Judgment N.K. JAIN, J.: 1. The petitioner wife of the detenu Udumanaliyar Safrudeen, filed this petition challenging the order of detention passed by the first respondent on 31.1.1997, under Sec.3(l)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods in future and to set the detenu at liberty forthwith. 2. The petitioner alleges in the affidavit that her husband had come from Singapore carrying two luggages one blue and another khakhi colour baggage and that he wanted to declare the goods and therefore he was directed in the red channel. It is alleged in the affidavit that he was made to admit that he brought two more luggages which contained emergency lights in which gold bars were found concealed. It is alleged that these bags did not belong to the husband of the petitioner. It is further alleged that her husband has been falsely implicated and that the impugned order passed on the basis of a single/ solitary instants is not justifiable. The further grievance of the petitioner is that the detention order, by which her husband had been detained, has been passed without any authority of law. It is further stated that considerable delay has been caused in disposing of the representation sent by the petitioner. It is further alleged in the affidavit that the detention order has been passed mechanically, without any application of mind. With these allegations, the petitioner is before this Court, with the prayer mentioned above. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the first respondent, denying the allegations as alleged. It is submitted that considering the materials available on record, the detention order has been passed, in accordance with law, It is further stated that the representation of the detenu dated 4.3.1997, sent through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Chennai was considered without any delay. Day to day explanations were given in paragraph 14 of the counter-affidavit. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the 2nd respondent, denying the allegations as alleged. It is submitted that there is no violation of constitutional norms, while making the declaration under Sec.9 (1) of the Act. It is further pointed out that the representation of the petitioner dated 3.4.1997, addressed to Additional Secretary was considered in time, on receipt of the materials from the sponsoring authority. It is submitted that there is no violation of constitutional norms, while making the declaration under Sec.9 (1) of the Act. It is further pointed out that the representation of the petitioner dated 3.4.1997, addressed to Additional Secretary was considered in time, on receipt of the materials from the sponsoring authority. Day to day events are shown in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit stating that there is no delay is disposing of the representation of the petitioner by the Under Secretary to Government of India. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, though reiterated the same contentions raised in the affidavit lays his legs only on two submissions. His first and the foremost contention is that authority who rejected the representation has no authority at all to pass such orders. His second submission is that there is considerable delay in disposing of the representations, which vitiated the impugned order of detention. He also relied on the decisions of Apex Court and Delhi High Court. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor as well as the learned Additional Central Government Standing counsel argued, rebutting the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. The first contention raised during the course of arguments by the learned counsel for the petitioner was not at all made in the affidavit. Since the point goes to the root of the case, this Court asked the officer concerned to file an affidavit, after hearing the Additional Central Government Standing Counsel, to ascertain about the existence of any notification. A supplementary affidavit has been filed by the Under Secretary to Government of India, New Delhi. It is submitted that vide order dated 26.4.1991, he had been delegated the representations. It is further submitted that the order dated 25.7.1996 does not speak about the supersession of delegation of power given in the earlier orders. Necessary order copies were enclosed therewith. 8. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on either side and perused the materials on record, and the case law relied on by the learned counsel. 9. It is no doubt true that representations has/ have to be decided only by the authorised officers. If a representation had been decided by an officer who has not been empowered with the power to decide the same, it cannot be termed that it has been ‘decided. 9. It is no doubt true that representations has/ have to be decided only by the authorised officers. If a representation had been decided by an officer who has not been empowered with the power to decide the same, it cannot be termed that it has been ‘decided. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the representation of the petitioner was not considered by a authority. To this, he cited the decisions in Shri Vinod Punwari v. Union of India, Crl.W.P.581, dated 12.10.1995 by the High Court of Delhi and Ms. Li Galina and others v. Union of India Ms. Li Galina and others v. Union of India , (1998)1 J.C.C. 6 (Del) 10. It will be appropriate to discuss the notifications referred to by the respondents. In the first notification dated 26.4.1991, it is seen that powers vested in the Central Government under COFEPOSA Act had been delegated as follows: By Office order dated 20.1.1993, the Finance Minister has decided that the Ministers of State in the Ministry of Finance will be allocated the following items of work. “…. …. The following items of work will be put to Finance Minister through Minister of State for Revenue & Expenditure. The following matters will be submitted direct to Finance Minister. (iii) All Matters of Department of Revenue not specifically mentioned above. …. 3. All other matters pertaining to the Minister of Finance, not mentioned above, will be submitted to the Finance Minister direct.” By office order dated 25.7.1996, the Finance Minister has delegated the powers to Secretary (Revenue) in respect of the disposal of the following cases. (i) All files concerning representation from COFEPOSA/PITNDPS, detenus addressed to the Government of India. (ii) Application for parole except where the application are addressed to the Minister in COFEPOSA/PITNDPS cases….” As stated earlier, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the representations was decided by the Joint Secretary, who had no power to do so, and as such the impugned order of detention is liable to be set aside. But, admittedly, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that notification issued in 1991 has been superseded by the notification issued later. But, admittedly, learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that notification issued in 1991 has been superseded by the notification issued later. A cursory perusal of the notifications, relevant portions of which have been extracted above, will clearly show that there is no mention that the earlier notification has been superseded by the later notifications. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out that there is any mention in the subsequent notifications about the supersession of the earlier notification issued in the year 1991. Therefore, in our humble opinion, by any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that by the issuance the subsequent, notifications, the earlier notifications got automatically superseded. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision in Shir Vinod Punwaris case, to support his contention, wherein a detention order passed on 27.6.1995 was challenged on the ground that as the Finance Minister was not out the country, me representation of the detenu was disposed of by the Minister for Revenue and Expenditure in the absence of any delegation of power, relying on the unreported decision or that Apex Court in Vijay Malhotra v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) Nos.768, 796 and 808 of 1979 dated 29.10.1979, wherein the representations of the detenus were rejected by the Minister of State (Home) of the Maharashtra Government. It was observed by their Lordships that the Government was unable to trace and produce before them any order or directive under which the Minister of State has been authorised to deal with or reject the said representations. The detention orders in Delhi Case (cited supra) were quashed on 20.3.1996, But, in the present case, as sub-, mitted, now three notifications, mentioned above, have come on record giving true and correct position, So the decision in Vinod Punwaris case is not helpful to the case of the petitioner. 12. That apart, a cursory perusal of the materials placed before us and the decisions inclinding the observations made in Vijay Malhotras case, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reveals that the point in controversy was never considered, nor there is any finding that by issuing subsequent notifications, the delegation of power granted in the earlier notification, automatically stands superseded. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the observations made in Vinod Punwaris case. 13. Therefore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the observations made in Vinod Punwaris case. 13. More so, our attention has been drawn by Mr.M.S.Nagi, Under Secretary to the Government of India, who also filed supplementary affidavit as stated, to the fact that the Finance Minister has to perform and discharge so many functions of various departments and also in COFEPOSA matters and as representations of the detenus have to be decided as expeditiouly as per the requirement of Art.22(5) of the Constitution, and with a view to avoid delay in dealing with the large number of files of routine nature being supplied to the Finance Minister, a general power of delegation to the Secretary (Revenue) was issued at the relevant point of time, otherwise there will be a stagnation at all levels and will also defeat the very purpose of the law enacted. He submitted that 1991 office order was not superseded, and in the 1996 order. ‘Secretary/COFEPOSA’ was added along with ‘N.D.P.S./Income tax case so as to avoid complications if any, in future. He submitted that both 1991 and 1996 office orders co-exist. 14. Next, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in D.Rana alias Dharmesh Prill alias Dharmesh Rana v. Union of India, Crl. W.P.I7 of 1997, dated 15.12.1997 wherein it had been observed that: “… being considered the mater were are clearly of the opinion that 1996 notification makes no room of doubt that 1991 notification stands superseded, if not earlier to which we are not considering herein….” The said case had been decided on 23.10.1997. Learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel brought to our notice that an S.L.P. is pending against the said decision and therefore it is not binding. This Court is aware of the fact that even if S.L.P. is pending against any order, it does not mean that there is finalisation of the verdict of their Lordships by any side. We have considered and gone through the case. However, Delhi decision in Ms.Li Galina ‘s case can be considered not as a binding, but of a persuasive value. We have considered and gone through the case. However, Delhi decision in Ms.Li Galina ‘s case can be considered not as a binding, but of a persuasive value. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the observations made in (1998)1 J.C.C. 6 that, “What was the occasion arose to delegate the power to the Secretary in the year 1996 again, when it was already given in the year 1991” and the observation ‘how the office order of 1991 would still continue after the issue of office offer dated 25th July, 1996’ are not acceptable and binding on the facts of this case, in view of the explanation, for the reason stated above and so also they have not considered the fact that 1993 notification was also in existence. More so, we find that in 1991 office order, specific power had been given for COFEPOSA matters. In 1993 office order, general powers inclusive of Cofeposa matters, had been given. In 1996 office order, while giving powers to N.D.P.S. and Income-tax matters, the words, ‘COFEPOSA’, Secretary (Revenue) also had been given so as to give clarity to the office order issued in the year 1991 and to avoid unnecessary complications if any arisen, had the words were not added. As such, we are of the view that both 1991 and 1996 office orders coexist and 1996 office order is nothing but an order giving more clarity to the existing office order of the year 1991. Under the circumstances, the decisions cited by the learned counsel are not acceptable to the facts of the given case. The detention order impugned herein, cannot be quashed on this ground. 15. Regarding the contention that the representation of the petitioner was disposed of by Central Government with inordinate delay, is concerned, undoubtedly, there is no time limit to dispose of the representation as provided under Art.22(5) of the Constitution, but as it involves the liberty of citizens, it should be decided at the earliest, in the context of necessity of a particular fact situation and each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. It is also true that report explanation/remark should not be called for mechanically and it should have been called for only by the competent person if necessary. No hard and fast rule can be framed. It is also true that report explanation/remark should not be called for mechanically and it should have been called for only by the competent person if necessary. No hard and fast rule can be framed. On consideration of the explanation offered in the counter, with day to day events and the intervening holidays and considering the relevancy necessitated to arrive at a conclusion we are quite convinced with the explanation submitted in the facts of the case. It cannot be said that the authorities have acted mechanically and they decided the representation with the delay. The detention order, impugned herein, cannot be quashed on this account. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner, though has not argued and prayed any relief against the State before this Court, considering the averments made in the counter affidavit and the arguments of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, we re satisfied with the explanation and hold that there is no delay on their part in disposing of the representation. 17. No other point was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. 18. For the reasons stated above, we see no ground to quash the detention order, impugned in this petition, Accordingly, H.C.P.No.775 of 1997 is dismissed.