Judgment : 1. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ of certiorari, calling for entire records relating to impugned Orders of 1st respondent made in Na.Ka.8886/98-A4 dated 18. 1998, confirming the order of 2nd respondent made in Na.ka. No. 1381 of 1998 dt. 30.4.1998 and quash the same, and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 2. This writ petition is filed by three petitioners. First petitioner was elected as President, 2nd petitioner was elected as Vice-President, and third petitioner is the Executive committee Member of T.P. Special 43 Muthampalayam Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank Ltd., Muthampalayam, Erode District. It is their case that even before they were elected as office-bearers, petitioners 1 and 2 have taken loans, namely, (1) Jewel Loan No. 959, (2) Short Term Loan No. 1237 for Rs. 15,000 and (3) As Surety for a loanee, respectively. Out of these, 1st petitioner repaid the entire loan amount on 1. 1998, and 2nd petitioner repaid the entire loan amount on 212. 1997, and, as against 3rd petitioner, a decree was obtained on 21. 1998 for a sum of Rs.4,463, and subsequently the original loanee has deposited the sum to the Co- operative Bank. It is further said that the second respondent issued a show-cause notice on 22. 1998, under Sec. 34 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, calling upon them to explain why they should not be removed from the Office of President, Vice-President and Executives Committee member of the co-operative Bank, for which they sent replies on 3. 1998 and 20.3.1998 respectively. Second respondent, after taking into consideration the explanation, held that petitioners have disqualified themselves from holding the office. The matter was taken in revision before 1st respondent, who also confirmed the Order. This writ petition is filed challenging the concurrent findings of the authorities below. 3. Detailed counter-affidavits have been filed by respondents 1 and 2. Though separate counters have been filed, contentions are similar. It is their case that so far as 1st petitioner was concerned, the due date for discharging the loan was 27. 1997, but it was discharged only on 1. 1998, and likewise, so far as 2nd petitioner was concerned, the due date was 19. 1997, whereas it was discharged only on 212. 1997. It is their case that so far as 1st petitioner was concerned, the due date for discharging the loan was 27. 1997, but it was discharged only on 1. 1998, and likewise, so far as 2nd petitioner was concerned, the due date was 19. 1997, whereas it was discharged only on 212. 1997. So far as third petitioner is concerned, the decree obtained against him is not yet discharged. According to them, action has been taken in accordance with law and, therefore, the impugned Orders are not liable to be set aside. Show-Cause notice was issued on 22. 1998 under Sec.34 of the Act, and the impugned Orders were passed only after taking into consideration the explanations given by petitioners. Respondents prayed for dismissal of writ petition. 4. Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu co-operative Societies Act 1983 is similar to Section 28 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. Relevant portion of Section 28 (1) of the Act of 1961 read thus: "28(1) No person shall be eligible for being elected or appointed as a member of a committee if he- (b) (i) is in default to the society or to any other registered society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him for such period as is prescribed in the by-laws of the society concerned or in any case for a period exceeding three months." That Section of the earlier Act has got relevance, because under similar circumstances, this Court has interpreted that Section and has held as to what is meant by the expression "is in default to the society". In Sec. 34(1) (b) also, the words used are "is in default to the registered society". Nainar Sundaram, J., as he then was, in the decision reported in Sivashanmugham T.T. v. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 1986 (99) L.W. 400 after extracting the above Section, has held thus:- "The rule invoked by the second respondent to exercise the power of removal is Rule 40 of the Rules framed under the Act. The show cause was issued on 8th April, 1985. The default "relates to February, 1980. Admittedly, the dues have been collected in December, 1980. The show cause was issued on 8th April, 1985. The default "relates to February, 1980. Admittedly, the dues have been collected in December, 1980. Hence, either on the date of the show cause or on the date of the passing of the order by the second respondent, the petitioner could not be held to be in default to the society in question within the meaning of the said provision. The set of expressions used in the provision extracted above is "is in default to the society". S.28 (2) (a) merely says that a member of the committee shall cease to hold office, if he becomes subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned is sub-S. (1). If a member of the Committee "is in default to the Society" within the meaning of S.28 (1) (b) (i) of the Act, on the date of the initiation of the action under Rule 40, the exercise of the power of removal may be held to be competent. We can take it that if on the date of the show cause, namely, on 8th April, 1985, the petitioner was in default within the meaning of S.28 (1) (b) (i) and if there was a clearance of the dues only after the show cause and before the passing of the order, that may not bring him any amelioration with regard to the default. Such view has been expressed by Kailasam, J., as he then was, in Ramakrishna Reddiar v. The Deputy Registrar, 1970 (1) M.L.J. 197. But here, long "before the date of the show cause, namely, 8th April, 1985, the petitioner had cleared the dues, and he could not be held to have had been in default to the society in question, on the date of initiation of action. Hence it is not possible to bring the matter within the ambit of Rules 28 (1) (b) (i) and 28 (2) (a) of the Act..." As could be seen from the above extract, learned Judge has also taken into consideration the decision of Kailasam, J. as he then was, reported in Ramakrishna Reddiar v. The Deputy Registrar, 1970 (I) M.L.J. 197 . In this case, petitioners 1 and 2 have discharged the loan on 1. 1998 and 212. 1997 respectively. The show cause notice is dated 22. 1998. In this case, petitioners 1 and 2 have discharged the loan on 1. 1998 and 212. 1997 respectively. The show cause notice is dated 22. 1998. So, on the date when the show cause notices were issued, they were not in default to the society. Following the decision referred to supra, the writ petition as against petitioners 1and 2 has to be allowed." 5. In regard to third petitioner, he stands on a different footing. There is a decree against him. Even though in para 3 of the affidavit, it is said that the original loanee has already deposited the sum with the Bank, in the counter, respondents have denied the same, and , according to them, the sum is still out-standing. The benefit of clause (b) of subsection (1) of Section 34 of the Act is not available to a decree debt, since the wordings are entirely different. 6. An argument was also advanced by learned counsel for petitioners that the revisional authority has not given sufficient opportunity to substantiate their case. According to him, immediately after the revision was filed, stay was ordered, and on the date when the case was posted for hearing, respondents entered appearance and filed counter, and on the same date orders were also passed, and sufficient opportunity was not given. I do not think that such an argument could be accepted, since the facts are admitted. In my view, the Order cannot be set aside on the ground of lack of sufficient opportunity. The Court is to consider only the question, what is the law to be applied. Since the third petitioner has not discharged the debt, and since he is not entitled to the benefits of clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act, the writ petition as against him will have to be dismissed. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part, and the impugned Orders are quashed as against petitioners 1 and 2 herein, and it is declared that they are not disqualified. As against third petitioner, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Connected W.M.Ps. are closed. `````