Honble SHARMA, J.–Invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner an Advocate, made following prayer- (i) order dated October 23, 1998 of the Joint Legal Remembrancer and Director Litigation Jaipur be set aside; and (ii) the petitioner be allowed to continue as Public Prosecutor Hanu-mangarh. (2). Contextual facts depict that the petitioner was appointed as Public Prosecutor for Hanumangarh Distt. vide order dated Sept.19, 1994 (Annexure-1). While the petitioner was discharging the functions of the Public Prosecutor, the State Government issued an order dated October 23, 1998 (Annexure-4) terminating the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and appointed Advocate Vijay Sharma (respondent No.3) as Public Prosecutor Hanumangarh. According to the petitioner the order Annexure -4 is arbitrary and illegal being violative of Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Rule 15 of the Rajasthan Law and Judicial Department Manual 1952(for short Manual 1952). (3). The respondents in their reply averred that the petitioner has crossed 60 years on July 23, 1998 therefore according to Rule 15 of the Manual 1952 he could not have continued as Public Prosecutor. Thus after following the procedure enumerated in Section 24 Cr.P.C., the appointment of Vijay Sharma was made. (4). Mr. Mahendra Goyal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner canvassed that without following the procedure contained in Section 24 of the Cr.P.C., the respondent No.3 has been appointed. The name of the respondent No. 3 was neither recommended by the District and Sessions Judge nor due formalities have been completed by the respondents 1 and 2 as required in Manual 1952. The respondents 1 and 2 have not properly appreciated the provisions contained in Rule 15 of Manual 1952 and without affording opportunity of showing cause the services of the petitioner have been terminated as such the impugned order Annexure-4 is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others vs. State of U.P. and others (1), State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others (2), Harpal Singh Chauhan and others vs. State of U.P. (3) and Manak Chand Jain vs. State of Rajasthan and another (4). (5). On the other hand Mr. J.S. Rastogi, learned Additional Advocate General, and Mr. Prem Shanker Asopa, learned Senior Advocate, have contended that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. (5). On the other hand Mr. J.S. Rastogi, learned Additional Advocate General, and Mr. Prem Shanker Asopa, learned Senior Advocate, have contended that the petitioner has not come with clean hands. He has intentionally concealed his age and even affidavit was filed by the petitioner without showing his age. The appointment of the respondent No.3 Vijay Sharma was made after following procedure enumerated in Section 24 Cr.P.C. as well as in Manual 1952. Reliance was placed on Suraj Narain Surwal vs. State of Rajasthan and others (5), Tahil Bulani vs. State of Rajasthan and others (6) and Bajrang lal Jat vs. State of Rajasthan and others (7). (6). Before adverting to the rival submission, it will be useful to consider the relevant statutory provisions. Section 24 Cr.P.C. provides thus- ``24. Public Prosecutors-(1) For every High Court, the Central Govern-ment or the State Government shall, after consultation with the High Court appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Prosecutors, for conducting in such Court, any prosecution, appeal or other proceeding on behalf of the Central Government or State Government as the case may be. (2). The Central Government may appoint one or more Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting any case or class of cases in any district or local area. (3). For every District the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor and may also appoint one or more Additional Public Pro-secutors for the district: Provided that the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor appointed for one district may be appointed also to be a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor as the case may be, for another district. (4). The District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion fit to be appointed as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district. (5). No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4). (6). (5). No person shall be appointed by the State Government as the Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor for the district unless his name appears in the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4). (6). Notwithstanding anything contain in sub-section (5) where in a State there exits a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers, the State Government shall appoint a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor only from among the persons constituting such cadre: Provided that where, in the opinion of the State Government, no sui-table person is available in such Cadre for such appointment that Government may appoint a person as Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor, as the case may be, from the panel of names prepared by the District Magistrate under sub-section (4). (7). A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or an Additional Public Prosecutor under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) or sub-section (6) only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less then seven years. (8). The Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, a person who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor. (9). For the purposes of Sub-section (7) and sub-section (8), the period during which a person has been in practice as a pleader, or has rendered (whether before or after the commencement of this Code) service as a Public Prosecutor or as an Additional Public or Assistant Public Prosecutor or other Prosecuting Officer by whatever name called, shall be deemed to be the period during which such person has been in practice as an Advocate. (7). Rule 15 of the Manual 1952 provides that the Public Prosecutor shall be appointed for a period of three years including the period of his probation, and may be reappointed for further periods not exceeding three years at a time. Ordinarily no person will be appointed as Public Prosecutor if he attains the age of 60 years or continued in that office if he attains the age. Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of his term of appointment, a Public Prosecutor shall continue as such until he is reappointed or his successor is appointed. (8). Ordinarily no person will be appointed as Public Prosecutor if he attains the age of 60 years or continued in that office if he attains the age. Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of his term of appointment, a Public Prosecutor shall continue as such until he is reappointed or his successor is appointed. (8). A look at sub-sections (4) & (5) of Section 24 Cr.P.C. reveals that panel of names of fit persons to be appointed as Public Prosecutor has to be prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the District & Sessions Judge and no person is eligible to be appointed as Public Prosecutor, whose name does not find place in said panel. Similarly a person who attains age of 60 years is not ordinarily to be appointed as Public Prosecutor as is evident from Rule 15 of the Manual of 1952. The petitioner who is an advocate is presumed to have knowledge of the aforementioned legal position and it appears that the petitioner intentionally did not mention his age in the writ petition as well as the affidavit filed along with it. The respondents 1 and 2 with their reply annexed copy of the application dated July 8, 1997 submitted by the petitioner to the District and Sessions Judge Hanumangarh. In the said application the petitioner has mentioned his date of birth as July 23, 1938 and admittedly on July 23, 1998 the petitioner has completed 60 years of age. The instant writ petition has been filed on November 5, 1998 assailing the order dated October 23, 1998 Annexure-4 whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated with immediate effect. On October 23, 1998 the petitioner has crossed the age of 60 years and in view of Rule 15 of Manual 1952 the petitioner was not entitled to be appointed as Public Prosecutor and under these circumstances it was not necessary for the respondent 1 and 2 to issue show cause notice to the petitioner before passing the said order of termination. The cases cited by the petitioner are distinguishable and not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. (9). The cases cited by the petitioner are distinguishable and not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. (9). In Shrilekha Vidyarthi vs. State of U.P. (supra) the Government of State of U.P. by one stroke terminated the appointments of all Government Counsel (Civil, Criminal and Revenue) in all districts of the State of U.P. by a general order and directed preparation of fresh panels to make appointments in place of the existing incumbents. The validity of this State action was challenged and it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the termination of appointments of Govt. Counsel was arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (10). In State of U.P. vs. Ramesh Chandra Sharma and others (supra), the Government refused to renew the terms of the District Government Counsel. In that case Ramesh Chandra Sharma, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Naresh Chandra Sharma respectively were appointed Additional District Government Counsel (Criminal) at Budaun in the State of Uttar Pradesh on different dates for a fixed term mentioned in the order of appointment. Their term was renewed similarly from time to time. However, a further renewal was denied to them by an order dated 1.10.1992. This order was challenged by them by a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ petition. The State of U.P. preferred appeal against the judgment before the Apex Court on the ground that the renewal of the tenure could not be claimed as a matter of right under para 7.08 of the U.P. Legal Remembrancers Manual. In reply counsel for the respondents contended that the appointment of an advocate as a District Government Counsel under Chapter VII of the Manual is an employment and not a professional engagement of an advocate and therefore the advocate is entitled to automatic renewal till he attains the age of 62 years prescribed in the Manual. In that case the report of the District Officer was favourable to the respondends Ramesh Chandra Sharma, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Naresh Chandra Sharma and the District Judge had really recommended renewal of their term. But in the case before me the District Judge Hanumangarh has not recommended the case of the petitioner. (11). In that case the report of the District Officer was favourable to the respondends Ramesh Chandra Sharma, Ashok Kumar Sharma and Naresh Chandra Sharma and the District Judge had really recommended renewal of their term. But in the case before me the District Judge Hanumangarh has not recommended the case of the petitioner. (11). In Harpal Singh Chauhan vs. State of U.P. (supra), the appellant Harpal Singh was appointed as Assistant District Government Counsel (Criminal) to appear in different criminal cases, on behalf of the State, in different Courts in the District of Moradabad. The State Government refused to extend his term for a further period of three years. The writ petition filed by Harpal Singh was dismissed by the High Court. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case indicated that the consultation between the Sessions Judge and District Judge about the merit and suitability of the person to be appointed as Public Prosecutor must be effective and real. Though there is no right to extension of the term, judicial review is open on ground of infirmity in decision making process. (12). As already stated the name of the petitioner has not recommended by the District Magistrate and thus the ratio of the aforesaid case is not applicable. (13). In Manak Chand Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (supra), the State Government had issued a wireless message to 14 Collectors before expiry of term of appointment of Public Prosecutors terminated their services. Under these circumstances the order of termination was set-aside. (14). The respondents 1 and 2 also averred in their reply that panel was invited from the District Magistrate vide letter dated 18.06.1997. Thereafter reminder was sent on August 12, 1997, in pursuance of the said letter the District Magistrate had sent panel of the advocates vide letter dated August 19, 1997. In the said panel the name of the respondent No.3 was incorporated. The application of the petitioner Mangilal Saraf was also forwarded showing his date of birth as July 23, 1938. Therefore it is wrong to say that there was no penal which included the name of respondent No.3 Vijay Sharma. The services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground of his age. (15).In view of the above, I see no unconstitutionality in the order dated October 23, 1998 Annexure-4. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.