Judgment : 1. The petitioners have filed the above revisions against the order passed in E.A.Nos. 83 of 1993 and 378 of 1992 in O.S. No. 10 of 1909, on the file of the Sub-Court, Chidambaram, dated 211. 1998. 2. One Hazarath Syed Sha Rahmathulla Sahib was given certain properties in Killai Village, Chidambaram Taluk, Samayapuram Village, Tiruchi District, and in Navabpettai, Chidambaram Taluk by the then King. After his death, he was intered in Killai village and his son Syed Sha Edullah was also intered after his death in Navabpettai Durgah. He had two sons, namely, Syed Sha Ghulam Mohideen and Syed Sha Phool. Syed Sha Phool had a quarrel with his father with respect to the properties and he separated himself from the family by getting 20 kani lands. The balance extent of the properties had come under the control of Syed Sha Gulam Mohideen. With a view to continue the object for which the properties were given by the original owner, the said Syed Sha Gulam Mohideen executed two documents in the year 1926 and 1939. The said Syed Sha Gulam Mohideen had three sons, namely, Fariduddin Athar, Mohamad Ghouse and Gulam Jeelani. The said three sons were directed to administer the three Durghas at Killai, Navabpettai and Samayapuram. There was a dispute between the parties regarding the management of the abovesaid Durghas. One Syed Sha Gulam Javani Sudari Sahib filed the suit in O.S. No. 10 of 1909 on the file of the Sub-Court, Mayavaram. The said suit was dismissed on 212. 1909. Thereafter the plaintiff therein filed appeal in A.S. No. 156 of 1910 before this Court. The Division Bench of this Court remanded the matter for fresh disposal. After remand, the learned sub-Judge in the judgment dated 23. 1923 appointed Piran Sahib as the Muthavalli of Killai Durgah and Gulam Kadhar Sahib as Muthavalli with respect to the other institutions. The original plaintiff in O.S. No. 10 of 1909 who was transposed as sixth defendant in the suit, filed appeal in A.S. No. 186 of 1923 and the other defendants in the suit filed appeals against the same judgment and decree, in A.S.Nos. 76, 77 and 106 of 1926. 3. The original plaintiff in O.S. No. 10 of 1909 who was transposed as sixth defendant in the suit, filed appeal in A.S. No. 186 of 1923 and the other defendants in the suit filed appeals against the same judgment and decree, in A.S.Nos. 76, 77 and 106 of 1926. 3. The Division Bench of this Court in modification of the decree of the trial court passed a decree to the following effect:- .(1) that the 12th defendant Piran Sahib be and hereby is appointed as Muthavalli for the Killai durga and its endowments, and that he will be on probation for a period of three years from the 9th day of May 1933; .(2) that the work of the said 12th defendant from April 1929 to 1936 be reviewed by the subordinate Judge of Mayavaram and that if there be no objection, he be made permanent; .(3) that the subordinate Judge of Mayavaram do pass the said 12th defendants .accounts kept as receiver and do also ascertain the surplus available for distribution and deal with the same; .(4) that the security of rupees six thousand already furnished by the said 12th defendant as receiver do continue during the period of his probation aforesaid; .(5) that the said 12th defendant do take possession of the durga of Killai and all its properties, moveables and immoveables; .(6) that the 2nd plaintiffs appointment (by the lower court) on probation for three years as Muthavalli for the Navabpettai durga and its endowments be and hereby is confirmed, without the discretion of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram being in any way fettered with in the matter of examining his work; .(7) that the said 2nd plaintiff do take possession of the durga at Nawabpettai and all its properties, moveables and immoveables; .(8) that the 12th defendant and the 2nd plaintiff as soon as they assume the management of their respective trusts do submit to the court (Sub court, Mayavaram) a correct inventory of all moveables and immoveables possessed by their respective durgas; .(9) that the 12th defendant and 2nd plaintiff do submit a correct list of outstandings and cash possessed by their respective durgas; .(10) that the 12th defendant and the 2nd plaintiff do also submit a report to the court (Sub court, Mayavaram) as to the probable income and expenditure of their respective durgas for the next fasli; .(11) that the 12th defendant and the 2nd plaintiff do likewise make a report as to the surplus available for distribution, the members of the family who would be entitled to distribution out of such surplus and the proportion in which each would be entitled to, and take the orders of the court (Sub Court, Mayavaram) thereon before such distribution; .(12) that the 12th defendant and the 2nd plaintiff do each of them keep regular and correct accounts of the income and expenditure of their respective durgas, submit the same to the court (Sub Court, Mayavaram) months and have them passed by the court once in six (Sub Court, Mayavaram); .(13) that the court (Sub Court, Mayavaram) be at liberty to give further instructions as occasions arise on all the above matters, on the application of any parties to the suit or their representatives, for the effective and proper management of the durgas and the division of the surplus amongst the members of the family and that such orders will be considered as orders passed in execution of the decree in this suit; .(14) that the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram be also at liberty if he thinks proper, to give directions for distribution of a definite fraction of the durgas with reference to the provisions Exs.D. and M; .(15) that the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram will see that the above provisions and directions in the decree are carried out;" 4. The said Peeran Sahib who has been appointed as Muthavalli for Killai Durgah died on 210. 1992. The said Peeran Sahib was working as Muthavalli from 1993 to 1974, and due to his ill-health he appointed his son Syed Ismath Basha Sahaf as his successor. He has also executed a document regarding the appointment of trustees on 26. 1992, which has been marked as Ex.A-2 in the trial court. 5. Now the petitions were filed before the lower court for appointment of Muthavallis on the basis of the decree passed in A.S. No. 186 of 1923. Though the four sets of persons filed petitions claiming Muthavalliship before the lower court, the lower court rejected the applications in E.A.Nos.375, 378 of 1992 and 68 of 1993. The lower court appointed the petitioner in E.A. No. 83 of 1993 as Muthavalli with respect of Killai Durgah and prescribed three years as probation period. Aggrieved against the said appointment of the petitioner in E.A. No. 83 of 1993 as Muthavalli, the petitioners have filed the above revisions, one against allowing E.A. No. 83 of 1993 and the another against the order of dismissal passed in E.A. No. 378 of 1992. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that there is no provision incorporated in the scheme decree for filling up the vacancy of the office of the Muthavalli by the court and by virtue of registered appointment deed dated 26. 1992 the petitioners have assumed charge as joint Muthavallis and so they have to be recognised as Muthavallis jointly to the Durgah known as the Durgah at Killai and its properties. The learned counsel has further submitted that the decree in A.S. No. 186 of 1923 cannot be construed as a scheme decree at all. He has also pointed out the comparative merits of the petitioners to sustain his submission that the lower court should have preferred the petitioners than the respondent. 7. I am unable to accept the said submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In clause 13 of the said decree, the High Court has given liberty to the lower court to give further instructions as occasions arise on all the matters on the application of any parties to the suit or their representatives for the effective and proper management of the durghas. In clause 13 of the said decree, the High Court has given liberty to the lower court to give further instructions as occasions arise on all the matters on the application of any parties to the suit or their representatives for the effective and proper management of the durghas. So, in view of the said clause in the decree, it cannot be said that the court has no power to appoint the Muthavallis. The said clause in the decree is very specific that the trial court can pass orders to have an effective and proper management if occasions arise. Even the said Peeran Sahib was appointed by the Court. In view of the abovesaid decree in A.S. No. 186 of 1923 it cannot be said that Peeran Sahib was having power to appoint the Muthavallis. It is well settled that unless the power is given, he cannot appoint anybody as Muthavalli and the appointees also cannot claim any right on that basis. Moreover, on the date of executing the said document ExA-2, the said Peeran Sahib was not a Muthavalli. The lower court relying on the decision in 1976 T.L.N.J 232, has held that only if the person is holding the post of Muthavalli, he can nominate his successor. It is also further held that if the Muthavalli is hale and healthy, he cannot execute the appointment deed as held in AIR 1962 Ori. 111 ; AIR 1958 A.P 8; 66 L.W 34;andA.I.R. 1974 All. 363. In view of the above, the lower court has rightly proceeded with the proceedings to appoint the Muthavallis on the basis of merits and demerits of the parties concerned. 8. Without accepting the case of the petitioners that they alone should be recognised as Muthavallis on the basis of Ex.A-2, the lower court has given elaborate reasonings to prefer the petitioner in E.A. No. 83 of 1993 to appoint him as Muthavalli, and rejected the request of the petitioners. In cases like this, the jurisdiction of this Court is restricted to interfere with the order of the trial court on merits. 9. The above revisions have been filed under Section 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking to set aside the order of the lower court on the ground that the lower court has not properly exercised its jurisdiction. 10. 9. The above revisions have been filed under Section 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking to set aside the order of the lower court on the ground that the lower court has not properly exercised its jurisdiction. 10. Before dealing with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the merits of the case, it is my desire to deal with the scope of jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. While dealing with the scope of the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court in decision in the Babhutmal v. Laxmibai, AIR 1975 S.C. 1297 , has held as follows:-"The Special Civil Application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Art. 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court. It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 : AIR 1954 SC 215 that the: Power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal. 193 S.B. to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This statement of law was quoted with approval in a subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : AIR 1958 SC 398 and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: It is thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Art. 227 of the constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Under Art.226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the fact of the record. But under Art.227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. 11. Under Art.226 the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the fact of the record. But under Art.227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. 11. While discussing the scope of the judicial superintendence, the Apex Court in India Pipe Fitting Co.v. Fakruddin, AIR 1978 SC 45 , has held as follows: - "The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the constitution is well settled. Power under Art. 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however erroneous those may be" 12. Similarly, in Khalil Ahmed v. Tufelhussein Samasbhai, AIR 1988 S.C. 184 , the Apex Court has further held that even if two views are possible and the trial Court has taken one view which is also possible and merely because another view is attractive, the High Court should not interfere and would be in error in interfering with the finding of the trial court under Art.227 of the Constitution. 13. Even in Trimbak v. Ramachandra, AIR 1977 S.C.1222, the Apex Court has taken similar view. 14. Recently, the Apex Court in Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, AIR 1998 S.C. 1990 , has held that the High Court should not disturb the findings of facts given by the trial court and has further held as follows:- "According to us, the High Court has traversed far beyond the limit of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution when the learned single Judge reversed the decree of eviction which was based on findings of facts arrived at by the fact-finding authority upon the evidence on record. It would have been well for the High Court to remind itself that it was not exercising certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but a Super-visory jurisdiction under Article 227 which obliges the High Court to confine to the scrutiny of records and proceedings of the lower tribunal. By relying on fresh materials which were not before the tribunal, the HIgh court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction. By relying on fresh materials which were not before the tribunal, the HIgh court should not have disturbed findings of facts in exercise of such supervisory jurisdiction. It is well nigh settled that power under Article 227 is one of the judicial superintendence which cannot be used to upset conclusions of facts, however erroneous those may be, unless such conclusions are so perverse, so unreasonable that no Court Could even have reached them. Way back to 1954, a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, AIR 1954 SC 215 , has pointed out that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 should be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the sub-ordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors". .15. In another decision in Sheikh Jalaludeen, S.M.S. and Another v. S.K. Sheik Jalaludeen and others, 1994 (1) L.W. 14 (SN), the Apex Court has held as follows: - "In our view, the High Court, in setting aside the order of the District Judge, has assumed jurisdiction with which it is not invested. Art. 227 of the Constitution by the 1st clause provides: Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It occurs in fasicule of Articles enumerating the powers of a High Court. It does not, however, define the quality or restriction on the exercise of the power. The power conferred by Art.227 is one of superintendence over courts and tribunals in the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. This power though judicial as well as administrative, is not appellate, nor even revisional. The power has to be exercised sparingly and in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authorities and not merely to correct errors of fact or law See Waravam Sing and Another v Amarnath and another, 1954 SCR 565 . In the exercise of this power the High Court cannot seek to reappraise evidence on which the conclusions of a subordinate court of tribunal is based, nor even to correct mere errors of law. In the exercise of this power the High Court cannot seek to reappraise evidence on which the conclusions of a subordinate court of tribunal is based, nor even to correct mere errors of law. But, in appropriate cases, the High Court may ratify errors apparent on the face of the record, or set aside orders made on erroneous assumption of or refusal to exercise jurisdiction or in arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority vested in a subordinate court or tribunal". The abovesaid decisions of the Apex Court are very clear that this Courts jurisdiction under Art.227 is very limited. 16. In this case the trial court has applied its mind with respect to various documents and evidence and preferred the applicant in E.A. No. 83 of 1993 to be appointed as Muthavalli and has given reasons also to reject the application filed by the petitioners. As held by the Apex Court, it is not for this Court to go into the correctness of the findings given by the lower court which are based on evidence. No party has any absolute right to be appointed to the office and the Court has to make the appointment in the best interest of the institution. 17. The lower court rejected the claim of the petitioners based on Ex.A-2 and has rightly come to the conclusion that the said Peeran Sahib has no power to appoint his successor. As stated earlier, he himself was appointed only by the Court pursuant to the scheme decree. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the decree in A.S. No. 186 of 1923 cannot be construed as a scheme decree on the basis that there is no provision with respect to future appointment of Muthavalli, as discussed supra, under the said decree, clause 13 was provided for that purpose. So, it cannot be said that the said decree is not a scheme decree. That being the fact the petitioners, on the basis of appointment of the said Peeran Sahib, cannot claim any right. Moreover, as held by the lower court, on the date of appointment of the petitioners by the said Peeran Sahib, he was not in the office. Even in the said decree no such power was given to Peeran Sahib to select his successors. Moreover, as held by the lower court, on the date of appointment of the petitioners by the said Peeran Sahib, he was not in the office. Even in the said decree no such power was given to Peeran Sahib to select his successors. The lower court has given another reason to reject the plea of the petitioners that a Muthavalli cannot select his successors when he is hale and healthy. Relying on the recitals in Ex.A-2, the lower court has come to the conclusion that on the date of Ex.A-2, the said Peeran Sahib was hale and healthy. The lower court has also relied on the decided cases in support of its decision. .18. While comparing the merits and demerits between the parties, the lower court relying on Exs.B-8 and B-9 found that P-W.1 the first petitioner herein has been residing in the property belonging to the Durgah as a lessee. A perusal of Exs. B-50 and B-51, it will be clear that the rent was not properly paid. Even P.W.2, the second petitioner has accepted that they are residing in the property belonging to the Durgah, and he has handed over the said property to the Wakf Board though it belongs to the Durgah. Moreover the lower court on evidence, found that the petitioners had spent money towards court expenses without getting any permission from the Wakf Board. 19. Under Section 62 of the Wakf Act, 1995 no Mutawalli shall spend any money out of the funds of the wakf for meeting any costs, charges, or expenses which are or may be, incurred by him, in relation to any suit, appeal or any other proceedings, for, or incidental to, his removal from office or for taking any disciplinary action against him. The lower court also found on the basis of Exs. B-47 and on appreciation of the evidence of P.W.1 and D.W.4 that the petitioners did not maintain the accounts properly during the period when they administered the Durgah. To take a different view from the said findings, the learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position to point out any other evidence. In view of the abovesaid facts based on evidence, the lower court has rejected the claim of the petitioners to be appointed as Mutawallis. To take a different view from the said findings, the learned counsel for the petitioner is not in a position to point out any other evidence. In view of the abovesaid facts based on evidence, the lower court has rejected the claim of the petitioners to be appointed as Mutawallis. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that regarding misappropriation, there is no pleading and so the lower court is not correct in deciding the same. The lower court has rejected the plea of the petitioners mainly on the ground that the first petitioner is residing in the premises of the Durgah as tenant and he has not paid the rent properly, that the second petitioner has been in possession of the property without even handing over the same to the Wakf Board, that the amounts were spent for litigation to defend their case without getting permission from the Wakf Board and that they have not properly maintained accounts during the tenure of their office. .20. To prefer the second respondent herein in C.R.P. No. 1312 of 1994, the lower court has given valid reasons based on evidence. First of all, the lower court found that the second respondent is the grandson through son of the original donee. But, the petitioners had relied on the fact that the second respondent had been cultivating the lands belonging to the Durgah on waram basis and so he is having personal interest in the property of Durgah. The said fact has been explained by the lower court to the effect that of Durgah cultivating a land on waram basis cannot be construed on tenancy basis and so the second respondent herein cannot have any personal right in the lands. Before the /lower court the respondents therein have established that they have not even withheld the money due from the Durgah. Moreover, on the date of the petition it was found that the second respondent herein was not the tenant to any of the properties of the Durgah. The lower court also took into consideration of the effective management of the Durgah by the father of the second respondent herein. It is also found that when the second respondent herein was incharge of the Durgah from 111. 1991 to 33. 1992 he did not waste the income of the Durgah and he did not do anything against the interest of the Durgah. It is also found that when the second respondent herein was incharge of the Durgah from 111. 1991 to 33. 1992 he did not waste the income of the Durgah and he did not do anything against the interest of the Durgah. Thus, the lower court has elaborately discussed about the issue in question and preferred the second respondent herein than the petitioners to appoint him as Mutawalli of the Durgah. The findings of the lower court are based on evidence and on well-founded reasonings. Hence I find it difficult to accept the case of the petitioners. 21. For the foregoing reasons, these revisions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, C.M.P. No. 6569 of 1994 is closed.