Judgment :- The Order of the Court is as follows: 1. Invoking article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner herein has filed the present writ petition, seeking for a writ of declaration declaring the provision of section 269UE(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ('the Act') as unconstitutional and void and to grant further consequential relief. 2. In support of the writ petition, the petitioner herein has filed an affidavit wherein they have narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petition and requested this Court to allow the wilt petition as prayed for. Per contra, on behalf of the respondents, a counter-affidavit has been filed rebutting all the material allegations levelled against them one after the other and ultimately they prayed that the writ petition may be dismissed for want of merits. 3. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. I have perused the contents of the affidavit and the counter-affidavit together with all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers. I have also taken into consideration the various points raised by the learned counsels appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments. 4. In the above facts and circumstances of this case, the only point that arises for consideration herein is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow this writ petition or not. 5. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner herein, as seen from the affidavit, are as follows : The petitioner-company is a wholly owned Government of India Enterprise and are engaged in the manufacture and supply of life saving drugs to Governmental Institutions as well as public. The petitioner has got Regional Office at 109, Anna Salai, Madras, and they have been in occupation of the said premises from August 1972. The total area occupied by the petitioner is 6340 sq. ft. and they are paying rent of Rs. 5, 833 per month. Originally there was a lease agreement between the petitioner and the owners of the premises and the said lease expired during 1980. Thereafter the petitioner continued as statutory tenants entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu (Building & Lease) Rent Control Act, 1960. The land owners had made an application to the second respondent on 11-3-1989 for transferring the land and building located at Nos. Thereafter the petitioner continued as statutory tenants entitled to the protection of the Tamil Nadu (Building & Lease) Rent Control Act, 1960. The land owners had made an application to the second respondent on 11-3-1989 for transferring the land and building located at Nos. 109 & 110, Anna Salai, Madras, for a consideration of Rs. 26 lakhs in favour of Mr. V. Krishnan. In exercise of the powers under section 269UD(1) of the Act, the second respondent decided that the property referred to above was fit for purchase by the Central Government as per the provisions of section 269UD(1) and an order was passed for purchasing the above property. This order was made by the second respondent on 22-6-1989. Subsequently, a letter was issued by the second respondent under section 269UE(2), requesting the petitioner to surrender and deliver vacant possession of the above property within 15 days of the receipt of the said letter. The aforesaid letter was received by the petitioner on 30-6-1989. Subsequently, the petitioner requested for extension of time to vacate the property and the same was rejected by the second respondent in his communication dated 25-7-1989 saying that there is no provision under the Act for allowing time to vacate the premises. Subsequent request made by the petitioner was also of no avail. The second respondent is pressuring the petitioner to vacate the premises. Hence, this writ petition to declare the provisions of section 269UE(2) as unconstitutional and void. 6. It is the case of the petitioner that section 269UE insofar as it provides that on making an order under sub-section (1) of section 269UD, the immovable property shall vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances and enable the Central Government to take possession of the immovable property by using force, if necessary, is unconstitutional and void, that the above premises is occupied by the petitioner who is governed by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu (Building & Lease) Rent Control Act, and under the said Act, eviction can be ordered only on the grounds specified under section 10. The first respondent has no legislative competence to extinguish the tenancy rights and also to evict the persons in possession of the immovable property by resorting to the method contemplated under section 269UE, which empowers the Central Government to summarily dispossess a tenant, if necessary, by using force by requesting the service of a police officer. It is stated by the petitioner that even buildings owned by the Central or the State Government are not exempt from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu (Building and Lease) Rent Control Act. Therefore, it is their contention that even the first respondent can evict a person in respect of a building vested in the Central Government under section 269UD(1) only by the procedure laid down in the Tamil Nadu Act. 7. It is also contended by the petitioner that the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact law on relationship of landlord and tenant. The power to regulate the relationship between the landlord and the tenant vests with the State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II of the First Schedule to the Constitution. This Entry specifically includes the relationship of landlord and tenant which takes within its ambit the tenancy legislation pertaining to land and building. It is stated by the petitioner that the Tamil Nadu (Building & Lease) Rent Control Act, consolidates the law relating to the regulation on the letting of residential and non-residential building and the control of rents of such building and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefor in the State of Tamil Nadu. Therefore, it is the case of the petitioner herein that section 269UE is unconstitutional and void and it is ultra vires Parliament. According to them, Chapter XX-C was inserted by the Finance Act, 1986 with effect from 1-16-1986 and the said Chapter enables the Central Government to purchase immovable properties in certain cases of transfer. Having regard to the object behind the introduction of Chapter XX-C, it is incompetent for the Parliament to legislate on the relationship of landlord and tenants and especially taking away the rights of statutory tenants granted under the Tamil Nadu Act. They contend that the provision of section 269UE gives a favoured treatment to the Central Government when it proposes to exercise its powers under section 269UE for purchasing the property. They contend that the provision of section 269UE gives a favoured treatment to the Central Government when it proposes to exercise its powers under section 269UE for purchasing the property. Having regard to the object of Chapter XX-C, the Central Government cannot be allowed to have preferential treatment in the matter of purchase of immovable properties by the Central Government under the provisions impugned. Therefore, according to them, the provision of section 269UE is discriminatory, unconstitutional and void and there is no justification or reason for favourably treating the Central Government for and against in the purchase of immovable properties. 8. Having seen the entire record available in this case, the only main contention of the petitioner herein is;that section 269UE which provides that on making of an order under section 269UD(1) the immovable property shall vest in the Central Government free from all encumbrances, is unconstitutional and void and that the occupation of the premises by the petitioner is governed by the Tamil Nadu (Building & Lease) Rent Control Act under which eviction can be ordered only on one of the grounds stated in section 10 thereof. Further, even buildings owned by the Central or State Government are not exempt from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the Central Government can evict a person in respect of a building vested in the Central Government under section 269UD(1) only by the procedure laid down in the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act. 9. That being so, relying on the decision of the Supreme Court made in C. B. Gautam v. Union of India, it is contended by the department that the Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the provisions of Chapter XX-C subject to the position that section 269UE(1) must be read without the expression 'free from all encumbrances' with the result that the property in question will vest in the Central Goverment subject to such encumbrances and leasehold interests as are subsisting thereon except for such of them as had been agreed to be discharged by the vendor before the sale is completed. They also contend that according to the Supreme Court, if under the relevant agreement to sell, the property is agreed to be sold free of all encumbrances or certain encumbrances, it would vest in the Central Government free of such encumbrances. They also contend that according to the Supreme Court, if under the relevant agreement to sell, the property is agreed to be sold free of all encumbrances or certain encumbrances, it would vest in the Central Government free of such encumbrances. Quoting the above Supreme Court decision, it is also contended by the learned senior counsel for the department that section 269UE(2) will have to be read down so that if the holder of an encumbrance or a lessee is in possession of the property and under the agreement to sell the property, it is not provided that the sale would be free of such encumbrances or leasehold rights ' the encumbrance holder or lessee who is in possession will not be obliged to deliver possession of the property to the appropriate authority or any person authorised by it and the provisions of sub-section (3) would not apply to such persons. At the same, it is the categoric contention of the learned senior counsel for the department that in the instant case, clause 4 of the agreement for sale specifically provided that, "the parties of the first part undertake to sell the schedule mentioned property to the party of the second part free from all encumbrances and charges" , and that, therefore, in such circumstances of the present case, in view of the above-mentioned Supreme Court decision, the petitioner shall not have any right to claim that the property will vest in the Government only subject to his tenancy agreement. There is every force in the said argument of the learned senior counsel for the department, as the above-mentioned clause 4 has not been denied by the petitioner herein in this writ petition. 10. Yet another significant aspect in this case is that, basing on the tenancy agreement between the land owners and the petitioner, the petitioner is claiming that the occupation of the premises by the petitioner is governed by the Tamil Nadu (Buildings & Lease) Rent Control Act under which eviction can be ordered only on one of the grounds stated in section 10 thereof and, hence, there is no legislative competence to extinguish tenancy rights and also to evict persons in possession of immovable property by resorting to the method contemplated under section 269UE. But, it is significant to note that in their affidavit filed in this writ petition, they themselves have clearly admitted that the agreement of lease with the owners of the property had expired during 1980 and thereafter there was no agreement of lease. In such circumstances, it is rightly contended by the department that the question of the property vesting subject to any agreement of lease or any tenancy rights as claimed by the petitioner would not arise. Therefore, it is also contended by the department that when admittedly there is no agreement of lease between the petitioner and the owner subsisting, on the date of the agreement and as the same a already expired during 1980 as admitted by the petitioner themselves the occupation by the petitioner of the premises in question is without any authority of law, I see every force in such contention raised by the department. 11. In support of their case, the learned counsel for the petitioner herein strongly relies on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in the very same case - C. B. Gautam (supra) and contends that an order for compulsory purchase results in the rights of holders of encumbrances and leasehold being destroyed or significantly diminished. It is significant to note that in the said case, it has been held by the Supreme Court (in para 34) as follows; ". . . It, therefore, appears to us difficult to uphold the last part of sub-section (1) of section 269UE insofar as it provides that the property in respect of which an order under sub-section (1) of section 269UE is made shall vest in the Central Government free of all encumbrances. In our opinion, the expression 'free of all encumbrances' is liable to be struck down as arbitrary, without any rational nexus with the object of the legislation in question and violative of article 14 of the Constitution . . ." (p. 557) Therefore, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the writ petition deserves to be allowed on the strength of the above decision of the Supreme Court and the impugned section of the Act is liable to be declared as unconstitutional and void. 12. At the same time, it is significant to note that such a decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 12. At the same time, it is significant to note that such a decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in the facts and circumstances of the particular case. It is common knowledge that the result of a particular case depends only on its own merits and facts and circumstances. Even in the said decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the same para 34 it has been clearly observed by the Supreme Court as under, "... In a given case, it might happen that [steeply the] property is intended to be sold under an agreement to sell subject to encumbrances and leasehold rights, and very often agreements to sell the immovable property do not provide that the property sold would be free from encumbrances or leasehold rights . . . ." (p. 556) Thus, as the case dealt with in the said judgment of the Supreme Court came within the second category of property mentioned above, the Supreme Court came to the said conclusion. But, in the present case, the factual position is different and it comes within the 1st category of the property, i.e., where the agreement to sell was subject to encumbrance and leasehold rights. Therefore, under such circumstances of the present case, the abovesaid Supreme Court decision is not helpful to the petitioner herein. 13. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the department that the petitioner cannot claim that it can be evicted only by one of the modes contemplated under section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act since by reason of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 which came into force with retrospective effect from 16-9-1958 providing for eviction of unauthorised occupants from premises belonging to the Central Government, the application of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act will be excluded. It is also stated by the learned counsel that section 2(g) of the said Act defines 'unauthorised occupation' in relation to a public premises as meaning "the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises had expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 'Public premises' has been defined in section 2(e) of the said Act as meaning any premises belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government. Therefore, it is contended by the department that for abovesaid ground also the petitioner cannot claim any protection under the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act from being evicted. I see every force in the said contention of the learned counsel for the department. 14. Further, it is significant to note that Chapter XX-C is in respect of the right granted to the Central Government for pre-emptive purchase of properties for various situations relating to the right of pre-emptive purchase which has been granted to the Central Government. Therefore, in view of the provisions of Chapter XX-C providing for a special mode of dispossession of tenants in regard to properties in respect of which an order of pre-emptive purchase has been made, the said Chapter will override the provisions of all the other enactments in that regard. In this regard it is contended by the department that when Parliament inserted Chapter XX-C by the Finance Act, 1986 with effect from 1-10-1986, it was aware of the provisions contained in the Rent Control Enactments of the various States as well as the provisions of the Public Premises Eviction Act, 1970. In this regard it is contended by the department that when Parliament inserted Chapter XX-C by the Finance Act, 1986 with effect from 1-10-1986, it was aware of the provisions contained in the Rent Control Enactments of the various States as well as the provisions of the Public Premises Eviction Act, 1970. It is also contended on behalf of the department that when in spite of these enactments relating to the eviction of tenants, the Parliament chose to make a specific departure from the procedure contemplated under the Rent Control Enactments of the various States, the intention of the Parliament must be given effect to and it is only the provisions of the Chapter XX-C, that will be applicable in cases of pre-emptive purchases under the said Chapter and which only will have to be resorted to for dispossession of tenants in occupation of the buildings purchased by the Central Government in exercise of the power under Chapter XX-C. Therefore, it is categoric contention of the department that in view of the special enactment for dispossession of tenants in occupation of buildings purchased by the Central Government in exercise of its powers of pre-emptive purchase under Chapter XX-C of the Income-tax Act, this procedure will exclude the application of the Rent Control Act to such premises. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I see every force in the above contention of the respondents. 15. Therefore, for the above-mentioned reasons and in the facts and circumstances of the present case and also in the light of my above discussions with regard to the various aspects of the present case, I am of the clear opinion that the petitioner herein failed to make out any case for declaring the impugned section of the Act as unconstitutional and void. Thus, the writ petition fails and the same deserves to be dismissed for want of merits. 16. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, WMP No. 21649 of 1989 is also dismissed.