Judgment : Plaintiff who succeeded in the trial Court and failed in the first appellate court is the appellant. .2. The plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent. The plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. The defendants took the vacant site on lease from the plaintiffs for the purpose of running tea shop by putting up superstructure in the suit site. Defendants 1 and 2 paid rent upto 30.6.1969 on a monthly rent of Rs.80 per month. .Thereafter, they did not pay any rent. Defendants 1 and 2 sub-let the premises to defendants 3 to 5. The plaintiffs terminated the tenancy with effect from 12. 1972. The defendants are attempting to remove the temporary shed and put up a construction. The defendants also trespassed into schedule property. They are liable to pay arrears of Rs.2,880. 3. The first defendant filed written statement contending that the defendant was running tea shop in 641/1 and it is a Government poromboke land and the plaintiffs have no right over the suit property and the defendant has put up construction only on the poromboke land and the plaintiffs cannot file the suit and the defendants are entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1964. 4. The suit was tried by the District Munsif, Melur and it was decreed for the relief of recovery of possession and for mesne profits. 5. The first defendant preferred appeal. The Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Madurai, tried the appeal and found that the appellant is entitled to the benefit under the Madras City Tenant’s Protection (Amendment) Act, 1964 (in short “the Act”) and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court, and remanded the suit for ascertainment of amount of compensation for the superstructure put in the A schedule property. 6. After remand the District Munsif, Melur, decreed the suit declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of A schedule property on payment of Rs.857.60 towards compensation to defendants 1 to 6 within three months from the date of decree and the tenant-defendants 1 and 6 shall put the landlord plaintiff into possession of the land with the building thereon and if the amount is not paid within three months from the date of decree, the suit shall stand dismissed under Sec.4(4) of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act. .7. .7. On appeal, the first appellate court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court by allowing the appeal holding that as per Sec.3 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act, all the pending proceedings had become abated as the City Tenant’s Protection Act was extended to the jurisdiction where the suit property lies during the pendency of that suit and so, the suit itself is not maintainable. 8. Aggrieved against the judgment and decree, the present appeal is filed by the plaintiffs. 9. The substantial questions of law that have arisen for consideration at the time of admission of the second appeal are as follows: .(i) Whether in view of the finding on additional issue No.3 in O.S.No.20 of 1978 and the limited scope of the remit order in A.S.No.165 of 1978, the lower appellate court was right in concluding that the suit had abated under Sec.3 of the Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1964. .(ii) Whether it is open to the 2nd respondent (6th defendant) in the appeal to raise pleas contrary to those raised by her predecessor-in-interest the 2nd defendant in the suit? 10. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that after disposal of the suit by the District Munsif in the first instance and when the matter was taken on appeal before the first appellate court and on the first appellate court remanding the matter to the trial court, for ascertaining the value of the superstructure and as no appeal was preferred on the remand order the plea with regard to the City Tenant’s Protection Act, cannot be agitated now and that City Tenant’s Protection Act was extended to the area in dispute during the pendency of the suit is not disputed. Ofcourse, no appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge remanding the matter to the trial court. After remand to the trial court, and on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge has considered the maintainability of the suit and held that the first defendant/appellant is not entitled to claim benefit under the Tamil Nadu City Tenant’s Protection Act. After remand to the trial court, and on appeal the learned Subordinate Judge has considered the maintainability of the suit and held that the first defendant/appellant is not entitled to claim benefit under the Tamil Nadu City Tenant’s Protection Act. The counsel for the appellant argued that as the appellate court has specifically directed to decide the claim of compensation to be paid to the plaintiff by the first defendant by remanding the suit neither the defendant nor the plaintiff has preferred any appeal against the finding of the appellate court and so, it was not necessary for the trial court to consider the question of maintainability of the suit. 11. Counsel for the respondents pointed out that no statutory notice was also given to defendants 1 and 2 under Sec. 11 of the City Tenant’s Protection Act and even on that ground the suit is not maintainable. After remand, as the trial court was directed to decide with regard to the claim of compensation payable for the superstructure, the trial court decided only on that point. On appeal, the lower appellate court found that the suit itself is not maintainable by virtue of Sec.3 of the Madras City Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1964 and the plaintiff has to file fresh suit after issuing notice under the provisions of the Act. So, by invoking Sec.3 of the Act 16 of 1964 the lower appellate court found that the suit itself is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the suit. So, by invoking Sec.3 of the Act 16 of 1964 the lower appellate court found that the suit itself is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed the suit. Sec.3 of the act reads as follows: "Every proceeding instituted by a landlord in respect of any non-residential building or part thereof situated in any municipal town specified in the notification issued under Sub-Clause (i) of clause (1) of Sec.2 of the Principal Act as amended by this Act and the Villages within five miles of such municipal town and pending before any court or other authority or officer on the date on which the said notification takes effect shall, insofar as the proceeding related to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act as amended by this Act in respect of such building or part, abate, and all rights and privileges which may have accrued to that landlord in respect of any such building or part and subsisting immediately before the date on which the notification aforesaid takes effect shall, in so far as such rights and privileges relate to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act as amended by this Act, ceases and determine and shall not be enforceable: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding in which the decree or order passed has been executed or satisfied in full before the date on which the notification aforesaid takes effect“. As per the section, every proceeding instituted by a landlord in respect of any nonresidential building or part thereof situated in any municipal town specified in the notification pending before any court or other authority or officer on the date on which the said notification takes effect shall in so far as the proceeding related to any matter falling within the scope of the principal Act as amended by this Act in respect of such building or part of it and all the rights and privileges accrued to the landlord ceases and shall not be enforceable. 12. 12. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that as no appeal was preferred as against the remand order, the finding of the lower appellate court that the suit is not maintainable by virtue of Sec.3 of the Act is not sustainable since the parties did not avail their opportunity of agitating the matter with regard to the City Tenant’s Protection Act on the remand order. Simply because of that, it cannot be stated that the suit is maintainable when there is statutory provision under Sec.3 of the Act which clearly shows that all pending proceedings before the court gets abated. 13. The counsel for the appellant argued that before remand, the first appellate court decided that the defendant is entitled to the benefits of City Tenant’s Protection Act and accordingly, remanded the matter to the trial court to decide the quantum of compensation to be paid to the first defendant. As no appeal was preferred on that appeal, it operates as res judicata and the same matter cannot be agitated now in this second appeal. He relies on the decision Sri Sangameswaraswamy Temple v. Sri V.A.M. Kunhamo (Died), 100 L.W.41, wherein it is held that, ”there is no doubt that the principle of res judicata would apply. It is seen that the claim made in the proceedings under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act as well in this suit is identical. The matter directly and substantially in issue in this proceeding, namely, the ownership of the superstructure was directly and substantially in issue in the proceedings under Madras City Tenant’s Protection Act. There is no dispute that the parties to the two proceedings are the same. Equally there is no controversy that the deceased first respondent and the appellant have litigated under the same title in the proceedings under the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act. The questions in issue in the proceedings under Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, and in the suit out of which this second appeal has arisen, namely, the leasing out of the vacant site and the putting up of the superstructure thereon by the deceased first respondent have been heard and finally decided by the court in the proceedings under Madras City Tenant’s Protection Act. No doubt, Sec.11, C.P.C. used the expressions “former suit” and “subsequent suit” and Sec.26, C.P.C. refers to the institution of suits by the presentation of a plaint. No doubt, Sec.11, C.P.C. used the expressions “former suit” and “subsequent suit” and Sec.26, C.P.C. refers to the institution of suits by the presentation of a plaint. The rule of res judicata is rested on consideration of public policy. No doubt, it has some technical aspects also. But, the twin principles which form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata are that it is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should attach to binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction and it is also in public interest that individuals should not be twice vexed with the same kind of litigation. If these principles are borne in mind, it would at once be apparent that the principle of res judicata is not a technical principle, but a fundamental doctrine aimed at putting an end to litigation and that doctrine would apply equally in all courts irrespective of the form the proceedings have taken, provided it was on the same cause. The form of the proceeding, whether it originated as a suit or even as an original petition, as in this case, is not really very material, but only the substance thereof," In this decision, the applicability of the principle laid down under Sec.11, C.P.C., has been decided and it has been held that the principle of res judicata would be applicable even though the previous proceedings originated not by means of a suit, but were commenced by filing an original petition only. Various decisions have been referred to in the above decision and the learned Judge has held that even though enquiry was summary, the decision referred therein as well as an appeal therefrom would operate as res judicata. 14. The counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the remand order holds good and as the appeal was preferred on that judgment, it operates as res judicata and as finding has been given by the lower appellate court at the time of remand that the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the City Tenant’s Protection Act, this suit is clearly barred by res judicata and the defendant is not entitled to agitate with regard to the same matter in this second appeal. .15. .15. The first appellate court while remanding that matter to decide with regard to the compensation has held that the first defendant is entitled to claim benefits under the City Tenant’s Protection Act. It found that the suit is maintainable and the defendant is entitled to claim benefit under the City Tenants” Protection Act. and there is no dispute that the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act is applicable to Dindigul from 33. 1973 and the lease is only for the vacant site and under such circumstances, the appellant is entitled to claim benefit, either to ask the lessor to pay compensation for the superstructure put up by him or to sell the land and the appellant is entitled to claim compensation before he gets eviction from the respondents. After remand, the first appellate court has found that the suit itself is not maintainable by virtue of Sec.3 of the Act since the applicability of the Act was not extended to the area when the suit was filed. This position was lost sight of by the lower appellate court when it passed the remand order. After remand when the matter was taken on first appeal, the maintainability of the suit was considered by the lower appellate court and the lower appellate court dismissed the suit. So, it cannot be stated that in the judgment and decree of the first appellate court while remanding the matter it was decided with regard to the maintainability of the suit. The sixth defendant being the legal heir is also entitled to claim benefits and the first appellate court has specifically directed the trial court to decide the quantum of compensation to be paid by the plaintiffs to the first defendant. After remand, the trial court gave its finding with regard to the claim of compensation and when the matter again went on appeal, the first appellate court has considered with regard to the maintainability of the suit and accordingly, dismissed the suit by allowing the appeal. The remand was for the limited purpose of deciding with regard to the quantum of compensation to be paid by the plaintiffs to the first defendant and after remand, the first appeal was considered in its entirety and the suit was found not maintainable. The first appellate court found that by virtue of Sec.3 of the Act, the suit itself is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed that suit. The first appellate court found that by virtue of Sec.3 of the Act, the suit itself is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed that suit. The first appellate court had considered with regard to the statutory provisions of the Act and found that the suit itself is not maintainable as the Act itself came into force to be applied to that area during the pendency of that suit. So, it cannot be stated that the judgment and decree of the first appellate court remanding the matter to the trial court operates as res judicata for the present appeal Sec.3 of the Act clearly states that all suits pending at the time when the Notification takes effect shall stand abated. In the first appeal while remanding, regarding the matter with regard to Sec.3 of the Act no decision was arrived at and so, the judgment and decree in that first appeal will not operate as res judicata for the present appeal. .16. The counsel for the respondents pointed out that no statutory notice has been given to respondents 1 and 2 under Sec.11 of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act and regarding that additional issues were also framed and non-issuance of statutory notice under Sec.11 of the Act vitiates entire proceedings and the suit is liable to be dismissed on that ground. The sixth defendant in her statement contended that she is entitled to claim the benefits under the Act and the suit is bad for want of statutory notice to defendants 1 and 2 under Sec.11 of the Act and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 17. The counsel for the appellant pointed out that since the defendants deny the title of the plaintiff, notice under Sec.11 is not mandatory and the suit is maintainable. The suit property is in respect of T.S.No.639/1. The plaintiff also issued notice under Ex.A-3 terminating the tenancy tinder the provisions of the Act on 12. 1972 and for that the defendant has sent reply under Ex. A-4 wherein he admitted that he has taken lease in respect of T.S.No.639/2 for storing firewood. But, the defendant has stated that he has handed over possession. But, that wording “handed over possession” is in a different hand-writing. So, it is clear from Ex.A-4 that the defendant himself had admitted that he has taken the suit premises from the plaintiff on rent. But, the defendant has stated that he has handed over possession. But, that wording “handed over possession” is in a different hand-writing. So, it is clear from Ex.A-4 that the defendant himself had admitted that he has taken the suit premises from the plaintiff on rent. As per Sec.II of the Tamil Nadu City Tenant’s Protection Act, 1922, “No suits in ejectment or applications under Sec.41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 shall be instituted or presented against a tenant until the expiration of three months next after notice in writing has been given to him requiring him to surrender possession of the land and building and offering to pay compensation for the building and trees, if any, and stating the amount thereof.” The provisions of Sec.11 are the provisions in favour of tenant and the tenants cannot be deprived of the protection given by Sec.11 simply because they are entitled to other benefits given by the Act. So, notice under Sec.11 is mandatory before instituting the suit against the tenant Notice under Sec.11 of the Act is a condition precedent for institution of a suit in ejectment. Sec.3 of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act clearly bars the pending suits at the time of passing the notification. Though the Act was not applicable to the area in question, at the time of institution of the suit, when the Act was extended to the area by notification, the suit instituted earlier gets abated. The provisions of Sec.11 is also not complied with in the present suit. Since, this suit was pending when the Act was extended to the area in question, the present suit in respect of the tenancy covered by that notification stands abated. By virtue of the notification, the defendant has become entitled to claim the benefits of that Act. Under the City Tenants Protection Act, the plaintiff must serve notice upon the persons who have lease hold interest at the time when he seeks to eject them. So, Sec.11 of the Act is mandatory and failure to comply with the provisions of that section will result in dismissal of the suit. So, for the foregoing reasons, I hold that the suit itself is not maintainable. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court allowing the appeal dismissing the suit is perfectly in order. It does not warrant any interference. So, for the foregoing reasons, I hold that the suit itself is not maintainable. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court allowing the appeal dismissing the suit is perfectly in order. It does not warrant any interference. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P.No.9740 of 1985 is also dismissed.