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1998 DIGILAW 132 (RAJ)

Hamir Singh v. State of Rajasthan

1998-01-28

P.C.JAIN

body1998
Honble JAIN, J.–The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for quashing the order passed by the State Government under Section 15(2) of the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the proceedings taken in pursuance thereto. (2). The facts relevant for the disposal of this writ petition may be stated as follows. Under the provisions contained in Chapter III-B of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 proceedings were initiated against the petitioner The petitioner filed his declaration and submitted all the relevant details of his family members and the land before the S.D.O., Bali. After considering the relevant record, the S.D.O., Bali came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not holding any land in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him. He, therefore, passed an order on 20.5.1974 dropping the proceedings initiated against him. The copy of the order dated 20.5.1974 is Ex.l. The State of Rajasthan or any of its officers did not file any appeal or revision against the order dated 20.5.1974. Hence the order dated 20.5.1974 be- came final. After coming into force the above Act, the Authorised Officer (Ceiling) (S.D.O.), Bali registered a case against the petitioner being No. 133/79 and considered the matter. After going through the entire record the Authorised Officer came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not holding any land in excess of the ceiling limit. He, therefore, passed an order on 11.8.1982 dropping the proceedings. Again, no appeal or revision was filed either by the State Government or any of its officers against the order passed by the S.D.O., Bali dated 11.8.1982. The order of the S.D.O., therefore, became final. However, after a lapse of about 5 years, respondent No. 1 issued notice under the provisions contained in Section 15(2) of the Act to the petitioner and his family and an order was eventually passed. After passing the above order, respondent No. 3, Additional Collector, Pali, reopened the ceiling case of the petitioner (No. 25/81) and the proceedings have been started against the petitioner The proceedings are still continuing. The petitioner moved an application before the Additional Collector, Bali stating therein that the proceedings under the new law after coming into force of the new Act were taken and fina- lised. The petitioner moved an application before the Additional Collector, Bali stating therein that the proceedings under the new law after coming into force of the new Act were taken and fina- lised. Hence the State Government could not have exercised the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act and no proceedings ought to have been taken by the A.D.M. The A.D.M. vide his order dated 16.9.1987 dismissed the above application. (3). I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Govern- ment Advocate for the respondents. (4). Learned counsel for the petitioner has very vehemently contended that admittedly the proceedings under the old ceiling law were taken against the petitioner and dropped by the S.D.O. vide his order dated 20.5.1974. However, after coming into force of the new law by enforcing the above Act, proceedings again initiated against the petitioner under the new law. When such proceedings were pending, the State Government was not competent and legally entitled to have passed an order purporting to be in the exercise of sub-sec.(2) of Sec. 15 of the Act. (5). Learned Government Advocate has submitted that the impugned order under Section 15(2) of the Act was passed after the termination of the proceedings under the old law but before the termination of the proceedings under the new Act. The State Government was, therefore, competent to pass an order under Section 15(2) of the Act to reopen the proceedings against the petitioners dropped by the S.D.O. under the old law. (6). I have considered the rival contentions. Section 15 of the Act confers pow- ers of superintendence over the officers entrusted with the enforcement of the ceiling law. The State Government has been invested with the powers to examine the proceedings with a view whether the order passed is in contravention of the provisions of the Act or the old law. The State Government can also examine the case from the angle whether the impugned order passed is prejudicial to the State Government. The State Government can also take into account the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which required reinvestigation or redetermination of the matter. The State Government can also examine the case from the angle whether the impugned order passed is prejudicial to the State Government. The State Government can also take into account the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which required reinvestigation or redetermination of the matter. A perusal of the provisions of Section 15 of the Act would show that if the proceedings to be reopened have been taken under the old law, the order is to be passed under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act and if the proceedings have been taken in pursuance of the new Act, the order would be under sub- section (1) of Section 15 of the Act. It would be further clear that an order under Section 15(1) of the Act can only be passed when the proceedings under the new law have been taken and finalised. In the instant case there is no dispute that the proceedings taken against the petitioner under the old law were reopened by the impugned order. It is very important to note that before that order was passed the proceedings initiated against the petitioner under the new Act, though commenced, have not terminated or finalised. Hence the State Government could not have exercised the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act. Obvious course for reopening the ceiling proceedings was to pass an order under sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act because the ceiling proceedings taken under the old law stood concluded. The exercise of passing the order under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act was premature at that stage. The application of the petitioner Ex.3 moved before the A.D.M. was, therefore, totally misconceived. In my considered opinion, the impugned order passed by the State Government under Section 15(2) of the Act cannot be assailed on the ground that ceiling proceedings under the new Act against the petitioner are pending. The pendency of the ceiling proceedings under the new Act do not constitute any bar for the exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. (7). For the above reasons, 1 find no substance in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, hereby dismissed. Since the ceiling proceedings under the new Act are pending, the petitioner shall be entitled to agitate all the points available to him before the concerned officer. (7). For the above reasons, 1 find no substance in the writ petition and the same is, therefore, hereby dismissed. Since the ceiling proceedings under the new Act are pending, the petitioner shall be entitled to agitate all the points available to him before the concerned officer. No order as to costs.