( 1 ) THE Petitioner allege to have been employed on daily wage basis in a project under the Indian Council of Medical research, an organized body of the Union of India at Shankergarh. ( 2 ) MR. Ali Murtaza, holding brief of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi submits that the project is still continuing yet the petitioners have been asked not to report on duty from 13. 12. 1991 orally, on 12th December, 1991. He contends that since the petitioners had been working for more than three years, they have acquired a right to be considered for being regularized. He, secondly, contends that the petitioners are still continuing without any break and have completed 24 days in a year. Their services could not be terminated. He also contends that since the petitioners were holding temporary posts, therefore, article 311 is very much attracted and as such, the termination of service of the petitioners cannot be sustained. He relied on the decision in the case of P. I. Dhingra. Vs. Union of India (AIR 1953 SC 36) in support of his contention that Article 311 is also attracted in respect of temporary posts since it does not make any distinction between a person holding permanent or temporary posts. ( 3 ) IN support of his contention that the petitioners are eligible for being considered for regularization, he had relied on a decision in the case of State of Haryana. Vs. Piara Singh ( AIR 1992 SC 2130 ). He particularly relied on the ratio decided in paragragh 17 of the said decision. On these grounds, he clalms that the writ petition should be allowed and the petitioners should be reinstated. ( 4 ) MR. K. R. Singh, learned Standing Councel on the other hand contends that the petitioners being daily wage labours do not have any right to any post and as such neither Article 311 of the constitution of India is Attracted nor they have acquired any right to be considered for regularization nor the could clalm any right against the order of termination. He also relies on a decision in the case of himansu Kumar Vidyarthi. He also relies on a decision in the case of himansu Kumar Vidyarthi. Vs state of Bihar ( 1997 (76) FLR 237 ) in support of his contention that the daily wage employee has nor right to the post and concept of retrenchment cannot be extended to such/daily wage employee and his disengagement cannot be said to be arbitrary. Relying on the decision in the case of Pushpa Agarwal, vs. Regional Inspectress of Girls School, Meerut ( 1995 (70) FLR 20 ), he contends that the principal of retrenchment as provided under the Central Industrial Disputes Act and the Rules framed thereunder, is also attracted in respect of a workman governed under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and the rules framed there under. ( 5 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length, and gone through the writ petition and have also confronted Mr. Murtaza about the pleading as to whether it has been pleaded that the petitioners are working for three years or more. The counsel had drawn my attention to paragraphs 4,6 and 11 of the writ petition in order to make out a pleeding. On a plaln reading of the said three paragraph, it does not show that such a case has been made put. Except the said three paragraph, there are no other paragraph from which he could decipher any statement to the extent that the petitioners have been working continuously for a period over three years in order to appreciate the factual aspect, it may be useful to refer to the said three paragraphs, which are quoted below ( 6 ) THAT the above project was sanctioned in the year 1986-87, and started operating in the year 1987 with about 30. 32 employees. All the appointments that were made, were purely temporary appointments. At the time when the petitioners were appointed, were already approximately 16-17 persons working in the project and taking the appointment of the petitioner also into account, the strength went upto 31. Thereafter. All the persons continued to function on the posts on which they were appointed. The petitioners are appointed as Surveillance/intervention workers. The petitioners are , therefore, the employees of malaria Research Center which is a body sponsered by the Health Ministry of the Union of India and the indian Council of Medical research. Thereafter. All the persons continued to function on the posts on which they were appointed. The petitioners are appointed as Surveillance/intervention workers. The petitioners are , therefore, the employees of malaria Research Center which is a body sponsered by the Health Ministry of the Union of India and the indian Council of Medical research. ( 7 ) THAT all the petitioners were continuously functioning on their posts without any break. It was only for the first time, this was done by the respondent no. 2 who is the new Officer -in-Charge, who had come in the month of June, 1991. ( 8 ) THAT the fact that approximately 30 persons have been continuing in the Research Centre for nearly last three years or more, Indicate that such number of workman are required by the centre permanently. Therefore, putting the break of or terminating the services of the petitioners not on the ground of work or conduct, amounts to unfair treatment and harassment taking advantage of precarious nature of the petitioners service. It is well settled that if the work is there and if the petitioners are suitable, then it is absolutely unfair to terminate the services of the petitioners for the purposes of appointing other persons. ( 9 ) ON a plaln reading of the said three paragraphs, it shows that the petitioners have not made out any such case. On the other hand in paragraph 4 it is contended that the project was sanctioned in the year 1986-87 and there were 30-32 employees in 1987 and when the petitioners were appointed, there were already 16-17 persons working. But it is not mentioned as to on which date or at least in which year the petitioners were appointed, Though in paragraph 6, it was said that they were continuing without any break form the date of their appointment but nowhere the date of appointment having been disclosed, the said statement cannot help the petitioners in absence of mentioned of any year or duration: In paragraph 11, though it has been said that approximately 30 persons had been continuing for nearly last three years or more, but nowhere it is contended that the petitioners have been continuing for three years or more. Thus there appears to be wholly absence of material particulars in the pleadings so as to make out a case on the basis whereof the entire argument was advanced by Mr. Murtaza, could be substantiated. ( 10 ) THE Principal which was advanced by Mr. Murtaza though are beyond all doubts being settled principal of law but those principals are attracted only on the basis of the facts as would be apparent from the pleadings. Though Mr. Murtaza had made certain statement at the bar but such statements do not form part of the pleadings. The high Court of record, It cannot rely on the statements made at the bar unless it forms part of the pleadings borne on record. ( 11 ) THE principal of Article 311 as contended by Mr. Murtaza does not apply in the present facts and circumstances of the case since, admittedly, the petitioners have not been able to make out a case that they were holding any civil post. Admittedly they are not members of any civil services, There is nor pleading that the petitioners had been holding any civil post under the state. A workman employed on a daily wage basis in a project does not hold a civil post, there is no question of distinction of temporary or permanent. Therefore, the decision in the case of P. L. Dhingra, (Supra), relied on by mr. Murtaza does not help him in the facts and attracted on the basis of the pleadings that has been made out as observed above. ( 12 ) THE question of regularisation as has been sought to be advanced by Mr. Murtaza relying in the case of Piara Singh, Supra also appears to be wholly misconceived. In asmuch as, in paragraph 17 of the said decision, it was held as follows:- " Now coming to the direction that all those adhoc/temporary employees who have continued employees who have continued for more than an year should be regularised, we find it difficult to substain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every adhoc/temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him which means creation of a vacancy (b) he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for application which means he had entered by a back-door (c) he was not eligible and/or qualified for the post at the time of his appointment (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are in addition to some of the problems indicated by us in para 12 which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, Unconditional orders. Moreover, from mere continuation of an adhoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for a regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no "rule of thumb" in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employee who have put in one years service as far as possible and subject to fulfilling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account there other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. Judged from this standpoint, the impugned directions must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable. " ( 13 ) A plaln reading the said paragraph shows that in the said case, it was never contended that a daily wage labour could be regularised even when there is no vacancy on the other hand , the court cannot give direction for creation of any post. However. In the fact and circumstances of the said case, the court had given certain directions for formulating scheme for regularization. In the present case, no interim order has been granted. Admittedly, the petitioners were out of employment since 13th december,1991. However. In the fact and circumstances of the said case, the court had given certain directions for formulating scheme for regularization. In the present case, no interim order has been granted. Admittedly, the petitioners were out of employment since 13th december,1991. Then again there is no pleading in order to bring facts suitable for the purpose of issuing direction for formulating a scheme. At the same time, in the case of himanshu kumar Vidyarthi, (Supra) it was held by the apex court that a daily wage employee has no right to the post. Therfore, the concept of retrenchment cannot be extended to a daily wage employee. The disengagement of a daily wage labour, who is engaged for a day is not a termination of service. Since a daily wage labour is engaged only on the basis of a contract lasting for a day only and each engagement is a fresh engagement, non-engagement or dis-engagement, therfore, is held not to be arbitrary. ( 14 ) IN the case of Smt. Pushmpa Agarwal, (Supra), it was held that the principal of retrenchment as enunciated in the Central Industrial disputes Act is also attracted in the case Governed by the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. By reason thereof, the principal enunciated in the case of Himanshu Kumar Vidyarti (Supra) can very well be attracted in the cases where an employee is engaged on a daily wage basis governed by the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, as in the present case. In the circumstances, it appears that no case of interfernce has been made out in writ jurisdiction. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the writ fails and is accordingly dismissed. No cost. ( 16 ) AT this stage Mr. Murtaza submitts that the court may be pleased to issue a direction for consideration of the representation that might be made by the petitioners having regard to continuation of their services. The Pleading, as observed earlier, does not show that there were sufficient materials in order to issue such a direction for consideration of the representation, particularly when the petitioners were no more in employment since 13th December, 1991 namely for over long seven years. In the fitness of the things, this Court feels that it is not a case fit for giving liberty to the petitioners to make representations for being considered by the respondents. Petition Dismissed. .