N. Vadivazhagi v. The Corporation of Madras rep. by its Commissioner, Ripon Buildings, Madras
1998-11-02
V.S.SIRPURKAR
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner herein challenges the two notices-cum-orders. The first order dated 8.2.1989 is allegedly under Section 256(1) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and the other order dated 2.8.1989 is allegedly under Section 256(3) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. 2. The petitioner has put up a construction of four-storeyed building at premises No. 100, Second Avenue, Anna Nagar, Madras-40. According to him he had obtained the planning permission from the Corporation on 17.11.1988 for the basement, ground and 1st floor and the additional floor was put up after applying for the sanction of the plan. The petitioner states that he was served with a notice dated 6.5.1989 under Sections 56 and 57 to stop the work and to produce necessary planning permission within 3 days from the date of receipt of the notice on 18.5.1989. However, he was served with a notice of demolition dated 15.6.1989 and the second respondent directed him to restore the land to its original condition. The petitioner further goes to state that thereafter he submitted an application with necessary enclosures for permission under Section 49 for the retention of the land and building under Section 56(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971. However, the said application was returned back on the ground that the proposal violated the land use and other requirements. The petitioner, therefore, filed the Writ Petition No. 9623/89 praying for a Writ of Mandamus to quash the said order and to direct the second respondent to grant permission under Sec. 49 of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1971. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that in the said petition there is a stay granted by this Court in W.M.P. No. 13781/1989 on 21.7.1989 and the same is still pending. The petitioner further submits that during the pendency of this petition, the petitioner was served with a notice-cum-order dated 2.8.1989 which was served in the name of one H. Ahamed Thambi. According to the petitioner, this Ahamed Thambi is his vendor. It is pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that though the said Ahamed Thambi has no concern whatsoever with the property, the said order stood in the name of Ahamed Thambi and it was mentioned therein that the provisional order dated 8.2.1989 was confirmed.
According to the petitioner, this Ahamed Thambi is his vendor. It is pointed out by the counsel for the petitioner that though the said Ahamed Thambi has no concern whatsoever with the property, the said order stood in the name of Ahamed Thambi and it was mentioned therein that the provisional order dated 8.2.1989 was confirmed. The counsel further submits that after enquiry, the petitioner came to know that the first order dated 8.2.1989 which was allegedly under Section 256(1) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act was served not on the petitioner but on the said Ahamed Thambi who simply ignored the matter, he being not connected with the property any more. Therefore, the petitioner in this petition challenges the orders dated 8.2.1989 and 2.8.1989 which have been allegedly passed under Sections 256(1) and 256(3) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act respectively. The counsel for the petitioner submits that both the orders are in the nature of notices and are passed against H. Ahamed Thambi, though it is the petitioner who is the real owner of the property. The counsel further points out that the two orders are nothing but a striking example for non-application of mind, as both the orders do not describe the property or the alleged deviation made by the petitioner to the plan for the construction done. It is also pointed out that there are number of blanks left in both the orders and as such, it only shows the non-application of mind on the part of the Authorities. Last but not the least, the counsel for the petitioner points out that the orders have been passed by the Executive Engineer for Commissioner. The counsel for the petitioner points out that the Executive Engineer had no jurisdiction in law to pass any such order, as this was a sole prerogative of the Commissioner under Section 256 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act. 4. We would not be concerned with the first part of the petition in which there is a reference to Writ Petition No. 9623/89. As the present petition is only against the subsequent orders passed under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and not under the Madras Metropolitan Development Act and that would be a separate subject. It is represented by the learned counsel that the said Writ Petition is now disposed of with a leave to resubmit his papers forthwith.
As the present petition is only against the subsequent orders passed under the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act and not under the Madras Metropolitan Development Act and that would be a separate subject. It is represented by the learned counsel that the said Writ Petition is now disposed of with a leave to resubmit his papers forthwith. 5. In so far as the present controversy is concerned, it will have to be seen whether the notices as ordered are in order. 6. Both the notices are in the name of one H. Ahamed Thambi and the property described is plot No. 4667, Door No. W100, 2nd Avenue, Anna Nagar, Madras-40. The first notice-cum-order which is dated 8.2.1989 and allegedly passed under Section 256(1) of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act IV of 1919 has number of blanks and does not show as to what precise deviation has been made by the petitioner in construction. Section 256(1) is clear. The said sub Section states that if the Commissioner is satisfied that the construction or reconstruction of any building. a) has been commenced without obtaining the permission of the Commissioner or b) is being carried on, or has been completed otherwise than in accordance with the plans c) is being carried on, or has been completed in breach of any of the provisions of the Act or ii) that any alternation or additions to, any building have been carried in breach of Section 255. Then a provisional order may be made by the Commissioner requiring the owner or builder to demolish the work done which is unlawfully executed. 7. The order contemplated under Section 256(1) of the Act is a provisional order and under Sub Section (2) of Section 256 copy of this order is to be served on the owner or builder or the concerned person as the case may be. 8. Section 256(3) contemplates that if the owner fails to show cause against the defects shown in the orders under Sub Section (1) then the Commissioner may confirm his order with any modification as he may think fit. 9. It is, therefore, clear that under Section 256(1) of the Act as also 256 (3), it would be essential on the part of the Commissioner to point out the defects or deviation, as the case may be. 10.
9. It is, therefore, clear that under Section 256(1) of the Act as also 256 (3), it would be essential on the part of the Commissioner to point out the defects or deviation, as the case may be. 10. When we see on the backdrop, we see that two orders have been passed and there are no lapses shown therein. Both the orders are in the printed forms and there does not seem to be any attempt on the part of the concerned Authority viz . the Executive Engineer to fill up the blanks therein. Both the orders are passed against one H. Ahamed Thambi. Further case of the petitioner is that, the planning permission was obtained from the Corporation on 17.11.1988 and the building was completed in the first week of June, 1989 and was also assessed to the property tax. The petitioner therefore, asserts that though the said H. Ahamed Thambi was only her vendor from whom she had purchased the property, strangely the notices-cum-orders have been passed against H. Ahamed Thambi and not against the petitioner which would show utter non-application of mind of the part of the Authorities concerned. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that even if the two notice-cum-orders are taken to be proper, they do not show as to what precisely was the option on the part of the concerned Authority viz. the Executive Engineer and therefore, the notices on that ground itself would be illegal. Learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relies on the order of K. Sampath, J. in W.P. No. 11455 of 1989 dated 24.7.1998, wherein K. Sampath, J. has taken a view that a notice containing blanks and where the deviation in the construction is not shown at all would be bad in law. K. Sampath, J. has also observed that in the notice which he was considering, the period within which the petitioner was expected to comply with the requirements was not shown. Same is the case here also. Therefore, both the notices have to go on this ground alone. In the case before Sampath, J. atleast, notices were served on the proper persons. Here they are not served on the petitioner at all though the petitioner claims that her name has already been recorded in the Corporation records as the owner of the property.
Therefore, both the notices have to go on this ground alone. In the case before Sampath, J. atleast, notices were served on the proper persons. Here they are not served on the petitioner at all though the petitioner claims that her name has already been recorded in the Corporation records as the owner of the property. That apart, the Corporation has not chosen to counter the claims of the petitioner, as regards the name of the petitioner having been recorded or even regarding the other claim that the petitioner “had sought permission for construction. 12. As if this is not sufficient, the counsel for petitioner also points out that the notices are signed by the Executive Engineer for Commissioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly submits that the powers under Section 256(2) of the Act are exercisable by the Commissioner alone and these powers could not be delegated. Section 16 of the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act deals with the delegation of powers. That Section is very specific. It is very specifically provided therein that amongst the other powers, the powers under Section 256 could not be delegated. The Section is somewhat like this: (1) The Commissioner may delegate to any other appointed under Sub Section. 2) of Section 7 or the holder of any municipal office any of his ordinary powers, duties or functions except those conferred or imposed upon, or vested in him by the following provisions, namely Sections 25(3), 183, 195, 217, 218, 256, 265, 271, 275, 282, 283, 284, 287, 288, 289, 292, 293, 299, 306, 308, 309, 319, 323, 324, 335, 380 & 398. 13. There is a positive reference to Section 256 in Section 16(1) of the Act. The specific language of the Section suggests the powers which could not be delegated under this Section which includes Section 256. No other provision to the contrary was pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent. It is, therefore, clear that the powers under Section 256 of the Act are not liable to be delegated at all and as such, it could be the Commissioner alone who could issue notice under Section 256(1) of the Act and could confirm the same under Section 256(3) of the Act. 14. Here both the orders are clearly passed by the Executive Engineer, who had chosen to put his signature.
14. Here both the orders are clearly passed by the Executive Engineer, who had chosen to put his signature. It is again, really difficult to call these notices as orders as both are only the printed documents wherein some blanks have been chosen to be filled in, while “others have been left out. For this reason also, the petitioner must succeed and the orders passed must be quashed. 15. In the result, the petitioner succeeds and the impugned orders are quashed. It is however, clarified that if the Authorities so choose, they would be free to take such action against the petitioner as is permissible in law and this order would not come in the way provided the action is within the four corners of law.