Judgment 1. The above revision is directed against the order of conviction and sentence dated 24.3.1998 in C.A.No.18 of 1997, on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu, confirming the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kancheepuram, in S.C.No.1 of 1996, dated 25.2.1997, convicting the Accused 1 and 2 under Secs.366 and 376, I.P.C. and sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 for each offence, both the sentences to run concurrently, and convicting the third accused under Sec.376 I.P.C., read with 34, I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000 in default of which, to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for three months in addition. 2. The revision petitioners are accused in S.C.No. 1 of 1996, on the file of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kancheepuram. A-1 and A-2 were facing trial for the offences punishable under Secs.366 and 376, I.P.C, whereas, A-3 was facing trial for the offence punishable under Secs.376 read with 34, I.P.C. with regard to an alleged occurrence, said to have been taken place 21.12.1994 at about 6.30 p.m. Azhvar Colony, within the jurisdiction of the respondent police station. 3. According to the prosecution, one, by name Sarala the victim, examined as P.W.I, was returning to her house, after purchasing provisions from the shop owned by a Nadar in the village. On the way to her house, she was intercepted by A-1, A-2 and A-3 respectively. A-1 stuffed a cloth in the mouth of P.W.1 and A-2 lifted P.W.1 and carried her to the house of A-1 and both A-1 and A-2 closed the doors of A-1 ‘s house, while A-3 was standing and waiting at the doors to see whether anyone was coming; A-2, first raped the said Sarala, the prosecutrix, P.W. 1, and thereafter, A-1 raped P.W.I. When A-1 and A-2 called A-3 to rape P.W.1, A-3 refused to come and told that he would stand outside the house of A-1 and watch whether anyone was coming. In the meanwhile, since the prosecutrix shouted, A-1 and A-2 opened the doors and all ran away. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutrix went to her house and informed her father, mother and brother, who were examined as P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 respectively. In the meanwhile, since the prosecutrix shouted, A-1 and A-2 opened the doors and all ran away. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutrix went to her house and informed her father, mother and brother, who were examined as P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 respectively. On the very next day, a complaint, was lodged which was marked as Ex.P-1 to the respondent police, and thereafter, she was taken to a lady doctor, who was examined as P.W.5, through whom, accident register was marked as Ex.P-2. 4. P.W.6 examined P.W. 1 as well as A-1 and A-2 who, by Ex.P-5, certified that P.W.I was aged about 16 to 17 years old, and also gave potential certificates marked as Exs.P-4 and P-5 for A-1 and A-2 respectively; P.W.7 and P.W.8, who turned hostile, were examined as eye witnesses; P.W.9, was the witness to the observation mahazar which was marked as Ex.P-6. The prosecution also produced M.O.1 to.M.O.4, namely: “TAMIL” as material objects and marked the chemical analysis report of the said clothes, which was marked as Ex.P-12. 5. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kancheepuram, in the light of the above evidences, namely P.W.1 to P.W.5 and P.W.9 read with Ex.P-2, by his order dated 25.2.1997 in S.C.No. 1 of 1996, convicted A-1 and A-2 under Secs.366 and 376, I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,000 for each offences, both the sentences to run concurrently, and convicted the third accused under Sec.376, I.P.C, read with 34, I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for seven years and imposed a fine of Rs.1,000, in default of which, to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for three months in addition, which was. on appeal in C.A.No. 18 of 1997, by order dated 24.3.1998, confirmed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu. Hence, the above revision. 6. on appeal in C.A.No. 18 of 1997, by order dated 24.3.1998, confirmed by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chengalpattu. Hence, the above revision. 6. Mr.T.Sudanthiram, learned counsel for the revision petitioners, invites my attention to Ex.P-12, namely, the chemical analysis report, which does not speak anything about the existence of the sperm on the clothes to corroborate the evidence of P.W.I to establish the offence said to have been committed by A-1 and A-2 he further invited my attention to the evidence of and P.W. 1 and P.W.5 read with Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and contends that a reading of these evidences would show that P.W. 1 is well in age to give consent for sexual intercourse; that except a bald statement by P.W.1 and A-1 and A-2 committed rape on her, there is no evidence on record to show that such an occurrence had taken place, that there is no medical evidence available on record either in the evidence of P.W.5 or under Ex.P-2 that the complainant P.W.I was subjected to such gang rape. Mr.Sundathiram further contends that as per Ex.P-3, the complainant P.W.I was well in the age to give consent for such sexual intercourse; assuming A-1 and A-2 had lifted the P.W.I for about 3/4 kgs. who is aged about 16 to 17 years old, with good physique, she would have definitely resisted them and should have sustained minimum minor injuries on any part of her external body; at least, her clothes should have been torn by such resistance; but, the very case of the prosecution that she was been lifted at 6 p.m. by A-1 and A-2 without any resistence by her would show that she should have given her consent to A-1 and A-2 to have intercourse with her. 7. Mr.Sudanthiram further contends that no internal injuries were found on her private parts, or near her thigh and this would again prove that she was not subjected to any force. 8. Mr.Sudanthiram, learned counsel for the revision petitioners places reliance on the decision in Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra , 1978 Crl.L.J. 1864 and contends that when no marks of injury has been found on the girl after the incident, it goes a long way to indicate that the alleged intercourse was of passive submission. 9. Mr.Sudanthiram, learned counsel for the revision petitioners places reliance on the decision in Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra , 1978 Crl.L.J. 1864 and contends that when no marks of injury has been found on the girl after the incident, it goes a long way to indicate that the alleged intercourse was of passive submission. 9. Mr.Sudanthiram, again, placing reliance on the decision on Ajay Kumar v. State of M.P. Ajay Kumar v. State of M.P. , 1995 Crl.L.J. 3435 and contends that there are no marks of injury or P.W.1; the alleged inter-course is deemed to be a peaceful affair on P.W.1, and would got to show that the absence of mark of injury on P. W. 1 would go a long way to indicate that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair and a story of her in putting up resistence, is all false. 10. Mr.Sudanthiram, further referring to the extract in Ex.P-2, contends that when P.W.5 categorically states that there was no rupture of hymen of P.W.1 and P.W.5 could insert her two fingers into the vagina P.W.1. P.W.1 the prosecutrix should have been accustomed with such intercourses, or she should have given consent to A-1 and A-2 to have intercourse with her, and therefore, it would not be safe to convict A-1 and A-2 for the said offences. 11. Mr.Sudanthiram also relied upon the decision in Annkodi v. State Annkodi v. State , 1994 M.W.N. (Crl.)243 and contends that when the vaginal hole could allow two fingers, the girl must be of immoral character, and her testimony cannot be relied upon to accept the case of the prosecution, and therefore, as in the instant case, when the evidence of P.W.5 read with Ex.P-2 reveals that the vaginal hole of P.W.I was so loose, allowing two fingers, her evidence cannot be relied upon. 12. Mr.Sundanthram, placing reliance on the decision in Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 Crl.L.J. 710 contends that if the medical evidence does not corroborate with the statement of the prosecutrix proving the commission of offence of rape, the evidence of the prosecutrix has to be rejected as a false story. 12. Mr.Sundanthram, placing reliance on the decision in Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 Crl.L.J. 710 contends that if the medical evidence does not corroborate with the statement of the prosecutrix proving the commission of offence of rape, the evidence of the prosecutrix has to be rejected as a false story. Mr.Sundanthiram, therefore, contends that since the evidence of P.W.5 and Ex.P-2 do not speak about the commission of offence by A-1 and A-2, the evidence of P.W.1 should be rejected as a false story. 13. Mr.Sudanthiram further contended that with regard to A-3, even the complainant P.W.1 herself clearly states that P.W.3 never participated in the commission of offence, and even when he was invited by A-1 and A-2, A-3 refused to join with them to rape P.W.1 and therefore, the charge under Sec.376 read with Sec.34, I.P.C. and the conviction and sentence against A-3 are totally illegal. 14. Per contra, Mr.C.M.Gunasekaran, learned Government Advocate, invited my attention to Sec.114 of the Indian Evidence Act and contends that the presumption with regard to the offence punishable under Sec.376, I.P.C, is in favour of the prosecution that P.W.1 had been subjected to such gang rape without her consent. According to the learned Government Advocate, the evidence of P.W.1 is very clear and direct that A-1 stuffed the mouth of the prosecutrix with a cloth; A-1 carried to the house of A-1 ; where, after closing the doors, A-2 raped P.W.1 first, and then A-1 raped P.W.1; and when A-2 invited A-3 to rape P.W.1, A-3 refused, stating that he would watch at the doors whether anyone was coming. Mr.C.M.Gunasekaran, therefore, contends that if the prosecutrix wanted to falsely implicate the accused, she would have also implicated A-3 that A-3 also raped her, which itself would show that A-1 and A-2 alone committed the rape, and she spoke only the truth. That apart, the argument that the prosecutrix did not resist A-1 and A-2 at the time of lifting and carrying her to the house of A-1 is not tenable, because, according to P.W.1, A-1 stuffed the cloth in her mouth and A-2 lifted and carried her to the house of A-1. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that she did not resist, is not tenable in law. 15. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners that she did not resist, is not tenable in law. 15. The learned Government Advocate further argued that even in the house, A-1 and A-2 closed the doors and raped her one after another, as mentioned above and all these would go to show that in spite of her resistence, she could not come out the clutches of A-1 and A-2; further merely because, she did not sustain any injury on her body, could not be a ground to hold that she was not forcefully raped, contrary to her consent. The learned Government Advocate also contends that the mere fact that two fingers could be inserted into the vaginal hole of the prosecutrix itself could not be a conclusive evidence that she was accustomed for such intercourses. 16. Mr.C.M.Gunasekaran, learned Government Advocate, further, invited my attention to the evidence of P.W.5 that she found rupture in the hymen of P.W.1, which corroborates with the evidence of P.W.1 that A-1 and A-2 had forcefully raped the prosecutrix. 17. The learned Government Advocate fairly admits that P.W.3 did not have an intention to rape, and therefore, he cannot be convicted and punished for the offence punishable under Sec.376, I.P.C. read with Sec.34, I.P.C. 18. The learned Government Advocate, placing reliance on the decision in Narayananamma v. State of Karnataka Narayananamma v. State of Karnataka , 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1573 contends that the mere fact that the hymen of the prosecutrix P.W.1 was rupturned and admitted two fingers, cannot be viewed as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse and the absence of sperm on her clothes also cannot disprove the case of the prosecutrix. 19. Mr.C.M.Gunasekaran, learned Government Advocate further contends that in a case of rape, the testimony of the prosecutrix cannot be tested as an evidence of a child witness or an accomplice, and therefore the rule of prudence that her evidence must be corroborated with material particulars has no application; at the most the court may look for some evidence which lends assurance. The learned Government Advocate relies upon the decision in Karnel Singh v. Slate of M.P Karnel Singh v. Slate of M.P, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 977 in this regard. 20. The learned Government Advocate relies upon the decision in Karnel Singh v. Slate of M.P Karnel Singh v. Slate of M.P, 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 977 in this regard. 20. The learned Government Advocate, further relies upon the decision in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh , 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 316 where, it is held that even if there is no medical evidence, it cannot be a ground to disbelieve the statement of the prosecutrix, nor to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. 21. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 22. P.W.1 clearly speaks that A-1 stuffed her mouth with a cloth and A-2 lifted and carried to the house of A-1,where, A-1 and A-2 closed the doors and raped the prosecutrix one after another and thereafter called A-3 to rape her, but A-3 refused, stating that he would watch whether anyone comes there. It is true that in the Ex.P-2, P.W.5 has observed as follows: “Alleged to have been raped by 2 known persons, Rajendran and Kumar residing in the next street of victim on 21.12.94 at 6.00 p.m. in Kumars residence. Pds regular. Pt got her menstrual flow after raping. O/E not answering pules 80/Minut Breasts well developed No ext. injuries L/E.No external injuries rapia well developed PV Vagina admits 2 fingers easily. Pt. is in periods. Bleeding through OS+ Sd/- Dt.23.12.1994.” 23. Of course, in Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra , 1978 Crl.L.J. 1864 it is held as follows: “The main contention which has been raised before us on behalf of the appellants is that no direct evidence being available about the nature of the consent of the girl to the alleged act of sexual intercourse, the same had to be inferred from the available circumstances and that from those circumstances it could not be deducted that the girl had been subjected to or was under any fear or compulsion such as would justify an inference of any “passive submission”, and this contention appears to us to be well based. As pointed out earlier, no marks of injury were found on the person of the girl after the incident and their absence goes a long way to indicate that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair, and that the story of a stiff resistance having been put up by the girl is all false.” “A man is said to commit “rape” who except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the five following descriptions: First - Against her will Secondly - Without her consent. Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death, or of hurt. Fourthly - With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly - With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation:Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception:Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape. The section itself states that in clauses Thirdly and Fourthly as to when a consent would not be a consent within the meaning of clause secondly. For the proposition that the requisite consent was lacking in the present case, reliance on behalf of the State can be placed only on clause. Thirdly so that it would have to be shown that the girl had been put in fear of death or hurt and that was the reason for her consent. To this aspect of the matter the High Court was perhaps alive when it talked of “passive submission” but then in holding that the circumstances available in the present case make out a case of fear on the part of the girl, it did not give a finding that such fear was shown to be that of death or hurt, and in the absence of such a finding, the alleged fear would not vitiate the consent. Further, for circumstantial evidence to be used in order to prove an ingredient of an offence, it has to be such that it leads to no reasonable inference other than that of guilt. Further, for circumstantial evidence to be used in order to prove an ingredient of an offence, it has to be such that it leads to no reasonable inference other than that of guilt. We have already pointed out that the fear which clause Thirdly of Sec.375 speaks of negatived by the circumstance that the girl is said to have been taken away by Ganpat right from amongst her near and dear ones at a point of time when they were all leaving the police station together and were crossing the entrance gate to emerge out of it. The circumstantial evidence available, therefore, is not only capable of being construed in a way different from that adopted by the High Court but actually derogates in no uncertain measure from the inference drawn by it.” 24. Even though in the instant case also there is no external injury, it may, at the best, be presumed that the accused had not applied any force on her body while carrying her to the house of A-1 to commit rape on her, which cannot be a ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecutrix totally and to reject the charge of rape committed by A-1 and A-2. Therefore, the above decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is not helpful to him under the facts and circumstances of the case. 25. No doubt, Annakodi v. State Annakodi v. State, 1994 M. W.N. (Crl.) 243 this Court has held as follows: “The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contends that the medical test also reveals that the private part of P. W.3 allowed two fingers and if she was a virgin-girl before this occurrence around the age of 13, the vaginal hole could not have been so loose allowing two fingers and therefore the girl must be of immoral character and her testimony cannot be relied upon to accept the case of the prosecution. P.W.3 has stated in her evidence that twice she had sexual intercourse with the revision petitioner on his compulsion, when they were staying in the house of the relation of the petitioner. If the sexual assault was only twice, as stated by her, and she was a young girl of 13 years old, the vaginal hole could not be so loose to allow two fingers. If the sexual assault was only twice, as stated by her, and she was a young girl of 13 years old, the vaginal hole could not be so loose to allow two fingers. Normally, girls would attain the puberty at the age of 12 or 13 years. So the condition of the private part of P.W.3 also leads to suspicion in the veracity of her evidence that only twice she had sexual intercourse with the revision petitioner. There is also inconsistency as to the place of arrest as P.W.3 has stated that when she was at Madras, she was arrested by the police, whereas P.W.10 would stated that he arrested the revision petitioner when he was with P. W.3 near the bus stop in Anaickerpatti of Madurai District. Even ignoring these inconsistencies as I am convinced from the evidence that P. W.3 was not a minor, but completed the age of 18, the willing adventure of this girl in the company of the revision petitioner for their flirting pleasure, may not fall within the rope of Secs.363 and 375, Indian Penal Code to deal with this revision petitioner under law. Therefore, the courts, below erred in accepting the prosecution case and convicting the revision petitioner. The revision deserves to be allowed.” 26. But, in this regard, I am obliged to refer the decision of the Apex Court in Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka , 1994 S.C.C. (Crl.) 1573 wherein it is held as follows; “Penal Code 1860- Sec.376 - Rape - Medical evidence - Rape on minor girl aged 14 years Statement of the doctor that hymen of the prosecutrix was ruptured and admitted two fingers - Held this cannot be viewed as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse.” “According to the doctor hymen of the prosecutrix was ruptured, admitted two fingers, bleed on touch, was reddish in colour, and was painful and tender. On this basis, the doctor opined that these were signs of rape. The ability of admission of two fingers and hymen being ruptured was viewed by the High Court as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. When the doctor had opined that the hymen was ruptured, she did not qualify her statement that it stood ruptured as of old or carried an old tear. The ability of admission of two fingers and hymen being ruptured was viewed by the High Court as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. When the doctor had opined that the hymen was ruptured, she did not qualify her statement that it stood ruptured as of old or carried an old tear. With clear objective in view the doctor must be presumed to have noticed the hymen as freshly ruptured, as otherwise, the doctor would not have described it in that fashion to be bleeding, tender and painful. The factum of admission of two fingers could not be held adverse to the prosecutrix for it would depend upon the size of the fingers inserted. When medical experts try to opine about the medical condition of a woman used to sexual intercourse, it is described as admission of two fingers easily, but here the doctor qualified her statement by saying that it was painful and bleeding on touch. These conditions obviously related to the hymen. The doctor was thus clear in her opinion that rape had been committed on the prosecutrix.” Penal Code, 1860, Sec.376 - Rape - Medical evidence - Absence of spermatozoa on vaginal smear -Does not falsify the version of the prosecutrix - Penetration does not necessarily lead to the discovery of sepermatozoa - Its absence may be due to various other factors such as faulty taking of smear, its preservation, quality of semen etc.” “With regard to the vaginal smear examination the doctor stated that no spermatozoa was seen on it, and the absence of sperms has been viewed against the version of the prosecutrix. It was never elicited from the prosecutrix as to whether the two persons who committed rape on her had reached orgasm emitting semen in her private parts. No presumption can be made that penetration of penis in the private parts of a rape victim must necessarily lead to the discovery of spermatozoa. It is a question of detail and has to be put to test by cross-examination. Otherwise also there may be various other factors which may negative the presence of spermatozoa such as faulty taking of the smear, its preservation, quality of semen etc. It is a question of detail and has to be put to test by cross-examination. Otherwise also there may be various other factors which may negative the presence of spermatozoa such as faulty taking of the smear, its preservation, quality of semen etc. The absence of spermatozoa prima facie could not be allowed to tell against the version of the prosecutrix.” Therefore, the mere fact that the hymen of the prosecutrix was found ruptured, admitting two fingers cannot be viewed as if the prosecutrix was habitual to sexual intercourse. Hence, I find it difficult to rely upon the decision in Annakodi v. State Annakodi v. State , 1994 M. W.N. (Crl.) 243. 27. In Ajay Kumar v. State of M.P. Ajay Kumar v. State of M.P. , 1995 Crl.L.J. 3435, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held as follows: “The cumulative effect of the entire circumstance emerging from the record coupled with the circumstances that no mark of injury was found on her person except a superficial abrasion referred to at Serial No.4 of the M.L.C. Ex.P.G., and her conduct in having left the shop upto Bus Stand, not having raised alarm till she met P. W.2 Satya Dev, goes a long way to indicate that the alleged intercourse was a peaceful affair and the story of her helplessness in putting up resistence, is all false.” 28. Again, in Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab Gurjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1998 Crl.L.J. 710 relief upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held as follows: “Medical evidence in this case also does not corroborate the statement of the prosecutrix, the medical evidence produced by the prosecution rather, in my view, does not prove that rape has been committed on the prosecutrix at all. It has come in the evidence of Dr.Santhosh Katari, P.W.I, who examined Bakkshish Kaur,.prosecutrix on 13.8.1986 at 3 a.m. that hymen was old turn completely. Vagina admits two fingers loosely. No fresh tear or laceration was found over the vagina. She did not find any semen stains on the clothes etc. It has come in the evidence of Dr.Santhosh Katari, P.W.I, who examined Bakkshish Kaur,.prosecutrix on 13.8.1986 at 3 a.m. that hymen was old turn completely. Vagina admits two fingers loosely. No fresh tear or laceration was found over the vagina. She did not find any semen stains on the clothes etc. She then stated that in grown up and well built ladies, whether married or unmarried, mark of violance such as bruises marks or scratches of finger nails can be found on the external genitial perineurm, abdomen, chest and back but they were not missing on the person of the prosecutrix. She then stated in her cross-examination that the injuries on the lip and face were superficial in nature and the possibility of their being self suffered could not be ruled out. She then stated in her statement that the prosecutrix told her that she was wearing the same clothes which she was wearing at the time of incident and the doctor found that there was no soiling with mud. Two swabs and two slides were taken from the vagina and the clothes and salwar and under-wear were sent to the Chemical Examiner. From the report of Chemical Examiner, Ex.A-4, no spermatizoa were found on any of the articles clothes, swab). “Bakshish Kaur, prosecutrix, has clearly stated in her statement at the trial that she had put in resistence to the alleged act of the accused. She specifically stated in her cross-examination before the trial that the accused had received injuries with her legs. She has also stated in her examination-in-chief that she gave injuries to the accused on his face. There is no evidence on the file which could show that there was any injury external or internal or even superficial on the body of the accused. I have seen the medico legal report Ex.P.E prepared by Dr.Sukhjit Singh Sidhu, P.W.3. Neither there is any mention in the report Ex.P.W nor it has been stated by the doctor at the trial that any injury was found on the person of the accused. Even P.W.7, S.I.Nazar Singh, Invesrigating Officer of this case who arrested the accused on 4.8.1986 did not find any injury on the person of the accused. He has admitted as correct in his cross-examination that the accused was medically examined and he did not find any injury on the person of the accused. Even P.W.7, S.I.Nazar Singh, Invesrigating Officer of this case who arrested the accused on 4.8.1986 did not find any injury on the person of the accused. He has admitted as correct in his cross-examination that the accused was medically examined and he did not find any injury on the person of the accused. Thus, the medical evidence completely contradicts the statement of the prosecutrix.” 29. Therefore, in view of the law laid down in the light of the decision in Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka Narayanamma v. State of Karnataka , 1994S.C.C. (Crl.) 1573 referred to above, I do not think the petitioners can still rely upon the decisions in: (1) Tukaram v. State of Maharshtra,Annakodi Tukaram v. State of Maharshtra,Annakodi 1978 Crl.L.J. 1864; (2) 30. I am also obliged to refer the decision in Narayan Dutta v. State Narayan Dutta v. State , (1980)1 Crl.LJ. 264 it is held as follows: “The statement of a ravished girl made voluntarily and immediately after or shortly after the occurrence is admissible in evidence. That is relevant as evidence of the credibility of the testimony of the prosecutrix. The court can dispense of the prosecutrix. The court can dispense with the necessity of corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is satisfied that it would be safe to rely upon her testimony. But where corroboration is possible and is available, it is judicious and reasonable to seek for such corroboration.“ 31. Again, in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. , 1995 S.C.C. (Crl) 977 the Apex Court has held as follows: “A woman who is a victim of sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime, but is a victim of another persons lust and therefore her evidence need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. She is not in the category of a child witness or an accomplice and therefore the rule of prudence that her evidence must be corroborated in material particulars has no application; at the most the court may look for some evidence which lends assurance.” 32. I am also obliged to refer the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 316. I am also obliged to refer the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 316. wherein the Apex Court has held as follows: “The testimony of the victim of sexual assault is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficulty in acting on the testimony of the victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion. The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge levelled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victims of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victims of another persons lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.” “Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating womens rights in all spheres; we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victims privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault -it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist de-grades the very soul of the helpless female. The courts, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradiction or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relief upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relief upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the. trial court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with case involving sexual molestations.” 33. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the above decisions, I do not find any justification to disbelieve the evidence of P.W. 1, the prosecutrix, assuming if there is any discrepancy requiring corroborative evidence by P. W.5 and Ex.P-2, therefore, I do not find any justification to disbelieve the evidence of P.W.I and to interfere with the order of conviction against A1 and A-2, and therefore, the order of conviction and sentence against the petitioners 1 and 2/accused 1 and 2 of the courts below are confirmed. 34. But, however, it is to be noted that there is no evidence for convicting A-3, as neither the F.I.R. speak about anything against A-3, nor the evidence of P.W.I could speak that he had either any intention to kidnap or rape P.W. 1 nor that he had raped P.W.1. In the absence of any such evidence against A-3 either under Sec.366 I.P.C. or Sec.376 read with Sec.34, I.P.C., or alternatively under Sec.109, I.P.C. I do not think it would be safe to convict A-3. Therefore, I am obliged to set aside the conviction and sentence against A-3 and acquit him in this regard, and allow the revision as far as A3 is concerned. 35. At this juncture, Mr. Sudanthiram invited my attention to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Joseph Alfonso v. State Joseph Alfonso v. State, (1998)2 Crimes 11 (Bom.) claiming reduction of sentence with regard to A-1and A-2. However, the learned Government Advocate objects such request of reduction of sentence, inviting my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 316 referred to above. Therefore, I do not see any justification to reduce the sentence, as requested by Mr. However, the learned Government Advocate objects such request of reduction of sentence, inviting my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, 1996 S.C.C. (Crl.) 316 referred to above. Therefore, I do not see any justification to reduce the sentence, as requested by Mr. Sudanthiram, learned counsel for the petitioners. 36. In the result, the revision is allowed in so far as the third petitioner A-3 is concerned and dismissed with regard to the petitioners 1 and 2, namely, A-1 and A-2. No costs.