Samantsinh Himmatsinh Chavda v. Gujarat STATE Road Transport Corporation
1998-03-09
A.L.DAVE, C.K.THAKKER
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
C. K. THAKKER, J. ( 1 ) ADMITTED. Mr. S. N. Shelat, instructed by Mr. Nagarker, appears and waives service of notice of admission. In the facts and circumstances of the case, appeal is taken up today for final hearing. ( 2 ) THIS appeal is filed against a judgment and order passed by the learned Single judge in Special Civil Application No. 7197 of 1998, decided on December 1,1997. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition filed by Gujarat State road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad ("corporation" for Short) by making the Rule absolute. ( 3 ) APPELLANT is the workman, who was working as a conductor at Halol. On October 30, 1987. he was suspended. A charge sheet was issued to him on July 16, 1987 and he was called upon to show cause as to why appropriate punishment should not be imposed on him on allegation that without prior permission of the Corporation, he participated in + in Special Civil Application No. 7197 of 1988, decided on 9th March, 1998 the election for the office of Sarpanch in different name. The Corporation then decided to dismiss the workman from service. Since some proceedings were pending before the industrial Forum, an Application No. 39 of 1987 was filed under Sec. 33 (1) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before the Conciliation officer and Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Godhra and, simultaneously, the appellant was suspended from service. An order was passed that during the. pendency of proceedings, the workman would be entitled to l/4th i. e. 25% salary, by way of suspension allowance. By an order dated August 8, 1988, the Conciliation Officer decided the application and rejected permission, relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in fakirbhai Fulabhai Solanki vs. Presiding Officer and Anr. , AIR 1986 SC 1168 . ( 4 ) THE Corporation approached this Court against that order by filing the above petition. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention raised on behalf of the corporation that the action taken by the second respondent of rejecting the application was contrary to law and, hence, it was liable to be set aside. But, at the same time, the learned Single Judge held that the action taken by the Corporation was imposed on the workman, the action cannot be termed as illegal, contrary to law or improper.
But, at the same time, the learned Single Judge held that the action taken by the Corporation was imposed on the workman, the action cannot be termed as illegal, contrary to law or improper. Being aggrieved by a later part of the order, the workman has approached this Court by filing this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 5 ) MR. Rathod, learned counsel for the appellant, drew our attention to a decision of a division Bench of this Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation vs. C. V. Pandor and Anr. , 1991 (2) GLR 771 . Almost in similar circumstances, the Division Bench held that whenever an application is made under Sec. 33 (1) of the Act, the Conciliation officer is expected to apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and to pass an appropriate order. The counsel contended that it is the jurisdiction of that authority and he alone can decide the question raised by an employer in an application under Sec. 33 (1) of the Act. The said application was rejected by the authority on the ground that suspension allowance was not paid. To that extent, the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside the said order But the learned Single Judge ought not to have decided the application and to that extent, the order is vulnerable. We see considerable force in the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant. ( 6 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, this Letters Patent Appeal deserves to be partly allowed and is allowed. The order passed by the learned Single judge quashing the order of the second respondent is not disturbed, but the order passed by the learned Single Judge that the punishment imposed on the appellant workman was legal and proper is hereby set aside. The matter must now go back to the Conciliation officer, who will decide an application filed by the Corporation under Sec. 33 (1) of the act. So far as suspension period is concerned, the Corporation will pay 50% of the pay and allowances, by way of suspension allowance, from October 30, 1987 to February 28, 1998 within four weeks from the receipt of the writ and shall continue to pay during the pendency of the said application.
So far as suspension period is concerned, the Corporation will pay 50% of the pay and allowances, by way of suspension allowance, from October 30, 1987 to February 28, 1998 within four weeks from the receipt of the writ and shall continue to pay during the pendency of the said application. ( 7 ) WE may clarify that, we have not expressed any opinion on merits one way or the other and it is for respondent No. 2 to take appropriate decision in accordance with law. Appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, no costs. .