Enforcement Inspector, Civil Supplies Dept. v. Vimal Kumar
1998-12-04
M.A.A.KHAN
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment M.A.A. Khan, J.-On inspection of business premises of Vimal Kumar, who was the sole Proprietor of M/s. Jhandi Prasad Parmeshwar Lal. Chirawa, Distt. Jhunjhunu, dealing in kerosene oil, the Enforcement Inspector found the petitioner storing kerosene oil in huge quantity at his petrol pump and to have committed serious irregularities in maintaining the accounts. The Enforcement Inspector was of the opinion that the petitioner had stored kerosene oil in order to mix the same will petrol. The Enforcement Inspector, therefore, lodged FIR No. 222/94 against the petitioner at Police Station Chirawa for offence committed under the Essential Commodities Act. He had earlier found the applicant selling petrol after mixing kerosene therein and lodged FIR No. 336 of 1994 with Police Station Kotwali, Jhunjhunu in that behalf Any way, on investigation of FIR No. 222/94, the Station House Officer/Investigating Officer of the case prepared charge-sheet No. 44 on 14-5-95. But before he could have submitted the charge-sheet in the Court, he received letter No. 548 dt. 2 1-3-96 from the Superintendent of Police, Jhunjhunu ordering cancellation of the proposed report under Section 173(2) Cr. P.C. against the petitioner. Thereupon, the In-charge of the police station had to submit and did submit a final report on 2 1-3-96 in the case to the concerned Special Judge. 2. Oncommunication of the result of investigation to him the Enforcement Inspector filed a protest petition on 21-11-96. The learned Spl. Judge made the following order on the protest petition so filed by the Enforcement Inspector 27.2.97 Þ27-2-97 ljdkj dh vks j ls ,-ih-ih-mi-A ifjoknh vkt mi- ugha gSA iqfyl }kjk nh x;h ,Q-vkj-rFkk i=koyh dk voyksdu fd;k rFkk ifjoknh }kjk isk kq nk izksVsLV fiVhku dks ns[kk x;kA ifjoknh dh izksVsLV fiVhku [kkfjt djrs gq, ,Q- vkj-Lohdkj dh tkrh gSA dkxtkr nkf [ky nQ~rj gksAß .3. Theprotest petition having been dismissed in the manner stated above, the Enforcement Inspector approached this Court under Section 397 r.w. Section 401, Cr. P.C. In that petition the present petitioner Vimal Kumar and State of Raj. were arrayed as parties. After hearing the Enforcement Inspector-complainant, this Court was of the opinion that the impugned order, on the face of it, suffered from illegality and invalidity in as much as that after receipt of the protest petition the learned Spl. Judge had not followed the procedure prescribed under Section 200 and 202 Cr.
were arrayed as parties. After hearing the Enforcement Inspector-complainant, this Court was of the opinion that the impugned order, on the face of it, suffered from illegality and invalidity in as much as that after receipt of the protest petition the learned Spl. Judge had not followed the procedure prescribed under Section 200 and 202 Cr. P.C. This Court, therefore, vide its order dt. 3-8-98 set-aside the order of the learned Spl. Judge dt. 27-2-90 and directed him to conduct further inquiry under Section 398, Cr. P.C. and make appropriate orders according to law. This Court further observed that before passing the orders the learned Spl. Judge may also consider whether the Superintendent of Police Jhunjhunu should or should not have directed Station House Officer (In-charge of investigation in the present case) not to file the charge-sheet against the present petitioner. This petition under Section 482, Cr. P.C. moved by Vimal Kumar petitioner, seeks recalling of the said order on the following grounds: .(i) That before passing the impugned order the Court did not issue any notice to the petitioner although, the petitioner had been made a party to the revision petition. .(ii) That the revision petition was miserably barred by limitation and an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay had also been filed but Court did not pass any appropriate orders on such application and proceeded to decide .the revision petition itself on merits. .(iii) That the Court erred in issuing directions to the Spl. Judge for considering as to whether the Superintendent of Police could have directed the Station House Officer, in-charge of investigation in the present case, not to file the charge-sheet. .(iv) That the Special Judge was not under any statutory obligation to have adopted the procedure laid down Under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. 4. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at sufficient length and have also gone through the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Habu vs. State of Raj 1987 Raj (1) LR 1: AIR 1987 Raj 83 , wherein it was held that an order which has been passed on merits in the absence of an appellant or his counsel may be recalled by the High Court in exercise of the powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. 5.
P.C. 5. At the very out set, I would like to observe that there can hardly be any dispute over the principle that an order made in the absence of a party without hearing him, when such order has been passed on merits and adversely effects his rights, may be recalled by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr. P.C. However, the question in each case would be as to whether such a principle applies to the facts of a given case or not. As would be seen on later discussion the said principle does not get invoked at all in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 6. The points raised by the applicant are decided as under: .(i) No doubt the present petitioner had been made party in the revision petition filed by the Enforcement Inspector in this Court but since no orders had ever been passed by the Spl. Judge against the present petitioner in the proceedings before him, this Court did not consider it necessary to issue notice to the petitioner and hear him before making any order in the revision petition. It need not be emphasised that since the learned Spl. Judge had not taken cognizance of any offence and had not summoned him as an accused, the petitioner was not an aggrieved person and as such had no locus stand in the case. It is well settled proposition of law that in the course of enquiry under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the person or persons who are alleged to have committed a cognizable or non-cognizable offence, have no right to participate for the obvious reason that no adverse orders have yet been passed against such person or persons and they have not been summoned as accused of any offence. Until and unless a person has been summoned as accused of an offence, he is not an aggrieved person and as such has no cause of grievance. As and when he is summoned as an accused, he would become an aggrieved person and would have a right of participation in the proceedings against him. In the instant case, undisputedly the petitioner had not been summoned as an accused. The learned Special Judge had not taken cognizance of any offence in the case.
As and when he is summoned as an accused, he would become an aggrieved person and would have a right of participation in the proceedings against him. In the instant case, undisputedly the petitioner had not been summoned as an accused. The learned Special Judge had not taken cognizance of any offence in the case. Instead, he had accepted the negative report of the police even without inquiring into the merits of the protest petition, which was required to be treated as a complaint and as such enquiry Under Sections 200 and 202, Cr.P.C. was required to be made. In view of such facts the applicant had no right of participation in the proceedings either before the Spl. Judge or before this Court. .(ii) It is true that the revision petition had been filed with delay and the Enforcement Inspector had also filed application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone such delay and no order had been passed by this Court on such application. However, this Court had, on examination of the order passed by the Spl. Judge, felt satisfied that the said order was exfacie, invalid and unsustainable. Illegality in an order cannot be washed away by lapse of time and while exercising the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397, Cr. P.C. it is always the duty of this Court to take notice of the illegality or material and uncurable irregularity in the order made by a Court subordinate to it. Such powers of this Court cannot be defeated by lapse of time. The rights of a revisionist is simply to invite the attention of the Court to any illegality or infirmity committed by any Court subordinate to it in making order. Since an invalidity in the order made by the Spl. Judge in this case in dismissing the protest petition without conducting an enquiry into that as per procedure laid down in Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. was noticed by this Court, this Court was competent to have passed appropriate order in the case, even if the attention of this Court to such invalid order was invited or came to the notice of this Court a bit later. (iii) It had come to the notice of this Court that although the Investigating Officer, who was the Station House Officer and was competent to file report under Section 173(2), Cr.
(iii) It had come to the notice of this Court that although the Investigating Officer, who was the Station House Officer and was competent to file report under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C. as per provision of the said section, had prepared the report under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C. to be filed against the petitioner but the Superintendent of Police had directed him not to file “the charge-sheet. On such facts this Court had thought it proper to require the Spl. Judge to consider whether an Administrative Authority can dictate the formation of opinion by a subordinate authority to act in a particular manner, when such opinion relates to the initiation of judicial proceedings under the Code. It might have been a different matter if the higher authority in the hierarchy would have made an order himself in administrative capacity. In that case he would be acting within the sphere of his own rights and not usurping the right of his subordinate of making his own satisfaction in a judicial matter. It was a matter of inquiry by the Special Judge to find out whether the SHO had or had not applied his own mind to the making of his satisfaction regarding submitting a final report and has simply obeyed the order of his superior authority. This Court did not express any opinion on the point and simply required the Spl. Judge to consider that aspect of the case. Since no opinion was expressed by this Court on that point, neither the complainant nor the prospective accused may feel aggrieved by the directions issued by this Court. (iv) In so far as the question regarding the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202, Cr. P.C. is concerned it may be observed that the Spl. Judge acts as a Magistrate in the administration of the Essential Commodities Act and has all the powers of the Magistrate with regard to taking cognizance of the case. Once it is accepted in principle that the Spl. Judge is a Magistrate under the E.C. Act, for all practical purposes, then necessarily it shall have to be accepted also that a negative report submitted to the Special Judge may become subject-matter of taking cognizance against a person, if on perusal of such report and the material submitted therewith, the Spl. Judge feels satisfied that commission of some cognizable offence is disclosed.
Judge feels satisfied that commission of some cognizable offence is disclosed. But since it was a negative report and the Spl. Judge had issued notice to the complainant inviting his objection against acceptance of the negative report by him and the complainant appeared and objected to the acceptance of the final report, the Spl. Judge was bound to hear him. After hearing him the Spl. Judge was either to take cognizance of an offence or may require the complainant to produce evidence in support of his objection. If latter course is adopted then the objection filed by the complainant/informant, which is called protest petition in common parlance, may be treated as complaint and complainant may be examined under Section 200, Cr. P.C. Once that was the factual position provision contained in Chapter XV came into play and the Court of Spl. Judge/Magistrate was required to follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 200/ 202, Cr. P.C. before taking cognizance of the offence and summoning the applicant as accused. Under such circumstances this Court had deemed it proper to issue directions in that behalf , as procedure under Chapter XV, Cr. P.C. had not been followed by the learned Spl. Judge in the present case. In view of the discussion made above, no case for recalling the order dated 3-8-1998 is made out. The application is, therefore, dismissed.