Ram Pujan Singh v. Gramophone Company Ltd — 1998 DIGILAW 140 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9th January, 1973 of the 6th Court of subordinate Judge. Alipore. decreeing Title Suit No. 36 of 1962 brought by respondent No. 1. 2. THE suit from which this appeal has arisen was initially numbered title Suit No. 40 of 1955. Appellants Nos. 1 to 4 were impleaded as defendant No. 1, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. Respondent Nos. 2 to 6 were impleaded as other defendants in the Civil Suit. Defendant No. 2 Sufer tewari died during the pendency of the suit. Thereupon, Keyera Debi, sarada Debi and Sripati Singh ware impleaded as defendant Nos. 2 (ka)2 (kha) and 2 (ga) being his wife, daughter and brother respectively. The suit was brought by the respondent No. 1 company for a decree of declaration of its title in respect of the suit lands described in the ii- Schedule to the plaint and also for a decree for the recovery of khas possession thereof after demolition and removal of huts and all structures and obstacles raised by the defendants thereon and also for payment of mesne profits after ascertaining the amount payable on proper enquiry and taking additional Court fees, if required for the same. Case of the plaintiff company is that it purchased the land as specified in Schedule I to the plaint from the Government of India on 30th November, 1929 and the deed of conveyance thereof was registered on 7th January, 1930 and thereby it became the owner of the land and it occupied the same, but defendant Nos. 1 to 3 who were absolute strangers hatched a plan to grab some portion of the land for the purpose of living and carrying on business and they trespassed over a part of the land forcibly and unlawfully in June 1952 and erected at hut and made some structures thereon against the wishes of and without the knowledge, approval or consent of the plaintiff company and without the knowledge, approval or consent of the plaintiff company and dispossessed the plaintiff company there from. It is further alleged that the defendants have forcibly converted a portion of the lands into a 'khatal' where some buffaloes and cows are kept and milched and they are also carrying on business of supply of milk. It is further alleged that the defendants have forcibly converted a portion of the lands into a 'khatal' where some buffaloes and cows are kept and milched and they are also carrying on business of supply of milk. It is further pleaded that during the current Settlement Survey, the forcible possession of the defendants has been recorded in respect of the two plots viz. , 2248/2925 and 2248/2926 of Mouza Dum Dum cantonment, J. L. No. 13 appertaining to the Draft Khaitan No. 1 of the said Mouza. The plaintiff company made oral protests and served notices upon the defendants asking them to quit and vacate the disputed lands and leaving them in the khas possession of the plaintiff. These notices were dated 14th November, 1952 9th March, 1953 and 4th May, 1955 and in reply to the last mentioned notice, defendant No. 1 sent a false and fancied story that he was invited by the plaintiff company to enter the land and to improve the same with the assurance of settlement which was totally false. Initially, the suit was brought against only three defendants. During the pendency of the suit, a local Commissioner was appointed. The local commissioner found the defendants' structures on the plaintiffs land covered by the conveyance deed executed in favour of the plaintiff. He also found occupation of four other persons on the disputed land who were, according to the plaintiff, brought into the land by defendant No. 1 to 3 during the pendency of the suit. These four persons were impleaded as defendant Nos. 4 to 7 by amendment of the plaint. The total area in possession of the defendants is 2 bighas, 2 cottahs and 3 chittaks, 22 sq. ft. 3. DEFENDANT No. 1 Ram Pujan Singh, in his written statement filed in July 1955, denied the plaint allegation regarding hatching a plan to grab possession of some portion of the vacant lands of the plaintiff forcibly in June 1952 and pleaded that the entire land described in Schedule- I of the plaint was low, ditch and full of jungles and about 20 years back, long before the great bombing at Calcutta, with intent to improve the fallow low lands, the then Factory Manager Mr. G. D. Clark with the help of one Ram Bharash Singh invited some persons to improve the low lands for making them fit for human habitation with the inducement that the persons who would improve the land at their own cost would get settlement of the lands improved by them at a reasonable and fair rent and they would have to pay the rent after three years from the date of improvement. Thus, induced, defendant No. 1 with enormous cost and excessive labour, improved a portion of the land in his possession and then constructed structures thereon and has been living and running milk business there. It is further pleaded that in reply to the notice dated 9th March, 1953 of Mr. J. W. Webber, acting Factory Manager of the plaintiff company, defendant No. 1 informed the plaintiff company, by his letter dated 11th March, 1953 that it was on the assurance of the company to settle the improved land with him at a reasonable and fair rent that he improved the land and made it fit for human habitation and he was prepared to pay fair and reasonable rent as an occupancy raiyat, but since on account of partition of Bengal, prices of lands have gone up abnormally high in West Bengal taking advantage of the situation, the suit has been filed after serving the Pleader's notice. He has also taken the plea that he has been in occupation of the disputed land for more than 12 years and he has acquired title by adverse possession and the suit is barred by limitation. Further plea taken is that the suit is not maintainable", since the plaint was not properly signed and verified and was not filed with the sanction of the Board of Directors of the Company. He has also alleged that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are his tenants. 4. DEFENDANT No. 2, in his written statement, has pleaded that he has been in occupation of about 10 cottahs of land which he occupied in or about 1938 when the land was low and which he filled with enormous expenses and upon which he constructed a 'khatal and since then he has been in possession without interruption and to the knowledge of the plaintiff and as such to has acquired good title by adverse possession. He has asserted that he had never any concern with defendant Nos. He has asserted that he had never any concern with defendant Nos. 1 and 3. Defendant No. 3 alleged, in his written statement, that he is not in possession of any portion the disputed land. But at the same time he has pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation and by adverse possession. 5. DEFENDANT No. 4, 5 and 6 have, in their joint written statement. pleaded that they are in possession of about 6 cottahs of land by virtue of promise of settlement with them by Mr. Clark the then Manager of the Company; and Mr. Clark and after words Mr. Webber the then Acting manager both encouraged them to improve the lands in their possession. They have also alleged that they have been in possession of the land for more than 12 years and the suit is barred by limitation. Subsequently, a separate written statement was also filed by defendant No. 4 wherein he pleaded that he has been in possession for more than 12 years and the suit is barred by limitation and adverse possession. In this written statement, he did not make any allegation about any promise of settlement of land by Mr. Clark or Mr. Webber. 6. THE following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court : 1. Is the suit barred by waiver, acquiescence and estoppel ? 2. Is the suit barred by limitation ? 3. Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties and of cause of action ? 4. Has the plaintiff arty right, title and interest in the suit property as alleged ? 5. Is the plaintiffs story of possession and dispossession true ? 6. Has the defendant No. 2 acquired any title by adverse possession as alleged by him? 7. Did defendant No. 1 improve the suit land on the inducement of the plaintiffs agent with an assurance to settle the same to him at a fair and reasonable rent ? 8. In the story of service of notice dated 14th November, 1952 upon the defendant No. 1 by Mr. G. D. Clark for vacating the suit land as alleged in the plaint, true ? 9. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for ejectment and for mesne profits against defendant No. 1 ? 10. What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to ? additional Issues : 11. Has the plaint been properly signed and verified ? G. D. Clark for vacating the suit land as alleged in the plaint, true ? 9. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for ejectment and for mesne profits against defendant No. 1 ? 10. What relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to ? additional Issues : 11. Has the plaint been properly signed and verified ? 12. Is the suit maintainable without sanction of the Board of directors of the plaintiff company before institution of the suit ? 13. Is the suit bad for defect of parties? 14. Did the defendant No. 2 acquire good title to the said 10 K plot by adverse possession ? 15. Is the suit barred under Order 2 Rule 3 of Civil Procedure code ? 16. Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession against defendant No. 2 series ? 17. Is the suit bad for mis-joinder of cause of action ? 18. Is the suit maintainable as framed ? 19. Have the defendants acquired title to the suit land by adverse possession ? 20. Is the plaintiff entitled to mesne profits ? The learned Trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit for declaration as also possession and also held the plaintiff company entitled to mesne profits from the defendants in respect of the lands in their respective possession from the date of possession till the date of recovery of possession with the further direction that the amount of such mesne profits would be determined in subsequent proceedings on proper steps being taken by the plaintiff company for the same. The report and maps and the field book of the Commissioner for local investigation were made part of the decree. 7. SHRI Tarak Nath Roy, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted the following points in support of the appeal 1. The plant was not signed and verified by a proper person and the suit was filed without sanction of the Board of directors and so the suit is not maintainable. 2. The suit is barred by limitation 3. The local Commissioner whose report has been made part of the plaint was appointed before defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were impleaded and as such there is no proper local commissioner's report an the record. 2. The suit is barred by limitation 3. The local Commissioner whose report has been made part of the plaint was appointed before defendant Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were impleaded and as such there is no proper local commissioner's report an the record. Point No. 1 the plaint was filed on 20th April, 1965. It was initially signed by K. Chatterjee. Assistant Manager of the plaintiff company and it was also verified by him on 19th April, 1955. Subsequently the plaint was also signed by J. E. George, the General Manager and constituted attorney of the plaintiff company on 18th April, 1962. The verification was also signed by him on that date. Order vi Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every pleading shall be signed by the party and his Pleader (if any): provided that where a party pleading is by reason of absence or for other good cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. Rule 15 (1) provides that save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. A Company is not a natural person and, therefore, some person has to sign and verify a plaint on its behalf. Order XXIX rule 1 says that in suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by any director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case. Another relevant provision bearing on the controversy is Order ID rule 1 Civil Procedure Code which reads as under : 1. Any appearance application or act in or to any Court required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such court may. Another relevant provision bearing on the controversy is Order ID rule 1 Civil Procedure Code which reads as under : 1. Any appearance application or act in or to any Court required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such court may. except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent or by a Pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be on his behalf : Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the parry in person. 8. IT is not disputed that Shri K. Chatterjee, the Assistant Manager neither having been the Secretary nor a Director of the Company nor having held a Power of Attorney in his favour was not competent to sign and verify the plaint. As regards Mr. J. E. George the General Manager of the plaintiff company it is not disputed that he was a Principal Officer of the company. Furthermore he was having Power of Attorney executed in his favour This Power of Attorney is dated 20th August, 1954 executed by Mr Harry Leslie Wilson who had been appointed the Company's General attorney by a Power of Attorney in respect of several countries mentioned therein including India to do. make, perform, execute and exercise all or any of the several acts deeds, power authorities, matters and things specified therein with full power to appoint substitutes to execute and perform all or any of the acts, matters and things within the scope of the Principal Power of Attorney. By the Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff company Harry Leslie Wilson was authorised to do all or any of the acts and things specified in Clauses 1 to 13 therein. Clauses 3, 4 and 13 which are relevant read as under : 3. To ask demand sue for and receive all and every sum and sums of money goods chattels and effects now or at any time due owing or belonging to the Company and to give effectual receipts and discharges for the same. 4. Clauses 3, 4 and 13 which are relevant read as under : 3. To ask demand sue for and receive all and every sum and sums of money goods chattels and effects now or at any time due owing or belonging to the Company and to give effectual receipts and discharges for the same. 4. To commence prosecute and defend refer to arbitration compound abandon suspend submit to judgment and become non suited in all actions suits claims demands and proceedings in relation to the property of the Company for the time being or for the recovery and obtaining of all debts and monies due to the Company or to which the Company is entitled or otherwise in relation to its affairs and to sue and be sued plead or be impleaded in any Court in any Civil or Criminal proceedings or before any arbitrator or person having by law or consent of parties authority to hear evidence and on behalf of the Company to accept service of process and receive all lawful notices and generally in the name of the Company or in his own name to commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in any Court or to resort to any other preceding allowed by the law in force in the said territory whether by constraint or person or attachment of money or goods or otherwise for recovering and obtaining payment delivery and possession of any goods chattels effects debts Assets and other monies belonging or due to the company or to which the Company is or may be entitled in law or in equity. 13. For the better and more effectual execution and performance of the several matters aforesaid the Company hereby gives and grants to the said Attorney Power and authority from time to time to appoint one or more: substitute or substitutes, sub-delegate or Sub-delegates to execute and perform all or any of the acts matters and things within the scope of this Power attorney and at pleasure to remove any such substitute or substitutes sub-delegate or sub-deligates and to appoint another or others in his or their place or places. John Venn, Notary Public certified and attested the Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. John Venn, Notary Public certified and attested the Power of Attorney in favour of Mr. Wilson, stating that the common seal of the Company was affixed thereon in the presence of a resolution of the Board of Directors of the Company in his presence and Mr. Alfred Clark one of the Directors and Henry Hugh Duvall, the Secretary thereof signed in his presence at foot of the Power of Attorney as witnessing the affixing of the seal of the Company. It is clear that the Power of Attorney executed in favour of Mr. Wilson was pursuant to a resolution passed by the Board of directors of the Company and that Power of Attorney authorised Mr. Wilson to sue, sign and verify the plaint and also to appoint one or more substitutes to execute and perform all or any of the several matters and things specified therein and as such Mr. J. E. George who was appointed attorney by Mr. Wilson had the power to sue, sign and verify the plaint- 9. SHRI Roy has referred in support of his submission to International continental Caoutchoue Compagnie vs. Mehta and Co., 31 CWN 1030 where a learned Single Judge of this Court held that the Secretary, Director, or other Principal Officer is not the party pleading. The party pleading is the Company. Hence it follows that as regards every pleading on behalf of a Company or corporation the fitness to verify of the person purporting to verify it must be proved by affidavit. However, this was based on Rule 12 Chapter VII of the Rules of this Court which provided that where any person, other than a party pleading, verifies a pleading under order 6 Rule 15 of the Code, his fitness to so verify shall be proved by his affidavit at the time the pleading is presented. However, the suit from which the present appeal has arisen was not instituted on the original side of this Court and, therefore, the rule on which the judgment is based is not applicable to the proceedings of the suit from which the present appeal has arisen. However, the suit from which the present appeal has arisen was not instituted on the original side of this Court and, therefore, the rule on which the judgment is based is not applicable to the proceedings of the suit from which the present appeal has arisen. The other decision referred by the learned Counsel for the appellant is Raj Kumar Dhar vs. A. Stuart Lewis, 61 CWN 445 where it was observed that prima two courses are open to the plaintiff namely (i) to verify the plaint himself, or (ii) to place proper materials before the Court for satisfying it that the person who had actually signed the verification was acquainted with the facts of the case. In that case the Power of Attorney in favour of the person who verified the plaint was not held sufficient to entitle the person to sign the verification. But that was a case where serious allegations of fraud, falsification of account, culpable negligence etc, had been made against the defendants In the present ease, allegations made in the plaint were in themselves sufficient to satisfy the Court that Mr. J. E. George was acquainted with the facts of the case. The other decision referred in M/s. Nibro Limited vs. National insurance Co. Ltd. , AIR 1991 Delhi 25 where referring to the provisions of Section 291 of the Companies Act the Court held that except where express provision is made that the powers of a Company in respect of a particular matters are to be exercised by the Company in general meeting in all other cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual Directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It was pointed out that the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a Company is not a technical matter and has far reaching effects as it often affects policy and financies of the Company and as such unless power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular Director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the Company and such a power can be conferred by the board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard. This decision is of no help to the appellants, as it does not lay down that a person who has been authorised by a Power of Attorney duly executed pursuant to a resolution passed by tine Board of Directors of the Company does not have the authority to institute the suit. Clearly such a person has the authority to file a suit having regard to the provisions of Order iii Rule 1 Civil Procedure Code referred earlier. 10. ON the other hand Son SAP. Roy Chowdhury, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent company has referred to Jhumarmull sethia vs. Champalal Bothra, 63 CWN 832 where it was held that a petition and the Vakalatnama filed along with it being initially signed by a person not legally authorised to sign the same on behalf of the petitioner can be validated by the signature of the petitioner himself at a later stage of the proceeding, the defect being merely formal. This was so held after referring to Dahyobati Girdhardas vs. Babaji Dahyoji Kotwal, AIR 1953 Bom 28 (1) where Chagla, C. J. held that the plaintiff can be allowed to amend the plaint, at a later stage, by himself signing irrespective of the bar of limitation. Reliance has also been placed on United Bank of India vs. Naresh kumar and Others, AIR 1997 SC 3 where it was held : "9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on as mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. 10. It cannot be disputed that a Company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its Pleader, if any. 10. It cannot be disputed that a Company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its Pleader, if any. As a Company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the Company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the Company. Reading Order 6. Rule 14 together with Order 29, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or Power of Attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a Company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the Company, for example, by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a Power of Attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its Officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its Officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer." As a result of our above discussion, we hold that Mr. The Court can on the basis of the evidence on record and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer." As a result of our above discussion, we hold that Mr. J. E. Geo had, by virtue of the Power of Attorney in his favour, the authority sign and verify the plaint and also to institute the suit, and the defects in these respects stood cured with retrospective effect from the date the institution of the suit, on 18th April, 1962 when he signed and verified the plaint. As such there is no substance in the argument made on bet of the appellants that the plaint was not signed and verified by a competent person and the suit was also not filed by a duly authorised person since sanction of the Board of Directors was not obtained. Point No. 2 defendant Nos. 1 in his written statement filed in July 1955 pleaded that about 20 years back he got possession of the disputed land. Thus according to his pleading he took possession in or about the year 1935. Defendant No. 2 pleaded that he took possession on or about 1938. The case of the defendants thus is that they came to be in possession of the disputed land in 1935 or shortly thereafter. On the other hand, definite case of the Company is that some defendants trespassed in June 1952 while others thereafter. Fatik chandra Chakraborty. an Ex-employee of the plaintiff Company, has deposed that he joined service of the Company on 16th June, 1929 and retired in March 1960 and after purchasing the land in question, the Company got possession thereof and got the land mutated in its name in the municipality but the defendants forcibly took possession of the disputed land in the 1st week of June 1952. He has further deposed that the Company never asked the defendants to improve the land and there was no talk of settling of land with them and the defendants did not have the possession for more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit. In cross-examination, he has stated that the defendants occupied the said land in the 1st week of June 1955. In cross-examination, he has stated that the defendants occupied the said land in the 1st week of June 1955. This statement appears to be due to inadvertance and there is no reason to disbelieve what he meant to say was that the defendants took possession in June 1952 as stated by him in his examination-in-chief. The statement of Mr. J. W. Webber the General Factory Manager of the plaintiff company was recorded in August 1959, on commission. He served the Company at Calcutta as a Superintendent, thereafter as an assistant Factory Manager and then General Factory Manager. He saw the disputed land for the first time in 1944. His evidence is to the effect that lands in question are owned by the plaintiff company, condition of these lands is jungly and swampy and, at present, there are hutments and squatters on the land. He joined service in Calcutta in December 1944 and saw the suit land for the first time in that year. Question No. 20 and its answer read as under : q. 20. When you first came here, what was the condition of these lands as you saw then ? ans. 1 found the lands in similar condition as they are now. On the basis of the answer to Question No. 20, learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the witness admitted that in the year 1944 the defendants were in possession of the disputed lands. However, we are unable to agree with the submission. We see no reason to disagree with the learned Trial Court that the answer given by the witness meant that the nature and condition of the land was jungly and swampy and not that the defendants were in possession even in 1944. He denied to have given any assurance or promise to any of the trespassers for settlement of the land on reasonable rent. On the other hand defendant No. 1 Ram Pujan singh has deposed that he came to the suit land with two cows and settled there in the year 1935, and after two months the durwan of the plaintiff company Ram Bharash Singh came to him and informed him that the plaintiff company was the owner of the land, to which he replied that his uncle was in police service. Thereafter, the durwan did not disturb him. The witnesses further stated that after 10 days. Thereafter, the durwan did not disturb him. The witnesses further stated that after 10 days. Ram Bharash Singh took him to Mr. Clark who asked him to improve the land and told, him that he would settle the land with him afterwards. Then, he started filling up the land and improved an area of about 2 bighas 4 cottahs of land and erected five structures thereon. Thereafter, he asked Mr. Clark to settle the land with him as previously promised but Mr. Clark asked him to improve the land further, and did not settle the land and, thereafter, he further constructed 30 rooms on the land. He has admitted that he received a notice in 1952 from Mr. Clark. It is inherently improbable that the Company would have waited for 17 years to issue a notice requiring the trespassers to vacate its land. It is also not probable that the Company would have asked the trespassers to improve the land at their own expense with the promise that after the improvement was affected, the land would be settled with them at reasonable rent. It is also difficult to believe that if the company had made the promise of settlement of land with the trespassers, the Company would not have honoured the promise and would allow the trespassers to continue with the trespass without getting anything in return while running risk to their title. The witness and the several other witnesses who have entered the witness box in support of the story of trespass more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit have rightly been disbelieved by the learned Trial Court. There is absolutely no reason to disbelieve the evidence produced by the Company that the defendants trespassed over the disputed land in the year 1952 and thereafter. Since the suit was filed in the year 1955, we affirm the finding of the learned trial Court that the defendants were not in possession of the land for 12 years prior to the institution of the suit and as such the suit is not barred by limitation. Point No. 3 it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the local commissioner was appointed before defendant Nos. 4 to 7 were impleaded, and as such a fresh commission should have been issued after they were impleaded. The report of the Commissioner indicated the area trespassed over by defendant Nos. Point No. 3 it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the local commissioner was appointed before defendant Nos. 4 to 7 were impleaded, and as such a fresh commission should have been issued after they were impleaded. The report of the Commissioner indicated the area trespassed over by defendant Nos. 4 at 7 also and, as such, it was not necessary to issue a fresh commission after these defendants were impleaded. Moreover, no request for fresh commission was made by the defendants. We see no merit in the submission made on behalf of the appellants. After a careful consideration of the entire records and the submissions made on behalf of the parties, we see no reason to interfere with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court in the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.