Judgment :- A. RAMAN, J. The accused is the petitioner. A complaint was laid against the accused before the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, under section 138 read with section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The case of the complainant runs as follows : The accused had dealings with the complainant by purchasing cotton yarn on credit. To discharge the outstanding due on such transaction, the accused issued a cheque dated December 20, 1995, for Rs. 50, 000 when the said cheque was presented for collection to the Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited, Salem, it was returned with a memo of dishonour, stating "funds insufficient". The accused had issued the cheque knowing fully well that he has no sufficient funds in his account to meet the demand in the cheque. The complainant received the information of dishonour of cheque on June 21, 1996. The complainant issued a legal notice on June 28, 1996. Therefore, the accused is guilty under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The petitioner herein, who is the accused filed an application before the trial court viz., the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, for his discharge from the case, and the same was dismissed by the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, on September 2, 1997, with the result, that this revision is preferred. The respondent-complainant, who was served with notice on this revision, has not chosen to enter appearance or contest the matter. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, and going through the records in this case, I am satisfied that this is a fit case, where the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate has to be set aside. The respondent-complainant, who was served with notice on this revision, has not chosen to enter appearance or contest the matter. After hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner, and going through the records in this case, I am satisfied that this is a fit case, where the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate has to be set aside. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act runs as follows : "Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both : Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless : (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation. Explanation. - For the purpose of this section, 'debt or other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." If a person, therefore, issues a cheque for payment of any amount due to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, and it is returned by the bank unpaid, the said person shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In order that section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act shall apply, three necessary conditions must exist. The first condition is that the cheque must have been or must be presented within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or from the date of validity, whichever is earlier. The second condition is that the holder in due course of a cheque, shall make a demand for the payment of the said amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The third condition necessary to invoke section 138 is the failure of the drawer of the cheque to make the payment of the amount of money to the payee or to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Only if these three conditions are satisfied, then alone section 138 of the Act will apply. In other words, an offence under section 138 of the Act shall be deemed to have been committed only on the fulfilment of the three conditions set out as provisos (a), (b) and (c) to section 138.Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act relates to cognisance of offences. It specifies that no court shall take cognisance of an offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing made by the payee, or the holder in due course. The other condition is that such complaint is to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. The other condition is that such complaint is to be made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Clause (c) provides that after the receipt of notice under clause (b), if the drawer fails to make payment to the payee or to the holder in due course, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice, the complaint has to be made within one month from the date on which the said cause of action arises. Therefore there must be failure on the part of the drawer of the cheque to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of notice from the drawer, and a complaint can be lodged for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act only within one month from the date on which the cause of action as provided under sub-clause (c) arises. Therefore, in order that a complaint shall be valid in the eye of law, it must conform strictly to the provisions of sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Only if the conditions set out under sections 138 and 142 are complied with, the Judicial Magistrate will be competent to take cognisance of the same. The offence is deemed to have been committed only if the conditions set out under clauses (a) to (c) are satisfied, and if such an offence is deemed to have been committed, then a complaint shall be made within one month, failing which, no cognisance can be taken by the Magistrate. The rulings of the courts are unanimous that the cause of action would arise only on the sixteenth day of the receipt of notice as envisaged under clause (b) to section 138 of the Act. Therefore, within one month from the date of arising of cause of action under clause (b) to section 138 of the Act, a complaint has to be made. Hence, the issuance of notice is an essential pre-requisite. Similarly, the failure to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of notice would set the law of limitation in motion. Therefore, within one month from the date of arising of cause of action under clause (b) to section 138 of the Act, a complaint has to be made. Hence, the issuance of notice is an essential pre-requisite. Similarly, the failure to make payment within fifteen days of receipt of notice would set the law of limitation in motion. Therefore, unless these essential conditions are satisfied, the magistrate will not have jurisdiction to take cognisance of a case.The complainant has to allege that for a sum of money due to him, the accused in discharge of the said debt or liability, handed over a cheque in payment of the same. Further, he should allege that the cheque was presented within a period of six months from the date on which it was drawn or within its period of validity. Thirdly, he has to make demand for payment of the said amount within fifteen days of receipt of information by him from the bank as to the return of the cheque unpaid. Lastly, if within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice, the drawer fails to make payment, then alone the right of the holder of the cheque to initiate action under section 138 of the Act would crystallise. Even then, it has to be initiated within a period of one month from the date on which the cause of action as indicated in clause (c) to section 138 of the Act had arisen. Thus, necessary allegations to that effect have to be made in the complaint to indicate a prima facie case. It is also incumbent upon the complainant to produce along with the complaint, the returned cheque with the banker's advice, a copy of the notice with acknowledgment to show that a demand was made within fifteen days after receipt of notice from the bank and further to show that no payment was made within fifteen days from the date of receipt of notice by the drawer. But, in this case on hand, what we find is that the complainant has not produced in court, the necessary documents. On the other hand, along with the complaint, only the power of attorney executed in favour of the person, who laid the complaint, the cheque, the memo of dishonour and the notice issued to the accused on such dishonour are produced. On the other hand, along with the complaint, only the power of attorney executed in favour of the person, who laid the complaint, the cheque, the memo of dishonour and the notice issued to the accused on such dishonour are produced. In the complaint, it is not stated that the accused received the notice on such and such date and that he failed to make payment within fifteen days of the receipt of notice. The complaint merely mentions about the issuance of notice. There is no allegation in the complaint as to what happened to the notice, whether it was received and acknowledged by the accused or whether it was returned on any ground by the postal authorities. It is also not stated as to when the notice was issued, if at all by the accused, or when it was returned by the postal authorities. Nor is it stated that the notice was returned by the accused with a wilful intention to avoid payment. The acknowledgment for the service of notice or the returned notice are not produced along with the complaint. Even in the sworn statement recorded on August 8, 1996, it is simply mentioned that a notice was issued on June 28, 1996. It is not stated in the sworn statement that the notice was received and acknowledged by the accused. Nor is it stated that within fifteen days of receipt of the said notice or information, the accused wilfully refused to make payment. Thus, in such circumstances, it is clear that in the absence of necessary averments in the complaint and in the absence of production of necessary documents which are vital, the complaint ought not to have been taken cognisance of by the Judicial Magistrate as no prima facie is thus disclosed to hold that section 138 is attracted. For the reason that the complaint so filed is not in accordance with section 138 of the Act and it does not specify the compliance of conditions that are necessary to attract the provisions or disclose the satisfaction of the requirements of section 138 read with section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.Therefore, as it is, the complaint does not disclose any averment or material to make it appear or prima facie conclude that an offence as specified under section 138 of the Act has been committed, or must be deemed to have been committed. In the absence of necessary averments and the non-production of acknowledgment or receipt of notice, it can never be stated that there has been a failure to make payment of the amount, within fifteen days of receipt of notice, in which case alone, section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will be attracted. Moreover, for the purpose of computing limitation under section 142(b) of the Act, the date of receipt of notice by the accused has to be set out so that the Magistrate can, if it is within the period provided, take cognisance of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the very order of the Magistrate in taking the complaint on file, rather in taking cognisance of the offence, cannot be sustained. Hence, when the very complaint is not at all maintainable, on the face of it, the accused is entitled to be discharged. In the result, the revision is allowed, setting aside the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate No. III, Srivilliputhur, on September 2, 1997, in C.C. No. 209 of 1996. The accused shall stand discharged of the offences. Consequently, Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 6584 of 1997 shall stand closed.