JUDGMENT G. SIVARAJAN, J. – Petitioner is a partnership-firm engaged in the crushing of metals of different sizes, namely 20 mm, 12 mm and 16 mm gravel by crushing big boulders and stones using crushers, compressors and other machineries. The petitioner is a small-scale industries unit registered with the Directorate of Industries and Commerce, Trichur Taluk evidence by exhibit P2. The petitioner thereafter applied to the General Manager, District Industries Centre for sales tax exemption as provided under S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 and S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990. The said application was rejected by the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Trichur by communication dated December 9, 1991 stating that as per the definition of "manufacture" given in Circular Nos. 20738/B3/90/TD dated October 25, 1990, April 1, 1991 and April 20, 1991 issued by the Taxes Department, the petitioner's unit does not qualify for sales tax exemption certificate. It is also stated that the manufacture for the purpose of S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 dated March 31, 1990 means the use of raw materials and production of goods commercially different from raw materials used and that in the case of the petitioner raw materials and finished products are one and the same. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed exhibit P6 petition before the Government with a copy to the Director of Industrial and Commerce, Trivandrum. By exhibit P7, the office of the Finance Minister informed the petitioner that the said petition has been forwarded to the concerned secretary for necessary action. The Director of Industries considered the said application and informed the petitioner that as per the existing directions from the Government, metal crushing unit is not eligible for sales tax exemption. It is seen that the petitioner has made a further petition to the Government in the Industries Department evidenced by exhibit P9, a copy of the same was also sent to the Director of Industries and Commerce, Trivandrum. To the said petition also the Director of Industries and Commerce sent reply evidenced by exhibit P10 stating that as per the circular already referred metal crushing units are not eligible for sales tax exemption. The petitioner has also produced the order issued by the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Trichur evidenced by exhibit P4, wherein exemption certificate was issued to another metal crushing industry, M/s. Mattathil Granite Metals, Chalakkudy. 2. The petitioner has also produced the order issued by the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Trichur evidenced by exhibit P4, wherein exemption certificate was issued to another metal crushing industry, M/s. Mattathil Granite Metals, Chalakkudy. 2. In this original petition the petitioner has sought for a declaration that it is entitled to sales tax exemption in view of exhibit P4 and also for a direction to respondents to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioner's unit for sales tax exemption. The petitioner has also sought for quashing exhibits P5, P8 and P10 communications. The petitioner has in the alternative requested for a direction to the second respondent to consider exhibit P6 and pass appropriate orders on the same. He submitted that since the notification S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 was issued long after the setting up of the unit and the commercial production the relevant notification that should apply to the petitioner is S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980. Learned counsel further submitted that there is no definition of "manufacture" in the said Government Order. He also submitted that the process involved in the case by employing various machineries and human labour will certainly amount to manufacture as understood in the notification S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 and that there is no justification for importing the definition contained in S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 for deciding the petitioner's application. He accordingly submitted that exhibits P5, P8 and P10 orders passed by the respondents are contrary to the spirit and object of the notification. Learned counsel also submitted that having regard to the fact that very huge amounts were invested in the plant and machinery for the purpose of crushing big boulders and stones into different sizes to suit the requirements of various customers for use and construction of the buildings and the number of workers engaged in the said industry and also the further fact that the Director of Industries and Commerce has understood the process employed by the petitioner as a manufacturing process by issuing exhibits P2 and P4 registration certificates the second respondent ought to have considered the matter keeping the spirit and object of the various Government Orders issued giving incentives for setting up new industries should have considered the matter sympathetically by granting exemption from sales tax to the unit of the petitioner, who is engaged in the metal crushing industry. Learned counsel alternatively submitted that the second respondent may be directed to consider exhibit P6 application and pass appropriate orders thereon. 3. Learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the process of converting big boulders and stones into metals of different sizes will not amount to a manufacturing process and that the end-product so completed can never be understood as a commercially different article. Going by the various decisions of the Supreme Court, learned Government Pleader further submitted that the definition of "manufacture" contained in the circular only refers to the general meaning of the term "manufacture" as understood in the common parlance and in the commercial world. He also submitted that applying the common parlance test or the functional test, it cannot be said that a new commercially different commodity emerged by the process employed by the petitioner. He accordingly submitted that exhibits P4, P8 and P10 are perfectly in accordance with the Government Orders S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 or S. R. O. No. 499 of 1990. 4. I have considered the matter. Admittedly the process employed by the petitioner is conversion of big boulders and stones into metals of different sizes namely, 20 mm, 12 mm, and 6 mm gravel by crushing big boulders and stones using crushers, compressors and other machineries. The question to be considered is as to whether this conversion of boulders and stones into metals of different types mentioned above will amount to manufacture or production as understood in S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 and S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990. Under S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 the Government made an exemption in respect of the tax payable under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act on the turnover of sale of goods produced and sold by the new industrial units under small-scale industries. Under S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 which was issued in supersession of S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 the Government made an exemption in respect of the tax payable under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act by new industrial units under the small-scale industries - on the turnover of sale of goods manufactured and sold by such units. It can be seen from the averments contained in the original petition as well as from exhibits P1 to P4 that the petitioner started the unit in 1985 pursuant to S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980. It can be seen from the averments contained in the original petition as well as from exhibits P1 to P4 that the petitioner started the unit in 1985 pursuant to S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1 all units which set-up their industries pursuant to notification No. 968 of 1980 are entitled to exemption provided under S. R. O. No. 968 of 1980 itself. In other words, any modification to the said notification will not apply to an industry set-up pursuant to S. R. O. No. 968 of 1980. In the instant case S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 was superseded and a fresh exemption notification was issued only in 1990 as per S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 with effect from first day of April, 1990. The petitioner in this case is therefore governed by the notification S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 and not by S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 with respect to the matters covered by former notification. The notifications S.R.O. Nos. 968 of 1980 and 499 of 1990 are substantially the same in so far as the quantum of exemption is concerned. But one difference is whereas in S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980 the exemption is in respect of the turnover of goods produced by the small-scale industrial unit, in S.R.O. No. 499 of 1990 the exemption is in respect of the turnover of goods manufactured by the S.S.I. unit. So in view of what I have stated earlier, what is relevant to be considered in this case is as to whether the process of converting big boulders into metals of various sizes, namely, 20 mm, 12 mm, and 6 mm gravel can be said to be goods produced by the units. The dictionary meaning of the word "produce" is "to bring forward or out, to extend; to bring into being; to bring forth", etc. The Supreme Court considered the meaning of the expression "produce" in the context of the definition of "dealer" in section 2(viii), clause (e) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The Supreme Court observed that the context in which the word "produce" appears in the definition of "dealer" can only mean "to bring forth, to bring into being or existence; to bring a thing into existence from its raw materials or elements". The Supreme Court observed that the context in which the word "produce" appears in the definition of "dealer" can only mean "to bring forth, to bring into being or existence; to bring a thing into existence from its raw materials or elements". For the said conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on the meaning of the word "produce" in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 'The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the meaning of the expressions "manufacture", "production", "produce", etc., recently in Commissioner of Income-tax v. N. C. Budharaja and Co. [1993] 204 ITR 412. That was a case which arose under the Income-tax Act, 1961, where a firm of contractors constituted for the purpose of construction of a dam, claimed deduction under section 80HH of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (1) of section 80HH provides that "where the gross total income of an assessee includes any profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking, or the business of a hotel, to which this section applies, there shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount equal to twenty per cent. thereof". Sub-section (2) of section 80HH says that this section applies to any industrial undertaking which fulfils certain conditions. One such condition is that it has begun or begins to manufacture or produce articles after the specified date in any backward area. It is in that context the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the expressions "manufacture" or "produce". The Supreme Court observed that the words "manufacture" and "production" have received extensive judicial attention both under the Income-tax Act as well as the Central Excises Act and the various sales tax laws. Thereafter the Supreme Court observed as follows : "................ The word 'production' has a wider connotation than the word 'manufacture'. While every manufacture can be characterised as production, every production need not amount to manufacture. The meaning of the expression, manufacture' was considered by this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63, among other decisions. The word 'production' has a wider connotation than the word 'manufacture'. While every manufacture can be characterised as production, every production need not amount to manufacture. The meaning of the expression, manufacture' was considered by this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Pio Food Packers [1980] 46 STC 63, among other decisions. In the said decision, the test evolved for determining whether manufacture can be said to have taken place is, whether the commodity which is subjected to the process of manufacture can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but is recognised in the trade as a new and distinct commodity. Pathak, J., as he then was, stated the test in the following words (at page 65) : 'Commonly, manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass. The nature and extent of processing may vary from one case to another, and indeed there may be several stages of processing and perhaps a different kind of processing at each stage. With each process suffered, the original commodity experiences a change. But it is only when the change, or a series of changes, take the commodity to the point where commercially it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but instead is recognised as a new and distinct article that a manufacture can be said to take place.' The word 'production' or 'produce' when used in juxtaposition with the word 'manufacture' takes in bringing into existence new goods by a process which may or may not amount to manufacture." 5. In order to get the benefit of Notification S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980, it is necessary for the petitioner to establish that the product dealt with by the petitioner is a different product obtained by him from the raw material by some processes. The question therefore is can it be said that the conversion of big metals into different sizes to suit the requirements of various customers does bring into existence a new and distinct commercial commodity other than the raw materials used. 6. The question therefore is can it be said that the conversion of big metals into different sizes to suit the requirements of various customers does bring into existence a new and distinct commercial commodity other than the raw materials used. 6. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that big boulders and stones even after conversion into metals of different sizes did not lose its identity as metal and therefore it has to be held that the raw material, namely, the big boulders are stones and the end-product, namely, metals of different sizes remain the same commodity. If that be so it cannot be said that the petitioner has sold the goods produced by it in order to be eligible for exemption from payment of sales tax as provided under S.R.O. No. 968 of 1980. I am therefore of the view that the third respondent was perfectly justified in rejecting the application for issuance of the eligibility certificate as contemplated under S. R. O. No. 968 of 1980 evidenced by exhibit P5. In that view of the matter, it has to be held that exhibits P8 and P10 communications are also perfectly valid. 7. Before parting with it is necessary to observe that the metal crushing units are considered to be industries by the Industries Department. The petitioner has also been treated as a S.S.I. unit evidenced by exhibits P2 and P4 certificates issued by the Industries Department. It is also relevant to note that in metal crushing industries the unit has to invest substantial amounts for acquisition of machineries. 8. Having regard to the spirit and object of the Government orders, it is a matter for consideration as to whether the industries like the one where huge investment is made by way of installing machineries for bringing out the product which is sold by the unit and as to whether the benefit of this exemption be extended to such units also. These are all matters for the Government to consider in public interest and according to industrial policy. The petitioner, knowing the difficulties in this matter, has submitted exhibits P6 and P9 representations before the Government and the petitioner states that these petitions are pending before the Government. If the Government so chooses, they can consider the question of granting exemption to this unit. The petitioner, knowing the difficulties in this matter, has submitted exhibits P6 and P9 representations before the Government and the petitioner states that these petitions are pending before the Government. If the Government so chooses, they can consider the question of granting exemption to this unit. There is no merit in this O. P. It is accordingly dismissed. Order on C.M.P. No. 17441 of 1993 in O.P. No. 9677 of 1993-B dismissed. Petition dismissed.