Judgment 1. The complainant is the same in all the petitions. Common question of law is raised. The same counsel is appearing for all the petitioners. Hence, the matter is disposed of by a common order as under. 2. A complaint was filed by the respondent against the petitioners under the Factories Act. The complaint in C.C.No.49 of 1996 Crl.O.P. No.10776 of 1998 is that there are only four stretchers available in the Factory of the petitioner, whereas according to Sec.87Rule 95 Schedule XXIV Clause 12 (A) of the Factories Act of 1948, there must be 4 stretchers for every 20 workers. Thus, there is contravention of Factories Act, which is liable to be punished under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 3. The gist of the complaint in C.C.No.48 of 1996 (Crl.O.RNo.10767 of 1998) is as follows: The minimum height of creche has not been raised to 3.7 metres at eves. Suitable open air play ground not provided. Adjoining the creche, a suitable wash room is not provided. The construction of creche does not conform to all the standards prescribed in Rules 73 of 76 of Tamil Nadu Factories Act of 1960. The height at eves of the paste preparation shed and mud filling shed is less than 3 metres from the floor level. Below the jelly work and ventilator, windows of size 0-91 × 1 -52 metre, are not provided in the creche. The windows and doors shall be such as they shall be open from outside. The canteen and rest room are not provided with all amenities. The accused has committed contravention of the relevant Rules and guilty under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 4. In C.C.No.47 of 1996 (Crl.O.P.No. 10768 of 1998) the allegation is that in the creche, washing room and toilet facilities are not provided and thus there is contravention of Rules, and hence, the accused is liable to be punished under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 5. The case in C.C.No.41 of 1996 (Crl.O.P. No.10769 of 1998), is as follows: On the date of inspection of the factory premises, more than 66 persons are employed in the process of manufacture of fire crackers, without employment of horse power, which is contravention of Rules. A creche is not maintained for the children of the women workers. Thus, the accused has committed contravention of Rules. Punishable under Sec.92 of Factories Act. 6. A creche is not maintained for the children of the women workers. Thus, the accused has committed contravention of Rules. Punishable under Sec.92 of Factories Act. 6. As regards C.C.No.51 of 1996 (Crl.O.P. No. 10770 of 1998), it is stated that the mixing shed is not situate at a distance of 30.5 meters away from the factory. The distance between gun powder mixing shed and Aluminium powder mixing shed is only 19.125 metres. The distance between the gun powder mixing shed and the nearest shed is 29.325 metres. In the office room, the wiring has not been made in conduit type. One of the wires leading from the pedestal fan is hanging loose and there is no plug provided to the same. The women workers in the Factory were wearing nylon sarees at the time of inspection. Thus, there has been contravention of Rules, for which the accused is liable to be punished under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 7. As regards C.C.No.50 of 1996 (Crl.O.P. No. 10771 of 1998), the allegation is to the following effect: The workers employed in the factory excepting mixing and billing section have not been provided with asbestos aprons and contrary to the Regulations, it was found that dealwood boxes with nails were found used in the factory. Besides metal drums and eversilver tiffin boxes were found in some of the sheds. The doors in the sheds were not found situated in opposite to each other in shed Nos.50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 59. As regards the sheds near the factory, the doors of the sheds shall not situate opposite to each other. But it was not in Shed Nos.4, 5, 12, 13, 20 and 21. Thus, there was contravention of Rules punishable under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 8. It is alleged in C.C.No.52 of 1996 (Crl.O.P. No. 10772 of 98) that there is only one First Aid Box found in the Factorys Office room whereas there should be at least two first aid boxes. Form No.15 has not been provided to the workers, who are entitled to leave wages. Enough number of toilets have not been built up. Thus, the accused is liable to be punished under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 9. Form No.15 has not been provided to the workers, who are entitled to leave wages. Enough number of toilets have not been built up. Thus, the accused is liable to be punished under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 9. It is stated in the complaint in C.C.No.53 of 1996 (Crl.O.P.No.10773 of 1998) that enough drinking water facility is not made, The office doors in the factory premises are not built according to the Regulations. Except in the mixing and billing shed, in the other sheds, rubber sheer is not provided. In the gun powder mixing sheds, rubber sheer is not provided as per the Rules. Hence, the accused is liable to be proceeded under Sec.92 of the Factories Act. 10. Originally, the cases were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Virudhunagar, and was taken on file in C.C.Nos.388 of 1995, 387 of 1995, 963 of 1995, 373 of 1995, 372 of 1995, 967 of 1995 and 375 of 1995. The case were later transferred to the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Virudhunagar by the proceedings of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, dated 14.2.1996, and the cases were taken on file by the Judicial Magistrate No.I, Virudhunagar in C.C.Nos.49 of 1996, 48 of 1996, 47 of 1996, 41 of 1996, 51 of 1996, 50 of 1996, 52 of 1996 and 53 of 1996, respectively. The High Court, issued a circular, dated 14.9.1995, instructing the Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw the cases pending under the Factories Act and filed before the Amendment came into force in which the punishment to be imposed is beyond the competency of the Judicial Magistrate. Therefore, the Additional District Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate withdraw the cases from the Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Virudhunagar to his file, and conducted the trial of the cases. At this stage, the petitioners have come up with these applications. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that under Sec.190 of Cr.P.C, the Magistrate has got ample power to take cognizance of the offence, and accordingly, the Magistrate is competent to try the case. It is open to the Magistrate to acquit the accused, if he finds that the case has not been made out. If the Magistrate comes to the opinion that the offence has been made out, it is open to the Magistrate to submit the papers to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the question of punishment. It is open to the Magistrate to acquit the accused, if he finds that the case has not been made out. If the Magistrate comes to the opinion that the offence has been made out, it is open to the Magistrate to submit the papers to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, on the question of punishment. Therefore, the Circular Order passed by the High Court cannot have the effect of a Judicial Order, and therefore, the entire proceedings pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, are liable to be quashed. 12. Sec.190 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: Subject to the provisions of this Chapter any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class, specially empowered in this behalf under Sub Sec.(2), may take cognizance of any offence- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Sub-Sec.(2):The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under Sub Sec.(l) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. The Judicial Magistrate, being the Magistrate of I class is empowered under Sec.190 of Cr.P.C to take cognizance of the case. 13. Sec.407 of Cr.P.C. empowers the High Court to transfer any case from one subordinate court to another subordinate Court. This power of the High Court can be exercised either on the report of the lower Court or on the application of the party interested, or on its own initiation. But, here in this case, on the report or request of the Chief Inspector of Factories, bringing to the notice of the High Court about the fact that the penalty for violation of any offence under the Factories Act is enhanced to Rs.1,00,000 by amendment. The Chief Judicial Magistrate alone is empowered to levy a fine beyond five thousand rupees. Therefore the High Court resolved to instruct the Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw the cases pending under the Factories Act and filed before the Amendment came into force in which the punishment to be imposed is beyond the competence of the Judicial Magistrate. 14. The Chief Judicial Magistrate alone is empowered to levy a fine beyond five thousand rupees. Therefore the High Court resolved to instruct the Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw the cases pending under the Factories Act and filed before the Amendment came into force in which the punishment to be imposed is beyond the competence of the Judicial Magistrate. 14. Sec.410 of Cr.P.C. empowers any Chief Judicial Magistrate to withdraw any cases or recall any case which he has made over to, any Magistrate subordinate to him, and may inquire into or try such case himself, or refer it for inquiry or trial to any other such Magistrate competent to inquire into or try the same. 15. All the cases, which are the subject matter of these petitions were originally filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Later, it came to be transferred by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, apparently acting under Sec.410, Cr.P.C. Now, on the basis of the circular issued by the High Court, the cases have been once again withdrawn to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is no doubt true that the Judicial Magistrate is empowered to take cognizance of the case. It is also true that it is open to such Magistrate to convict the accused or to acquit him. It is also true that whenever a Magistrate is of the opinion, after hearing the evidence for the prosecution and the accused, that the accused is guilty, and that he ought to receive a punishment different in kind from or more severe than, that which such Magistrate can inflict, he can forward the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate to whom he is subordinate, and submit proceedings under Sec.325 of Cr.P.C. But, such procedure would lead to further delay and definitely some inconvenience would be cause to both the parties concerned. I do not propose to canvass the validity of the circular passed by the High Court. For the petitioners counsel submitted that the petitioner have preferred writ petitions challenging the validity of the Circular passed by the High Court. I do not propose to canvass the validity of the circular passed by the High Court. For the petitioners counsel submitted that the petitioner have preferred writ petitions challenging the validity of the Circular passed by the High Court. Therefore, whether it was competent for the High Court to pass such a Circular, whether the Circular passed in would amount to a Judicial legislation and whether the High Court has power under the Code of Criminal Procedure to issue such circular, whether Judicial power can be conferred and administrative circulars are all questions that have to be gone into and decide in the Writ Petitions initiated by the petitioners. Therefore, I have refrained from entering into any discussion on the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners in that behalf. 16. The point that falls for consideration in these applications is whether in the circumstances, a case has been made out for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Sec.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 17. I have already pointed out that originally the cases were filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Now they are back before the same (Additional District Judge-cum Chief Judicial Magistrate). From the very grounds, we find that already witnesses have been examined, and the case is posted for defence evidence. The petitioners have thus submitted themselves to the proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and has come before this Court, seeking the relief only after participating in the proceedings. Nothing prevented the petitioners from coming to the court at the earliest point of time immediately on coming to know of the withdrawal of the cases to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Thus, there are some laches on the part of the petitioners. Further, it is neither pleaded nor it can be stated that the petitioners are prejudiced in any manner there is also no hardship. Further the case is now to be tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, an office, higher in rank in the echelons of Judicial hierarchy. Hence, there may not be any prejudice to the petitioners, if the matter is tried and disposed of by the Chief Magistrate. 18. The discretion under Sec.482, Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised by this Court, only if the court is satisfied that there is an abuse of its process, which call for its interference. That is no the case here. 18. The discretion under Sec.482, Criminal Procedure Code can be exercised by this Court, only if the court is satisfied that there is an abuse of its process, which call for its interference. That is no the case here. Nor it can be stated that it is otherwise necessary to secure the ends of justice. The case is now to be tried by a different forum and higher forum. Therefore, it cannot be stated that any prejudice will be caused to the petitioner. It cannot be stated now that the order passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, withdrawing the cases to his file is null and void. Nor it is a case where there is any arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction by the lower court. It is also not stated that any principles of natural justice have been violated. It is also not the statement that any hardship has been caused to the petitioners by reason of withdrawal of the cases to the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate. Further, I have already pointed out that there is laches on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, I am of the view that there is no ground made out to persuade this Court to exercise the jurisdiction under Sec.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, in such circumstances, I am of the firm view that the reasons advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners, for exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482 of Cr.P.C. by this Court are neither sound nor valid. 19. In the result, these petitions are dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the main petitions, Crl.M.P.Nos.4458, 4460, 4461, 4462, 4463, 4464, 4465, 4467, 4468, 4469, 4470, 4471, 4472, 4473, 4459 of 1998 shall also stand dismissed.