ORDER : R. Jayasimha Babu, J.—The petition is directed against the order made by the Industrial Tribunal on a reference made to it concerning the relief that the Workmen of Bharat Skin Corporation would be entitled to, if it were to be held that non-employment of the workmen under the guise of closure was not justified. The Tribunal has held that the closure was a fact, that it was justified and that the workmen are not entitled to any relief. 2. It is not disputed now that of the 48 workmen that were employed, about 46 employees have been settled their claims and only the two claims of two workmen to the counsel for the workmen, which remain unsettled. The closure was with effect from August 20, 1979. It has been found by the Tribunal that no work was carried on from August 20, 1979 to December 9, 1979. Thereafter, the machinery of the undertaking was leased to a sister-concern. It is the case of the workmen that the closure was a pretence, that the reality is that the work was carried on by the benamidar R.S. & Sons and that there was functional integrality as between the two firms Bharat Skin Corporation and R.S. & Sons and in both of the firms, members of the same family were partners. It is also the case of the workmen that the employer had referred to the other concern as a sister-concern and as a feeder unit, and that there was also a common boiler from which hot water was supplied to the two units, both of which are engaged in the processing of leather. 3. The case so pleaded by the workmen has been rejected by the Tribunal by an elaborate order, after considering the depositions of the witnesses and the documents that the parties had filed before it. The Tribunal had concluded at the end at paragraph 20 of its order thus: "R.S. & Sons is totally a different legal entity from the respondent firm. It is seen that there is no question of transfer of workmen from Bharat Skin Corporation to R.S. & Sons vice versa there is no business connection." 4. The Tribunal had concluded at the end at paragraph 20 of its order thus: "R.S. & Sons is totally a different legal entity from the respondent firm. It is seen that there is no question of transfer of workmen from Bharat Skin Corporation to R.S. & Sons vice versa there is no business connection." 4. It has also been noticed by the Tribunal that the two firms have separate factory licence, separate Panchayat licence/separate registration under the sales-tax, both State and Central, separate provident fund code number and separate E.S.I. code number and were situated in separate compounds though adjacent. No business connection as between the two firms was shown before the Tribunal. There was no question of transfer of any employee from one firm to another. There is no evidence to show that the two firms were under the common management or that there was financial inter-relationship or other relationship from which it could be inferred that there was functional integrality. 5. The business premises of the two firms were different and they were owned by two different managements of which all the partners were not common and was registered separately under the applicable statute as a separate unit and they did not have a common office or common facilities to hold that they are partners of the same business, and that the two firms were integrated is any manner. It has not been established that the firms are not independent legal entities. 6. The Supreme Court, in the case of Andhra Prabha Ltd. v. Madras Union of Journalists 1968-1-LLJ-15 has laid down that even in industrial law, a new company, which is an independent legal entity cannot be called as a benamidar for another older organisation, because there was in both companies a person or family of persons who could guide the destinies of the two companies. Therefore, the fact that the two firms have members of the same family as partners does not on that account render one the benamidar for the other. There is no allegation that R.S. & Co. is merely the same Old Bharat Skin Corporation under a new garb. 7. Therefore, the fact that the two firms have members of the same family as partners does not on that account render one the benamidar for the other. There is no allegation that R.S. & Co. is merely the same Old Bharat Skin Corporation under a new garb. 7. In the case of Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers 1987-I-LLJ-427 (SC) it was held that even the fact that the Provident Fund accounts of the employees and the Employees' State Insurance accounts of the two units had common numbers with the authorities concerned and settlements containing similar terms had been entered into between the management and the workmen of the two units are not sufficient to hold that the two units were one and the same notwithstanding the fact that the nature of the business carried on in them was the same. It was noticed by the Court in the case that the workmen of both units had been employed independently and there was a separate muster roll in each of the two units and there was no rule or condition regarding the inter-transferability of the workmen. That is also the case there. 8. It is therefore clear that the fact that the two units are sister-concerns or part of the same group, does not ipso facto warrant a conclusion that one unit is a benamidar of another, even if the two units are engaged in similar lines of business. 9. In the case of Kalinga Tubes Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1969-I-LLJ-557 (SC) it was held inter alia when a closure is alleged, what is required to be considered is the entire circumstances and the facts for the purpose of ascertaining whether there has been a closure. 'The essence of the matter, is the factum of closure by whatever reasons motivated. It is not necessary that the undertaking must be wound up or that there should have been a transfer of the machinery or the factory before it could be said that the undertaking had been closed down.' What the Tribunal was required to ascertain therefore was as to whether the facts and the circumstances placed before it by the parties warranted a conclusion that there was in fact a closure. In order to hold that there was a closure it was not necessary for the Tribunal to find that the entire business has been completely wound up or that the machineries owned by the units have been transferred. 10. In this case, the Tribunal has found that the closure was the culmination of a long period of indiscipline and violence in the. establishment of the employer. The fact that there was such violence is not a matter in dispute although, it is the claim of the petitioners here that such violence was caused by the rival unions and not by the unit which raised the dispute. For the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances leading to a closure, it is immaterial as to which union was responsible for the violence and indiscipline, among the workmen of the undertaking. According to the employer, the employees had resorted to violence rendering it difficult for undertaking to continue to function as an industrial undertaking and therefore it was decided to close the undertaking. 11. Learned counsel for the workmen placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court under the Provident Funds Act, 1925, wherein the Court held that the two units, though are different were in effect one and the same for the purpose of the Provident Fund Act. The Counsel referred to the case of Rajasthan Prem Krishen Goods Transport Company v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors. 1996 2 LLN 287 and the case of Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. Naraini Udyog and Ors. 1996-II-LLJ 1063 (SC). In the former case, it was found by the Court that the place of business of the two units was common, management was common, letter heads bore the same telephone numbers, ten partners of one firm were common though there were additional partners. In the latter case, it was found that there was common head office, common branch; common telephone and accounts of two units were being maintained by a common set of clerks. The finding of the Court in the circumstance of cases, those was that the two units were not different, but they were one and the same. The conclusion was based on the facts established in those cases. No Such facts have been established in this case. 12. The finding of the Court in the circumstance of cases, those was that the two units were not different, but they were one and the same. The conclusion was based on the facts established in those cases. No Such facts have been established in this case. 12. Learned counsel also referred to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and Anr. 1986-I-LLJ-490 and to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. 1991-II-LLJ-76 particularly to the observations of the Court in paragraph 16 of the judgment. In the case of S. G. Chemicals (supra), the Court found that the function of the Churchgate division and the Trombay factory of the Company were neither separate nor independent, but was so integrally connected as to constitute the Churchgate division and the Trombay factory as one establishment. The Churchgate division was earlier a part of the factory and had been shifted subsequently and that the work of the company was carried on in various places, all the purchases of the Trombay factory were made by the Churchgate division which also looked after marketing and sales of the goods. The statistical work of the factory and the work relating to sales were also looked after by Churchgate division. It was in these circumstances that the Court held that there was functional integrality, There is no such evidence in this case. In the case of Gurmail Singh (supra) the Court observed in paragraph 16 of the judgment that there can be cases where an alleged transfer of industrial undertaking can be held to be fictitious of benamidar and that in fact it was found to be benami and there was no change of ownership inspite of apparent transfer. In this case, the facts established do not warrant the conclusion that R.S. & Co. was a benamidar for Bharat Skin Corporation or do the facts established warrant an interference that the closure was fictitious. The reliance placed by the counsel for the workmen on the statement of MW1 that during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, some of the workmen had been employed by R.S. & Co. after closure, does not on that score lead to the conclusion that the closure was fictitious. The reliance placed by the counsel for the workmen on the statement of MW1 that during the course of proceedings before the Tribunal, some of the workmen had been employed by R.S. & Co. after closure, does not on that score lead to the conclusion that the closure was fictitious. It was always permissible for the other legal entity to recruit workmen. Instead of recruiting persons from outside, it had chosen to recruit persons who has gained experience in the sister-concern. That fact does not imply that it was acting as a benamidar for the other. 13. Counsel for the workmen placed reliance upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court (unreported) in Khivaraj Automobiles v. The Presiding Officer, Labour-Court, Madras and Anr. in W.P. No. 819 of 1978 decided on October 22, 1980. On the facts found by the Court in that case, the Court upheld the award of the Labour Court which had made an award holding that the reference before it was competent and the workmen continued to be the employees of the management and therefore, are entitled to wages and attendant benefits. The reference that was before the Labour Court was as to whether the stoppage of work on the date mentioned in the reference in the workshop owned by the petitioner in that writ petition was because of closure or lock-out and as to what relief the workmen are entitled to. The Labour Court held that the cause was only the lock-out not the closure as there was no real and genuine closure of the workshop. The Labour Court found that the management was continuing its business activities in the same premises by re-employing the workmen who were originally employed in the workshop. It is in this factual background that the Labour Court had reached the conclusion which was upheld by this Court and which decision was later confirmed by the Division Bench. 14. The facts in this case are different. There is no finding by the Tribunal that the management of Bharat Skin Corporation continued to carry on the work in the same premises on the same machineries by employing the same workmen. As noted-earlier, that the unit had been completely closed is the finding recorded by the Tribunal. 15. 14. The facts in this case are different. There is no finding by the Tribunal that the management of Bharat Skin Corporation continued to carry on the work in the same premises on the same machineries by employing the same workmen. As noted-earlier, that the unit had been completely closed is the finding recorded by the Tribunal. 15. Counsel for the workmen submitted that subsequent leasing of the machinery by the employer to the sister-concern should be regarded as indicating that the real intention of the employer was not closure, but in substance, to continue to carry on the undertaking. No such inference can be drawn from that circumstance. As held by the Supreme Court, to prove closure, the employer need not demonstrate that the company is wound up or that the machinery owned by him is transferred to others. If the owner of the factory in which the machinery had been installed, considered it necessary to merely lease out the machineries after keeping them idle for several months, that circumstance cannot warrant the conclusion that there was in fact no closure or that the closure that has been affected, earlier was unreal. There was no functional integrality as between the two firms as found by the Tribunal. Employment of some of the workmen of this employer by sister-concern at a subsequent point of time, does not make the other concern a benamidar. It is well known that more than one industrial undertaking is often owned by same company, or group of companies or individuals controlling a group of companies and the fact that they constitute a group does not erase the separate legal identities of the firms or companies, which constitute the group. 16. The finding of the Tribunal are based on the evidence placed before it by the parties applying thereto relevant legal principles and does not require interference by this Court. The writ petition is dismissed.