to 1999, and for costs of suit. 12. Paragraph 11 of plaint in that case reads thus: “The cause of action for the suit arose at Chennai within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court when the plaintiff received the communication dated 9.5.1998 inviting the plaintiff to participate in the Regional Council Meeting to be held and on 20.6.1998 when the plaintiff made all preparation to send the delegates from Madras to Neiyoor in pursuance of the circular received by the plaintiff, and on 18.6.1998 when the delegates from the plaintiff and other delegates from other Y.M.C.As. of Southern Region arrived at the venue, and on 19.6.1998 when the second defendant sent a telegram postponing the Regional Council Meeting and on 20.6.1998 when the delegates assembled in the venue conducted the Regional Council Meeting and elected the office-bearers and on 20.6.1998 when the first defendant was informed about the conduct of Regional Council Meeting and the elections of office bearers and on 19.6.1998 when the President and Secretary of the Regional Council Committee informed about the Regional Council Meeting and on 1.7.1998 when the first defendant proposed to hold another Regional Council Meeting and subsequently. The suit is not barred by jurisdiction as Sec.20(c) of C.P.C.” The main reason for filing the suit is to prevent the action of the petitioner to hold a meeting on 1.7.1998 of the Regional Council meeting. The reasons mentioned by me in the earlier revision, viz., C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998 fully apply to the facts of this case also and it is a matter for arbitration, or if the same is not possible, to file a suit before a court of proper jurisdiction. 13. When this contention was raised by learned counsel for petitioner, it was argued by learned Senior Counsel for respondents that Art.XIII of the Bye-laws will apply only to a National Council for National Executive, and the Regional Committee is not bound by the same. When the declaration is sought for only regarding the Regional Committee meeting, there is no bar of suit or arbitration. It must also be noted that the Regional Committee is not made a party to the suit and learned Senior Counsel for respondents conceded that the only necessary party in the case is the Regional Council and not the National Council. The action of Regional Secretary in postponing the election is a matter in issue, was the argument advanced by learned senior counsel. I do not think that the said submission could be accepted on a reading of the plaint. What the plaintiff wants is, that those persons who have been elected on 20.6.1998 must be declared as the Executive Members of the Regional Council so that they get right to participate in the National Council. In fact, the effect of the declaration is only to compel the petitioner-National Council to invite those persons who have been allegedly elected, to participate in the meeting. While disposing of C.R.P.No.2417 of 1998, I have held that the election itself was improper and few delegates by themselves cannot decide about the change of venue of the election after it has been postponed. Even if we accept for argument sake that the postponement of the meeting by the General Secretary is improper, that will not vest jurisdiction in some of the delegates to change the venue for election and declare themselves as office bearers. The bye-laws provide for election and the procedure for it. None of them has been complied with in this case. The bye-laws provide for election and the procedure for it. None of them has been complied with in this case. Paragraph 7 of the plaint says that the delegates decided to make alternate arrangements by themselves. What is the right for them to make alternative arrangement when all of them are governed by the same bye-laws, is not stated anywhere in the plaint. Even if the Regional Secretary has committed an illegality, the petitioner and other office bearers also cannot commit another illegality for the purpose of justifying their action. 14. Learned Senior counsel for respondents submitted that when necessary party is not impleaded and a party who is not necessary has been impleaded, they may be given some time to amend the plaint. 15. I do not think that I should accede to such a request after the respondents have obtained unfair advantage on the basis of the plaint. In what way the courts at madras have got jurisdiction is not stated. Even the alleged meeting has taken place only at Nagercoil and no part of the cause of action arose at Madras. The very same presiding Officer again obliges the respondents by granting an interim Order, without looking into the averments made in the plaint. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal and others , (1998)2 S.C.C. 70 . In paragraph 16, their Lordships held that ‘the questions is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of O.7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint. ‘Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported I.Arivanandam v. T.V.Satyapal I.Arivanandam v. T.V.Satyapal I.Arivanandam v. T.V.Satyapal , (1977)4 S.C.C. 467 . In O.S.No.4721 of 1998, paragraph 11 of the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, and if the act of the petitioner is construed as a cause of action, the suit could not have been filed before the lower Court. In O.S.No.4721 of 1998, paragraph 11 of the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, and if the act of the petitioner is construed as a cause of action, the suit could not have been filed before the lower Court. In this connection, it must also be stated that the plaintiff himself has made a correction in the plaint by incorporating a sentence in the last portion of paragraph 11 wherein he has said that the suit is not barred by jurisdiction as per Sec.20 (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is a patent falsehood which the plaintiff himself knows. 16. The impugned Order also suffers from the settled legal principles enunciated by the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi , (1993)3 S.C.C. 161 . Paragraphs 34 and 35 are relevant for our purpose, and they read thus: “The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of O.39 of the Code. Before the Proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said “The Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite, party”. The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite-party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the court “shall record the reasons” why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement of recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principles, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a Statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. This requirement is consistent with the principles, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a Statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the provisions to Rule 3 of O.39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplus age for all practical purposes. proviso to Rule 3 of O.39 of the Code, attracts the Principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not at all. This Principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare. This Principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare. As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed…” 17. In Gujarat Bottling Co., Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. Gujarat Bottling Co., Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. Gujarat Bottling Co., Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. , (1995)5 S.C.C. 545 . In paragraph 47, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the conduct of the plaintiff who approaches the Court is a relevant factor to be construed in such cash cases. In the case on hand, plaintiff who is well aware of lack of jurisdiction of lower court, has instituted the suit after making necessary correction, in the plaint, and has obtained an interim order. “of the person who seeks an order of injunction under O.39, Rule 1 or Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also in respect of the party approaching the Court for vacating the ad-interim or temporary injunction order already granted in the pending suit or proceedings.” 18. In hold that the suit itself is not maintainable and the very filing of the suit in a court at Madras is nothing but an abuse of process. The conduct of the plaintiff is such that the plaint should be struck off from the file of the lower court. 19. In the result, the impugned order is set aside, and C.R.P.No.2418 of 1998 is also allowed. 20. Mere setting aside of the impugned order itself may not be sufficient for the proper disposal of the civil revision petition. 21. I find that there is an inter se dispute in the Regional Committee. Persons who claim themselves as elected representatives of the Regional Council, have declared so after flouting the entire law. 20. Mere setting aside of the impugned order itself may not be sufficient for the proper disposal of the civil revision petition. 21. I find that there is an inter se dispute in the Regional Committee. Persons who claim themselves as elected representatives of the Regional Council, have declared so after flouting the entire law. It is only proper on the part of the petitioner to take immediate action under Rules 12 and 13 and Art.XI of the Bye-laws so that the entire dispute could be resolved once and for all. It is only proper on the part of the petitioner-National Council to supersede the Regional Committees as provided in the said Rules and See that proper elections are conducted in accordance with law under its guidance, and thereafter entrust the administration back to the properly elected representations. 22. In the result, both the Civil Revision Petitions are allowed with costs as indicated above. Advocates fee Rs.3,000 (Rupees Three thousand) in each of the Revisions. Connected C.M.Ps. are closed.