R. S. R. T. C, Jaipur v. S. T. A. T. , Jaipur — 1998 DIGILAW 1351 (RAJ)

Honble SHETHNA, J.–The petitioner-RSRTC (Corporation) has challenged in this petition the impugned orders dated 4.5.1993 (Annex.2), 24.8.1993 (Annex.3) and 22.12.1995 (Annex.5) almost after a period of one year i.e. on 7.1.1997 before this Court by way of this writ petition. (2). On 15.1.1997 when this matter was first placed before Honble P.P. Naole- kar, J. it was adjourned at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner to explain the delay in filing the writ petition. Later on, on 24.1.1997, an affidavit of an officer of the Corporation is filed, therefore, on 27.1.1997, it was ordered to be listed on 12.2.1997 alongwith the affidavit. On 12.2.1997, it was adjourned by Honble V.G. Palshikar, J to 3.3.1997, at the request of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter, this matter was not placed before the Court and it has been placed to- day after the expiry of period of almost two years for hearing on admission. (3). The learned counsel Shri Lodha for the petitioner submitted that in 1997 in an identical writ petition No. 220/97 RSRTC/STAT, Honble V.G. Palshikar, J. has already ordered to issue notice to the other side, therefore, in this matter also, notice be issued to the other side and both the matters be heard together. (4). In my opinion, issuance of notice is not binding precedent. This Court is bound by the final judgment of the learned Single Judge and if it is not agreeing with the same, then, in that case, the matter is required to be referred to the Larger Bench. Normally, when identical matters are admitted, then, the Court may admit such identical matters. But, it is not that the Court is bound to admit even if it is fi- led late or is suffering from the vice of gross delay and laches. Therefore, in any humble opinion, mere order of issuance of notice by another learned Single Judge in a similar type of petition, is not sufficient to entertain this petition and issue notice to the other side. (5). I have not allowed the learned counsel Shri Lodha for the petitioner to go into the merits of the case, as this petition was required to be dismissed only on the ground of gross delay and laches. (5). I have not allowed the learned counsel Shri Lodha for the petitioner to go into the merits of the case, as this petition was required to be dismissed only on the ground of gross delay and laches. Shri Lodha tried to explain the delay of more than one year, on the basis of affidavit of an officer of the Corporation filed in this petition on 24.1.1997. I have gone through the affidavit and without making any comment on it, I may only say that some averments made in the said affidavit were not in good taste. It could have been avoided. Any way, in my opinion, the explanation, which is tried to be offered in the affidavit, cannot be accepted for the reason that when the petition was filed before this Court on 7.1.1997, the same officer, who has sworned the affidavit, has not at all explained the delay of more than a period of one year in filing the petition late in challenging the impugned or- ders. It appears that only when the learned Single Judge before whom this matter was placed for the first time on 15.1.1997 asked the learned counsel for the petitioner to explain the delay in filing the petition late, then, only an affidavit is filed and the delay is sought to be explained. However, I am not satisfied with the explanation offered in it. Therefore, this petition is required to be dismissed only on the ground of gross delay and laches in filing this petition late before this Court. (6). Before parting I must state that last time this matter was placed before Honble V.G. Palshikar, J. on 12.2.1997 and, thereafter, till today i.e. 15th December, 1998 for a period of almost two years, the petitioner has not even tried to see that this petition is placed before the Court for admission. Under the circumstances, when the petitioner is challenging the first two orders passed in the year 1993 (Annex.2 and 3 respectively) and the last order dated 22.12.1995 (Annex.5), it would not be proper to entertain this petition after a lapse of three years of passing the last order dated 22.12.1995 (Annex.5). (7). In view of the above discussion, this writ petition is dismissed summarily only on the ground of gross delay and laches, without going into the merits of the case.