JUDGMENT The Court : The petitioners in this writ application have challenged a letter of intimation issued by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation whereby the petitioner no. 1 has been informed that a total sum of Rs. 3,78,53,713.34 is payable by the petitioner no. 1 as consolidated rate till August, 1997. The aforesaid amount was inclusive of Rs. 1,32,62,564.97 towards interest and Rs. 31,43,443.50 as penalty. 2. The petitioners have also prayed for mandamus directing the Municipal Authority to act in accordance with sections 171 and 174 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (Act) and to determine the annual valuation of premises no. 54/1, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Calcutta and the commercial surcharge leviable in respect thereof in accordance with the said provision. 3. The facts giving rise to instant writ application can be summarised thus:- (a) The petitioner is a lessee in respect of premises no. 54/1, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road, Calcutta (premises) having right to induct and realise rent from its sub-lessees. (b) The respondent no. 1 on March 27, 1997 issued a notice of demand amounting to Rs. 2,00,24,855/- as principal dues of tax from 1st quarter of 1988 in respect of the premises. The said respondent also issued an order of attachment for realisation of the said dues. (c) Being aggrieved by the aforesaid attachment notices issued upon the petitioner no. 1 as well as its tenants of the premises, the petitioners moved a writ application being Writ Petition No. 1028 of 1997 which was ultimately disposed of by the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kabir on July 3, 1997 thereby directing the respondents to allow the petitioners to pay off the outstanding rates and taxes together with interest accrued thereon by monthly instalment of Rs. 2 lakhs together with current dues. It was further ordered that in default of any two instalments the respondents would be at liberty to re-impose attachment. (d) On July 23, 1997 the petitioners wrote a letter to the Commissioner, Calcutta Municipal Corporation thereby requesting him to reconsider the assessment made by the respondent. (e) The respondents have not answered the said letter received on July 24, 1997 but sent the letter of intimation thereby giving in details the amount payable by the petitioners till August, 1997. 4. Mr. Mallick, the learned counsel appearing in support of the instant writ application has made threefold submissions before me. Firstly, Mr. (e) The respondents have not answered the said letter received on July 24, 1997 but sent the letter of intimation thereby giving in details the amount payable by the petitioners till August, 1997. 4. Mr. Mallick, the learned counsel appearing in support of the instant writ application has made threefold submissions before me. Firstly, Mr. Mallick contends that the letter dated July 23, 1997 written on behalf of his clients was an application to invoke power under section 192 of the Act and as such it was the duty of the respondent no. 2 to consider such application. Secondly, according to Mr. Mallick, in assessing the consolidated rates of the premises the gross rent which includes tax payable in respect of the premises cannot be taken into consideration. Lastly, Mr. Mallick contends that in this case the respondents cannot impose commercial surcharge inasmuch as its tenants being Income Tax Department, a part of the Government of India, it cannot be said that any commercial activity is carried on in the premises. 5. Mr. Das Adhikary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand has refuted the aforesaid contentions raised by Mr. Mallick. According to Mr. Das Adhikary, the second and the third point raised by Mr. Mallick was very much available to the petitioners when they moved the earlier writ application. No appeal having been filed by the petitioners against he order dated July 3, 1997 passed by Kabir, J. the said order has attained finality. Over and above, Mr. Das Adhikary contends that those two points raised by the petitioners are even not tenable in the eye of law. According to him, in assessing the valuation, the tax of the premises payable by a tenant, if included in the gross rent, should also be considered as rent. In support of such contention Mr. Das Adhikary relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Canara Bank and Another vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabed reported in 1996 (7) SCC page 298. Mr. Das Adhikary further contends that if the property is let out for the purpose other than residential one, in that event commercial surcharge can be imposed. 6. As regards the first point raised by Mr. Mallick, according to Mr. Mr. Das Adhikary further contends that if the property is let out for the purpose other than residential one, in that event commercial surcharge can be imposed. 6. As regards the first point raised by Mr. Mallick, according to Mr. Das Adhikary, no case of fraud, mistake or accident having been alleged, section 192 of the Act has no application to the fact of the present case. 7. Now coming to the first contention raised by Mr. Mallick in my opinion, the same is devoid of any merit. According to section 190 of the Act, every valuation in the assessment list prepared under section 184 shall, subject to the provisions of section 185 or the order under section 188 or section 189 be final. According to section 191 of the Act, valuation as determined under section 190 shall be entered in the Municipal Assessment Book. By virtue of the power conferred under section 192, the Commissioner after giving a notice upon the owner, lessee, sub-lessee or the occupier can amend the Municipal Assessment Book at any time in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) of section 192. Therefore, the scheme of the Act, as mentioned above, indicates that there is no scope of reopening any valuation made under section 184 or 185 or any order passed under section 188 or section 189 at the instance of an owner, occupier, lessee or sub-lessee by applying under section 192 of the Act. 8. Therefore, the Municipal Commissioner rightly ignored the representation of the petitioners dated July 23, 1997. 9. As regards the second and the third point raised by Mr. Mallick, I find substance in the contention of Mr. Das Adhikary that those points were available to the petitioners while resisting the order of attachment in their earlier writ application but the said writ application having been disposed of by directing the petitioners to pay off the entire amount assessed by the respondents by monthly instalment of Rs. 2 lakhs the present writ application is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. It is now settled that principle of constructive res judicata applies also to writ proceeding. (See "Direct Recruit Case"- 1990 (2) SCC 715 ). 10. Apart from the question of constructive res judicata, I find that the 2nd point raised by Mr. 2 lakhs the present writ application is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. It is now settled that principle of constructive res judicata applies also to writ proceeding. (See "Direct Recruit Case"- 1990 (2) SCC 715 ). 10. Apart from the question of constructive res judicata, I find that the 2nd point raised by Mr. Mallick has already been answered against the petitioners by the Apex Court in Canara Bank and Another vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad reported in 1996 (7) SCC 298 as pointed out by Mr. Das Adhikary. 11. As regards the third contention of Mr. Mallick it may be mentioned here that section 171 (4) of the Act vests the Corporation with a power to levy a surcharge if the land, building or the portion thereof is used for "commercial or non-residential purpose". Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the Income Tax Department, a tenant of the petitioner no. 1 does not carry on any commercial activity in the premises in the strict sense of the term, the tenancy being for non-residential purpose, section 171 (4) of the Act is clearly attracted. 12. Therefore the petitioners have no case even on merit. All the points raised by Mr. Mallick having failed, the writ application is dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.