JUDGMENT P.K. Sarkar, J.- This second appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 26th July, 1983, passed by Sri Mithilesh Kumar Sigh, Additional Sub- ordinate Judge, Samastipur, in Title Appeal No. 48/78/4/83. 2. The defendant second set in the original Title Suit No. 72/75 are the appellants in this case and Respondent 1st party of this appeal were the plaintiffs. Respondent second set were the defendants 1st party and Respondent 3rd set were the defendants 3rd party and Respondent 4th set were the defendants 4th party in the said original Title Suit. 3. The plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 72/75 for a declaration that the plaintiffs' sale-deed dated 25.5.74 confer perfect right, title and interest over the suit land as mentioned in Schedule-1 of the plaint to the plaintiffs and the defendants 1st party had no right to cancel the sale-deed and to re-execute another sale-deed dated 21.6.75 in favour of Defendant 2nd set with respect to the same land, who are appellants in the case, and thus, the deed of cancellation dated 11.6.75 and the sale-deed dated 21.6.75 do not have any adverse effect on the plaintiffs' title over the suit land. The plaintiffs also claimed redemption of the suit land as well as (sic) of receipt of the original sale-deed dated 25.5.74 by the defendant second party to him. 4. The facts of the case as appears from the plaint is that defendant 1st party are members of joint Hindu family and the defendant no.1 Nokhey Rai (since deceased) executed a sale-deed in the capacity of the Kana of the family for 6 Kathas 10 Dhurs of land fully described in the Schedule-I of the plaint in favour of the plaintiffs-Respondent 1st party in this appeal for consideration amount of Rs. 3,000/-. The cause for selling the property was stated to pay past debt. It further appears that in the sale-deed itself it was mentioned that out of the aforesaid Rs.3,000/- being the consideration amount, a sum of Rs. 2,000/- was already paid and Rs. 1,000/- will be retained by the vendee in his hand re-deeming the suit land from mortgage. The plaintiffs asserted that out of Rs. 2,000/- paid to the defendants, the later paid the same to his creditors and on 25.5.74 defendant no.1 executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. 2,000/- was already paid and Rs. 1,000/- will be retained by the vendee in his hand re-deeming the suit land from mortgage. The plaintiffs asserted that out of Rs. 2,000/- paid to the defendants, the later paid the same to his creditors and on 25.5.74 defendant no.1 executed the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The registration receipt was authorised to the plaintiffs by the defendant no.1 and it was agreed that the plaintiffs will get the kewala direct from the Registration Office. However, the plaintiffs endorsed the said receipt to defendants 4th party after instructing that he will bring the kewala from the Registration office and will hand-over the same to anyone of them. The plaintiffs also went to the mortgagee defendant 3rd set with a view to re-deem the amount of the mortgage executed by defendant no.1. But when the money was tendered, only defendant no.8 became ready to receive the amount i.e. Rs. 500/- and to delivere possession of the said land to the plaintiffs over half of the land. Another mortgagee defendant no.7 (brother of defendant no.8) agreed to receive the amount Rs. 500/- only after the crops are taken out. However, on 9.6.75 the plaintiffs received a notice which was issued on behalf of the defendants 1st party by their lawyer regarding cancellation of the sale-deed due to non-payment of the consideration amount. Therefore, the plaintiffs went to the Registration Office and learnt that defendant no.4 had already taken out the sale-deed. But he did not hand- over the same to them. Subsequently defendant no.1 executed a cancellation deed of the plaintiffs' sale-deed dated 25.5.74 on 13.6.75 and got another sale-deed executed in favour of the appellants i.e. defendant 2nd set on 21.6.75 with respect to the same land. Hence, the suit. 5. It appears that defendant 1st party did not appear in the original Title Suit nor filed any written statement. Defendant second party actually contested the suit and denied the entire facts and also denied that out of the consideration amount, Rs. 2000/- was paid before execution of the sale-deed. The entire payment of consideration amount has been denied. However, payment of Rs. 500/- by the plaintiffs has been admitted. Defendant second party actually contested the suit and denied the entire facts and also denied that out of the consideration amount, Rs. 2000/- was paid before execution of the sale-deed. The entire payment of consideration amount has been denied. However, payment of Rs. 500/- by the plaintiffs has been admitted. These defendants also claimed that the plaintiffs' sale-deed was cancelled by defendant no.1 on 13.6.75 and another sale-deed was executed in favour of the defendant second set i.e. the appellants in the case on 21.6.75 by the defendant no.1. Hence, they prayed that the plaintiffs have acquired no title and the suit be dismissed. 6. The Learned Munsif Second, Samastipur, heard the suit and by his judgment dated 20.6.78 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs holding that proper consideration has been passed and also directed the defendant 1st party and defendant second party to hand-over the original sale-deed dated 25.5.74 to the plaintiffs. They were also directed to hand-over the original relevant Bharna deed to the plaintiff on receipt of Bharna money of Rs. 500/-. The appellants, thereafter, filed an appeal against the said judgment and the said appeal was heard by Sri Mithilesh Kumar Singh, Additional Sub-Judge, Samastipur, and by his judgement dated 26.7.83 he also dismissed the appeal and thereby confirmed the decree passed by the court below. The appellants filed second appeal against the said order. 7. From the record it appears that the second appeal was admitted in this Court on the following substantial question of law namely "Whether the courts below are justified in throwing the burden of proving the non-payment of consideration money upon the defendants in the circumstances of the case ?". 8. There is no dispute on the fact that defendant no.1 executed a sale-deed on 25.5.74 in favour of the plaintiffs with respect to the suit land for a sum of Rs.3,000/-. It also appears that there is a recital in the sale-deed that out of the consideration amount of Rs. 3,000/-, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- will be paid to the plaintiffs by which he will re-deem the mortgages executed by defendant no.1 in favour of Prahlad Rai and Amak Rai and the rest of the amount Rs. 2,000/- will be paid at the time of the execution of the sale-deed and accordingly, the plaintiffs put in possession of the land. 1,000/- will be paid to the plaintiffs by which he will re-deem the mortgages executed by defendant no.1 in favour of Prahlad Rai and Amak Rai and the rest of the amount Rs. 2,000/- will be paid at the time of the execution of the sale-deed and accordingly, the plaintiffs put in possession of the land. It also appears that the receipt was with defendant no.4 Scribe who was to take the sale-deed from the Registry Office. It is also admitted that the plaintiffs re-deemed one of the mortgages namely the mortgage with defendant no.8 and paid a sum of Rs. 500/- to him and got a receipt for such payment. It also appears that the cancellation deed of the sale-deed of the plaintiffs was executed by defendant no.1 subsequently and also he executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant no. II, part, i.e. the appellants. 9. From the impuged Judgment it appears that the First Appellate Court found that the defendant second party i.e. the appellants failed to prove that the consideration amount of Rs. 2,000/- was not paid by the plaintiffs before the execution of the sale-deed and, thus, the averments in the sale-deed regarding payment of consideration amount was accepted. The lower court also earlier held that the burden of proof regarding non-passing of consideration in the plaintiffs' sale-deed is on the defendants 1st and second parties who are appellants in this case. From the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants before this Court it appears that the main grievance of the appellants is that the court below and also the First Appellate Court committed illegality in holding that it is on the defendants second party i.e. the appellants to establish the fact of non-passing of the consideration amount in the plaintiffs' sale-deed. The learned counsel for the Respondent 1st party i.e. the plaintiffs, however, stated that the court below has clearly stated in paragraph-13 of Judgment as follows: "Though in my view it is for the defendant to prove by the rebuttal evidence the non-payment of consideration but for the sake of convenience I would like to see plaintiffs' evidence first." This will show that, though, onus lies on the defendant second party, initially, the court considered the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs on the point and came to the conclusion that the defendant second party's contention regarding non-passing of the consideration amount can not be believed. Similarly, the First Appellate Court also found the same thing on the basis of the evidence on record. Thus, the court below who are courts of facts had went through the facts of the case and evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs paid Rs. 2000/- to defendant 1st party and the consideration as alleged in the sale-deed has been passed making the sale-deed perfect and valid and, thus, the plaintiffs got title on the basis of the aforesaid sale-deed. After the concurrent findings of facts by the two courts below, it is, perhaps, not open to this Court to go into the facts of the case. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has referred to a decision of this Court in Baldeo Singh and others vs. Dwarika Singh and others reported in 1978 P.L.J.R., 255, the relevant portion of the decision is quoted below. "It is almost settled that the question whether title passes on mere execution and registration of a deed or only on payment of consideration depends upon the intention of the parties, to be gathered from the deed. It has also been held that, though, saledeed may recite that the consideration has been paid, but there is nothing to prevent the parties from adducing evidence to show that the recital is untrue and, that, in fact, the consideration was not paid; this will not be barred by Section 92 of the Evidence Act. Admittedly, the consideration money was not paid at the time of the execution and registration of the deed. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not acquire title on mere execution and registration of the saledeed." 11. The learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on a decision in Girish Narayan Singh and another Vs. Admittedly, the consideration money was not paid at the time of the execution and registration of the deed. Therefore, the plaintiffs did not acquire title on mere execution and registration of the saledeed." 11. The learned counsel for the appellants also placed reliance on a decision in Girish Narayan Singh and another Vs. Akhtar Hussain and others reported in A.I.R. 1953 Patna, 330 wherein it is held that while considering the sale-deed regarding payment of consideration, the intention of the parties should be taken into consideration in interpreting the sale-deed. 12. The learned counsel for the appellants also referred to a decision in Mostt. Tunni Kuer vs. Gauri Naun reported in 1956 B.L.J.R., 8. The following recital in the said Judgment may beneficially be quoted below: "where the document recites that consideration money has been paid and possession has been delivered but in fact it is found that possession has never been delivered, consideration has never been paid and upon registration, the registration receipt has been retained and not handed over to the vendee, these circumstances are clear indications that parties intended that the passing of the full consideration was the sine qua non of the passing of the title." 13. The learned counsel for the appellants referred another decision in Pabni Mahtani vs. Haralal Mahto and others reported in 1985 B.L.J.R., Vo1.33, 785 wherein it was held that title will pass only after payment of full consideration money. 14. The learned counsel for the appellants referred another decision of this Court reported in 1953 B.L.J.R., Vol. 1, 147, wherein it was held that the intention of the parties was that title would not pass until the entire consideration had passed and the mere registration of the sale-deed did not vest title in the vendee. 15. Similarly, this Court in another decision Shiva Narayan Sah vs. Baidyanath Prasad Tiwary reported in 1974 B.L.J.R. Vol. XXII, 81, has held that a title did not pass to vendee on execution and registration of the sale-deed, but it was initiated to pass on payment of the entire consideration money. 16. In earlier decision in Ram Janam Pandey and another vs. Shyam Behari Lal and another reported in 1955 B.L.J.R. Vol. III, 93, their Lordship of this Court have held which can be conveniently quoted as follow. 16. In earlier decision in Ram Janam Pandey and another vs. Shyam Behari Lal and another reported in 1955 B.L.J.R. Vol. III, 93, their Lordship of this Court have held which can be conveniently quoted as follow. "The question whether title under a sale-deed passes upon its execution and registration or is postponed till the payment of the consideration is made, depends upon the intention of the parties and that intention is to be collected from the whole instrument." 17. From the decisions referred to above it is apparent that only the averments in the sale-deed regarding payment of consideration amount will not be sufficient to hold that the consideration has passed confirming the aforesaid title. The intention of the parties has to be inferred from the construction of the instruments. It also appears that while interpreting the instrument, the facts such as, though, from the sale-deed it appears that possession has been delivered, but in fact it is found that possession has never been delivered; consideration has never been paid and the registration receipt has been retained and not handed over to the vendee, have to be taken into consideration. 18. On a careful perusal of the aforesaid decisions and the principle of law as enunciated in the aforesaid decisions it also appears that the law is also settled on the point that the parties will have a right to adduce evidence to contradict the fact mentioned in the saledeed that the money has been paid. On perusal of the impugned order it appears that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge has also admitted this position. Both the parties adduced evidence. The plaintiffs brought the creditors to establish the fact that Rs. 2000/- was paid in cash to defendant no.1 and he in turn paid the dues of the creditors. The veracity of such evidence are to be looked into by the courts below who are the courts of facts and not by this Court since there is concurrent findings of facts on the question of aforesaid payment. Perhaps, it is not possible for this Court to take another view at the stage of the Second Appeal. It is true that the courts below placed the onus of proving non-payment of consideration amount on the defendants in view of the fact that there is a prima facie proof of such payment in the sale-deed. Perhaps, it is not possible for this Court to take another view at the stage of the Second Appeal. It is true that the courts below placed the onus of proving non-payment of consideration amount on the defendants in view of the fact that there is a prima facie proof of such payment in the sale-deed. However, the courts below also examined the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs regarding payment of such consideration. 19. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a decision in Goli Ramaswami and another Vs. Narla Jagannadha Rao and others reported in A.I.R. 1962. A.P., 94, wherein it was held that once execution is proved, recitals of payment of consideration are prima facie proof of it against the executants or persons claiming under him. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents also placed reliance upon an old decision of this Court in Jamuna Prasad Sah vs. Faujdar Sahni reported in A.I.R. 1929, Patna 254, wherein it was held that recital in a mortgage-bond as to the receipt of the consideration by the mortgagor is admissible as against the subsequent purchaser and if such purchaser challenges the passing of consideration, the initial onus is upon him. 21. Another decision reported in A.I.R. 1949, Ajmer, 52 (Kishan Lal vs. Gouri Shankar) has also been referred wherein it has been held which may be quoted below. "A recital in a mortgaged-bond as to the receipt of the consideration is an admission by the mortgagor. Such an admission would be evidence against the mortgagor and would also be admissible against the subsequent purchaser as his representative when the execution of the document has been proved or admitted and if the purchaser wants to show that no consideration passed, the initial onus would be on him." On the basis of the aforementioned decision, the learned counsel submits that the view taken by the court below that no consideration has been passed in the sale-deed of the plaintiffs, the onus is on the subsequent purchaser, namely, defendant second party who are appellants here, can not be held as erroneous and, thus, can not be set aside. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, challenged this contention of the respondents and stated that in no case onus can be thrusted on the appellants. 22. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, challenged this contention of the respondents and stated that in no case onus can be thrusted on the appellants. 22. The facts indicated above show that the courts below have fully considered the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs including on the point of payment of consideration amount to come to conclusion and did not satisfy themselves only on the contents of the documents. It is, therefore, not open to this Court while hearing this Second Appeal under Section 100 C. P. C. to enter into the details of the facts and evidence in this case to take a contrary view. 23. Accordingly, I find that no substantial question of law is involved in this case which requires a decision by this Court affecting the concurrent findings of the courts below. This Second Appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, parties will bear their own costs.