Judgment :- 1. Petitioner seeks issuance of Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the proceedings of the Principal Commissioner and Commissioner of Revenue Administration, Chepauk, Chennai made in D.Dis(01) 111293/96 (A.A. No. 216/96) dated 1.4.1997 and the proceedings of the second respondent in K.DiS. 42650/96/03, dated 12.11.1996 and quash the same and to direct the respondents to renew the licence bearing No. 14/U/4 for DBBL Gun for the subsequent periods and pass such further orders. 2. Petitioner is in possession of double barrel Gun from the year 1959 and he has been given licence to possess the same from time to time. Even though originally the licence was issued to possess the Gun throughout India, subsequently, the licence was restricted to Coimbatore District. It is the case of the petitioner that he has been handling the Gun as per the provisions of the Arms Act and the terms and conditions stipulated. While he was away at Madras for nearly a month during 1989, he kept the Gun in the bureau, which remained unlocked. A close relative of the petitioner secured the Gun from Petitioners wife by falsely representing that he was in need of the gun for protecting his field from wild animals which was destroying his crops in the field. Believing the said words of the relative, his wife without knowing the consequences handed over the Gun. The close relative misused the said gun which resulted in Criminal Complaint. It is said that the case before the Judicial Magistrate, Pollachi was taken up and ultimately ended in acquittal. 3. A case was also registered against the petitioner under Section 25(3)(1) of Arms Act, which was challenged by the petitioner in Crl.O.P. No. 5374 of 1993 and the entire proceedings was quashed. Thereafter petitioner was asked to produce the original licence, which was also produced before the Collector. Since the period of licence already expired, petitioner moved an application before the Licensing Authority to renew the licence to possess the Double Barrel Gun. The same was dismissed and the matter was taken on appeal, which was also dismissed. The said orders are challenged in this Writ Petition on various grounds. 4. I heard the Government Pleader also. Though no counter has been filed, Government Pleader, on instructions, argued the matter. 5. The same was dismissed and the matter was taken on appeal, which was also dismissed. The said orders are challenged in this Writ Petition on various grounds. 4. I heard the Government Pleader also. Though no counter has been filed, Government Pleader, on instructions, argued the matter. 5. The licensing authority as per the order dated 12.11.1996 held that since the Superintendent of Police, Coimbatore has clearly stated that the applicants case is not recommended for renewal, the same is rejected. When the matter was taken up on appeal, the appellate authority held that the appellants weapon was taken away from his house and was subsequently seized by the Police. Though the case against the appellant was quashed by the High Court, appellant did not take due care, as a result of which the Gun was used in commission of I.P.C. Offence. The Superintendent of Police also did not recommended for renewal of licence. Therefore the petitioner does not deserve to possess the weapon, and the appeal was dismissed. 6. The only question that arises for consideration is whether the authorities below were justified in rejecting the request of the petitioner for renewal of licence of Gun and whether this Court can interfere in such decisions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 7. Section 14(1)(b) of the Arms Act provide for the grounds on which renewal application could be rejected, which read thus, “Sec. 14(1)(b) a licence in any other case under Chapter II, (i) Where such licence is required by a person whom the licensing authority has reason to believe- (1) to be prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or, (2) to be unsound mind or, (3) to be for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act, or, (ii) where the licensing authority deems fit necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to refuse to grant such licence.” 8. The scope of Section 14 of the Act came up for consideration before the Full Bench of Honourable Patna High Court, reported in AIR 1987 Patna 122 ( Kapildeo Singh v. State ). The Full Bench said that the refusal of grant of licence has to be judicially exercised and with proper application of mind orders should be passed. The scope of Section 14 of the Act came up for consideration before the Full Bench of Honourable Patna High Court, reported in AIR 1987 Patna 122 ( Kapildeo Singh v. State ). The Full Bench said that the refusal of grant of licence has to be judicially exercised and with proper application of mind orders should be passed. The Full Bench further said that the power of the Courts is very much limited in such cases. At page 125 of the Volume the Full Bench held thus, “It would be manifest from the aforesaid provisions that under the Act there is first a legal bar for having in possession or carrying a firearm unless a valid licence is first secured in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Secondly, even the original grant under Section 13 (2A) is vested entirely in the licensing authority and it seems that the widest discretion has been given to it. Even after confirming to the procedural requirements, the licensing authority may, as regards the general category of arms, either grant the licence or refuse to grant the same. This discretion in this context has perhaps been deliberately kept untrammelled. Further, under Section 14 the law mandates a refusal to grant licence even where the licensing authority has reason to believe that the applicant is for any reason unfit for licence under the Act. The larger tilt of the law in this context is thus somewhat too plain to call for further elaboration.” (Emphasis supplied) In paragraphs 9 to 12 of the said Judgment, their Lordships further held thus, “Now it is true that sub-section (3) does not in terms provide that the pendency of a criminal charge is a ground for the revocation of licence. However, it is equally true that it is not possible for the legislature to conceive every situation in the future which may render the suspension of revocation of a licence granted earlier necessary. It is, therefore, that the residuary discretion is left in the licensing authority. On this score, the language employed is again of the widest amplitude. However, it is equally true that it is not possible for the legislature to conceive every situation in the future which may render the suspension of revocation of a licence granted earlier necessary. It is, therefore, that the residuary discretion is left in the licensing authority. On this score, the language employed is again of the widest amplitude. Clause (a) warrants revocation if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence “is for any reason unfit for the licence under the Act.” Now, the employment of such phraseology in the statute by the framers can leave no manner of doubt that a wide residuary discretion has been vested in the licensing authority to revoke provided it is satisfied that the holder is unfit for the licence under the Act. The issue, thus, is whether the pendency of a major or capital crime case may not, in the opinion of the District Magistrate, satisfy him that such a person is unfit for holding the licence further. Plainly enough such discretion given by the statute cannot be put in a strait-jacket. It cannot possibly be said that in a particular case the implication of the holder in serious or horrendous capital crime may not furnish an adequate ground for the licensing authority for being satisfied that the former holder of the weapon is now unfit for the privilege of the licence granted under the Act. This more so in the light of the fact that sub-section (1) requires the licensing authority to give notice in writing to deliver up the licence to it written such time as may be specified in the notice in the event of variation, suspension and the revocation of licences. That would invariably give an opportunity to the licensee, as in the present case to show some cause against such action. It is after consideration of this explanation that the licensing authority may, on the overall circumstances, be satisfied from the nature of the case that the person is now unfit for continuing as a licensee for arms. A further safeguard is provided by sub-section (5) of Section 17. It is after consideration of this explanation that the licensing authority may, on the overall circumstances, be satisfied from the nature of the case that the person is now unfit for continuing as a licensee for arms. A further safeguard is provided by sub-section (5) of Section 17. The licensing authority must record in writing reasons therefor and also furnish to the holder of the licensee on demand a brief statement of the same unless in exceptional cases he is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interest to furnish such statement. Nevertheless the requirement of recording reasons in writing is inflexibly mandatory. Therefore, it cannot be easily said that the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority hedged in by the statutory requirement cannot be exercised on the basis of the pendency of the serious or capital criminal charge. If such subjective satisfaction has been, broadly and reasonably exercised, to my mind, it would come within the parameters of the statute under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 17. A strong note of caution, however, must be sounded in this context. It is not the pendency of any and every criminal case which would inflexibly warrant the suspension of revocation of a licence validly granted. A criminal case may range from a paltry traffic offence to the most horrendous capital crime. Whilst the pendency of the former may hardly provide an adequate basis under S. 17 (3), in the case of the latter after notice and hearing of the explanation such action may well become necessary. Equally, the use or employment of the licensed weapon in the alleged crime might well be a relevant and added factor for consideration in the exercise of the discretion bv the licensing authority. There is no gainsaying that licensed weapons are not to be allowed to degenerate into crime weapons. It bears repetition that sub-section (3) puts the matter in the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority and inevitably the issue cannot be put in the Procrustean bed of a precise definition or an exhaustive remuneration of situation in which such discretion may be exercised. Mr. Mishra had then sought to contend that the actual use or misuse of the licensed weapon in the alleged murder and even the petitioners participation therein is as yet subjudice before the Court of Session. Mr. Mishra had then sought to contend that the actual use or misuse of the licensed weapon in the alleged murder and even the petitioners participation therein is as yet subjudice before the Court of Session. Therefore, the licensing authority could draw no sustenance from what as yet are only allegations in a pending case, for revoking the licence. This argument loses sight of the fact that under sub-section (3) (a) it is the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate that for some reason the holder has become unfit for the licence. It is not the requirement of clause (a) aforesaid that there must be a formal conviction on a criminal charge only for holding a person as unfit. There is a wide gap betwixt the two, namely, a reasonable subjective satisfaction and an objective conviction on a criminal charge resting on the basis of acceptable evidence. One cannot go to the length of holding that because the matter is as yet pending trial the licensing authority could not be subjectively satisfied about the unfitness of the holder. If the argument of Mr. Mishra were to be accepted then in the context of even a most horrendous crime committed with licensed weapons, the licensing authority would be denuded of all powers of suspending or revoking the licence till the completion of the trial and a conviction therein. Perhaps, the matter can even be elongated so long as an appeal against such conviction may be pending. Indeed, it appears to me that under sub-section (3) the actual conviction or acquittal on the criminal charge does not have an inflexible or conclusive impact on the exercise of the discretion by the lie sing authority thereunder. Even if the holder of the licence may be acquitted bv narrowly giving the benefit of doubt, the licensing authority could perhaps, still take the view that along with other factor such a person may not be fit for holding an arms licence. Equally, conviction on any and every criminal charge would not provide an inflexible rule that the licensing authority must revoke the same and it may well be justified in allowing the continuance of the said licence . As is noticed hereafter, conviction and acquittal are issues of relevance under sub-section (7) for the criminal Court and not conclusive for the licensing authority who is governed by the provisions of sub-section (3).” 9. As is noticed hereafter, conviction and acquittal are issues of relevance under sub-section (7) for the criminal Court and not conclusive for the licensing authority who is governed by the provisions of sub-section (3).” 9. On the basis of the above decision, we have to consider whether the authorities below are justified in rejecting the request of the petitioner. Petitioner must know that he alone should possess the Gun and if it is taken by any third party it is likely to be misused. In this case the gun was misused by the third parry. While renewing the licence, the authorities below are justified in considering the fact that the weapon for which licence has been granted is used in a crime. Such incident should not be allowed to be repeated is a relevant factor which they are entitled to be considered while considering the application for renewal. While dismissing the appeal, the appellate authority has held that, ‘only because appellant did not take due care of the weapon, it was used for commission of an offence. Therefore, he is unfit to hold the same’. 10. When a discretion has been exercised by proper application of the mind as held in the Full Bench decision (cited supra), this Court is not expected to interfere under Article 226 of Constitution of India, unless the findings are perverse. No argument was put forward by the counsel for the petitioner that the reasonings of the appellate authority is perverse. His argument was based on quashing of criminal complaint as against the petitioner only. Merely because criminal complaint has been quashed, that will not entitle the petitioner to hold Double Barrel Gun. 11. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. Nos. 26992 and 26993 of 1997 are closed.