V. Dutta Gyani, C. J. (Acting)-- This appeal under section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 arises out of judgment and award dated 19.9.96 passed by Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kamrup, Guwahati in MAC Case No.319 (K)/93. 2. It was on 1.1.93, that Umacharan aged about 42, was returning home as usual from CPWD office. Little knowing that he would be knocked down by a car ultimately putting an end to his life. He sustained severe head injuries and despite immediate and efficient medicare, as available in the city, he succumbed to the injuries on 4.5.93 after prolonged treatment and hospitalisation, leaving behind his wife and three school going children. The appellant filed their claim, which was registed by the respondents owner, insurer on the ususal mechanical stereo typed objections with slander or no supporting facts. A plea of contributory negligence was also raised but without any attempt substantiating the same, so much so, the driver of the offending vehicle who was a party, was not examined as a witness, as indeed no evidence was adduced as such by the respondents. 3. The learned Member, on the basis of the pleading, framed the following issues: (1) Whether the claim petition is maintainable ? (2) Whether the deceased died due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle ? (3) To what relief the claimants are entitled ? 4. As rightly noted by the learned Member, the evidence adduced by the appellants has remained unchallenged and the respondents even did not choose to be present either in person or through counsel to support the plea of contributory negligence. It does not rest with the trial Court, the insurer having filed a Caveat, not choose to appear when this appeal was taken up for hearing in fact conclusion of arguments by the appellants counsel, the appeal was marked CAV, thereafter learned counsel for the respondent insurer appeared with a request to hear him which we granted despite the appeal marked CAV. When the appeal was taken up again for hearing, counsel for the insurer was not to be there. We has no option but to fix it for judgment. When the appeal was taken up again for hearing, counsel for the insurer was not to be there. We has no option but to fix it for judgment. In the later part of the day learned counsel appeared craving for hearing, we had to, tell him mat it was with a view to accommodate him that indulgence was shown which failed to avail, still however if he so desired should-submit his arguments in writing. This is the way how a nationalised institution seeks to serve the lofty object of Nationalisation of General Insurance Act and comfort those in grief. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Tribunal's judgment is worthnoting in this regard. 5. The only point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, as indeed the only point that arises for consideration is whether the Tribunal was justified in allowing deduction of the salary which the dependent wife (appellant No.l) would receive on account of employment given to her on compassionate grounds? Although it is purely a question of law, and may be allowed to be raised the fact remains that the defendent respondents had not raised any such specific plea, it was the learned Member who on his own, while dealing with issue to what reliefs the claimants were entitled to, the learned Member on an admission made by the appellant No. 1 in her statement, before the Tribunal that she had been temporarily appointed on compassionate grounds by the department where her husband was working, she was being paid Rs.2,350/- PM, what the learned Member did having calculated the annual dependency and applying the multiplier of 15, worked out the compensation at Rs.3,95,640/- making a further deduction 20%, on account of imponderables reduced the same to Rs.3,16,512/- so far so good, what follows thereafter is that the amount as calculated above, has been neutralized by the subsequent income of the wife who was temporarily appointed on compassionate grounds on a monthly salary of Rs.2,350/-. What is surprising is that all the line of reasoning has been evolved in the name of equity. While learned counsel for the insurer in his written submission has supported fully the above reasoning counsel for the appellant contended that it was wholly impermissible under the law to make any such deduction, as there was no relation between the accidental death of the husband and employment of his dependent wife. 6. While learned counsel for the insurer in his written submission has supported fully the above reasoning counsel for the appellant contended that it was wholly impermissible under the law to make any such deduction, as there was no relation between the accidental death of the husband and employment of his dependent wife. 6. Let us examine the question in the light of some leading judgments on the point vis-a-vis the object and social philosophy behind the provisions of law, governing motor accident claims and compensation. Being a beneficient provision to provide timely help and succour to those injured in motor accidents or suffered bereavement on account of such accident, what should be the approach of the Court ? and even if one as the Tribunal appears to have gone by, it will to be shown as to what is the nexus between the compassionate appointment and fatal accident ? 7. A five judges Bench of this Court in Saminder Kaur & another vs. Union of India & another, 1987 ACJ 7» had occasion to consider the question, whether the defendants as legal representatives of the deceased who met with accidental death, receiving post-retiral benefits, such as, pension, gratuity, provident fund, life insurance policy amount, family pension whether such benefits were liable to be deducted from the amount of compensation ? One of the questions posed before the Bench as Question No.2 was : "If and when any amount due under a policy of insurance taken by the deceased can be deducted in such a case?” 8. The Full Bench answering the question held that the wrongdoer, cannot be permitted to take any advantages of these payments. The following passage from the judgment is worth-noting: "When a Govt. servant retires, he becomes entitled to provident fund, pension and gratuity benefits. Provident fund or pension, or gratuity are the deferred payments of satisfactory service, saving and contributions of the deceased employee. These amounts his family would have in any case been entitled to get whether the employee died a natural death or died in an accident. Therefore, they ought not to be taken into consideration for determining the amount of just compensation, as they cannot be termed as pecuniary benefits. As regards family pension, the widow of a Government employee would be entitled to under the service conditions. Therefore, they ought not to be taken into consideration for determining the amount of just compensation, as they cannot be termed as pecuniary benefits. As regards family pension, the widow of a Government employee would be entitled to under the service conditions. 'We do not think that it is benefit received by the widow and the wrongdoer should be allowed to take advantage of the family pension and gain by it." 9. The above judgment covers the whole gamut of case law on the point, A Division Bench of Madras High Court in AP Dorairaj vs. State of Madras, 1947 ACJ174, dealing with similar question and referring to English judgments held as follows: "We hold that in the present case, the amounts paid by the claimant's employer gratuitously should not be taken into account in assessing the damages. It is admitted that a sum of Rs.7,000 has been so paid gratitiously by the company Heatl and Gresham Ltd. That amount cannot be deducted from compensation payable towards loss of salary. Therefore, we hold that the claimant is entitled to a sum of Rs.7,000 towards loss of salary." 10. More recently, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Geethakumari & others vs. Rubber Board & others, 1994 ACJ 796, considering the earlier judgments of various High Courts and the Supreme Court held as follows : 'Therefore, it can be said that the right to get employment in the dying in harness scheme is a separate and distinct right which is available in the case of death of the employee due to natural reasons also. This is an additional ground to hold that the compensation payable in a motor accident cannot be reduced on account of the giving of employment to any one of the legal representative of the deceased. Accordingly, we hold that no portion of the pension, insurance money, gratuity provident fund or any gratuituous payment received by the Idgal representatives of a deceased employee can be deducted from the amount of compensation payable to them under the Motor Vehicles Act. So also the salary or any part thereof which may be payable to the. widow for the employment given to her on compassionate grounds on account of her husband's death cannot be deducted from the compensation payable to her under the Motor Vehicles Act. So also the salary or any part thereof which may be payable to the. widow for the employment given to her on compassionate grounds on account of her husband's death cannot be deducted from the compensation payable to her under the Motor Vehicles Act. No part of the income that the widow or other legal representatives may be getting from any business or profession, whether it is a continuation of the business of the deceased or a new business started by them, can be deducted from such compensation." 11. As already noted above, the learned Member of the Tribunal having taken into consideration the fact that the deceased was earning Rs.3,297/- per month and deducting 1/3rd for his personal expenses determined the dependency to Rs.2,198/-. The Tribunal also took into account the monthly salary of Rs.2,350/-of claimant No. 1 and observed that in view of this salary of Rs.2,350/- and the dependency being only Rs.2,198/-, the claimant cannot claim anything on this count, and virtually neutralised the calim in view of the monthly salary earned by the appellant on account of her appointment on compassionate ground, which as already discussed above, cannot be legally taken into account and adjusted towards the payment of compensation. The Tribunals reasoning has to be found in paragraph 13 and 14 of the impugned judgment. Paragraph 14 is noted below : "Now, there is no denial of the fact that the present income of the claimant No. 1 Srimati Charu Barman is directly related and contingent to the death of her husband, she would not have entitled to such payment or earning had the death of her husband been not caused by vehicular accident in question. So under the dictation of the law of equity a Court of reasons will have to take into account deduction for this benefit in order to deduce the just and proper compensation to the claimant. The annual income from salary of claimant No.l is 2,350 x 12 = Rs.28,200/-. This amount is higher by Rs.1824.00 that the multiplicand in this case which is annually Rs.26,376/-. Therefore, practically speaking the claimant will not be entitled to any amount other than the amount, due to loss of consortium, loss of amenities and loss of estate etc. together with expenses incurred during treatment of victim before his death." 12. This amount is higher by Rs.1824.00 that the multiplicand in this case which is annually Rs.26,376/-. Therefore, practically speaking the claimant will not be entitled to any amount other than the amount, due to loss of consortium, loss of amenities and loss of estate etc. together with expenses incurred during treatment of victim before his death." 12. Without disturbing the calculations made by the Tribunal and accepting the total sum as worked out Rs.3,95,640/- which is squared up to Rs.4,00,000/-out of which the Tribunal has awarded only Rs.2,00,000/- including the no-fault award at the rate of 12% per annum. The deduction of Rs .2,00,000/- (Two lakhs) on account of claimant-appellant's income as an appointee on compassionate grounds having been held to be illegal, the same is to be added to the total compensation payable to the claimant appellant. Accordingly, the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant appellant comes to Rs.4,00,000/-, recoverable jointly and severally from the respondents. The rate of interests @ 12% per annum as fixed by the Tribunal is maintained. The respondents are directed to pay/deposit the amount within two months from the date of this judgment, failing which interests @ 18% per annum on unpaid amount shall be chargeable. 13. There are three minor claimant appellants to safeguard their interests. It is further directed that the amount on payment, recovery or realisation shall be deposited in a nationalised Bank and the claimant-appellant No.l, the mother, natural guardian, shall be entitled to withdraw Rs.50,000/-, the remaining amount shall be deposited in Term Deposit Scheme of 60 months, interests earned thereon shall be paid to the appellant. It is open to approach this Court for any modification in the order, in case of any eventuality or urgent expenses required to be made. 14. The appeal is allowed in terms of the direction indicated above. Counsel fee Rs.2,500/-.