JUDGMENT D. RAJU, C.J.—The above second appeal has been filed against the order dated 10.8.1992 in CMA No. 42-S/6 of 1992, passed by the learned District Judge, Solan, dismissing an application filed by the appellant-State under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking for the condonation of 88 days delay, in filing an appeal against the judgment and decree dated 17.8.1991 passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Grade, Solan, exercising the powers of the Civil Court, under Section 163 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1953. The factual details necessary for dealing with and disposing of this appeal are in a narrow compass. I desist from adverting to the respective claims of the parties on merits of the contentions having regard to the judgment I intend to pass on this appeal and the consequences of such disposal to be given to this appeal. The fact that the property in question is a Government land initially cannot be seriously disputed. It appears that the respondent has come to occupy the land measuring 61 sq. metres, comprised in Khasra No. 289/2, situated at Jawahar Park, Solan, by encroaching upon the same. The Patwari Halqua, Solan, appears to have made a report dated 5.11.1990 bringing to the notice of the competent authority about the encroachment and in the consequential proceedings instituted by the Assistant Collector under the. Land Revenue Act, the Respondent asserted a claim of having perfected title by adverse possession on account of his being in occupation and enjoyment of the property for more than 30 years. The Assistant Collector assumed the powers of the Civil Court as envisaged under Section 163 of the Land Revenue Act and dealt with the matter as a Civil Suit. After following the required procedure, the suit of the appellant came to be dismissed vide his judgment and decree dated 17.8.1991. 2. The application for a copy of the judgment appears to have itself been made only on 21.1.1992 and certified copies were said to have been supplied on 27.1.1992. Thereupon, the memorandum of appeal was actually filed on the first opening day of the Civil Court on 19.2.1992 and the application appears to have been filed seeking for condonation of the period of limitation from 17.8.1991 to 19.2.1992. 3. The said application for condonation was opposed by the respondent-defendant in the Court below. Thereupon, the memorandum of appeal was actually filed on the first opening day of the Civil Court on 19.2.1992 and the application appears to have been filed seeking for condonation of the period of limitation from 17.8.1991 to 19.2.1992. 3. The said application for condonation was opposed by the respondent-defendant in the Court below. The learned District Judge after noticing the fact that the requisite period of limitation meant for filing the appeal in matters of this nature being 30 days and it should have been otherwise expired on 16.9.1991 computing from the date of the judgment and on finding that even an application for copy of the-judgment was filed about 4 months and 5*days after the expiry of the limitation period, the learned District Judge adverting to the principles laid down by. a Division Bench of this Court in a decision reported in AIR 1977 HP. 13, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Vijay Singh, and by the Patna High Court reported in AIR 1985 Pat 187, State of Bihar v. Bhajadhari Rai, held that the appellant has not made out a case of sufficient cause for condonation of the delay and consequently ordered the dismissal of the application «for condonation filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. As a consequence thereof the appeal also came to be summarily rejected at the stage of the registration itself. Hence, the above second appeal. 4. Mr. Ml. Chauhan, learned Dy, Advocate-General appearing for the appellant-State while relying upon the decisions reported in AIR 1987 SC 1352, Naubat Ram Sharma v. Additional District Judge, II, Moradabad and others, AIR 1996 SC 2750; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma and (1996) 3 SCC 132; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, contended that the learned District Judge has not chosen to properly consider the question of condonation of the delay in an objective manner keeping in view the rights of the parties as also the difficulties normally encountered in the departments in similar, circumstances and that, therefore, the order of the learned District Judge is liable to be set aside. 5. Per contra, Mr. 5. Per contra, Mr. Ankush Sood, learned Counsel for the Respondent vehemently contended that the exercise of discretion by the learned District Judge in this case cannot be found fault with and inasmuch as with the lapse of time and expiry of the period of limitation, a party to a litigation acquires substantial rights, the same could not be interfered with or disturbed or deprived of except for specific, special and convincing reasons and that, therefore, no interference is called for in my hands. The learned Counsel in support of such submissions placed reliance upon the two decisions adverted to by the learned District Judge. 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing on either side, in my view, the learned District Judge has adopted too much of a technical approach arid that too unmindful of substantial rights involved for consideration in this case. As indicated earlier, the land is that of the Government and the Respondent is asserting a claim of perfection of title by adverse possession. When substantial rights of parties, particularly, relating to property and that too public property, are involved, the Courts are expected to also keep into consideration the fact that the departments manned by officers in carrying on the day-to-day business of the Government adopt at times an attitude of no interest and even exhibit indifference too. If such indifference alone of some officer or other in day-to-day carrying out the business of the State is to be an ultimate deciding factor to condemn the State to deprive an effective opportunity to have an adjudication on merits of the claim, real and substantial justice is likely to fail and ultimately what suffers in the process is the interest of public. This does not mean howsoever is the indifference and lethargy exhibited, the Court should always close their eyes and invariably come to the rescue of the officers of the State. There cannot be-any invariable rule of general application for all the cases in such matters and, as pointed out earlier, it would depend upon a proper and objective appreciation of not only the factum of delay, the reasons for the delay but also the nature of the rights involved and are in stake, if any, vis-a-vis, public interest. There cannot be-any invariable rule of general application for all the cases in such matters and, as pointed out earlier, it would depend upon a proper and objective appreciation of not only the factum of delay, the reasons for the delay but also the nature of the rights involved and are in stake, if any, vis-a-vis, public interest. Keeping in view all such aspects if the matter is considered in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the recent pronouncements, there could be only one course of action left with this Court that the delay, on the facts noticed earlier, deserves to be condoned. The order of the learned District Judge cannot be supported or approved by this Court when it is found to have not approached the issue taking into account the practicalities of the situation in a pragmatic manner. Consequently, while setting aside the order of the learned District Judge, I hold that the reasons assigned constitute sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 88 days in this matter. The order passed by the learned District Judge on 10.8.1992 in CMA No. 42-S/6 of 1992 is, therefore set aside. The delay is condoned and the learned District Judge, Solan, is directed to restore the appeal filed by the State, which has been summarily rejected on account of refusal to condone the delay and assign it a number and proceed further from that stage in accordance with law. The learned District Judge shall ensure the disposal of the appeal, so restored, within a period of six months having regard to the long lapse of time already involved in the matter. 7. The parties/their Counsel shall appeal before the learned District Judge, Solan, on 20th August, 1998. The appeal is allowed on the above terms. No costs. Appeal allowed. -