Honble SHETHNA, J.–There cannot be any better example of fraud and dishonesty of a person than that of this case, which is committed by Roop Singh, the original power of attorney holder, of original defendants No.1 to 6. This petition is filed by legal representatives of original plaintiffs deceased Jai Karan and Neki Ram before this court under Art.226 of the Constitution challenging the judgment and order dated 15.01.93 (Annex.9) passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sri Ganganagar and the judgment and order dated 20.08.98 (Annex.11) passed by the Board of Revenue. (2). The original plaintiffs-deceased Jai Karan and Neki Ram and the original defendants were the near relatives. The original plaintiffs claimed themselves to be the sole Khatedar tenants of the disputed land in village Dungarwas. They filed a suit under Sec.88 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1995, (for short, `the Act) against the original defendants for declaring them as Khatedar tenants before the trial Court. One Roop Singh son of Neki Ram (original plaintiff No.2 and the present petitioner No.2) was having the power of attorney of those original defendants No.1 to 6- present respondents No.5 to 10. The original defendants were sued through their power of attorney holder Roop Singh. According to the original plaintiffs, Roop Singh was having the power of attorney of defendants since April, 1990, copy of which is annexed at Annex.3. Fresh power of attorney was executed on 16.4.90 by defendants Banwari Lal, Veer Singh and Deewan Singh in favour of Roop Singh (Annex.5) and by Shri Shishupal Singh and Ors. on 9.4.90 (Annex.6). Roop Singh, power of attorney holder of defendants, filed a written statement dated 8.2.1991 (Annex.2) is a suit which was filed just one day before i.e. 7.2.91 and admitted the averments made in the plaint filed by the original plaintiffs and on the basis of such written statement filed by Roop Singh, power of attorney holder of defendants, the Judge of the trial Court Shri Umesh Chandra Tomar, Asstt. Collector, Nohar, delivered the judgment on 22.2.91 (Annex.7) and passed the decree on the same day i.e. 22.2.91 (Annex.8). Collector, Nohar, delivered the judgment on 22.2.91 (Annex.7) and passed the decree on the same day i.e. 22.2.91 (Annex.8). When the original defendants No. 1 to 6 present respondents No. 5 to 10 came to know about the fraud played with them by their power of attorney, they challenged the impugned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court i.e. Assistant Collector, Nohar, At Annexs.7 and 8, respectively, before the Revenue Appellate Authority, Sir Ganganagar. The said appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on 22.2.91 was set aside by the Appellate Authority by its judgment and order dated 15.1.93 (Annex.9). The original plaintiffs challenged that order of Revenue Appellate Authority in second appeal before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed by the Board of Revenue, by its order dated 20.8.98 (Annex.11). The present petitioners have challenged the aforesaid order passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority (Annex.9) and Board of Revenue (Annex.11) before this court by way of this petition, which is labelled as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. (3). First of all, it must be stated that though,this petition is labelled as a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution, but strictly speaking it is a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the scope of which is very narrow and limited. The Apex Court in its judgment in the case of Mohd. Yunus vs. Mohd. Mustaqim (1) has held that this Court cannot correct even the error of law committed by the courts below in its powers under Art.227 of the Constitution. In this case, neither the Appellate Authority nor the Board of Revenue has committed any jurisdictional error or an error of law, which is required to be corrected by this Court, therefore, there is no question of exercising its powers under Art.227 of the Constitution. (4). However, learned counsel Mr. Purohit for the petitioners tried to submit on the basis of Single Bench judgment of this Court in case of Assoomal vs. Tekumal and Anr. (2), that it was a consent decree passed by the trial Court i.e. Assistant Collector, Nohar, in a suit filed by the original plaintiffs- petitioners, therefore, it cannot be set aside in an appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was submitted by Mr. (2), that it was a consent decree passed by the trial Court i.e. Assistant Collector, Nohar, in a suit filed by the original plaintiffs- petitioners, therefore, it cannot be set aside in an appeal before the Appellate Authority. It was submitted by Mr. Purohit that the only alternative for the defendants was to file a regular suit and not to challenge the consent decree by way of an appeal. He, therefore, submitted that the Appellate Authority and the Board of Revenue both committed a jurisdictional error in not appreciating that contention raised before them. In case of Assoomal (supra), a consent decree was passed on a compromise entered into by the learned counsel for the defendant, who, according to the defendant, was never engaged as counsel and the fraud was played with the Court. The learned Single Judge of this Court on facts of that case, held that, ``though, the factum of consent can be enquired into a summary proceeding, the reality of consent cannot be so investigated. The remedy of the defendant is to file a regular civil suit to set aside the compromise decree on the ground that it was obtained by practising fraud on the Court. (5). In this case, the facts are not only totally different but also gross and shocking. In this case, the suit was filed on 7.2.91 in the court of Assistant Collector, Nohar, against the defendants and the power of attorney holder filed written state- ment on behalf of the defendants on the next day i.e. on 8.2.91 giving consent to decree the suit and the learned trial Judge i.e. Assistant Collector, Nohar, without bothering or verifying the fact that even no notice was issued by him in the suit, straight-away decreed the suit on 22.2.91 in an utmost hurry as if the heaven was going to fall, within fifteen days of the filing of the suit. Aggrieved by that order, when the defendants filed first appeal before the Revenue Appellate Authority, their appeal was allowed on 15.1.93 and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for re-trial. Against that remand order passed by the Appellate Authority, the plaintiffs petitioners filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed on 20.8.98 by the Board of Revenue. Against that remand order passed by the Appellate Authority, the plaintiffs petitioners filed second appeal before the Board of Revenue, which was dismissed on 20.8.98 by the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue considered the entire material before it and came to the conclusion that, it was a case of fraud practised upon the Court also. It also considered the fact that the suit was filed on 7.2.91 and without issuance of any notice to the defendants, their power of attorney holder straight-away files written statement giving his consent immediately on the next day i.e. 8.2.91 and within a fortnight i.e. on 22.2.91, the suit was decreed. Thus, the present petitioners have not only abused the process of law but also tried to play fraud upon the court, which is required to be viewed very seriously. The Appellate Authority simply set aside such consent decree and remanded the case to the trial Court but the present petitioners were not satisfied with that and challenged such remand order by way of second appeal before the Board of Revenue. Though their second appeal was also dismissed, they were not satisfied and filed this false and frivolous petition before this court. While dismissing the second appeal, the court observed that- ``A foul smell of mis-using judicial procedure is sensed by us. Therefore, we think in the fitness of the things that such practices should be discouraged. (6). I fully agree with the reasons assigned by the Board of Revenue and I am also of the view that this is nothing but a case of fraud and gross abuse of process of law committed by the present petitioners and such persons are not entitled for any discretionary relief from this court particularly when the matter is only reman- ded by the Appellate Authority to the trial Court to decide it afresh in accordance with law. (7). In view of the above discussion, this petition fails and is dismissed. (8). However, before departing, I must state that a tendency of filing such false and frivolous petitions is increasing day by day, which should be viewed very seri- ously. (7). In view of the above discussion, this petition fails and is dismissed. (8). However, before departing, I must state that a tendency of filing such false and frivolous petitions is increasing day by day, which should be viewed very seri- ously. A party should not think that by spending some money, they can take the most valuable time of the Court by filing such false and frivolous petitions, therefore, the petitioners are saddled-with a special cost of rupees ten thousand, which shall be deposited by them before the Registrar General of this Court on or before 31st Jan., 1999, failing which appropriate proceedings be initiated against them. If the said amount is deposited, then the same shall be utilised for the legal-aid purpose.