Judgment :- R. JAYASIMHA BABU, J. The assessee is aggrieved by the notices dt. 19th June, 1992, issued under s. 148 of the IT Act, 1961, calling upon the assessee to submit a return of its income for the asst. yr. 1983-84, as the AO had reason to believe that the income in respect of which assessee was chargeable to tax for the years 1983-84 to 1988-89 excluding 1984-85 had escaped assessment within the meaning of s. 147 of the IT Act, 1961. According to the assessee it had fully disclosed all the material facts necessary at the time the original assessments were made and, therefore, the notices issued beyond the period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment years were wholly illegal. 2. Though the notices do not set out the reasons, in the counter-affidavit of the Dy. CIT, Coimbatore, at para. 5, the reasons for the issuance of those notices have been set out as under, "........It has been found during the course of the assessment proceedings for the asst. yr. 1989-90, that the material evidence relevant for the allowability of deduction under s. 80-I of the Act during the asst. yr. 1983-84 was neither produced by the petitioner nor examined by the AO. Thus, the materials relevant for the claim of deduction under s. 80-I of the Act was never considered from the beginning, but only the quantum of relief was questioned. It is only in the asst. yr. 1989-90, that the Dy. CIT has gone into the assessee's eligibility to the relief under s. 80-I on a consideration of the relevant materials furnished at the instance of the Dy. CIT. Thus, it was not a question of change of opinion on the same set of facts, since the facts were never considered in the first instance ...........". 3. In the order of assessment for the year 1989-90, the AO has with regard to the assessee's claim for deduction under s. 80-I of the Act noted that in response to his question to the assessee as to when the industrial undertaking in question was established, the assessee had claimed that no industrial undertaking was commissioned in the calendar year 1982; that it had claimed deduction under s. 80-I of the Act from 1983-84; that the licenced capacity of the assessee remained at 100 from the asst. yrs. yrs. 1980-81 to 1989-90, while the installed capacity increased from 10 to 20 in 1983-84; that the production increased from 4 in the year 1980-81 to 52 in the year 1989-90 (21 months period); that the assessee was incorporated on 30th May, 1971; that the industrial licence pursuant to which the industrial undertaking was established was issued on 22nd January, 1977; that the assessee was engaged in the manufacture of blast hole and water well drilling rigs; that the assessee-company in the asst. yr. 1983-84 constructed a new production bay with a dimension larger than the existing one and capable of taking up manufacture of 10, "sized drills which were till that point of time being imported; that the new bay was commissioned in 1984, when commercial production began in the newly constructed bay and that new machineries have been installed at a total cost of Rs. 18.76 lakhs4. In the assessment orders for the year for which notices have been issued under s. 148 of the Act, there is no indication that any material was produced before the AO for the relevant years and that the AO was fully aware of all the materials at the time the assessments were made. 5. Learned senior counsel for the assessee Mr. V. Ramachandran submitted that the assessee could not possibly be expected to furnish materials which the form or return did require; that the AO for all these assessment years had made a detailed computation of the amounts to be allowed as deduction under s. 80-I of the Act, which would prima facie indicate that he had applied his mind as to the eligibility of the assessee for relief under s. 80-I and that therefore, the present notices are only to be regarded as the result of a change of opinion. It was further submitted that the assessee had made full and true disclosure of all the relevant material facts necessary for the assessment during all these years. 6. Learned counsel referring to ss. It was further submitted that the assessee had made full and true disclosure of all the relevant material facts necessary for the assessment during all these years. 6. Learned counsel referring to ss. 147 and 149 of the Act, submitted that where the AO wishes to reopen an assessment after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the conditions set out in the proviso to s. 147 of the Act must be satisfied in addition to the action being initiated within the time-limit set out in s. 149 of the Act, having regard to the extent or income alleged to have accepted tax. Learned counsel placed reliance on the concluding part of the main proviso to s. 147 of the Act, which refers to the disclosure of all the relevant materials facts fully and truly for assessment for the assessment year. It was submitted that the proceedings had been initiated in all these cases only in June, 1992, long after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year7. Counsel for the Revenue relied upon the assessment order for the asst. yr. 1989-90 as well as the contents of the counter-affidavit. Counsel further asserted that notwithstanding the proviso to s. 147 of the Act, notice could be issued under s. 148 of the Act, if it is permissible to do so in terms of any of the clauses of s. 149 of the Act and that, therefore, it was not necessary for a finding that there had been failure on the part of the assessee to fully and truly disclose all the material facts at the time of reassessment. 8. Sec. 147 of the Act deals with the income escaping assessment. Before a notice under s. 148 of the Act can be issued, all further requirements of s. 147 of the Act must be fully met. The time-limits specified in s. 149 of the Act is not a substitute for what has been stated in s. 147 of the Act. Sec. 149 of the Act merely stipulates the time-limits within which action can be taken under s. 147 of the Act and a notice issued under s. 148 of the Act. The time-limits specified in s. 149 of the Act is not a substitute for what has been stated in s. 147 of the Act. Sec. 149 of the Act merely stipulates the time-limits within which action can be taken under s. 147 of the Act and a notice issued under s. 148 of the Act. In other words, where a notice issued under s. 148 of the Act is after the expiry of a period of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the conditions set out in the proviso to s. 147 of the Act must be satisfied. Such a notice also should conform to the time-limits and the monetary limits set out in s. 149 of the Act. There is no option given to the AO to comply with either s. 149 of the Act or to the proviso to s. 147 of the Act, Both of them are to be simultaneously complied with and the requirements therein are to be fulfilled before a valid notice can be issued under s. 148 of the Act. 9. In all these cases the notices have been issued after the expiry of the period of four years. The notices can be sustained only if it can be held that there had been failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts that were necessary for the assessment for these assessment years10. In the case of ITO vs. Lakhmani Mewal Das the Supreme Court observed in the context of s. 148 of the Act that". We may add that the duty which is cast upon the assessee is to make a true and full disclosure of the primary facts at the time of the original assessment. Production before the ITO of the account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered by the ITO will not necessarily amount to disclosure contemplated by law.". It is thus clear that the assessee cannot take shelter under the plea that the return did not require a particular fact to be set out and therefore, the failure to disclose the facts will provide immunity to the assessee from any notice being issued under s. 148 of the Act after a period of four years. It is thus clear that the assessee cannot take shelter under the plea that the return did not require a particular fact to be set out and therefore, the failure to disclose the facts will provide immunity to the assessee from any notice being issued under s. 148 of the Act after a period of four years. The duty that is cast upon the assessee is to disclose the primary facts on the basis of which the AO can decide as to whether the assessee is entitled to the deduction claimed or not. The mere fact that the ITO had reached some conclusions and had allowed the deduction does not necessarily imply that the ITO had been provided with the primary facts required for making a decision as to whether the deduction claimed was allowable in terms of the relevant statutory provisions. 11. The assessment orders for all these years do not indicate that the primary facts required for claiming the relief under s. 80-I of the Act had been disclosed, at the time the assessment orders were made. The assessee has not placed any materials de hors those assessment orders which would indicate such knowledge on the part of the AO. 12. It is only in the assessment order for the year 1989-90, along with the material facts, the reasons relevant to the allowability or otherwise of the assessees' claim for deduction under s. 80-I of the Act have been set out. The facts stated therein would constitute information for the purpose of s. 147 of the Act and would provide grounds for the reasonable belief which the AO is required to entertain before initiating proceedings under that section13. Learned counsel for the assessee relied on a Division Bench judgment of Gujarat High Court in Arvind Boards & Paper Products vs. M. T. Keshruwala in support of his submission that the assessee had disclosed all the facts and all that the AO had now done is to change his opinion thereon. The decision relied upon turned on the special facts in that case. The Court herein had found that there was no warrant for holding that the assessee therein had failed to disclose the relevant material facts. 14. The Supreme Court in A.L.A. Firm vs. CIT elaborately considered the circumstances in which assessments can be reopened. The decision relied upon turned on the special facts in that case. The Court herein had found that there was no warrant for holding that the assessee therein had failed to disclose the relevant material facts. 14. The Supreme Court in A.L.A. Firm vs. CIT elaborately considered the circumstances in which assessments can be reopened. The apex Court set out four situations in which notices under s. 34(1)(b) of the IT Act, 1922, which corresponds to s. 147 to 1961 Act could be validly issued. The Court also noticed the fact that in the case of Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society vs. CIT, it was emphasised that the ITO must have some information which makes him to realise that he has committed an error in the earlier assessment and such information need not necessarily be extraneous to the record. It would be enough if the material on the basis of which the reassessment proceedings are sought to be initiated came to the notice of the ITO subsequent to the original assessment. 15. Applying the law laid down by the apex Court in A.L.A. Firm's case (supra), the only conclusion possible on the facts of these cases is that the notices issued to the assessee under s. 148 of the Act do not suffer from any infirmity, as they are based on the information contained in the assessment order for the year 1989-90 which information, though material and concerned to the primary facts had not been placed by the assessee at the time of assessment for the relevant assessment years for reopening when those notices had been issued16. The writ petitions, therefore, fail and they are dismissed. No costs. All the connected writ miscellaneous petitions are also dismissed. However, the references made in the earlier part of this order with regard to the contents of the assessment order for the asst. yr. 1989-90 are not to be treated as preventing the assessee from challenging the correctness of the contents of that assessment order. It is open to the assessee to urge all his contentions before the AO.