JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for quashing the order of suspension dated 18-5-98 (Annexure 1), the order dated 14-11-98 (Annexure 8) by which Mr. Subh Kazan Beniwal has been directed to take over the charge from the petitioner and the order dated 27-11-98 (Annexure 11) by which the appeal of the petitioner against the suspension order has been rejected by the Appellate Authority. 2. The case has a chequered history and this is the third round of litigations against the same impugned suspension order dated 18-5-98. However, for the purpose of deciding this.case, it is not necessary to discuss the earlier orders as this Court earlier did not entertain the petitions on the ground of availability of the alternative remedy etc. 3. The petitioner was posted as the Tahsildar and had been served with a suspension order dated 18-5-98 (Annexure-1) reciting that an enquiry was contemplated against him and immediately thereafter he approached this court but could not succeed in getting the relief against the said order. In the meanwhile, the other impugned order dated 14-1-198 (Annexure-8) was passed directing the other officer to take over the charge from the petitioner and his appeal against the suspension order had been rejected by the Appellate Authority by the impugned order dated 26-11-98 (Annexure-11). Hence this petition. 4. The suspension order has been challenged mainly on the factual grounds and the petitioner has tried to show that the allegations made against him are not true and some other persons are responsible for the same. Petitioner has also taken legal action against the persons who are alleged to be responsible for committing the delinquency and, therefore, no suspension order could have been passed against him. Allegations, on which the petitioner is facing the disciplinary proceedings, is in respect of shortage of Government Fund to the tune of Rs. 31,583/- it may not be out of place to mention here that during the pendency of the appeal against the said suspension order, the petitioner has been served with a charge-sheet, wherein five charges have been levelled against him. The first charge relates to the same incident in which there had been an embezzlement of the Government money to the tune of Rs. 31,583/; the second charge relates to is an allegation of embezzlement to the tune of Rs. The first charge relates to the same incident in which there had been an embezzlement of the Government money to the tune of Rs. 31,583/; the second charge relates to is an allegation of embezzlement to the tune of Rs. 1266/; the third charge is for misusing his official capacity and granting a sanction without power to the tune of Rs. 47,872/; the fourth charge relates to not verifying the record which led to embezzlement of the Government money and the fifth charge relates to violation of the Rules of Account and acting without jurisdiction as well as misuse of his official capacity during the period from 23-7-1997 to 23-12-1998. However, Mr. Mridul has submitted that the petitioner's case is confined only to the first charge as the suspension order has been passed only on the basis of first charge, for which the petitioner cannot be held responsible. Petitioner's appeal was limited only to the first charge. 5. The issue involved herein is no more res integra as it has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions. In U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parisad v. Sanjeev Rajan, 1993 (Suppl.) 3 SCC 483 , the Apex Court observed as under : "Ordinarily, when there is an accusation of deflection of the money, the delinquent employees have to be kept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of. Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed only to keep an individual concerned out of the employment, is a different matter. But even in such a case, no conclusion can be derived at without examining the entire record in question and hence it is always advisable to allow the disciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered ........ Whether' the employees should or should not continue in their office during the period of inquiry is a matter to be assessed by the concerned authority and ordinarily, the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employees with the case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director was impressed by the 1st respondent employee's representation. However, after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not be innocent. However, after the report, it was noticed that the employee could not be innocent. Since this is the conclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in their possession, no conclusion to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at the interlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record. In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke the order of suspension." 6. A similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. B.K. Mohanty, 1994 (4) SCC 126 : ( AIR 1994 SC 2296 ) wherein the Apex Court observed that suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding and disabling an employee to discharge the duties of an office just to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetuate the alleged misconduct and it may, also, serve the purpose of removing the impression amongst the members of the service that dereliction of duty can also pay fruits and the erring employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment. The other purpose of putting an employee under suspension is to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or to facilitate the delinquent to impede the progress of investigation or enquiry etc. However, the Court further observed that the suspension order should not be actuated by mala fide, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. It must be a step to achieve the ultimate result of the enquiry and the Authority must bear in mind the public interest and the impact of the delinquent's continuation in office while facing the disciplinary proceedings. 7. In State of Rajasthan v. B. K. Meena, 1996 (6) SCC 417 : (1996 Lab IC 2750) the Hon'ble Apex Court considered several of its earlier judgments and observed as under (at page 2753 of Lab IC) : "The interests of administration and good Government demand that these proceedings are concluded expeditiously. It must be remembered that interest of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. It must be remembered that interest of administration demand that undesirable elements are thrown out and any charge of misdemeanour is enquired into promptly. The disciplinary proceedings are meant not really to punish the guilty but to keep the administrative machinery unsullied by getting rid of bad elements. The interest of the delinquent officer also lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. If he is not guilty of the charges, his honour should be vindicated at the earlier possible moment and if he is guilty, he should be dealt with promptly according to law." 8. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority has applied its mind and passed a speaking and reasoned order while rejecting the appeal of the petitioner against the impugned suspension order and came to the conclusion that the facts and circumstances did not warrant any interference with the impugned suspension order. It was held so after analytically examining the whole record and according the personal hearing to the petitioner. The Appellate Authority observed that the charge was of a very serious and grave nature. 9. Whether the charge is true or false, has to be examined in the disciplinary proceedings by the Disciplinary Authority and the Court cannot go into it at this stage and decide the same. The Court cannot take over the function of the Disciplinary Authority. The truth or otherwise of the charge is a matter for the Disciplinary Authority to decide and even after conclusion of the enquiry, the Court has a very limited scope of judicial review and that too on the process of decision making and not on the correctness of the decision. Therefore, it is not desirable that the Court must assess the correctness of the charge at this stage nor it is impossible for the writ Court to examine a case as an appellate forum dehors the limitation of judicial review while considering the quashing of the suspension order at the threshold. (vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh, 1994 (3) SCC 357 : (1994 AIR SCW 2777) and Secretary to the Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, 1996 (3) SCC 157 . Undoubtedly, the competent authority has i always a power to review the suspension order. (vide Union of India v. Upendra Singh, 1994 (3) SCC 357 : (1994 AIR SCW 2777) and Secretary to the Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, 1996 (3) SCC 157 . Undoubtedly, the competent authority has i always a power to review the suspension order. It is an inherent power conferred upon him by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the Authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if he is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for passing such an order. But the Court cannot exercise the said power, also. 10. Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 and Appendices I and II to the said Rules provide for a detailed procedure in respect of suspension and conducting the disciplinary proceedings. The said requirements have to be complied with and concerned authorities have to act in accordance with the procedure provided in the said appendices. 11. In view of the above, the case does not warrant any interference by this Court and the petition is dismissed. However, the Disciplinary Authority is directed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously.Petition dismissed. *******