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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

1998 DIGILAW 144 (HP)

KEWLA WIDOW OF LATE SHRI JINIA v. DAULAT SINGH

1998-08-05

S.S.NEGI

body1998
ORDER S.S. Negi—This is a revision petition filed by Smt. Kewla and others against the order of learned Commissioner, Shimla Division, dated 10.3.1997 in case No. 154/96 by which he dismissed the petition of present petitioners. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the respondent No. 1 presented an application before the Assistant Collector I Grade, Theog on 17.2.1993 requesting therein that his share in the land appurtenant to Khata Khatauni No. 24/24, measuring 57-10 bighas be partitioned from other co-sharers. The proceedings commenced on this application culminated into formulation and approval of the mode of partition by the Assistant Collector I Grade on 16.7.1993. The Revenue Field Agency carried out the partition in accordance with the mode of partition. When the case came up for execution of instrument of partition on 17.6.1995, one of the petitioners namely Shri Inder Singh raised objections before the Assistant Collector claiming that a private partition had already taken place inter se parties. He asserted that there was no need for fresh partition. The Assistant Collector rejected the plea. The petitioners filed appeal against the orders passed by the Assistant Collector dated 16.7.1993 and 17.6.1995 before the Sub-Divisional Collector, Theog on the grounds of improper service to the various co-owners and besides private partition has already been taken place. The Sub-Divisional Collector dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 13.8.1996. Aggrieved of the said order, Shri Inder Singh filed revision petition before learned Commissioner, Shimla Division who after hearing the case, dismissed the petition by passing the impugned order. Hence the present revision petition. 3. I have heard the petitioners, their learned Counsel and respondents and have gone through the relevant record available on the case files of the lower Courts. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioners questioned the propriety of the impugned order and challenged it as illegal, wrong and without jurisdiction. He prayed that the order dated 19.4.1993 of Assistant Collector I Grade by which the petitioners were proceeded ex-parie be set aside as there was no proper service and case be remanded for decision afresh after affording due opportunity to the parties. The plea for inadequate service on 19.4.1993 has mainly come from Shri Inder Singh, one of the petitioners. 5. Perusal of the record shows that Shri Inder Singh was absent on 19.4.1993 and was proceeded ex-parte on account of his refusal to accept service of notice. The plea for inadequate service on 19.4.1993 has mainly come from Shri Inder Singh, one of the petitioners. 5. Perusal of the record shows that Shri Inder Singh was absent on 19.4.1993 and was proceeded ex-parte on account of his refusal to accept service of notice. Therefore, the Process Server effected the service by affixation. Service upon other petitioners was also effected in accordance with law and ex-parte proceedings were taken against other co-owners by the Assistant Collector only after he satisfied himself to the fact that the parties were aware of partition proceedings. Subsequently, parties against whom ex-parte proceedings were taken are stated to have associated themselves with the partition proceedings as is evident from the record of the lower Courts. Therefore, the petitioners cannot feign ignorance about the partition proceedings before the Assistant Collector. They associated in the proceedings as and when it suited their interests and convenience. In view of this, the contention of improper service and denial of opportunity lack force and is accordingly dismissed. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further contended that the land in question cannot be partitioned since a private partition qua the land had already taken place between the parties long ago. He also drew our attention to a document purported to be a deed of private partition between the parties. Proforma respondent Shri Ram Singh also averred that private partition had taken place between the parties long ago. On consideration of the arguments put forward by the parties on the factum of private partition and also scrutiny of purported document of the said private partition, the argument deserves to be rejected for a number of reasons. The record of rights shows that the parties, i.e., petitioners, respondents including proforma respondent are recorded as co-owners in the land appurtenant to Khata Khatauni, the subject matter of partition and possession has also been reflected jointly. The records do not reveal the exclusive possession of parties. Therefore, the plea of private partition is fallacious. No private partition can be presumed to have taken place without severence of possession. The petitioners have nowhere claimed exclusive possession in furtherence of the said private partition, though such a plea in itself would not have been sufficient to establish the factum of private partition. Therefore, the plea of private partition is fallacious. No private partition can be presumed to have taken place without severence of possession. The petitioners have nowhere claimed exclusive possession in furtherence of the said private partition, though such a plea in itself would not have been sufficient to establish the factum of private partition. When all the co-owners are in joint possession of land, the presumption and fact of private partition cannot be validly raised and accepted and hence the plea is not sustainable. Secondly, the said private partition in order to be valid has to be embodied in the record of rights by way of mutation which the parties have filed to do so. The parties at no stage informed the Patwari halqua with regard to the fact of the said partition. Even at this stage parties have failed to show any cause much less sufficient cause as to why said document was not produced before the revenue field agency in order to implement the same. Such an inaction would have been excusable if the parties to the partition agree to it but this is not the case here since respondent No. 1 not only denies the execution of any such private partition document but also challenges that his signatures on the said document are forged. Without going into the question of forgery imputed to the signatures of the respondent No. 1 on the said document, it is sufficient for us to discard the said document in view of the discussion here-to-fore on the grounds that one of the parties to the document denies execution thereof and the said document has not been embodied and given effect to in the record of rights nor exclusive possession has been claimed on the strength of such document. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the fact of valid private partition cannot be accepted. The perusal of this document does not precisely elucidate the exact shares of the co-owners and apportionment of their shares. Resultantly, this plea is bereft of any merit and is rejected. 7. Learned Counsel for petitioners further contended that the application for partition was not maintainable on the ground that the parties are recorded joint owners in four villages as such partial partition could not have been allowed. Resultantly, this plea is bereft of any merit and is rejected. 7. Learned Counsel for petitioners further contended that the application for partition was not maintainable on the ground that the parties are recorded joint owners in four villages as such partial partition could not have been allowed. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has not brought any documentary evidence to show that the same parties owned land jointly in other three villages. Rather respondent No. 1 has stated that in one or two of the villages some third parties are also co-owners with present parties. Therefore, there is no question of partial partition in this case because there are third parties stated to be joint owners with the present parties. Disallowance of partial partition can at best be applicable in one revenue estate. The land in question and sought for partition is in one revenue estate and, therefore, it is capable of being partitioned. The plea of partial partition sought to be so raised is mutually inconsistent and contradictory with the plea of the petitioners when on the one hand they contend private partition having taken place and on the other hand they contend that the lands in all other revenue villages where the parties are joint owners should also be partitioned. 8. In view of the discussion, this plea is also rejected. No other point was either urged or pressed. 9. Consequently the revision petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. 10. Orders be communicated to the parties and file be consigned to record room after due completion. Revision dismissed.