Judgment :- 1. Writ Petition No. 6027 of 1998 was listed on 17.9.1998. Learned counsel for the petitioners wanted an adjournment for three days. I therefore posted the said Writ Petition on 18.9.1998. On 18.9.1998 the matter did not reach. Subsequently, I was sitting in a Division Bench. The case was listed to-day. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has filed an affidavit in the following terms: “I respectfully state that I feel that for the reasons hereinafter stated it would not be proper for me to do any of my case before the learned Judge (The Honourable Mr. Justice S Jagadeesan). Myself and the learned Judge have practised in one and the same office and that during that time there were bickering and misunderstandings, which I do not want to elaborate beyond this. After his elevation as a Judge, I have appeared so far in five or six cases and on all the occasions I have met only with harassment, intimidation and insult. I do not want to indulge in further details beyond this and I have lost many cases in view of his attitude towards me. I can no longer withstand the insults and intimidations after having put in twenty nine years on the Bar. In the interest of justice the above two Writ Petitions and ail other cases should not be posted before the learned Judge and they may be posted before some other Judge so that I will get an impartial hearing in the matter”. Learned counsel for the petitioners himself has admitted that he appeared before me on five or six cases on earlier occasions and as such what provoked him to file this sort of affidavit is not clear. If he has got any grievance, he could have made representation to the appropriate authority to have his cases not to be posted before me or at least without seeking for any adjournment, he could made a request. Even though the learned counsel for the petitioners has sworn to the said affidavit on 17th September, 1998, he has kept quiet without making any representation to have the matter posted before some other learned Judge. 3. So far as I am concerned, it is clear that after knowing my attitude in the matter like this, in the order made in Writ Petition Nos. 3. So far as I am concerned, it is clear that after knowing my attitude in the matter like this, in the order made in Writ Petition Nos. 10748 and 12714 to 12717 of 1998, dated 1.9.1998, (since reported in 1998 Writ L.R. 726) and Writ Petition No. 13744 of 1998, dated 14.9.1998, (since reported in 1998 Writ L.R. 731) the learned counsel for the petitioners wanted to take away the case from my list, which is highly improper on his part. In those cases, I have held that encroachers or licensees cannot have any vested rights to have their occupation to a particular place. Even for alternative sites, they should not want the site to their choice. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners also sought for a weeks time so as to enable him to make some other arrangements. I do not think that it is necessary to grant time, since the issue is already covered in many Judgments and since the learned counsel for the petitioners has refused to argue the matter, I have decided to dispose of the same after perusing the affidavit filed in support of these Writ Petitions. The attitude of the learned counsel for the petitioners clearly reveals that he avoids this 4 Court, knowing fully well that the Writ Petitions will be dismissed following the earlier Judgments. A counsel who is not able to bear a ‘no from the Court is unworthy of an Advocate. The filing of the affidavit is a clear proof to establish the extent to which the counsel could go to favour his clients. 5. In fact, when Writ Petition No. 6027 of 1998 was listed for admission, I find from the endorsement of S.S. Subramani, J that the said Writ Petition is a repetition of Writ Petition No. 18659 of 1992 and therefore, it was directed to be listed along with Writ Petition No. 18659 of 1992. 6. I have perused Writ Petition No. 18659 of 1992. There are sixty seven petitioners in that Writ Petition and the relief sought for is for the issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus or any other appropriate writ to quash the notice served on the petitioners, dated 2.11.1992 issued under Sections 220 and 222 of Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and consequently to forbear the respondents from in any manner interfering with the trading ! activities of the petitioners in South Mada Street, Mylapore, Chennai-4. 7. In the affidavit, the petitioners have stated that their ancestors and forefathers started the business of selling vegetables and leaves etc., some time in 1950. The abovesaid market is commonly known as ‘Tank Market’ and every one in Mylapore area in particular and the residents of Madras city in general know about the market and the market has gained wide popularity from among the general public The market is situate adjacent to the Kapaleeswarar Temple on the southern side and the platform around the tank is 11 feet wide on the outer side of the fence and 18 feet width on the inner side of the fence. The platform wherein the petitioners are carrying on the business is 11 feet wide and 67 to 80 shops have been set up. The petitioners are very poor people and from the income derived from the said business of selling vegetables etc., they have to sustain themselves and their families. They do not have any other avocation in life. They are poor people, who cannot invest huge sums of money. They buy the articles required from the wholesale Kothawal Market and with the profit earned by selling the vegetables to the general public they have to sustain their lives. While so, the Assistant Engineer, Corporation of Madras, Division No. 132 called the petitioners and threatened that they will be removed at any time since the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu wanted to beautify the surroundings of the Kapaleeswarar Temple and also to maintain the Temple in a noteworthy manner. If the petitioners were thrown away from the market, then they will be left with no other remedy and no relief can be obtained by them. Hence to safeguard their interests, they have invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If the petitioners were thrown away from the market, then they will be left with no other remedy and no relief can be obtained by them. Hence to safeguard their interests, they have invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The main contentions of the petitioners are that (i) the respondents cannot dislodge or remove them from the shops, unless a suitable alternative accommodation is opened and given to them by the respondents, which will be both beneficial to the general public as well as to the petitioners; (ii) the petitioners are not the trespassers, occupying the shops without any authority; and (iii) the fact that the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras has been collecting the licence fee from 1960 till 1989 either by themselves or by leasing out to third parties to collect the licence fee on their behalf cannot entitle him to throw away the petitioners from the shops, without affording them a suitable and proper place for their alternative accommodation. The trading on pavements and streets is a fundamental right and the Government can only impose reasonable restrictions and regulate them and the Government cannot prohibit such tradings. As laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Sodan Singh v. New DelhiMunicipal Committee ( AIR 1989 S.C. 1988 ) the right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)(g) on street pavements, if properly regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are meant exclusively for passing or repassing and for no other use. Since the petitioners are not the trespassers, Section 223(2) of Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 cannot be invoked. Hence, the Writ Petition. 8. The second respondent Corporation has filed a detailed counter affidavit in which the second respondent has denied the averments made in the affidavit and contended that the width of the road is 38 to 40 feet. Sixty four vendors have encroached on the platform and the Corporation of Madras has never collected any licence fee. The petitioners who are all identified as the encroachers, about sixty four members are offered alternative place to carry on their business on the northern and western sides of Chitrakulam which is 500 feet away from the existing encroached area. The petitioners are doing vegetable business which are all perishable in nature. The petitioners who are all identified as the encroachers, about sixty four members are offered alternative place to carry on their business on the northern and western sides of Chitrakulam which is 500 feet away from the existing encroached area. The petitioners are doing vegetable business which are all perishable in nature. In fact, the encroachers were asked to remove the acroachment from their sheps to an alternative place offered at Chitrakulam. The petitioners do not have any right to maintain the above Writ Petition; as stated supra since the petitioners did not have any right to remain in the encroached place. The petitioners have also suppressed the fact about the provision of the alternative place by the Corporation of Madras in its notice, dated 28.10.1992. Even though many other detailed averments have been made in the counter affidavit, I am of the view that the same are not necessary for the disposal of the Writ Petition and hence they are omitted. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the second respondent Corporation contended that the Writ Petition itself is not maintainable since the petitioners have been issued with notice to vacate the encroached portions and when they have been allotted alternative site, it is not fan-on their part to file this Writ Petition, challenging the impugned notice on the ground that they are entitled for the alternative site. 10. I have carefully considered the various averments made in the affidavit as well as the contentions of learned counsel for the second respondent Corporation. One of the impugned notices, dated 2.11.1992 issued by the second respondent Corporation reads thus: Tamil From the above notice, it is clear that the petitioners have been given an option to give their consent for the alternative site within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice to the Commissioner and if such request for the alternative site is not made within seven days, the person, who failed to make such request will not be entitled for the allotment of the alternative site. It is also clear that the petitioners have been given the right to submit their requests for the alternative site within seven days from the date of receipt of the impugned notice. It is not clear from the affidavit whether the petitioners have made any such request to the Commissioner of Madras for the allotment of alternative site. It is also clear that the petitioners have been given the right to submit their requests for the alternative site within seven days from the date of receipt of the impugned notice. It is not clear from the affidavit whether the petitioners have made any such request to the Commissioner of Madras for the allotment of alternative site. When the main grievance of the petitioners is that the respondents are duty-bound to provide them with suitable alternative site to carry on their trading activities and when the impugned notice itself is very clear that such alternative accommodation had been made and the petitioners can approach the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras by making necessary application, I am of the view that the Writ Petition itself is not maintainable] 11. Further, earlier to this Writ Petition, the petitioners have also filed Writ Petition No. 16637 of 1992 for the issue of a writ of mandamus forbearing the respondents from interfering with the trading activities of the petitioners. The said Writ Petition was dismissed on the ground that it was premature and this Court directed the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from the shops without following the procedure which is known to law. 12. When the petitioners were issued with the notices, the present Writ Petition has been filed. As stated earlier, the main grievance of the petitioners being the provision of suitable alternative site, the impugned proceeding itself clearly reveals that the petitioners have to approach the authorities concerned within seven days from the date of receipt of the notice for getting the suitable alternative accommodation, failing which they will not be entitled to have the alternative accommodation. Hence the alleged grievance of the petitioners is only an imaginary one. 13. In the Judgment reported in Sodan Singh v. New DelhiMunicipal Committee ( AIR 1989 SC 1988 ), referred to and relied on by the petitioners in their affidavit, though the Supreme Court has held that it is a fundamental right for the hawkers to vend in the Street platforms, it is further held that they have no right to occupy a particular place in the following terms: “We do not think there is any question of application of Article 21 and we will be briefly indicating our reasoas therefor later. But can there be at all a fundamental right of a citizen to occupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat and engage in trading business. We have no hesitation in answering the issue against the petitioners . The petitioners do have the fundamental right to carry on a trade or business of their choice, but not to do on a particular place . The position can be appreciated better in the light of two decisions of this Court in Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union v. Union of India ( (1981) 2 SCR 52 : ( AIR 1981 SC 344 )_and K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu ( (1982) 3 SCR 628 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1107 )”. In a recent Judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. v. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan (AIR 1997 SC !52), the Supreme Court in paragraph 20 has held as follows: “Empirical study of urban and rural population in India discloses that due to lack of civil facilities and means of livelihood people from rural areas constantly keep migrating to the urban areas resulting in mushroom growth of slums and encroachment of the pavements/footpaths etc. Every municipal corporation has statutory obligation to provide free flow of traffic and pedestrians right to pass and repass freely and safely; as its concomitance, the Corporation/Municipality have statutory duty to have the encroachments removed . It would, therefore, be inexpedient to give any direction not to remove, or to allow the encroachment on the pavements or footpaths which is a constant source of unhygienic ecology, traffic hazard and risk prone to lives of the pedestrians. It would, therefore, be necessary to permit the Corporation to exercise the statutory powers to prevent encroachment of the pavements/footpaths and to prevent construction thereon. As held earlier, the Corporation should always be vigilant and should not allow encroachments of the pavements and footpaths. As soon as they notice any encroachment they should forthwith take steps to have them removed and would not allow them to settlle down for a long time. It is stated in their affidavit that they are giving 21 days notice before taking action for ejectment of the encroachers. That procedure, in our view, is a fair procedure and, therefore, the right to hearing before taking action for ejectment is not necessary in the fact situation . It is stated in their affidavit that they are giving 21 days notice before taking action for ejectment of the encroachers. That procedure, in our view, is a fair procedure and, therefore, the right to hearing before taking action for ejectment is not necessary in the fact situation . But the Commissioner should ensure that everyone is served with a notice and as far as possible by personal service and if it is not possible for reasons to be recorded in the file, through affixture of the notice on the hutment, duly attested by two independent panchas. This procedure would avoid the dispute that they were not given opportunity; further prolongation of the encroachment and hazard to the traffic and safety of the pedestrians”. 14. In view of the above Judgment of the Supreme Court, I am of the view that the petitioners cannot have any vested rights to have their trade in a particular place. Moreover, the petitioners themselves have filed the present Writ Petition on the ground that they will have to be provided with a suitable alternative site. When the impugned notice itself makes it clear that the petitioners have to approach the authorities concerned for the allotment of alternative site from out of the already selected area, I am of the view that the Writ Petition is misconceived. Since the petitioners have not chosen to make any request before the authorities for allotment of alternative site and rushed to this Court this Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs. For the reasons stated in the order in Writ Petition No. 18659 of 1992, Writ Petition No. 6027 of 1998 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, it is dismissed. No costs.