Judgment :- 1. Petitioner seeks initiation of contempt for punishing respondents herein for having committed civil contempt by disobeying the final order passed by this Court in Second Appeal No. 1170 of 1992 dated 12.7.1996, and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. 2. Petitioner, i.e., first applicant Arthur Theodore James, filed O.S. 6861 of 1969, on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, claiming partition. After trial, the City Civil Court passed a preliminary decree on 6.8.1977 declaring that plaintiff is entitled to one-third share in the property. Petitioner, thereafter, filed I.A. 25822 of 1977, for passing final decree. Commissioner was appointed to find out whether the properties are capable of division. In the meanwhile, defendant S.C. James filed A.S. 185 of 1978 against the preliminary decree, and it was dismissed by this Court on 4.10.1982. Against that, she preferred L.P.A. No. 19 of 1983, and it was also dismissed on 2.3.1988. After dismissal of those Appeals, final decree application was taken up, and, on the basis of Report filed by the Commissioner, final decree was passed on 11.11.1990. Defendant died, and in his place, his legal heirs were impleaded as defendants 2 to 4. Petitioner was allotted Plot A in the Commissioners Plan Ex. C-2 appended to the final decree. Defendants 1 to 4 were directed to put the plaintiff in possession of the property, and in respect of ‘B’ Schedule property in Tambaram, plaintiff was allotted the portion marked ‘A’ in the Commissioners Plan marked as Ex. C-3. Defendants 2 to 5, not satisfied with the allotment, filed A.S. 142 of 1991, on the file of City Civil Court, Madras. Appellate Court modified the final decree regarding pathway and confirmed the allotment. Defendants 2 to 5 filed Second Appeal No. 1175 of 19 92, before this Court, and it was dismissed. 3. After conclusion of all these proceedings, first applicant herein (who is now no more) filed E.P. 8787 of 1996, for effecting division by appointment of Commissioner, in accordance with the final decree passed by the Court. 4. Defendants 2 to 5 filed Second Appeal No. 1175 of 19 92, before this Court, and it was dismissed. 3. After conclusion of all these proceedings, first applicant herein (who is now no more) filed E.P. 8787 of 1996, for effecting division by appointment of Commissioner, in accordance with the final decree passed by the Court. 4. Respondents herein filed a counter stating that third party has been granted leease in respect of the property and there is a superstructure at the eastern end of the portion allotted to the applicant in the final decree, and this superstructure did not exist in 1979 and, therefore, the property cannot be delivered. Thereafter, respondents 1 to 4 herein also filed an application under Sec. 47, C.P.C. It was withdrawn, and, at their instance, one Savarinathan filed O.S. 317 of 1998 claiming to be tenant of the petitioners deceased brother. It is said that defendants 1 to 4, i.e., respondents 1 to 4 herein and Savarinathan are colluding together and are obstructing the execution of the decree which the first applicant had obtained. First applicant was aged 73 years at the time when he filed this Contempt Application and now he is no more and his legal representatives have further prosecuted the matter. According to them, respondents herein are preventing the administration of justice, and, therefore, they are liable to be punished for contempt. Hence, this Contempt Application. 5. First applicant filed an application for appointment of a Receiver in respect of the property which was allotted to him in the final decree. 6. Counter affidavit has been filed by respondents 1, 2 and 4, stating that there is neither civil contempt nor criminal contempt, and contempt proceedings should not be converted as one to execute decree. The allegation that respondents are preventing execution of the decree and are abusing process of Court are denied. If is said that preferring an appeal is the vested right of a citizen, and it will not amount to obstruction of judicial process. They prayed for dismissal of the Contempt Application. 7. Respondents submit that they are not claiming any right over the property allotted to the petitioner. The submission of learned counsel is recorded. 8. If is said that preferring an appeal is the vested right of a citizen, and it will not amount to obstruction of judicial process. They prayed for dismissal of the Contempt Application. 7. Respondents submit that they are not claiming any right over the property allotted to the petitioner. The submission of learned counsel is recorded. 8. Learned counsel, thereafter, submitted that even though respondents herein are not claiming any right over the property allotted to petitioner, and now applicants 1 to 3, a Receiver cannot be appointed in contempt proceedings. The argument is that contempt proceedings is not intended to execute decree, for which proceedings will have to be taken in accordance with law. Contempt proceedings are intended only to respect the Majesty of Court. In support of his contention, learned counsel relied on certain decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court as well as this Court. 9. Learned counsel for applicants submitted that even though he has filed the application for contempt, proceedings initiated by respondents one after another, will show that their action amounts to abuse of process of Court, and atleast this Court can take into consideration the conduct of respondents in preventing the applicants from getting possession pursuant to a decree which has become final. It was also submitted by learned counsel that after the final decree became final in Second Appeal, a suit was filed by a person claiming himself to be a leasee from his deceased brother and the very same person has also filed an application under Section 47, C.P.C., and when the same was refused to be entertained by the executing Court, respondents herein filed A.S. No. 60 of 1998, before the City Civil Court, Madras, and thus, the applicant have been fighting the litigation for the last nearly 30 years. It was also submitted by learned counsel that even in the various affidavits filed by respondents, they have admitted that there is a change in the nature of property, and for that reason, they wanted that the decree should not be executed. According to him, this shows j that the intention of the respondents is only to see that the applicants herein do not get possession of the property allotted to them, even after a fight for more than 30 years. 10. I heard learned counsel for both parties in detail. 11. According to him, this shows j that the intention of the respondents is only to see that the applicants herein do not get possession of the property allotted to them, even after a fight for more than 30 years. 10. I heard learned counsel for both parties in detail. 11. I find force in the contention of learned counsel for respondents 1, 2 and 4, that no ground has been made out for initiating contempt proceedings. The only allegation made in the affidavit is that respondents are preventing the petitioners herein from getting possession of the properties by filing applications and appeals. I also agree with learned counsel for respondents that contempt proceeding is not intended to execute a decree, and a Court which has the power to initiate contempt proceedings, should not be equated to an executing Court. In view of this finding, naturally, I can only dismiss the Contempt Application. 12. But, merely because Contempt Application is not maintainable, can this Court close its eyes when manifest injustice is shown to exist because of various acts and omissions committed by respondents herein? Even though there may not be any act of contempt, when frivolous applications are filed one after another and thus, execution of a validly obtained decree is prevented, is it not abuse of process of Court? When this Court is informed that there is miscarriage of justice and there is an abuse of process of Court, is not this Court duty bound to take note of the same and prevent the repetition of abuse of process? Powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India are intended to prevent such acts. When this Court is informed that the acts of the respondents herein amount to abuse of process, this Court can exercise its suo motu powers both under Sec. 151, C.P.C. and under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, to take necessary action. If this Court can exercise its powers under Section 151, C.P.C. and also under Art. 227 of the Constitution suo motu, will the respondents be justified in raising a contention that these allegations have been made in a Contempt Application, and so, this Court should close its eyes, whatever may be the prejudice caused to the applicants? If this Court can exercise its powers under Section 151, C.P.C. and also under Art. 227 of the Constitution suo motu, will the respondents be justified in raising a contention that these allegations have been made in a Contempt Application, and so, this Court should close its eyes, whatever may be the prejudice caused to the applicants? According to me, whatever may be the source of information, if this Court is satisfied that great prejudice has been done to a litigant and that injustice is being perpetuated, this Court is dutybound to take necessary action to prevent repetition of the same. After all, Courts are there only to do justice between the parties, and the contention that that could be done only in a particular proceeding, is only a technical argument which also amounts to obstruction to the cause of administration of justice. Section 151, C.P.C. and Art. 227 of the Constitution give ample powers to Courts to see that the Subordinate Courts act within their limits and no party to a litigation also abuses his position as a litigant through process of Court. If applications after applications are filed in order to prevent a successful decree holder from getting the fruits of the decree, and the Court also supports such action by entertaining such applications, it will only mean that the Court is also impliedly perpetuating the abuse of process. According to me, if a Court does not prevent such abuse, it ceases to be a Court of law. 13. After having heard learned counsel on both sides, I feel that this is an extraordinary case where this Court should exercise its inherent powers and also judicial supervisory powers. 14. After the final decree has become final, when Execution Petition was filed, respondents herein raised an objection that the nature of the property has changed, and the petitioner cannot take possession of the property at its present stage. The reason for making such a statement is that the deceased brother of the original plaintiff has granted leave in favour of one Savarinathan, who has constructed the building in the property and he has also filed a suit against the applicants herein and others not to disturb his possession and not to execute the decree. The so-called lease in favour of Savarinathan was entered into pending suit for partition and, therefore, he is also bound by the decree. The so-called lease in favour of Savarinathan was entered into pending suit for partition and, therefore, he is also bound by the decree. He cannot have a better claim than the so-called lessor. If Savarinathan has put up any construction pending litigation, he is bound to remove the same. Merely because, the decree does not provide for removal of the structure, the power of the executing Court cannot be belittled, and the decree will not become inexecutable. In the decision reported in 1979 - I - M.L.J. 380 (Duraisami Mudaliar v. Ramasami Chettiar and another) Nainar Sundaram, J., as he then was, after taking into consideration all legal precedents, has considered the powers of executing Court in such cases. Relevant portion of the decision reads thus:— “The statutory principle which has got to be kept in mind is that where a Court directs by a decree or order that vacant possession of land should be given, that decree can be made effective by directing its own officer to remove the superstructures on it, and to deliver vacant possession of the property to the decree-holder. It may not be necessary to have any specific power in that behalf, and such a power is exercised in every case in which vacant possession is ordered. The power to remove the superstructures on the land is an incidental power; necessary and ancillary to the power to deliver possession of the property. If, however, should there be any obstruction within the meaning of Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that has not to be dealt with specifically under the said provisions. This has been recognised by Satyanarayana Rao, J., in K. Arumugham Naicker and another v. Sri Thiruvalluva Nainar Temple by its Trustee. Of course, the learned Judge was concerned with a case, where the relationship of landlord and tenant prevailed and the proceedings were one under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act. There will not be any difficulty with reference to a case where the superstructures came to be put up by the defendant either during the pendency of the suit or after the decree. In such a case, in execution of the decree for possession, the executing Court can order the removal or demolition of the construction made during the pendency of the suit or after the decree. In such a case, in execution of the decree for possession, the executing Court can order the removal or demolition of the construction made during the pendency of the suit or after the decree. Such was also the view expressed in Narain Singh v. Imam Din and that has been followed by D.S. Mathu, J., in Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Hussain, suggesting appropriate directions according to the need of particular cases.Where, however, the superstructures were put up before the institution of the suit and were not ordered to be removed as a part of the mandate in the decree, the proper course in appropriate cases would be to direct the judgment-debtor to remove the superstructures so put up by him so as to effectuate vacant delivery of the suit site to the decree-holder. In Kauk Sike v. Onq Hock Sein, Duckworth, J., passed an order in the Second Appeal as follows:— “I modify the order of the lower Court by directing that the appellant to vacate the building on the land as soon as this order is communicated to him and that he granted two months from this date within which, if he so pleased, he may dismantle the building and remove its materials”. The directions adopted by Duckworth, J., were followed by D.S. Mathur, J. in Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Hussain and the learned Judge observed that where the constructions were made before the institution of the suit, the rule laid down in the Rangoon case could be adopted”. 15. In this case, it is admitted that the superstructure was put up after the institution of suit. Even in cases where there was superstructure before the institution of the suit, the above decision has held that, the judgment-debtor must be directed to remove the superstructure. Therefore, I hold that the superstructure put up in the property pending suit, should be removed. 16. In the result, I direct the executing Court to issue Commission along with the Bailiff as prayed for by applicants herein in the Execution Petition, with a direction to the Commissioner to deliver the property to the petitioners herein, without any further delay. The Bailiff must see that the superstructure put up in the property is removed by Savarinathan before possession is delivered to the applicants herein. The Bailiff must see that the superstructure put up in the property is removed by Savarinathan before possession is delivered to the applicants herein. Savarinathan, who claims under the respondents herein, will be given the right to remove the superstructure till the Bailiff visits the property. If he does not remove the superstructure before the Bailiff visits the property to deliver possession of the same to the applicants herein, the Bailiff must be directed to remove the building. The executing Court is also directed to provide all necessary and adequate police protection to see that the directions given by it as indicated above, are implemented, and the superstructures are removed from the property. If assistance of any Woman Police Constables is required, executing Court is also bound to provide the same, without waiting for any application from decree-holder or the Commissioner or the Bailiff for that purpose. If the building in the property is locked, the Bailiff must be authorised to break open the lock. I make it clear that these directions must be implemented even if there is any interim Order from any Subordinate Court, and this Order alone will stand even if there is any prohibitory order which may be passed by any Subordinate Court before this Order is implemented. I direct the executing Court to implement this Order and comply with the above directions within 72 hours from now, and report compliance to this Court on 2.11.1998 without fail. 17. The Contempt Application is dismissed. No costs. The executing Court is directed to deliver the property to the applicants herein as per directions given above. Pending sub-applications are closed.