Judgment 1. The pertinent question that arises for my consideration in the above revision is as to the scope and ambit of Sec.145 of Crl.P.C. in deciding whether the order dated 31.12.1996 of the learned Executive Magistrate in directing the revision petitioner (A’party and the respondent B’ party to maintain status quo in the light of the evidences on record to decide whether the petitioners, namely, ‘A’ party are entitled to continue in possession of the building and premises at No.6,Commissioner Subbaiah Pillai Street,Udumalpet Town. 2. Admittedly, the Inspector of Police, Udumalpet Police Station, Udumalpet, received an information that the dispute between the revision petitioners and the respondents herein as to the possession and enjoyment of the property within the local jurisdiction of the learned Executive Magistrate, Assistant Collector, Pollachi and Sub-Divisional Magistrate was likely¡ to cause breach of peace. In pursuance of the said information, the learned Executive Magistrate passed an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being satisfied, and required the petitioner and respondents, who are parties to such dispute, to appeal before him and to put in writing as to the actual position of the subject of dispute, as contemplated under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. Of course, there is no dispute as to the compliance of the procedure contemplated under Secs.145(1) and 145(3), Crl.P.C. 3. Accordingly, the learned Executive Magistrate, pursued their statement, heard the parties, received all the evidences produced by them, and passed an order on 31.12.1996, directing the petitioners ‘A’ party, and the respondents ‘B’ party to maintain status quo as to the decision of the disputed property. The learned Executive Magistrate, Pollachi, due to ambiguity in evidence, was not able to arrive at a definite conclusion as to who was in actual possession of the disputed property, and further directed both the parties to maintain status quo till the title is decided by a competent civil court. Hence, the above revision. 4. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners, invited my attention to Secs. 145(1) and 145(4) of Crl.P.C. and Secs.2(h) and 13 of the Trade Unions Act. 5. Hence, the above revision. 4. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioners, invited my attention to Secs. 145(1) and 145(4) of Crl.P.C. and Secs.2(h) and 13 of the Trade Unions Act. 5. According to Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, when the scope and spirit of Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is to decide as to who was in possession and enjoyment of the land on the date of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. which was likely to cause breach of peace in the light of the available materia¡ evidence on record, which shall be without reference to the merits and claims of any of the parties to possess the land in question, and of course, which shall be subject to the decision of a competent civil court to determine the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof as provided under Sec.146, Crl.P.C. the learned Executive Magistrate is under a statutory obligation to decide, without ignoring the material evidence available on record, and pass an order as to who was in possession of the subject of dispute. 6. Admittedly, in the instant case, the land and building in question, were originally owned, possessed and enjoyed by a trade Union afflicted to D.M.K., a political party; but turned to be a disputed property, in pursuance of a split in the parent political party viz., D.M.K., resulting in the formation of M.D.M.K. and consequently, the members of the Trade Union also got divided and split into two trade Unions, affiliated to the two respective political parties. 7. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, without referring and going into the political controversies, which were considered as a background for the split in the erstwhile trade union, invited my attention to the definition of Trade Union as defined under Sec.2(h) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. 8. 7. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, without referring and going into the political controversies, which were considered as a background for the split in the erstwhile trade union, invited my attention to the definition of Trade Union as defined under Sec.2(h) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926. 8. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, referring to Sec.13 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, contends that the trade union, a registered corporate body, is entitled to acquire and held both movable and immovable properties; the executives and office bearers of such trade union alone are entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the property, and therefore, the trade Union which was managed by the executives as defined under Sec.2(a) and the office bearers as defined under Sec.2(b) referred by the revision petitioners, viz., ‘A’ party alone, are entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the property, in the light of the documents marked on their behalf, namely, Exs.A-36, A-37, A-38, A-39, A-40, A-41, A-43, A-45 and A-46. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, further contends that any interference with such possession, if not protected by an order of the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. inspite of material evidences adduced by them, would cause breach of peace in the locality. 9. Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai also invited my attention to the finding of the learned Executive Magistrate that the Inspector of Police, Udumalpet, got the keys and possession of the property only from a third member of the ‘A’ party, and therefore, the learned Executive Magistrate is under an obligation to pass an order to put the ‘A’ Party in possession of the property, particularly when the respondents, namely, ‘B’ Party could not produce any such evidence to show that they were in actual possession of the disputed property, as found by the learned Executive Magistrate himself. According to Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners, passing of an order to maintain status quo, under the facts and circumstances of the case, amounts to failure of exercising the power and jurisdiction conferred on the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec. 145, Crl.P.C 10. According to Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel for the revision petitioners, passing of an order to maintain status quo, under the facts and circumstances of the case, amounts to failure of exercising the power and jurisdiction conferred on the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec. 145, Crl.P.C 10. Per contra, Mr.Viduthalai, learned counsel for the respondent ‘B’ Party, contends that the spirit and scope of Sec.145, Crl.P.C. is to prevent the breach of peace, or, in other words, to maintain peace in the locality in question, but not to entrust the disputed property to either party, Mr.Viduthalai further contends that when the members of the erst while trade union in question got split in consequence of the split in a parent political party, the learned Executive Magistrate is left with no option except to direct both the parties to maintain status quo as to the possession and enjoyment of the disputed property, as he is rather not supposed to decide the merits and claims of either party, as such an attempt is totally contrary to the scope of Sec. 145(4), Crl.P.C. 11. Mr.Viduthalai also contends that when there was a vertical split in the parent political party and consequently there was a corresponding split in the erstwhile trade union, the possession and enjoyment of the disputed property could not be decided merely on the basis of Exs.A-36, A-37, A38, A-39, A-40, A-41, A-43, A-45 and A-46 referred to above, which were, of course, produced by the revision petitioners ‘A’ party merely because they happened to be in possession of such documents, and therefore the documents, by themselves, could not be considered as a testing factor to decide as to who was in possession of the disputed property on the date when the learned Executive Magistrate passed an order under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C, to maintain peace or to avoid breach of peace. 12. 12. Mr.Viduthalai invited my attention to Sec.145(4) and Sec.145(6), Crl.P.C. and contends that it is not always obligatory on the part of the learned Executive Magistrate to pass an order to put either party in possession and enjoyment of the disputed property, because, the learned Executive Magistrate is also given an option to attach the disputed property until the merits and claims of the parties are decided by a competent Civil Court as per Sec. 146, Crl.P.C, and therefore, the decision taken by the learned Executive Magistrate directing the parties to maintain status quo till the title is decided by the competent authority, is more appropriate and justified. 13. In order to substantiate his contention, Mr.Viduthalai places reliance on following decision, namely: (i) K.Selvaraj v. The Inspector of Police and another, Criminal Revision Case No.15 of 1996, order dated 23.4.1998 and (ii) The decision of the Apex Court in R.C.Patuck v. Fatima A.Kindasa R.C.Patuck v. Fatima A.Kindasa, A.I.R. 1997 S.C.2320. 14. I have bestowed my careful consideration to the submission of both sides. 15. In this regard, I am obliged to refer Secs.145 and 146 of Crl.P.C. which read as follows: “Sec.145, Crl.P.C: “Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace:(1) Whether an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression “land or water” includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for a service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for a service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute. (4) TheMagistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any land which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under Sub-sec.(1)in possession of the subject dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under Sub-sec.(1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under Sub-sec.(1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under Sub-sec.(1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to Sub-sec. (4) be treatedas being in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to Sub-sec.(4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed.“ (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid don in Sub-sec.(3)”. (7) When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be made a party to the proceeding and shall thereupon continue the inquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal representative of a deceased party for the purposes of such proceedings is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the deceased party shall be made parties thereto. (8) If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or otherwise produce of the property the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of such property, and upon the completion of the inquiry, shall make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale proceedings thereof, as he thinks fit. (9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the proceedings under this section, on the application of either party issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to produce any document or thing. (10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under Sec.107. Sec.146, Crl.P.C: Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver:(1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in Sec.145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if no receiver in relation to such subject of dispute has been appointed by any civil court, make such arrangements as he considers proper for looking after the property or if he thinks fit, appoint a receiver thereof, who shall have subject to the control of the Magistrate, all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Provided that in the event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of dispute by any civil court, the Magistrate- (a)shall order the receiver appointed by him to hand over the possession of the subject of dispute to the receiver appointed by the Civil Court and shall thereafter discharge the receiver appointed by him; (b)may make such other incidential or consequential orders as may be just.” 16. I am also obliged to refer Secs.2(a), 2(b), 2(h), 5, 6 and 13 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, which read as follows: Sec.2(a): “Executive” means the body, by whatever name called, to which the management of the affairs of a Trade Union is entrusted.” Sec. 2(b):“Office-bearer” in the case of a Trade Union, includes any member of the executive thereof, but does not include an auditor.” Sec.2(h):*“Trade Union” means any combination, whether temporary or permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers, or between workmen and workmen, or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business, and includes any federation of two or more Trade Unions: Provided that this Act shall not affect.. (i) any agreement between partners as to their own business; (ii) any agreement between an employer and those employed by him as to such employment; or (iii) any agreement in consideration of the sale of the goodwill of a business or of instruction in any profession, trade or handicraft. (i) any agreement between partners as to their own business; (ii) any agreement between an employer and those employed by him as to such employment; or (iii) any agreement in consideration of the sale of the goodwill of a business or of instruction in any profession, trade or handicraft. Sec. 5: Application of registration:(1) Every application for registration of a Trade Union shall be made to the Registrar, and shall be accompanied by a copy of the rules of the Trade Union and a statement of the following particulars, namely: (a) the names, occupations and addresses of the members making the application; (b) the name of the Trade Union and the address of its head office; and (c) the titles, name, ages addresses and occupations of the office-bearers of the Trade Union. (2) Where a Trade Union has been in existence for more than one year before the making of an application for its registration, there shall be delivered to the Registrar, together with the application, a general statement of the assets and liabilities of the Trade Union prepared in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.” Sec.6:“A Trade Union shall not be entitled to registration under this Act, unless the executive thereof is constituted in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and the rules thereof provide for the following matters, namely: (a) the name of the Trade Union; (b) the whole of the objects for which the Trade Union has been established; (c) the whole of the purposes for which the general funds of the Trade Union shall be applicable, all of which purposes shall be purposes to which such funds are lawfully applicable under this Act; (d) the maintenance of a list of the members of the trade and adequate facilities for the inspection thereof by the Office-bearers and members of the Trade Union; (e) the admission of ordinary members who shall be persons actually engaged or employed in an industry with which the Trade Union is connected, and also the admission of the number of honorary or temporary members as office-bearers required under Sec.22 to form the executive of the Trade Union; (ee) the payment of a subscription by members of the Trade Union which shall not be less than twenty five paise per month per member; (f) the conditions under which any member shall be entitled to any benefit assured by the rules and under which any fine or forfeiture may be imposed on the members; (g) the manner in which the rules shall be amended, varies or rescinded; (h) the manner in which the members of the executive and the other office bearers of the Trade Union shall be appointed and removed; (i) the safe custody of the funds of the Trade Union and annual audit, in such manner as may be prescribed, of the accounts thereof, and adequate facilities for the inspection of the account books by the office bearers and members of the Trade Union; (j) the manner in which the Trade Union may be dissolved. Sec. 13: “Incorporation of registered Trade” Unions:Every registered Trade Union shall be a body corporate by the name under which it is registered, and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal with power to acquired and hold both movable and immovable property and to contract, and shall by the said name sue and be sued.” 17. Sec.2(h) defines the trade Union; Secs.2(a) and 2(b) define the executives and office bearers of the trade union: Sec.5 prescribes the procedure for registering the trade Union and Sec.6 contemplates to constitute the executives of the trade union. Sec.13 enables the trade union to acquire and hold both immovable and movable properties. 18. Sec.22 deals with the proportion of office bearers to be connected with the industry; Sec.23 deals with the procedure to be followed in changing the name of the trade union; Sec.24 deals with the amalgamation of the trade Unions and Sec.25 deals with the notice of change of name or amalgamation; Sec.26 deals with the effects of change of name and of amalgamation and Sec.27 deals with the dissolution of the trade union. 19. A reading of Secs.22, 23, 25 and 27 of the Trade Unions Act, together makes it clear that the office bearers are controlling the day to day affairs and activities of the respective trade unions, Irrespective of the fact relating to the split among the members. Therefore, if the parties decide the issue under Sec.145, Criminal Procedure Code, the evidence produced by the office bearers of either parties alone can be considered as relevant. 20. If the learned Executive Magistrate is favoured with sufficient material evidence by the respective parties before him, certainly, he is expected to discharge his obligations under Sec.145, Criminal Procedure Code, and there is an implied statutory obligation on the learned Executive Magistrate to decide as to the dispute with regard to the possession of the property between the parties, instead of disowning his responsibility to discharge the statutory powers, particularly when there are material evidence on record. 21. 21. Of course, the learned Executive Magistrate has been given an option to follow any of the interim measures framed under Sec. 146, Crl.P.C. But, such an interim measure can be resorted only in the following circumstances, namely: (i) The case is to be one of emergency; (ii) If he desires that none of the parties was in such possession, as is referred to in Sec.145; and (iii) If the learned Executive Magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to who of them was then in possession of the disputed property. 22. It is therefore implied that if the learned Executive Magistrate is satisfied to direct both the parties to maintain status quo he should give reasons for not considering the evidence produced before him. 23. But, a reading of the order of the learned Executive Magistrate dated 31.12.1996, which is challenged in the above revision, does not reflect any such reasons for ignoring the evidence produced by the revision petitioners ‘A’ party. 24. No doubt, the Apex Court, while interpreting the powers of the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec.145, Crl.P.C. in R.C.Patuck v. Fatima A.Kindasa R.C.Patuck v. Fatima A.Kindasa, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 2320hasheld as follows: “It will be seen from the facts stated above that the order under Sec. 145(1) was passed by the learned Magistrate on 16.3.1993. The question is whether the Magistrate could have passed any order in favour of the petitioner under Sub-sec.(4) of Sec.145. Going by the main Sub-clause (4) of Sec.145, it is clear that the Magistrate could initially decide who was in possession as on the date when the order under Sec.145(1) was passed on 16.3.1993. In cases where the proviso to the said Sub-clause (4) applied, that is, if it appeared to the Magistrate that any party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed, within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of this order under Sub-sec.(1) the Magistrate might treat the party so dispossessed as if the said party had been in possession on the date of his order under Sub-sec.(l). In other words, if the conditions mentioned in the proviso to Sub-sec.(4) were satisfied, the Magistrate could deem a person to be in possession as on the date of the order under Sec. 145(1) notwithstanding the fact that he was not in fact in possession on that date, But lost possession earlier, within two months next before the order. In this case unfortunately there is no material to show that any report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate within the period contemplated by the proviso. On the other hand, petitioners admissions show that she lost possession much before the period mentioned in the said proviso. We are, therefore, of the view that both the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that no order for restoration of possession could be passed in favour of the petitioner under Sec.145 of the Crl.P.C. A contention was then raised that as the dispossession of the petitioner was continuing, and it amounted to a continuing and it amounted to a continuing wrong and, therefore, the proviso to sub-clause (4) must be deemed to be satisfied. We are afraid that such a contention based on continuance of dispossession, cannot be accepted.” 25. Placing reliance on the above decision, Mr.Viduthalai contends that if the revision petitioners ‘A’ party are not able to establish the dispossession, they are not entitled for possession, and therefore, restoration of possession of revision petitioners ‘A’ party cannot be granted. 26. But, in the instant case, I have already observed that the learned Executive Magistrate has not given any reason for disbelieving the evidence produced by the revision petitioners ‘A’ party, namely, Exs.A-36, A-37, A-38, A-39, A-40, A-41, A-43, A-45 and A-46. 27. Alternatively, Mr.Viduthalai referred to the order in K.Selvaraj v. The Inspector of Police and another, Crl.R.C.No.15 of 1996, dated 23.4.1998, wherein it is held as follows: “In view of the rival claim of possession of the building among these two sections and the orders of this Court dated 4.4.1995 refusing to give possession of the building to the ‘A’ party against which there is no appeal by the persons aggrieved, till the civil court passes the order with regard to the possession of the building, I feel that the Revenue Divisional Officer shall to deliver possession of the building to any of the parties. As a matter of fact, after the interim stay granted by this Court in this revision, The Revenue Divisional Officer has ordered for the locking of the building again. This is seen by her order in M.C.No.192/93/A1 dated 12.1.1996. As the building has been taken possession by the Revenue Divisional Officer again, it is proper to direct the Revenue Divisional Officer to keep the building under her control till the civil court passes the order with regard to the possession of the building. In the result, the revision is allowed setting aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 2.1.1996 and she is directed to keep the building under her possession and control till the civil court passes the order either in the interim application or in the main suit itself, and hand over possession of the building to the party entitled to be in possession as per the order of the civil court.” 28. Again, in the instant case, even in the very order of the learned Executive Magistrate by order in M.C.Nos.75 of 1996 and 76 of 1996, dated 31.12.1996, it is observed as follows: “On perusal of the deposition of the witnesses and exhibits filed by ‘A’ and ‘B’ parties, and hearing the arguments of both the sides, I conclude that the jurisdiction of this Court is only with respect to the party which party was in possession of the disputed building on the date of passing of the preliminary order under Sec. 145(1) was passed. This Court is not concerned with the claims made to the title of the disputed building. Keeping the above in mind, of all the total evidence produced by ‘A’ party, the receipts of electricity bills, taxes, telephone bills etc. are important to determine the actual possession on the date mentioned.” “A-3 Easwaran in his deposition stated that the taxes, electricity charges, water charges, telephone charges and other expenditures remitted by him and receipts kept in office and that he sent the remitted receipts to the head office which are retained there. According to his statement Thiru S.Duraisamy signed the receipts after verification.” On verification it was found that the receipts of electricity bills, takes, etc. i.e., A-37, A-38, A-39, A-40, A-46. These documents clearly bear the signature of Thiru S.Doraisamy, who is as per ‘A’ party contention the General Secretary of Kovai Periyar Mavatta panchalai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam. According to his statement Thiru S.Duraisamy signed the receipts after verification.” On verification it was found that the receipts of electricity bills, takes, etc. i.e., A-37, A-38, A-39, A-40, A-46. These documents clearly bear the signature of Thiru S.Doraisamy, who is as per ‘A’ party contention the General Secretary of Kovai Periyar Mavatta panchalai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam. But Exs.A-34, A-35, A-36, A-41, A-43, A44, A-45 have the signature of Thiru Doraisamy scribbled in pen over these without his designation. These discrepancies in the documents leads to ambiguity. The ‘B’ party has not been able to produce any such evidence which shows that they were in actual possession of the disputed building.” 29. Therefore, a reading of the above portion of the impugned order in M.C.Nos.75 of 1996 and 76 of 1996, dated 31.12.1996 of the learned Executive Magistrate makes it clear that the revision petitioners have placed adequate material evidence before the learned Executive Magistrate to satisfy that they were dispossessed of the disputed property as per the evidence produced by them, as contemplated under Sec.145(4) of Crl.P.C. 30. On the other hand, it is observed by the learned Executive Magistrate in his order dated 31.12.1996 that the ‘B’ party had not been able to produce any such evidence to show that they were in actual possession of the disputed building. 31. It is under such circumstances, the order in S.Doraisamy and two others v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by Inspector of Police and two others, Crl.R.C.No.394 of 1997, dated 10.9.1997 referred by Mr.N.T.Vanamamalai, learned senior counsel appearing for the revision petitioners, deserves to be referred to, wherein, it is held as follows: “When there were sufficient materials available the Executive Magistrate ought to have acted under Sec.145(4), Crl.P.C. That has not been done.” 32. Admittedly, Exs.A-36, A-37, A-38, A-39, A-40, A-41, A-43, A-45, A-46, are related to the details of tax, electric charges, water charges and telephone bills, produced by the revision petitioners ‘A’ party before the learned Executive Magistrate on the date of passing the order namely 31.12.1996 under Sec.145(l), Crl.P.C. in their capacity as office bearers of their respective trade unions. But, on the other hand, no such documents were produced by the respondents ‘B’ party in their capacity as office bearers of the trade union. But, on the other hand, no such documents were produced by the respondents ‘B’ party in their capacity as office bearers of the trade union. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record produced by the respondents ‘B’ party, the evidence produced by the petitioners ‘A’ party cannot be lightly disregarded and they are considered to be sufficient material evidence to hold that the revision petitioners ‘A’ party was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order of the learned Executive Magistrate under Sec.145(1), Crl.P.C. Merely because the exhibits contained, the signature of S.Duraisamy, General Secretary of Kovai Periyar Mavatta Panchalai Thozhilalar Munnetra Sangam, representing the head office of the revision petitioner ‘A’ party trade union, cannot be a ground to disregard the said exhibits to hold that there are discrepancies in the said exhibits particularly, when the ‘B’ party was not able to produce even any such evidence to show that they were in possession of the disputed building. 33. Of course, Mr.Viduthalai would contend that the mere production of these documents cannot be a factor to decide the possession when there was a vertical split in the trade union in question in consequence of the split in the parent political party. It is only under such circumstances, I do not propose to decide the issue on the basis of the split in the political party much less, the trade union, unless and otherwise such a split and charge in the office bearers or in the name of the trade union are statutorily recognised and fit in with the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, referred to above. Therefore, what remains to be decided is, whether the revision petitioners or the respondents were representing the office bearers of the trade union which was holding the possession of the disputed property. Such a vital issue was not either taken note of, or discussed by the learned Executive Magistrate in his order, inspite of production of such material evidences, particularly as per Exs.A-25 to A-27, A-36 to A-41 and A-43 to A-46 which show that the office bearers representing the revision petitioners ‘A’ party, alone were holding the possession of the property in question. 34. 34. Taking note of the above vital evidences, I am obliged to set aside the order of the learned Executive Magistrate dated 31.12.1996, and consequently, (i) The learned Executive Magistrate is directed to restore the possession to the revision petitioners ‘A’ party forthwith, of course, such an order of restoration of possession shall be subject to any interim order of final order which may be passed by the competent civil court in appropriate [proceedings, provided under Sec.146(2); (ii) While passing such interim or final order, the competent civil court shall not be prejudiced by any of my observations in the above revision or the observations of the learned Executive Magistrate in the order dated 31.12.1996 impugned in the abvoe revision; (iii) The parties are at liberty to take appropriate proceedings, if they are so advised, if any such interim or final order is passed by the competent court; (iv) As there is already an order of this Court dated 23.4.1998 directing the civil court to pass appropriate orders as to the interim or final order in the matter in question in O.S.No.2024 of 1994 and O.S.No.59 of 1994, on the file of the learned District Munsif, Coimbatore, the learned District Munsif, Coimbatore, is directed to pass interim or final orders expeditiously, in any event, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 35. The revision is allowed with the above directions. However, there will be no order as to costs.