JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - Heard. Shri I.C. Dash, learned Counsel for the respondents, submits that respondent No.9 having died in the meantime, appeal cannot be heard without bringing his L.Rs. on record. Since the interest of respondent No. 9 is represented by other respondents. 1 am of the considered opinion that substitution is not necessary in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge. Puri, in Title Appeal No. 34/1 of 1985/84. The appellant was defendant No. 1 and respondents 1 to 4 were the plaintiffs in Title Suit No. 125/64 of 1983/80. The other respondents, namely, respondents 5 to 11 were defendants 2 to 6. being the co-sharers of the plaintiffs. In the suit the plaintiffs prayed for the following reliefs: "That the plaintiff therefore prays: (a) The Court be pleased to declare that the plaintiffs have the option to purchase the shares of the suit land of the defendants 2 to 5 (two to five) and of the defendant No. 6(six) at such reasonable price as may be mutually agreed upon or as may be determined by the Court from the said defendant No. 1 (one). (b) that the Court be pleased to permanently restrain the defendant No. 1(one)not to interfere in the plaintiff's possession over the suit property and from destroying, damaging or making any waste and damaging in suit land or change its shape in any form. (c) award costs of the suit against the defendants. (d) Any other relief which the Court deems just and proper in fact and circumstances and case may also be decreed." 3. Shortly staled, the plaintiff's case was that the suit property specifically described in the schedule of the plaint is the homestead land belonging to plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 8 over which there exists joint family dwelling house. Defendant No. 1. a stranger to the family claimed to have purchased the share of defendants 2 to 4. and 6. But sine the suit property is joint family qua the dwelling house, he being a stranger-transferce is not entitled to have joint possession. With these averments, the plaintiffs filed the suit claiming the reliefs as quoted above. 4. Only defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. and 6. But sine the suit property is joint family qua the dwelling house, he being a stranger-transferce is not entitled to have joint possession. With these averments, the plaintiffs filed the suit claiming the reliefs as quoted above. 4. Only defendant No. 1 contested the suit by filing written statement. He urged that the suit was not maintainable since the suit property was no more joint family dwelling house of the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6. His positive assertion was that there was amicable partition between the parties whereupon they were possessing their respective shares separately. At first he (defendant No. 1) had interest from Ananda Samantray. father of defendants 2 to 4 under the registered sale-deed dated 23.3.1971 and subsequently purchased the 1/4th interest of defendant No.6 by registered sale-deed dated 1.7.1978. After purchase he amalgamated the same with his own land and has been possessing by converting it to a compact area. The suit property having lost the character of joint family qua the dwelling house, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reliefs as prayed for. 5. On the above pleadings the learned trial Court framed 8 issues of which issue Nos. 3 and 6 were not pressed. Both parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective cases. Learned trial Court on consideration of the evidence decided the remaining issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. Against trial Court's judgment and decree the defendant No. 1 preferred appeal and the learned first appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence and on consideration of the points of law involved set aside that part of the judgment and decree of the trial Court giving option to the plaintiffs to purchase the shares of defendants 2 to 6. Insofar as the decree for permanent injunction, the learned appellate Court modified the same by holding that if defendant No. 1 is in possession, he shall vacate the building within one-month, failing which the plaintiff shall be at liberty to evict him through Court. Aggrieved thereby, defendant No. 1 approached this Court by filing the present Second Appeal. The appeal came up for admission before this Court on 3.2.1987. Upon hearing the Court passed the following order: "Heard. The Second Appeal is admitted for consideration of substantial question of law formulated in grounds A to E of the memo of appeal." 6. Section 100. Aggrieved thereby, defendant No. 1 approached this Court by filing the present Second Appeal. The appeal came up for admission before this Court on 3.2.1987. Upon hearing the Court passed the following order: "Heard. The Second Appeal is admitted for consideration of substantial question of law formulated in grounds A to E of the memo of appeal." 6. Section 100. CPC has undergone a change in 1976. By Amendment Act of 1976 the scope of Second Appeal has been restricted and the power to entertain such appeal is hedged by limitation. As to what should be the duly of the Court while admitting Second Appeal, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Panchugopal Barua V. Umesh Chandra Goswami, 1997 AIR SCW 1936, have laid down: "Generally speaking, an appellant is not to be allowed to set up a new case in second appeal or raise new issue (otherwise than a jurisdictional one), not supported by the pleadings or evidence on the record and unless the appeal involves a substantial question of law. a second appeal shall not lie to the High Court under the amended provisions. In the present case no such question of law was formulated in the memorandum of second appeal in the high Court and rounds (6) and (7) in the memorandum of the second appeal on which reliance is placed did not formulate any substantial question of law. The learned single Judge of the High Court also as it transpires from a perusal of the judgment under appeal, did not formulate any substantial question of law in the appeal and dealt with the second appeal, not on any substantial question of law, but treating it as it was a first appeal as of right, against the judgment and decree of the subordinate Court. The intendment of the Legislature in amending Section 100. CPC was thus, respected in its breach, xxx" 7. In view of the aforesaid dictum of the apex Court. I heard the learned Counsel for appellant afresh as to if there arc substantial questions of law involved so that those can be formulated again for appreciating the findings recorded by both the Courts below. The learned Counsel could not satisfy me that questions of law are involved in the present appeal which can be treated as substantial questions of law. 8. The learned Counsel could not satisfy me that questions of law are involved in the present appeal which can be treated as substantial questions of law. 8. The suit property has the character of joint family qua the dwelling house belonging to the plaintiffs and defendants 2 to 6. Admittedly defendant No. 1 is a stranger purchaser and there is concurrent findings of both the Courts below that the defendant No. 1 failed to establish that there was a partition of the suit properly by metes and bounds amongst the co-sharers. It is the settled law that a stranger purchaser cannot have joint possession of a dwelling house belonging to a joint family. In the above view of the matter and there being no substantial question of law. the appeal is dismissed. No costs. Final Result : Dismissed