JUDGMENT - R.K. BATTA, J.:-The appellants had filed a suit for injunction seeking to restrain the respondent from executing Proceedings No. 31/62 on the ground that the said proceedings and application dated 6-5-1987 were without jurisdiction and null and void. An application for temporary injunction was filed which has been rejected by Civil Judge, S.D. Panaji vide impugned Order dated 17th August, 1993 which is subject matter of challenge in this appeal. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to have a bird's eye view of what had transpired prior to the filing of this suit for permanent injunction. 2. The truck belonging to the respondent was insured with the Companhia de Seguros de Bonanca (a Portuguese Insurance Company) which was represented in Goa by its general Agent Shridhora S.B. Caculo. The said truck had met with an accident and on 24-9-1962 the respondent filed an application against the said Insurance Company in which claim for damages sustained by the truck in the accident was put up. In view of the arbitration clause in the insurance contract, it was prayed in the said application that the Arbitrators be appointed to decide the claim for damages. The respondent served a notice on the firm 'M.S.B. Caculo represented by its successor Shridhora S.B. Caculo as Agent of the said Insurance Company in Goa and the said firm carried the vehicle to a workshop at Margao which belonged to one Francisco Santos .The Arbitrators made .award dated 5th March, 1965. In the said Award the said firm was directed to hand over the truck duly repaired to the respondent and to pay a sum of Rs. 1,875/- per month from 18-10-1961 till the date of actual delivery. The Award was not satisfied and, as such, execution proceedings were initiated by the respondent against the said firm. The firm which was represented by Shridhora S.B. Caculo objected to the execution proceedings on the ground that the said Award was not binding on the firm as the Award had been passed against the said Insurance Company. The trial Court vide Order dated 17-7-1967 upheld the objections and dismissed the execution proceedings. The present respondent filed Agravo Appeal No. 35/69 against the said order in the erstwhile Court of Judicial Commissioner. The trial Court vide Order dated 17-7-1967 upheld the objections and dismissed the execution proceedings. The present respondent filed Agravo Appeal No. 35/69 against the said order in the erstwhile Court of Judicial Commissioner. The learned Judicial Commissioner did not agree with the lower Court that execution petition was filed against the firm and not against the General Agent of the Insurance Company. Accordingly, the learned Judicial Commissioner remanded the matter to the lower Court with a direction to find out whether the respondent therein is the Agent of the said Insurance Company and then disposed of the execution petition in accordance with law. From paras 3, 4 and 5 of the judgment dated 17-7-1970 it is clear that the learned Judicial Commissioner had held that the matter as to whether or not proceedings had been properly instituted had been settled as undoubtedly the execution proceedings had been instituted against the General Agent of the said Insurance Company. What was left open for decision of the trial Court was to find out whether the respondent therein continued to be agents of the said Insurance Company or not. The trial Court, on remand, by order dated 2nd December, 1981, held that the decree was actually against the said Firm in its capacity as General Agent of the Company and the Award was passed when the firm was still agent for the company. It had also been observed by the trial Court that even assuming that thereafter the firm ceased to be Agent (which fact had not been proved) the liability still subsists. This order of the trial Court was challenged before the erstwhile Court of Judicial Commissioner in First Appeal No. 1/82 which was converted into Civil Revision No. 171/84. When the said Revision came up for hearing, the Advocate for the predecessor of the present appellants sought leave of the Court to withdraw the revision application with the liberty to take available legal steps in the matter. The revision was allowed to be withdrawn and liberty was granted to take available legal steps in the matter. The parties agreed that the finding in the execution proceedings will not bind them in future proceedings that may be filed by the present appellants. This order is dated 20th February, 1985. The revision was allowed to be withdrawn and liberty was granted to take available legal steps in the matter. The parties agreed that the finding in the execution proceedings will not bind them in future proceedings that may be filed by the present appellants. This order is dated 20th February, 1985. Even thereafter Shridhora S.B. Caculo filed an application on 20-3-1986 in the execution proceedings for stay on the ground that he wanted to file a separate suit. This application was rejected by the trial Court vide order dated 4-10-86. The said Shridhora S.B. Caculo expired on 8-3-87 and the present appellants were brought on record as his legal heirs after which they participated in the said proceedings. On 19-4-1988 the present appellants filed an application under section 47 of C.P.C. This application was rejected by the trial Court on 21-1-1989. This order dated 21-1-1989 was assailed before this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 75/89. This revision was dismissed on 8-3-1990. In para 8 of this judgment, it was observed that the matter as to whether or not the proceedings had been properly instituted had been settled since undoubtedly the execution proceedings had been instituted against the General Agency of the said Insurance Company and what was left open by way of direction was that the Executing Court should decide whether the said firm continued or not to be agent of the Insurance Company. It was also observed in this judgment that in order dated 20th February, 1985 in Civil Revision Application No. 171/84 liberty was granted to take available steps in the matter. The parties had agreed that the findings in the execution proceedings will not bind the parties in future proceedings that may be filed by the firm. In view of the same, it was not open to the firm to raise the objection once again under section 47 of C.P.C. and the remedy left was to file any other proceedings in the matter which are permissible in law. 3. Thus, after spending more than two decades raising objections against execution and challenging the same before the Judicial Commissioner's Court/High Court, the appellants have instituted the present suit seeking to declare the proceedings and application dated 6-5-87 as being without any jurisdiction, null and void. 4. 3. Thus, after spending more than two decades raising objections against execution and challenging the same before the Judicial Commissioner's Court/High Court, the appellants have instituted the present suit seeking to declare the proceedings and application dated 6-5-87 as being without any jurisdiction, null and void. 4. Learned Advocate Shri Bodke for the appellants, submitted that Shridhora S.B. Caculo was successor of M/s. M.S.B .Caculo who was agent of the said Insurance Company upto liberation and, as such, the Award dated 5th March, 1965 is not binding against the firm since the suit had been filed against the said Insurance Company in which Shridhora Caculo was shown as General Agent. It was contended that liberty had been granted by this Court vide Order dated 20th February, 1985 to take available legal steps in the matter and, as such, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent that the suit is not maintainable. It was also urged that the application for execution against the present appellants was filed in 1989 i.e. after more, than 12 years of the Award and, as such, the application is barred by limitation. Alternatively, he, however, submitted that the decree can be executed against the assets of the firm. Learned Advocate Shri Bodke relied upon the ruling in Manager, Transport Corporation of India Ltd. v. M/s. Ashok Weaving Mills)1, 1996 A.I.H.C., 3189. 5. On the other hand, learned Advocate Shri Ramani submitted that the arbitration proceedings had started on 24-9-1962 under Article 1565 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code in which the firm was held liable. It was pointed out that Shridhora Caculo had urged in the said proceedings that he was merely Manager and representative of the Insurance Company and, as such, was not necessary party. However, his objection was overruled vide Order dated 2-7-63 whereby Shridhora Caculo was held to be necessary party. The said Shridhora had filed an appeal against the said order, but it was dismissed for non-prosecution. It was next pointed out that Shridhora Caculo had filed an appeal against the Award dated 5-3-65 but it was not pursued. When application dated 11-1-67 was filed for recovery of decretal amount of the truck, it was objected only on two grounds that the Award was against the Insurance Company and execution could not be filed against the firm M/s. M.S.B. Caculo and secondly, the firm was no longer Agent. When application dated 11-1-67 was filed for recovery of decretal amount of the truck, it was objected only on two grounds that the Award was against the Insurance Company and execution could not be filed against the firm M/s. M.S.B. Caculo and secondly, the firm was no longer Agent. The trial Court had upheld this objection which was upset by the erstwhile Court of Judicial Commissioner and ultimately it was found that the Award was against the firm as agent of the Insurance Company and the Award was passed when the firm was still agent of the Insurance Company. According to him, this controversy had been finally settled. It was further contended that even thereafter also Shridhora Caculo continued litigation in the execution proceedings and even after his death the appellants filed an application under section 47 C.P.C. raising same objections which were rejected. According to learned Advocate Shri Ramani, the liberty which was granted to the appellants was to take available legal steps. After drawing my attention to section 47 C.P.C., he urged that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which decree was passed or their representatives, and relating to execution, satisfaction or discharge of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate Suit. In this connection reliance was placed on (R.P.A. Vallimmal v. R. Palanichami Nadar others)2, J.T. 1997(2) S.C., 449. Shri Ramani also relied upon (Papaiah v. State of Karnataka others)3, J.T. 1996(9) S.C. 292 in support of his contention that the principle of estoppel does not apply where Act itself voids the agreement and there cannot be estoppel against statute. He next urged that the liberty given by the Court should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the statute. He, therefore, submitted that the injunction application filed by the appellants is nothing but abuse of process of law and the sole object behind the same is to delay the execution somehow or the other and that the injunction application should be dismissed. It was pointed out by him that all the property of Shridhora Caculo which has come in possession of the appellants is liable for attachment. 6. Taking the rival contentions into consideration and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the arbitration proceedings had been initiated under Article 1565 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code. It was pointed out by him that all the property of Shridhora Caculo which has come in possession of the appellants is liable for attachment. 6. Taking the rival contentions into consideration and on perusal of the record, it is noticed that the arbitration proceedings had been initiated under Article 1565 of the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code. These proceedings were filed against the firm M.S.B. Caculo, successor Shridhora S.B. Caculo, General Agency of Companhia de Seguros de Bonanca. In these proceedings, the said Shridhora Caculo had urged that the firm was not a necessary party, but this objection was overruled vide order dated 2-7-63. The appeal filed by the said Shridhora against the said order was dismissed for non-prosecution. The Award was passed on 5-3-1965 against which Shridhora filed appeal, but he did not pursue the same. Thereafter on 11-1-67 application for recovery of truck and the decretal amount was filed by the respondent against the firm. The only objections raised were that the award had been passed against the Insurance Company and it could not be executed against the firm and the firm was not any longer Agent of the said Insurance Company. It may be mentioned here that the truck in question which had met with an accident was taken into custody by the firm and it was taken to the workshop of Joao Santos of Margao who was appointed receiver. After Santos left, the respondent was appointed receiver. The Award was passed against the Agency/Firm who was directed to deliver the truck duly repaired and compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,875/- per month from 18th October, 1961 till discharge. The objections which were taken against execution application dated 11-1-67 were upheld by the trial Court vide Order dated 17-7-67 in Agravo Appeal No. 35/69. The learned Judicial Commissioner noticed that the matter as to whether or not the proceedings had been properly instituted had been settled since undoubtedly the execution proceedings had been instituted against the General agent of the Insurance Company. However, what was left open and which the Executing Court was directed to decide was whether the petitioners therein continued or not to be agents of the Insurance Company. By order dated 2nd December, 1981 the Executing Court held that the firm M/s. M.S.B. Caculo continued to be Agent of the said Company. However, what was left open and which the Executing Court was directed to decide was whether the petitioners therein continued or not to be agents of the Insurance Company. By order dated 2nd December, 1981 the Executing Court held that the firm M/s. M.S.B. Caculo continued to be Agent of the said Company. This order, as I have already pointed out, was challenged by filing First Appeal No. 1/82 which was converted into Civil Revision Application No. 171/84. This revision was allowed to be withdrawn vide Order dated 20th February, 1965 in which the following order was passed :--- "Heard Ld. Adv. Shri Mulgaonkar for the applicant and Shri. Rebello for the respondent. Shri. Mulgaonkar seeks leave to withdraw this revision application with liberty to take available legal steps in the matter. Allowed to withdraw. Liberty prayed for granted if the applicant so chooses. However the parties agree that the finding in the execution proceedings will not bind the parties in further proceeding that may be filed by the petitioner if he so chooses. This Revision is accordingly disposed of. No costs." By this order, leave was granted to withdraw the revision with liberty to take available legal steps in the matter. Even inspite of this, M/s. M.S.B. Caculo, successor Shridhora S.B. Caculo sought stay of execution which was rejected. In the meantime Shridhora Caculo died on 8-3-87 and his heirs the present appellants were brought on record. The present appellants also participated in the proceedings and even filed an application under section 47 of C.P.C. which was rejected by the trial Court and Civil Revision Application No. 75/89 against the said order was rejected by this Court. 7. In the suit the appellants sought injunction not to take further steps in furtherance of the said execution proceedings by way of attachment or in any way otherwise. The trial Court rejected this injunction. 7. In the suit the appellants sought injunction not to take further steps in furtherance of the said execution proceedings by way of attachment or in any way otherwise. The trial Court rejected this injunction. The grounds taken were that the Award had to be filed in the Court for getting a decree; that application dated 6-5-87 in the execution proceedings against the appellants had been filed much beyond the period of limitation i.e. after 12 years of the passing of the Award; that Shridhora had already expired on 8-3-87 and the petition was filed against the dead person which is a nullity and that only because Shridhora and thereafter the appellants under mistaken belief took in the proceedings, it would not amount to waiver or acquiescence on their part when the proceedings are nullity. All these pleas have been taken up after a long drawn battle in which Shridhora Caculo participated from the year 1962 till his death on 8-3-97 after which even the present appellants participated in the said proceedings. The appellants have once again raised the issue that the Award was not binding on the firm which had been finally settled in the execution proceedings. The sole aim and object of filing the suit and the stand taken therein is to somehow delay the execution proceedings in which act the predecessor of the appellants had been successful for over two decades. Liberty which was granted by this Court vide Order dated 20th February, 1985 in Civil Revision Application No. 171/84 was to take available legal steps in the matter. Thus, the liberty granted was to take admissible steps available. It is no doubt true that the parties had agreed that the findings in executions proceedings will not bind them in further proceedings which may be filed by the predecessor of the appellants, but the said agreement cannot override the legal provisions. It has been rightly pointed out by learned Advocate Shri Ramani, relying upon section 47 C.P.C. that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. It has been rightly pointed out by learned Advocate Shri Ramani, relying upon section 47 C.P.C. that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The agreement between the parties would not obviously have overriding effect over the provisions of the law including section 47 C.P.C. Besides this, on merits also, no case is made out for grant of discretionary relief by the appellants in the facts and circumstances of this case. The trial Court had therefore very rightly refused to grant discretionary relief to the appellants and dismissed the temporary injunction application. The discretion exercised by the trial Court can by no stretch of imagination be said to be either perverse or such that interference would be justified. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in this appeal and the appeal is hereby dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 2,000/-. Interim relief which was granted on 13-9-1993 and was made absolute on 31-3-94 is hereby vacated. Appeal dismissed.