R. BALIA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by defendant Nos. 1, 2 and 12 in the original suit no. 19 of 1997 against the order dated 5-9-1997 passed by Civil Judge (Senior division), Kutch whereby he confirmed the ad interim ex parte order made on 5-9-1997 on an application, Exh. 5 made by the plaintiff for grant of temporary injunction in its favour, directing the defendants to maintain status quo in regard to the suit property known as Vijay Vilas Palace situated at Kathada, Taluka : mandvi-Kachchh and made to last the decision of the suit. ( 2 ) THE suit has been filed by Hanumantsinhji Madansinhji Jadeja in all against 13 defendants including the present appellants. The suit was for cancellation of sale deed executed by Maharao Madansinhji on 14-7-1972 as rectified by a deed of rectification dated 24-7-1972 in favour of the present appellant No. 1. Appellant No. 1 is a registered partnership firm of which appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are present partners. Respondent Nos. 2 to 9 (original defendant Nos. 3 to 10) are alleged to be erstwhile partners of appellant No. 1 who since long are alleged to have ceased to be partners and are made formal parties to the suit as at the time when the sale deed in question was executed they had interest in the partnership firm. The defendant No. 11 Modi Mafatlal mangaldas was the person who at the initial stage was appointed to execute the sale deed and since sale deed and rectification deed were in fact executed he also remain to be a formal party. Defendant No. 13 and respondent No. 11 is the State of Gujarat which has been impleaded as a party as the plaintiff relies on some orders made by State of Gujarat in Agricultural Land Ceiling proceedings in respect of the property in question. However, for the purpose of securing the plaintiffs right to get the sale set aside and make it available for succession to the estate of Maharao Madansinhji who died on 21-6-1991, it remains a formal party. These parties, viz. , respondent Nos. 2 to 11 are not affected by outcome of this appeal either. For the purpose of present appeal, the presence of respondent Nos. 2 to 10 is, therefore, dispensed with as they are not necessary for the decision of this appeal. These parties, viz. , respondent Nos. 2 to 11 are not affected by outcome of this appeal either. For the purpose of present appeal, the presence of respondent Nos. 2 to 10 is, therefore, dispensed with as they are not necessary for the decision of this appeal. ( 3 ) PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT No. 1 lay claim to the property in question under a Will executed by Maharao Madansinhji on 17-12-1985. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the transfer made by Maharao Madansinhji during his life on 14-7-1972 being contrary to the provisions of Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 was invalid and inoperative, the property continued to be the property of Maharao madansinhji in respect of which he could make disposition by a testamentary document. Even otherwise, in the absence of testamentary disposition, the property would have devolved on the heirs of Maharao Madansinhji as an intestate succession because the transfer dated 14-7-1972 being invalid, the rights in the property in dispute never passed to the purchasers. For this purpose, reliance was placed on Sec. 8 of the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960 and orders made by authorities under the Act of 1960. In the first instance, by order dated 2-2-1979, the competent authority held the transfer not to be binding within the meaning of Sec. 8 of the Act, which in further proceedings was set aside by order dated 7-2-1997 of the Gujarat revenue Tribunal and case was remanded back to the original authority for deciding the question afresh. ( 4 ) ONE fact which is of relevance and need notice at this juncture is that during his life time on 18-10-1977 Maharao Madansinhji himself had filed a civil suit challenging this very transaction which suit he withdrew on 7-12-1977. The second fact which has been noticed by the trial Court and on which emphasis has been laid is that the plaintiff has also prayed for probate of Will dated 17-5-1985 of Late maharao Madansinhji. ( 5 ) THE trial Court in passing the order under appeal for holding prima facie case in favour of plaintiff appears to have been influenced by singular consideration that the order of preparing inventory in Special Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 is pending compliance and the movable properties are the part and parcel of the suit property in Special Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980. It held :"as inventory of the property is ordered to be issued in Special Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 which is still to be carried out and the Court in the present case has also ordered inventory of movable articles if the disputed transfer of property gives rise to multiplicity of proceedings and therefore, the plaintiff had a prima facie case. "it also opined :"as the probate petition is pending and the inventory in both the suits are pending and if the disputed property is transferred it would give rise to multiplicity of proceedings and it would also affect to the antique articles and therefore, the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff rather than the defendants. "by the same reasoning the learned trial Judge held the question of irreparable injury in favour of the plaintiff and made the order as noticed above. ( 6 ) IT has been urged by learned Counsel for the appellants that rights between the transacting parties, viz. , vendor Maharao Madansinhji and purchaser the firm appellant No. 1 remain unaffected by any provision of the Ceiling Act, though in a given circumstance, it may affect the computation of the surplus area held by the vendor for the purpose of the Act. No provision of the Act provides that vendor can himself ignore the transaction made by him and claim the property back from the purchaser merely because for the computation of surplus land in his holding the same may be ignored. Therefore, if the inter parties rights under transaction in favour of present appellants remain unaffected by Ceiling Act, the plaintiffs have no prima facie case in respect of the property in question, namely, the Vijay Vilas palace. So far as the question of inventory of movables in the Vijay Vilas Palace is concerned, it is the subject-matter of different orders and proceedings and the learned trial Judge has seriously erred in mixing the two issues while considering the case for issuing any temporary injunction in respect of the property in question. It was also urged that during his life time Maharao Madansinhji himself having filed a suit in respect of the suit transaction which was withdrawn, he had no right to file a suit again for the same relief, whether on same or other grounds. It was also urged that during his life time Maharao Madansinhji himself having filed a suit in respect of the suit transaction which was withdrawn, he had no right to file a suit again for the same relief, whether on same or other grounds. The present plaintiff who only claims as successor to Late Maharao Madansinhji has no right to maintain the present suit in respect of these very transaction, for declaring it to be invalid and retrieving the property back to the fold of the estate of the deceased, which was not possessed by his deceased father. ( 7 ) ON the other hand it has been strenuously urged by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-respondent that a transaction which is hit by the provision of the Act of 1960 is invalid and void ab initio and no right, title or interest passed on to the defendant No. 1 or its partners and also on the ground that the transaction was hit by Sec. 20 of the Contract Act being against the public policy. ( 8 ) HAVING carefully considered the rival contentions, and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, the appeal merit acceptance. ( 9 ) IN first instance, plaintiffs claim their right to challenge sale deed dated 14-7-1972 as rectified by deed dated 24-7-1972 as heir of Late Maharao Madansinhji whether succession is testate or intestate. Once Maharao Madansinhji himself has challenged that transaction by Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 on 18-7-1977 and withdrew that suit the issue between the present appellants and Maharao Madansinhji about the validity of that transaction became final on all grounds directly raised or which could have been raised by him for challenging the validity of said transaction, maharao Madansinhji himself could not have maintained second suit for challenging the said transaction. If that be so, his successors or heirs would not get a better right to challenge transactions made by him after his death. Therefore, the present suit challenging the validity of impugned transaction by plaintiff, who claims through late Maharao Madansinhji only, is prima facie barred on principles of res judicata. If that be so, his successors or heirs would not get a better right to challenge transactions made by him after his death. Therefore, the present suit challenging the validity of impugned transaction by plaintiff, who claims through late Maharao Madansinhji only, is prima facie barred on principles of res judicata. ( 10 ) SECONDLY, and more importantly, the plea of the plaintiffs about the availability of property for succession stems from assumption that a transaction which may be ignored for the purpose of computation of surplus area under the Act of 1960 is a nullity, void ab-initio and does not confer any right on the transferor, is not well founded. ( 11 ) SECTIONS 7 and 8 of the Act of 1960 in this connection may be reproduced which reads as under :"7. Restrictions on transfers of sub-divisions of land and consequences of transfer or sub-division made in contravention thereof :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time-being in force, no land shall, after the appointed day, be - (a) transferred whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or of an award or order of any other competent authority or by way of gift, exchange, lease or otherwise, or (b) sub-divided (including sub-division by a decree or order of a Civil Court or any other competent authority) whether by partition, family arrangement or otherwise, except with the permission in writing of the Collector. (2) The Collector may refuse to give such permission if in his opinion the transfer or sub-division of land is likely to defeat the object of this Act. (3) In computing under the provisions of this Act, the area of surplus land, if any, held by a person, the transfer or sub-division of land made by or on behalf of such person in contravention of sub-sec. (1) shall be ignored. (4) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to a person who held land not exceeding the ceiling area. 8. (1) shall be ignored. (4) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply to a person who held land not exceeding the ceiling area. 8. Transfers of partitions made after 15th January 1959 but before commencement of this Act :- (1) Where after 15th day of January, 1959 but before the commencement of this Act, or after 24th day of January, 1971, but before the specified date, any person has transferred whether by sale, gift, mortgage, with possession, exchange, lease, surrender or otherwise or partitioned any land held by him, then notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time-being in force such transfer or partition shall, unless it is proved to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act. Where such transfer or partition was made after 15th day of January 1959 but before the commencement of this Act or in order to defeat the object of the Amending act of 1972 where such transfer was made after 24th day of January, 1971 but before the specified date : provided that where any transfer or partition of land is effected by a document required by law to be registered which is, however, not registered and such document, purports to have been executed before 24th day of January, 1971 no Court shall pass a decree in any suit filed for the grant of specific relief on the basis of any such document unless the Court is satisfied on merits of the case that the document is a bona fide document executed in fact before 24th January, 1971, and that it is not ante-dated as a result of collusion between parties or otherwise in order to defeat the object of the Amending Act of 1972 : provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any transfer of land by way of gift or partition made on or after the 24th January 1971 to a son who was major on the said date. (2) Any person affected by the provisions of sub-sec. (1) may, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed form, make an application to the Collector for a declaration that the transfer or partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may be, of the Amending Act of 1972. (2) Any person affected by the provisions of sub-sec. (1) may, within the prescribed period and in the prescribed form, make an application to the Collector for a declaration that the transfer or partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may be, of the Amending Act of 1972. (3) On receipt of such application, the Collector shall hold an inquiry and after giving an opportunity to the transferor and the transferee or as the case may be, to the parties to the partition, to be heard and after considering the evidence which may be provided decide whether the transfer or, as the case may be the partition was or was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act, or, as the case may be, of the amending Act of 1972 and accordingly may - (i) reject the application, or (ii) by order in writing make a declaration that the transfer or, as the case may be, the partition was not made in anticipation in order to defeat the object of this Act, or as the case may be, of the Amending Act of 1972. (4) Where the application is rejected, the transfer or, as the case may be, the partition shall be ignored in computing under this Act the area of surplus land, if any, held by such person. " ( 12 ) SECTION 7 prima facie in first instance inhibits any transfer after the appointed day by way of sale, gift, exchange, lease or otherwise except with the permission in writing of the Collector. The Collector is empowered to refuse such permission only in circumstance, if in his opinion such transfer is likely to defeat the object of this Act. Consequence of the contravention of this has also been provided, that in computing any area of surplus if any held by a person, such transfer in contravention of sub-sec. (1) shall be ignored. It also clarifies that the provision does not apply in case a person does not hold land exceeding the ceiling area. Consequence of the contravention of this has also been provided, that in computing any area of surplus if any held by a person, such transfer in contravention of sub-sec. (1) shall be ignored. It also clarifies that the provision does not apply in case a person does not hold land exceeding the ceiling area. ( 13 ) LIKEWISE reading of Sec. 8 goes to show that where after the fifteenth day of January 1959 but before the commencement of the Act or after 24th January 1971 or before the specified date any person transfers, whether by sale, gift, mortgage with possession, exchange, lease, surrender or otherwise or partitions land held by him, then, unless it is proved to the contrary, such transaction shall be deemed to have been made in order to defeat the object of the Act. That is to say, Sec. 8, in the first instance creates a rule of evidence by raising a presumption against the bona fide nature of transfer by deeming it to be made in order to defeat the object of the Act. Obviously, this is not a conclusive presumption, but a rebuttable one and what shall be the consequence of such a transfer shall depend on an enquiry in a properly instituted proceedings about this fact. That is envisaged in sub-sec. (2 ). Sub-section (3) provides for what orders can be made on formation of opinion as a result of enquiry, and sub-sec. (4) provides for the consequence where in the opinion of competent authority such transferor has not been able to discharge onus to rebut the presumption raised against him. The only consequence that is provided is that where the application is rejected, the transfer or as the case may be, partition shall be ignored in computing under this Act, the area of surplus land if any held by such person. ( 14 ) THUS, it would appear that Sec. 7 as well as under Sec. 8 only inhibit the transfers made to defeat the object of the Act, if the same are made without prior permission of Collector or after and during specified dates. The statute has also provided consequences to follow, when there is a contravention of the requirement of Sec. 7 or the presumption under Sec. 8 remains unrebutted. The statute has also provided consequences to follow, when there is a contravention of the requirement of Sec. 7 or the presumption under Sec. 8 remains unrebutted. The consequence is not to invalidate the transaction affecting the rights of the parties inter se but is merely to ignore it for the purpose of computing surplus area held by the vendor or the transferor as on the relevant date and determine the question of ceiling accordingly. The effect is only limited to the purpose of the Act and not for any other purpose. Therefore, prima facie in the absence of any provision invalidating the transaction, no inference can be drawn that pendency of proceedings for considering whether the transactions in question are to be ignored for the purposes of computation of surplus area within the meaning of the Act of 1960, gives any right to vendor to ignore that transaction voluntarily made by him and to lay claim to the property on that basis, against the vendees and retrieve it. At best on culmination of ceiling proceedings, if ultimately it is held that the indicted transfer was with a view to defeat the provisions of the Act, it is to be ignored for the purpose of computing surplus area under the provisions of the Act, and on such computation, the surplus area declared to have been held by the holder of the land shall vest in the State Government. If such surplus area is vested in the State Government includes the transferred lands, the holder does not get a right to that land. If the surplus area of which the right vests in the State Government is other than the land which has been transferred by the holder, after ceiling proceedings are over, there is no provision by which the transfer is held to be invalid and the property which has been transferred to third parties is reverted back to the holder. Likewise, if the transfer is held to be bona fide, the consequence will be that such land shall not be considered while considering the land held by the transferor. The vendor will not get any right to that land. The very fact that treatment of land itself depends upon finding about the object of transfer, militates against holding the transfers to be void ab initio and does not permit the vendors to ignore the same on that basis. The vendor will not get any right to that land. The very fact that treatment of land itself depends upon finding about the object of transfer, militates against holding the transfers to be void ab initio and does not permit the vendors to ignore the same on that basis. Thus viewed from any angle, prima facie, because of the pending of proceedings under the Ceiling Act, plaintiff has no case to lay claim to the property in question which has been transferred by Maharao Madansinhji during his life time way back in 1972, whether the transfer is ignored for the purpose of ceiling area or not. ( 15 ) THE fact that there is an order of Civil Court in Special Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 about preparing inventory of the movable property lying in the property in question, or similar order has been made in this case, in my opinion, is hardly relevant for the purposes of considering issue about the validity of transfer of immovable property in question and considering injunction application in that regard. The right to which respective parties lay claim to movable property shall be governed by orders made in that respect. However, those orders cannot affect the prima facie case of plaintiff to lay claim to the immovable property in question, which has been transferred by late Maharao Madansinhji under the impugned sale deed. In this connection it has been brought to the notice of the Court that the order made for preparing inventory of the movables in Special Civil Suit No. 68 of 1980 is still continuing to operate whereas order made on 19th March 1997 in the present suit by the trial Court has been made the subject-matter of Civil Revision Application no. 525 of 1997 in which the operation of that order has been stayed on 13th August, 1997. Be that as it may, so far as the right to the movable property including articles lying within the present property are concerned, shall be governed by those respective orders and if the parties so desire, they may obtain necessary orders from the Court about protecting this interests in the movable properties. No case is made out for getting any temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff related to the immovable property in question which has been subject-matter of transfer dated 14-7-1972 as rectified by deed dated 24-7-1972. No case is made out for getting any temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff related to the immovable property in question which has been subject-matter of transfer dated 14-7-1972 as rectified by deed dated 24-7-1972. The right to immovable property vijay Vilas Palace and right to movable property lying therein are two independent rights in respect of different properties. ( 16 ) ACCORDINGLY this appeal succeeds. The order under appeal dated 5-9-1995 is set aside. The application for temporary injunction is dismissed. Costs of this appeal shall abide by costs in the suit. Civil application accordingly stands disposed of. .