Judgment :- Y. VENKATACHALAM, J. The petitioner Sangam herein has filed the present writ petition seeking for a writ of Mandamus to direct the 1st respondent herein to refer the issue of non-employment of the 25 workmen mentioned in the Annexure for adjudication. 2. In support of the writ petition, the petitioner herein has filed an affidavit wherein they have narrated all the facts and circumstances that forced them to file the present writ petition and requested that their writ petition may be allowed as prayed for. Per contra, on behalf of the respondents, the 2nd and 3rd respondents have filed separate counter affidavits rebutting all the material allegations levelled against them one after the other and ultimately requested this Court to dismiss the writ petition for want of merits. 3. Heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing, for the respective parties. I have gone through the contents of the affidavit and the counter affidavits together with all other relevant material documents available on record in the form of typed set of papers and in particular the impugned G.O. No. 562 dated July 7, 1993 passed by the 1st respondent herein. I have also taken into consideration the various legal points raised by both sides and also the decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties during the course of their arguments. 4. Thus, in the above facts and circumstances of this case, the only point that arises for consideration herein is, as to whether there are any valid grounds to allow this writ petition or not. 5. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner herein is as follows : On behalf of 25 workmen/members the petitioner sangam has filed this writ petition. The 2nd respondent management have got their paper Mills at Kagithapuram where they employ about 2000 workers. Approximately over 1100 workers are employed by so called contractors. All the 25 workman concerned in this case were employed for work connected with the manufacturing process. These 25 workmen had been employed by the 3rd respondent for work in the Mills of the 2nd respondent/management for over 5 years. Some of them have completed 9 years. Approximately over 1100 workers are employed by so called contractors. All the 25 workman concerned in this case were employed for work connected with the manufacturing process. These 25 workmen had been employed by the 3rd respondent for work in the Mills of the 2nd respondent/management for over 5 years. Some of them have completed 9 years. The details pertaining to these workmen, their date of joining service and the name of the contractors under whom they were employed when they were illegally terminated are all filed in the typed set of papers which formed part of the conciliation failure report. The 3rd respondent association represents the contractors. Though the work under the 2nd respondent management is of a permanent nature, the management gave work on contract. It is significant to note that though the contractors were changing, all the workmen continued to remain in employment under one contractor or another. Though the workmen were supposed to be employed by the contractors, in reality, they were employed by the 2nd respondent/management. Their work was supervised by the 2nd respondent and the work to such workmen was also allotted by the 2nd respondent. The 25 workmen concerned in this dispute had to do only the work allotted to them by the 2nd respondent management. The so called system was only a farce. It was an attempt to deny various benefits and protection under labour laws. These 25 workmen were really the employees of the 2nd respondent management. The 25 workmen concerned in this dispute who were discharged were all active members of the petitioner union. When the charter of demands relating to various issues was pending before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Tiruchirappalli the management, the 2nd respondent herein and the 3rd respondent started taking fresh hands for doing the work performed by the contract workers. On January 28, 1992 the 2nd respondent management allowed 9 new persons to perform the work in the Mills. In fact, in April 1990, when the management allowed the outsiders to perform the work, the petitioner union objected to it. The action of the 2nd and 3rd respondents in giving jobs to outsiders to break the strike is illegal and is an act of unfair labour practice. The petitioner union protested against this and struck on January 30, 1992 during the second shift. The action of the 2nd and 3rd respondents in giving jobs to outsiders to break the strike is illegal and is an act of unfair labour practice. The petitioner union protested against this and struck on January 30, 1992 during the second shift. On January 31, 1992, the management called the police and removed all the striking workers. The management thereafter started taking some workmen leaving many to stay outside without job. Thereafter on the advice of the Commissioner of Labour, the 2nd respondent provided job for all the workers except the 25 workmen concerned in this case. On June 30, 1992, the petitioner union made representation to the Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madras, stating that the management had not given work to the 25 workman who are all active members of the petitioner union and that the job was denied because they had participated in the strike on January 30, 1992. No charges were levelled against these 25 workmen and the management had not conducted a domestic enquiry. The petitioner union requested the Special Deputy Commissioner to advice the 3rd respondent to reinstate the 25 workmen concerned in this case with continuity of service and other benefits. The 2nd respondent filed a counter stating that they have not maintained any registers pertaining to the employment of contract workmen and that these 25 workmen concerned in this case instigated the other workmen to strike work which had resulted in loss and that the principal employer namely the 2nd respondent had given notice to the 3rd respondent threatening cancellation of their agreement. The 2nd respondent stated that they are only the principal employer and there is no employer-employee relationship between them and the workmen concerned in this dispute. The conciliation ended in a failure and the Special Deputy Commissioner of Labour submitted failure report to the Government on August 10, 1992. By an order dated July 7, 1993 the 1st respondent declined to refer the dispute relating to the non-employment of the 25 workmen for adjudication on the ground that the workmen concerned were employed by the contractors, viz., the 3rd respondent and not by the Principal Employer and that the contract workers have no preferential claim to be absorbed in service and therefore the contract workers did not stand a chance to raise a dispute under Section2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The petitioner union and the 3rd respondent have entered into an 18(1) settlement incorporating these items including applicability of model standing orders. They are regular workmen working under the contractor permanently. According to the petitioner the impugned order of the 1st respondent dated July 7, 1993 is illegal and is bad. The 3rd respondent did not obtain the requisite permission under Section 33(1)(a) and (b) of the Act as the dispute relating to Charter of demands was pending before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Trichy.6. On the above factual aspect of this case, it is contended by the petitioner that the 1st respondent has erred in declining to refer the dispute on the ground that it was reported that there was no employer and employee relationship between the 2nd respondent and the 25 workmen, that the order refusing to refer the dispute between the contractor and the workmen was totally on irrelevant basis, that the Government had proceeded on the assumption that the demand of the petitioner union was against principal employer while in fact the demand for employment of 25 workmen was against the contractor who employed them. It is also their case that the principal employer was also made a party to the dispute as in the event of the workmen succeeding in the dispute against the contractor, the liability to pay consequential benefits should be made the responsibility of the Principal Employer in the event of the contractor failing to implement it. They state that the dispute is clearly an industrial dispute and the same has to be decided only by a Tribunal. Their contention is that the 1st respondent exceeded its jurisdiction in reaching the final conclusion on grounds not sustainable in law. According to the petitioner the 1st respondent has failed to note the fact that all the workmen who struck work except the 25 workmen concerned in the dispute have been provided with job by the contractor. Further they contend that the 1st respondent has erred in law in declining to refer the matter under Section10(1) of the I.D. Act and therefore runs counter to the well established principles of law laid down by the Apex Court. Their categoric contention is that the first respondent's power under Section10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative and not judicial. Their categoric contention is that the first respondent's power under Section10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is administrative and not judicial. By order dated July 7, 1993, the 1st respondent has determined the lis between the parties usurping the judicial function which it has no jurisdiction to do and that the 1st respondent is clothed with only administrative power under Section10 of the ID Act. Their plea is that as these 25 workmen are suffering without employment, it is necessary in the interest of justice that the dispute of non-employment be referred to adjudication at the earliest.7. Per contra, it is the case of the 2nd respondent that it is not the case of the petitioner that it represents any of the direct workmen of the 2nd respondent. As such the petitioner union cannot raise or maintain an industrial dispute against the 2nd respondent nor can it maintain the present writ petition purported to have been raised by the petitioner in respect of an issue concerning the workmen of the 3rd respondent. The 2nd respondent is not a necessary party to the writ petition. The 2nd respondent has nothing to do with the engagement of workmen by the members of the 3rd respondent association. The 2nd respondent does not exercise any control or supervision over the workmen engaged by the members of the 3rd respondent association. The petitioner union was pursuing the dispute regarding the non-employment of the 25 workmen only against the concerned contractors. It is their categoric contention that with regard to the issue or non-employment of the 25 workmen, the 2nd respondent took the stand that as it was not their employer, no claim could be made against the 2nd respondent. It is submitted by them that as far as the 2nd respondent was concerned, the said order of the 1st respondent in G.O. No. 562 dated July 7, 1993 is perfectly valid and justified and the same does not call for interference by this Court. 8. Whereas it is the case of the 3rd respondent that it is a registered society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and it has been entering into settlements with the contract workmen under Section18(1) of the I.D. Act. The second respondent herein awards labour contracts for a period of one year by inviting tenders. 8. Whereas it is the case of the 3rd respondent that it is a registered society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 and it has been entering into settlements with the contract workmen under Section18(1) of the I.D. Act. The second respondent herein awards labour contracts for a period of one year by inviting tenders. On the expiry of the period of one year, being the period of contract, the contractor will have no connection with the contract workers engaged by him during the period of contract. In fact, the contractor engages only the required number of workers to execute the work on getting contract from the second respondent herein. The number of workers to be engaged by the contractor varies depending upon the volume of work and the nature of work. The third respondent herein is only an association of contractors and it does not enter into the affairs of the members of the third respondent who employ contract labour. Thus, it is the case of the third respondent that it is neither a proper or necessary party to the present writ petition. It is contended by them that the 25 workmen who are concerned in the present dispute were engaged by various contractors for a period of one year and on the expiry of the said period of one year, their employment came to an end automatically and that there cannot be any industrial dispute between the said 25 workmen concerned in the above writ petition and any of the members of the third respondent herein.9. Having seen the entire material available on record this case, the following are the admitted facts. The 25 workmen in question in this petition had been employed by the 3rd respondent, for work in the mills of the 2nd respondent management. The employees were employed under several contractors. The 3rd respondent herein is only an association of contractors and it does not enter into the affairs of the members of the third respondent who employ contract labour. The management gave work on contract. All the workmen are employed by the contractors and not by the 2nd respondent management directly. The 2nd respondent has nothing to do with the engagement of workmen by the members of the 3rd respondent association. The management gave work on contract. All the workmen are employed by the contractors and not by the 2nd respondent management directly. The 2nd respondent has nothing to do with the engagement of workmen by the members of the 3rd respondent association. In the above factual position, it is contended by the petitioners that though the workmen were supposed to be employed by the contractors, in reality, they were employed by the 2nd respondent management. Per contra, it is the categorical contention of the 2nd respondent that it is not the case of the petitioner that it represents any of the direct workmen of the 2nd respondent, that the petitioner union cannot raise or maintain an industrial dispute against the 2nd respondent, that the 2nd respondent has nothing to do with the engagement of workmen by the members of the 3rd respondent association and that the 2nd respondent does not exercise any control or supervision over the workmen engaged by the members of the 3rd respondent association and that therefore, it is their categoric stand and contention that the said 25 workmen are not their employees and no claim could be made against them. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I see every force in the said contention of the 2nd respondent management. Such conclusion is inevitable in view of the following averments made by the petitioner themselves in the affidavit. When the workmen went on strike on January 30, 1992, no charges were levelled against these 25 workmen and the management had not conducted a domestic enquiry. That itself shows that the 2nd respondent management has no control or supervision over the employees in question. It is the admitted case of the petitioner that the petitioner union requested the special Deputy Commissioner to advice the 3rd respondent to reinstate the 25 workmen concerned in this case. This circumstance also goes to show that they were employed only by the 3rd respondent and not by the 2nd respondent management directly. Further during the strike period the 2nd respondent management the so called principle employer had given notice to the 3rd respondent threatening cancellation of their agreement. That apart, even as per the petitioners, the petitioner union and the 3rd respondent alone have entered into an 18(1) settlement incorporating these items including applicability of model standing orders. Further during the strike period the 2nd respondent management the so called principle employer had given notice to the 3rd respondent threatening cancellation of their agreement. That apart, even as per the petitioners, the petitioner union and the 3rd respondent alone have entered into an 18(1) settlement incorporating these items including applicability of model standing orders. Further it is also contended by the petitioner that the 3rd respondent did not obtain the requisite permission under Section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Act as the dispute relating to charter of demands was pending before the Asst. Commissioner of Labour, Trichy. Apart from the above circumstance there is yet another circumstance viz., it is also the contention of the petitioner that the Government had proceeded on the assumption that the demand of the petitioner union was against the principal employer while in fact the demand for employment of 25 workmen was against the contractor who employed them. Thus all the circumstances above mentioned clearly goes to show that there is every force in the contention of the 2nd respondent management that they are only the principal employer and there is no employer-employee relationship between them and the workmen concerned in this dispute.10. In this case it is significant to note that the petitioner herein is vehemently challenging the G.O. of the 1st respondent passed on July 7, 1993 and in para-2 of the affidavit it has been clearly indicated by them that they are filing this writ petition against the order of the 1st respondent made in G.O. (D) No. 562 dated July 7, 1993 declining to refer the dispute (sic.) relating to non-employment of 25 workmen who were employed by the 3rd respondent for the work under the Industrial Disputes Act. But it is significant to note that there is no prayer for quashing the said G.O. either in the petition or in the affidavit. In both of them it has been simply stated that they want only a direction to the 1st respondent to refer the issue on non-employment of the 25 workmen mentioned in the annexure for adjudication. 11. But it is significant to note that there is no prayer for quashing the said G.O. either in the petition or in the affidavit. In both of them it has been simply stated that they want only a direction to the 1st respondent to refer the issue on non-employment of the 25 workmen mentioned in the annexure for adjudication. 11. Now coming to the other aspects of this case, it is the main contention of the petitioner that the 1st respondent's power under Section10(1) of the I.D. Act is administrative and not judicial and by order dated July 7, 1993, the 1st respondent has determined the lis between the parties usurping the judicial functions which it has no jurisdiction to do. In support of such contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on a number of decisions. 12. But in this regard, it is significant to note that in Shaw Wallace & Co., case (1988-1-LLJ-177) a Bench of this High Court, after analysing the various decisions of the Supreme Court and other High Courts, observed that on a final analysis, the following principles emerge : 1. The Government would normally refer the dispute for adjudication. 2. The Government may refuse to make reference, if : (a) the claim is very stale; (b) the claim is opposed to the provisions of the Act;(c) the claim is inconsistent with any agreement between the parties; (d) the claim is patently frivolous; (e) the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse; (f) the person concerned is not a workman as defined by the Act; 3. The Government should not act on irrelevant and extraneous consideration; 4. The Government should act honestly and bona fide; 5. The Govermnent should not embark on adjudication of the dispute; and 6. The Govermnent should not refuse reference on the ground that domestic enquiry was fairly and properly held and punishment awarded was appropriate. Thus, it is clear from the above that on certain grounds, the Government can refuse reference and such power of the Government is only discretionary power and it can be exercised by the Government in either way depending upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Further Section10 read with 12(5) of the LD. Thus, it is clear from the above that on certain grounds, the Government can refuse reference and such power of the Government is only discretionary power and it can be exercised by the Government in either way depending upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Further Section10 read with 12(5) of the LD. Act confers very wide and even absolute discretion on the appropriate Government either to refer or to refuse to refer an industrial dispute. Moreover it is well established by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Government is not prevented from considering the merits of the dispute raised by the workmen prima facie. It is no doubt true that Section 12(5) does not make it obligatory on the part of the Government to make any reference at all and it has got discretion to refer or not to refer the dispute. Even that discretion, is qualified by the requirement that the Government should be satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board or a Tribunal. Therefore the settled position is that the only requirement for taking action under Sec. 10(1) is that there must be some material before the Government to form an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This is an administrative function of the Government as the expression is understood in contradistinction to judicial or quasi-judicial function. Being an administrative function the appropriate Government cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and determine the lis. Under Sec. 10 the appropriate Government, is to be satisfied that an Industrial Dispute exists or is apprehended and this may permit the Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or putforth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons and not for industrial peace and harmony. That being so, if the determination of the appropriate Government is based on irrelevant or extraneous grounds not germane to the exercise of power, then only it is reliable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review. But in this case such a contention has not been raised by the petitioner. That being so, if the determination of the appropriate Government is based on irrelevant or extraneous grounds not germane to the exercise of power, then only it is reliable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review. But in this case such a contention has not been raised by the petitioner. Further, it is significant to note that it is settled proposition of law that if the claim is patently frivolous or if the admitted facts are so glaringly against workmen not warranting trial or adjudication by tribunal or Court, then the Government would be justified in refusing to make a reference. From the facts of this case it has already been found by this Court that the 2nd respondent has clearly established that in this case there is no employer-employee relationship between them and the workmen concerned in this dispute. That apart in the impugned order dated July 7, 1993 it has been clearly stated by the 1st respondent as follows : "The workmen engaged by a contractor and not by the Principal employee cannot confer on them any preferential claim to be appointed in service. Nor are they entitled to be absorbed in the service of the principal employer. The contract workers of the Tamil Nadu Newsprint and Papers Limited, therefore do not stand a chance to raise an industrial dispute as detailed in Section2(k) of the I.D. Act." That being so, it cannot be said that such action of the Government is usurping its judicial function which it has no jurisdiction to do. It can only be said that by such action of the Government, it has only determined prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons. On such a process the Government has found that the claim is patently frivolous and the admitted facts are so glaringly against the workmen not warranting trial or adjudication by Tribunal or Court and that therefore it has passed the impugned order refusing to make reference. On such a process the Government has found that the claim is patently frivolous and the admitted facts are so glaringly against the workmen not warranting trial or adjudication by Tribunal or Court and that therefore it has passed the impugned order refusing to make reference. Therefore, under such circumstances of this case, it cannot be contended that the action taken by the 2nd respondent is beyond its jurisdiction, and I am of the clear view that the impugned order has been passed by the Government by properly exercising its discretion vested in it by virtue of the provisions of the I.D. Act and that the same is within its jurisdiction and such an order cannot be interfered with by invoking writ jurisdiction of this Court by way of this writ. 13. Therefore, for all the aforesaid reasons and in the facts and circumstances of this case and also in view of my above elaborate discussions with regard to the various aspects of this case and also on the basis of the various decisions discussed above, I am of the clear view that the petitioner herein has miserably failed to make out any case in their favour and that therefore, their writ fails and the same is liable to be dismissed for want of merits.14. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently M.P. No. 20912 of 1995 also is dismissed.