Judgment :- V. KANAGARAJ, J. For the The above appeal suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated November 9, 1983, made in O.S. No. 9313 of 1981 by the VIth Additional judge, City Civil Court, Madras, thereby decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff-Corporation directing the defendant-bank to pay Rs. 40, 000 with interest thereon at 20 per cent. per annum from August 7, 1981, till the date of decree and at 6 per cent. per annum from that date onwards till the date of realisation and with proportionate costs. The suit filed by the respondent herein in the court below is for a decree directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff a sum of Rs. 68, 000 together with interest on Rs. 40, 000 at 20 per cent. per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation and with costs. So far as the averments of the plaint are concerned, the plaintiff-Corporation entered into a contract dated August 29, 1977, with Indecor, Broadway, Madras, for supply of timber of certain specifications with the condition that the said company should furnish performance guarantee in the form of a bank guarantee of a nationalised bank and the defendant-bank offered the guarantee in No. 33 of 1977, dated August 29, 1977, and undertook to indemnify and keep indemnified the plaintiff-Corporation to the extent of Rs. 40, 000 against any loss, claim or damage, etc., caused to the plaintiff-Corporation by reason of any breach of contract by Indecor that the defendant-bank further agreed to pay to the plaintiff on demand and without any demur any sum becoming payable to the Corporation under the agreement, the plaintiff being the deciding factor whether any breach has in fact been committed or not and the said guarantee to remain in force till October 30, 1977, or till the expiry of the extended period and it shall continue to be in force till all the dues to the plaintiff-Corporation are duly and fully paid and till the claim satisfied or discharged. The guarantee period got extended from time to time and ultimately, till March 31, 1978, Indecor did not fulfil the obligations as per the contract and the plaintiff was constrained to invoke the bank guarantee as per its letter dated February 10, 1978, and on March 31, 1978.The further averments of the plaint are that, Indecor filed a suit in April, 1978, in the City Civil Court, Madras, against the plaintiff and the defendant, wherein, an order to maintain the status quo had also been passed and the said suit got stayed by the High Court; that on August 6, 1981, the plaintiff sent a telegram to the defendant-bank for extension of the validity of the bank guarantee, but taking shelter of the interim order to maintain status quo, the defendant-bank refused to comply with and since the plaintiff has already invoked the bank guarantee, the defendant-bank is liable to pay the amounts due under the guarantee without any demur; that since the defendant-bank has failed to pay the amount, it becomes liable to pay the interest also at 20 per cent. on the principal sum of Rs. 40, 000 from January 1, 1978, up to the date of the suit which is arrived at Rs. 28, 000 and, therefore, liable to pay Rs. 68, 000 with interest at 6 per cent. from the date of claim, till the date of realisation of the said amount. In the written statement, the defendant-bank has contended that only on account of the interim order passed by the City Civil Court, Madras, in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978, the bank could not extend the bank guarantee at the request of the defendant-Corporation and in view of the proceedings pending, the defendant cannot be called upon to pay the amount due under the guarantee. Further, the terms of the guarantee do not provide for payment of interest; that since the non-payment of the amount due under the guarantee was not due to this failure on the part of the bank, but on account of the order of the court; that the suit is also barred by limitation. Further, the terms of the guarantee do not provide for payment of interest; that since the non-payment of the amount due under the guarantee was not due to this failure on the part of the bank, but on account of the order of the court; that the suit is also barred by limitation. The lower court, based on the above pleadings by parties, framed five issues including one on the limitation point ordered for trial wherein no witness got examined on both sides, but only documentary evidence was made available by the plaintiff exhibiting 11 documents marked as exhibits A-1 to A-11 and on the side of the defendant, two documents have been marked as exhibits B-1 and B-2 and having regard to such evidence placed on record and appreciating the same in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case in its own way, the trial court has ultimately arrived at decreeing the suit as stated supra, questioning the validity of which the above appeal has come to be filed by the defendant on grounds, such as those brought forth in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, among which the following are vital :(i) that the suit based on a guarantee, the period of guarantee expired on March 31, 1978, and under the terms of guarantee, the amount becoming payable on demand, the suit filed on September 29, 1981, is clearly barred by limitation; (ii) that the claim dated February 10, 1978, itself is an admission on the part of the plaintiff, that the principal debtor had committed breach of contract even on February 10, 1978, and when the claim as against the principal debtor itself is barred and is not enforceable, the plaintiff cannot rely on the term that the guarantee shall continue to be enforceable till all dues are duly paid by the principal debtor. Such term cannot extend the period of limitation either under article 27 or article 57 of the Limitation Act or any other article of the Limitation Act; (iii) that the learned trial judge has erred in complying with the principles enunciated in Sundarambal Achi v. Appellate Authority and Sub-Collector 1983 96 LW 71 and Texmaco Ltd. v. State Bank of India, 1979 AIR(Cal) 44, to the facts of the case, and (iv) that the learned trial judge further erred in awarding interest at the rate of 20 per cent. per annum from August 7, 1981, which has no legal basis, especially when admittedly there is no contract to that effect and the amount payable by the defendant-bank shall in no event exceed the sum of Rs. 40, 000 as per the contract of guarantee. The learned judge has erred in assuming 20 per cent. as the prevailing rate of interest. If we have a glance at the documents filed on the part of the respondent/plaintiff, exhibit A-1, dated August 29, 1977, is the bank guarantee given by the appellant/defendant to the respondent/plaintiff; exhibit A-2, dated December 31, 1977, and exhibit A-3, dated January 30, 1978, are the letters written by the defendant-bank to the plaintiff, thereby extending the date of exhibit A-1 guarantee. Exhibit A-4, dated February 10, 1978, is the copy of the letter from the plaintiff to the defendant-bank thereby invoking the bank guarantee on account of default in performance by Indecor. Exhibit A-5, dated February 13, 1978, is the letter from the defendant-bank to the plaintiff-Corporation extending the bank guarantee till March 31, 1978. Exhibit A-6, dated March 31, 1978, is the copy of the letter from the plaintiff to the defendant to expedite remittance of the bank guarantee amount. Exhibit A-7, dated April 20, 1978, is the certified copy of the order made in I.A. No. 6940 of 1978 in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978; exhibit A-8, dated April 28, 1978, is the order made in Application No. 1924 of 1978 in C.S. No. 206 of 1978 on the file of the High Court, Madras; exhibits A-9 and A-10 both dated August 6, 1981, are the copies of the telegram issued by the plaintiff to the defendant calling upon the defendant to extend the validity of the bank guarantee. Exhibit A-11, dated August 7, 1981, is the letter from the defendant-bank to the plaintiff expressing its inability to extend the tenure. Exhibit A-11, dated August 7, 1981, is the letter from the defendant-bank to the plaintiff expressing its inability to extend the tenure. So far as the two documents marked on the part of the defendant are concerned, exhibit B-1, dated April 7, 1983, is the letter from counsel for the plaintiff in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 and exhibit B-2, dated April, 1978 is the copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978.So far as exhibit A-1 bank guarantee is concerned, it is dated August 29, 1977, given by the defendant-bank in its guarantee No. 33 of 1977 in lieu of such deposit required from Indecor for the due fulfilment by them of the terms and conditions of the agreement dated August 29, 1977, entered into between the plaintiff and Indecor during the period commencing from August 29, 1977, to October 30, 1977, or extended period, if any, thereby the defendant-bank undertaking to indemnify the plaintiff-Corporation to the extent of Rs. 40, 000 against any loss, claim suit proceedings or damages, costs, charges and expenses caused or suffered by the plaintiff by reason of any breach by Indecor of any terms or condition of the agreement and thereby authorising the plaintiff-Corporation to recover the same from the defendant and the said guarantee shall remain in force and effective up to and inclusive of October 30, 1977, or till the expiry of the extended period, if any, and that it shall continue to be enforceable till all the dues of the Corporation under or by virtue of the said agreement have been fully paid and its claim satisfied or discharged or till the branch manager of the Corporation certifies that the terms and conditions of the said agreement have been fully and satisfactorily carried out by Indecor and accordingly discharges the guarantee subject, that the Corporation shall have no rights under this guarantee after the expiry of six months from the date of termination of the contract. So far as exhibit A-2, is concerned, the validity period had been extended up to January 31, 1978, and under exhibit A-3, it has been further extended up to February 28, 1978. Exhibit A-4 letter from the plaintiff is to the effect of calling upon the defendant-bank to pay the full amount of Rs. 40, 000 with interest at the rate of 20 per cent. Exhibit A-4 letter from the plaintiff is to the effect of calling upon the defendant-bank to pay the full amount of Rs. 40, 000 with interest at the rate of 20 per cent. per annum on account of breach of the terms and conditions of the contract as set out in the agreement dated August 12/23, 1977, by Indecor of Broadway, Madras. Exhibit A-5 is the letter further extending the term of bank guarantee till March 31, 1978. Exhibit A-6 letter has been written by the plaintiff calling upon the defendant to expedite action as warranted under exhibit A-4, notice. Exhibit A-7 is the order to maintain status quo. Exhibit A-8 is the "stay order" granted by the High Court, thereby staying all further proceedings in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978. Exhibit A-9 is the telegram issued by the plaintiff calling upon the defendant to extend the validity of the bank guarantee. Exhibit A-10 is the telegram issued by the defendant to the plaintiff, reminding of the order of the court to maintain status quo as a sort of reply to exhibit A-9 and exhibit A-11 is the letter from the defendant-bank to the plaintiff stating that extension of the bank guarantee could be done only at the request of Indecor, thus refusing to comply with the request of the plaintiff for the extension of guarantee, further reminding of the status quo order passed by the City Civil Court, Madras, in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978.Exhibit B-1 is the letter by the lawyer of Indecor calling for both the plaintiff and the defendant to appear before the court on April 13, 1978, and exhibit B-2 is the served copy of the plaint in the suit filed by Indecor against the plaintiff and the defendant in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 whereby praying for a decree against both the plaintiff and the defendant herein for an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the bank guarantee dated August 29, 1977, or doing any further act pursuant to the plaintiff's letter. During arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-bank would contend that the bank guarantee was given on August 29, 1977, and regarding the merits of the case, there is no dispute; that exhibit A-1 bank guarantee is dated September 29, 1977; that exhibit A-4 is the notice issued by the respondent to the appellant on February 10, 1978, thereby contending that Indecor have committed breach of the terms and conditions of the contract and that they invoke the guarantee No. 33 of 1977 dated August 29, 1977, executed by the bank in their favour, further calling upon the appellant to pay the full amount of Rs. 40, 000 within three days. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend, at this juncture that with the sending of the notice in exhibit A-4, the contract is closed; that under exhibit A-5 letter dated February 13, 1978, wherein the appellant-bank had intimated to the respondent that as per the request of their customer, Indecor, they are extending the validity period of the guarantee up to March 31, 1978; that under exhibit A-6 letter dated March 31, 1978, sent by the respondent to the appellant-bank, the attention of the bank has been drawn to exhibit A-4 and required the bank to expedite the remittance of the amount as per exhibit A-4; that with another term of six months, there had been a curtailment of the contract and would cite a judgment reported in Kerala Electrical and Allied Engineering Company v. Canara Bank, 1980 AIR(Ker) 151, wherein it is held that: "Contract Act 1872 section 28. - Agreement in restraint of legal proceeding-Condition in a bank guarantee that a suit or action to enforce claims under guarantee is to be filed within six months from date of expiry of guarantee - Not hit by section 28." Further contending that the respondent should have further asked the appellant to delete the portion and he would cite another judgment reported in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. M. N. Kaul, wherein it is held that : "Liability of guarantor-Guarantor cannot be made liable beyond terms of his engagement-Enforceability of the guarantee also depends upon its terms." Yet another judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak and Co., wherein it is held that: "Contract Act (9 of 1872) section 28. - Contract of insurance - Clause in policy providing shorter period than prescribed by law for filing of claim from occurrence - Contract covering losses due to not and strike - Insured informing insurer about strike - He, however, filing suit for damages after expiry of stipulated period - Clause does not curtail limitation - Not hit by section 28 - Suit is time-barred." The next judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in New India Assurance Co. v. R. M. Khandelwal, 1974 AIR(Bom) 228. In this case, while dealing with a matter concerned with the Insurance Act and the provisions therein, it is held that: "Implied incorporation of policy conditions - Machine risk insurance policy - Condition of forfeiture in case of fraudulent claim or failure to bring action within stipulated time on repudiation - No reference made to such condition on receipt of first premium nor brought to the notice of insured before acceptance - Condition forms normal term of class of policies in question and is binding on insured - Condition does not violate section 28 of the Contract Act." The next judgment cited is Prithvi Nath v. Union of India, AIR 1962 J & K 15. In this case, it has been held that : "What section 28 forbids is not extinguishment of the rights or liabilities of a party to a contract on the happening of a specified event but the limiting of the time within which a party may enforce his rights. A party will have no right to enforce, if the rights have already been extinguished under the contract. In such a case there can be no question of the time for the enforcement of the rights being limited." The next judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in New India Assurance Co. A party will have no right to enforce, if the rights have already been extinguished under the contract. In such a case there can be no question of the time for the enforcement of the rights being limited." The next judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India 1988 2 LW 130, wherein regarding the point of limitation, it has been held, - "Suit for enforcing a fidelity guarantee by an insurance company for due performance of a contract between the Food Corporation of India and a dealer - Period of six months for filing suits, fixed under the contract of fidelity - Suits filed after the six months period, held, is barred by limitation and not maintainable against the insurance company - Restriction of period of limitation by agreement - Validity." Yet another judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in Pearl Insurance Company v. Atma Ram. In this case, a clause in an insurance policy ran as follows : "'In no case whatever shall the company be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of twelve months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration.' It was contended that the clause was rendered void by section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, held, - that as the clause did not limit the time within which the insured could enforce his right and only limited the time during which the contract will remain alive it was not hit by the provisions of section 28 of the Contract Act." The last judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant is one reported in Kasim Ali v. New India Assurance Co., AIR 1968 J & K 39, wherein it is held that : "Insurance contract - Under terms of policy suit to be filed within three months after rejection of claim - plaintiff's claim rejected by Company's letter dated February 25, 1961, and basic stand taken by company repeated in number of letters thereafter - Suit instituted on February 1, 1962, about a year after rejection of claim, held time-barred - Plaintiff had no justification to wait till February 1, 1962 - By that time his right had completely extinguished - Condition in insurance policy limiting period to file suit is not against section 28 or section 23." Learned counsel would then argue that the bank guarantee was dated August 29, 1977, after exhibit A-5, the same got extended up to March 31, 1978. Exhibit A-4 is the final document dated February 10, 1978; that the six months period is over on September 31, 1978, and the respondent would say that the limitation is three years from the expiry of the term of six months from the time of exhibit A-5 and the lower court would say that there is no limitation at all; that article 27 is only applicable in this case, in matters like the one in hand wherein the compensation for breach of contract is concerned, the contingency is the revocation of the bank guarantee, since the revocation has taken place on February 10, 1978, itself, a suit filed on September 29, 1981, is hopelessly time-barred and hence, it cannot be revived. In reply, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation would contend that under exhibit A-1 bank guarantee dated August 28, 1977, it had been thereby unconditionally agreed to indemnify thus, accepting the guarantee of demand in addition to that, the time-limit got extended up to March 31, 1978, at the instance of the appellant under exhibit A-5 thereby meaning that it shall continue to be enforceable. Under exhibit A-2, the extension was up to February 28, 1978. Subsequently, under exhibit A-5, time was sought for payment till March 31, 1978, by the appellant and under such circumstances, the bank was left with no option, but to pay the money within March 31, 1978, but once again, the bank did not pay the money and in the meantime, filing a suit in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 and filing an application for interim order for maintenance of status quo, the same had been passed by the City Civil Court, Madras, on April 20, 1978. This suit had been instituted by Indecor Limited against both the appellant and respondent and had obtained the order of status quo regarding the bank guarantee; that from exhibit A-8, dated April 28, 1978, it comes to be known that a suit in the High Court has been filed by the respondent against Indecor along with an application to pass an order of interim stay of all further proceedings in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 and stay order had been granted until further orders. In exhibit A-9, the respondent issued a telegram dated August 6, 1981, thereby calling upon the appellant to extend the validity of the bank guarantee and keep it alive pending disposal of the suit and for a period of six months thereafter. Under exhibit A-11, dated August 7, 1981, the appellants express their inability to extend the bank guarantee citing the order passed by the City Civil Court, to maintain status quo in the other suit filed by Indecor.It is section 55 of the Limitation Act that is applicable to this case wherein the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted continues to be there. Even subsequently they did not pay stating that there was some dispute on terms of the guarantee. Even subsequently they did not pay stating that there was some dispute on terms of the guarantee. Learned counsel would ultimately contend that even before obtaining the order of status quo, the breach of the bank continued under section 55 of the Limitation Act; that the breach occurs for the first time or continually or continues, does not come to an end, they are liable to pay; that the lower court has also dealt with the limitation question in issue No. 2 as per para. 9 of its judgment; that even in August, 1981, and September, 1981, the bank guarantee is enforceable according to the terms of the bank guarantee in exhibit A-1, dated August 29, 1977, and would cite a judgment in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. M. N. Kaul, wherein it is held: "Whether a guarantee is enforceable or not depends upon the terms under which the guarantor bound himself. To this there are some exceptions. In case of ambiguity when all other rules of construction fail the courts interpret the guarantee contra proferentem that is, against the guarantor or use the recitals to control the meaning of the operative part where that is possible. But whatever the mode employed, the cardinal rule is that the guarantor must not be made liable beyond the terms of his engagement." That Indecor went to the City Civil Court, Madras, and obtained an order of status quo in April, 1978; Learned counsel would cite yet another judgment in Raj Kumar v. Tarapada, wherein relating to an arbitration proceeding, the principle laid down is : "In respect of an award filed in the court pursuant to the order of the court by the arbitrators within four months of execution, i.e., within time prescribed for presenting for registration, during the period from July 26, 1978, to December 20, 1982, there was a subsisting injunction preventing the arbitrators from taking any steps in relation to the award. The arbitrators had asked for the return of the award for registering it, but the injunction was in operation. After the injunction was vacated the arbitrators renewed their prayer before the court to return the award so that they might get it registered. But, the court declined to return the award and the same remained in the custody of the court till the date when it was returned. After the injunction was vacated the arbitrators renewed their prayer before the court to return the award so that they might get it registered. But, the court declined to return the award and the same remained in the custody of the court till the date when it was returned. The arbitrators presented the same for registration on the very next day of the return.Held, as the arbitrators could not take back the award from the custody of the court to take any further steps for its registration the entire period during which award remained in custody of court should be excluded and it could not be said that they failed to get the award registered as the law required, i.e., within period of four months. The two legal maxims the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and an act of the court shall prejudice no man would apply with full vigour in the facts of the case and that being the position the award would be taken to be presented before the sub-registrar, on November 25, 1983, the very next day of getting possession of the award from the court. Tarapada Dey v. District Registrar, 1987 AIR(Cal) 107, reversed." So far as the appellant-bank, confining to the above appeal is concerned, they have no other grievance than that of the limitation point and since the court below has not properly dealt with the question of limitation, especially under the subject clause of exhibit A-1 agreement. The entire argument of learned counsel appearing for the appellant would only be focussed on the question of limitation, stating thereby that the filing of the suit in the trial court on September 29, 1981, is hopelessly time-barred. The entire argument of learned counsel appearing for the appellant would only be focussed on the question of limitation, stating thereby that the filing of the suit in the trial court on September 29, 1981, is hopelessly time-barred. The contentions of learned counsel appearing for the appellant are that under exhibit A-4 letter addressed by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellant/defendant, the contract is closed; that in spite of extension of the guarantee up to March 31, 19781 there had been a curtailment of the period of the contract with February 10, 1978, and, therefore, the suit to enforce claims and guarantee is to be filed within six months from the date of the expiry of the guarantee or that the respondent should have asked the appellant-bank to delete the portion, but the respondent/plaintiff has not done the same and, therefore, the suit is not hit by section 28 of the Contract Act and that the guarantor cannot be made liable beyond the terms of his engagement thereby meaning that from February 10, 1978, within six months the limitation would come to a close.The claim of the appellant that the suit has been time-barred is based on two reasons. One is factual and the other is legal. On facts, as per the terms of agreement in exhibit A-1, the appellant would cite the subjective clause of the agreement, which runs as follows : ".... however, that the Corporation shall have no rights under this guarantee after the expiry of six months from the date of termination of the contract." Further, resorting to section 28 of the Contract Act, learned counsel for the appellant would cite many judgments, as mentioned supra, to the effect that when there is a clause inserted into the contract itself, limiting the period of enforcement, section 28 of the Contract Act is not a bar and unless the respondent has not made use of the six months period, he is not entitled to file the suit thereafter, since the suit will become time-barred and, therefore, he would claim that the suit is barred by limitation. It is relevant to point out that other than this subjective clause, the contents of exhibit A-1 contract would give a free hand to the respondent/plaintiff to recover the amount from the appellant-bank on the default of Indecor, at any time it pleases and it is relevant to quote the construction of the agreement, regarding this case since according to the norms fixed by the apex court in State of Maharashtra v. Dr. M. N. Kaul, whether a guarantee is enforceable or not depends upon the terms under which the guarantor bound himself. In the instant case, how far the guarantor bound itself could be seen from the extracts of exhibit A-1 guarantee itself, which read as follows : "We agree to pay to the Corporation on demand and without any demur any sum which may become payable to the Corporation under the said agreement due to non-fulfilment of any or part of the aforesaid agreement by the said business associates and in respect of which we the bank have hereby given this guarantee for payment.We, the bank, agree that the Corporation shall be the sole judge to decide whether the said business associates have committed any breach or breaches of any/all of the terms and conditions of the said agreement and the extent of loss, damages, cost, charges and expenses suffered or incurred by the Corporation on account thereof and such decision shall be binding on us. We, the bank, further agree that the guarantee herein contained shall remain in full force and effective up to and inclusive of October 30, 1977, the date referred to above or till the expiry of the extended period, if any, and that it shall continue to be enforceable till all the dues of the Corporation under or by virtue of the said agreement have been fully paid and its claim satisfied or discharged or till the branch manager of the Corporation certifies that the terms and conditions of the said agreement have been fully and satisfactorily carried out by the said business associates ... We, the bank, undertake not to revoke this guarantee during its currency, except with the previous consent of the Corporation in writing." From the construction of exhibit A-1 document in the above terms and conditions of the agreement and the undertaking given by the bank, it is clear that the indemnity given by the bank to the Corporation for and on behalf of Indecor is unlimited and very liberal, so as to give all the loop-holes for the Corporation to make use of the language, with which the terms have been clothed. Hence, even regarding the limitation, it has been clearly spelt out that the guarantee shall remain in force and it shall continue to be enforceable till all the dues of the Corporation under or by virtue of the agreement have been fully paid and its claim satisfied or discharged or till the branch manager of the Corporation certifies that the terms and conditions of the agreement have been fully and satisfactorily carried out by the business associates. But, the claim of the appellant is the subjective clause under which the Corporation shall have no rights under this guarantee after the expiry of six months from the date of termination of the contract. Hence, it is relevant to decide whether the contract had been terminated and if so with what result. Under exhibit A-4 copy of letter from the plaintiff to the defendant, it has been mentioned that the guarantee has been "invoked" by the respondent-Corporation, on February 10, 1978, and the said act would be termed by the appellant that the contract has been closed. The term of the contract has been curtailed by the respondent-Corporation itself and on such terms, since for such a subjective clause, section 28 of the Contract Act being a hurdle, learned counsel for the appellant would focus all his attention to ward off the said hurdle created by section 28 of the Contract Act and in fact almost all the judgments cited on behalf of the appellant, by his counsel, are only to the effect of crossing the hurdles created by section 28 of the Contract Act.But, it is highly relevant to consider whether in fact there had been a termination of the contract as it is termed in the subjective clause. Neither the terms occupied in exhibit A-4, so far as the Corporation invoking the bank guarantee is concerned, nor on the other hand the appellant-bank terming that the contract has been closed or the period curtailed would convey the full meaning of termination of contract, as employed in the subjective clause of exhibit A-1 agreement. A meaningful interpretation of these terms would definitely show that the term "termination of contract" has got wider connotation than the other terms "invoking the bank guarantee" or "closing the contract" or "curtailing the contract" or the term of "span of contract", etc. It should be admitted that what is contemplated in the subjective clause of the contract, i.e., the termination of the contract has not at all taken place in the whole of the affair concerned with the contract, pertaining to the bank guarantee and hence the question of operation of section 28 of the Contract Act or consequently resorting to the judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellant to ward off the effect of section 28 of the Contract Act do not arise at all. It is further relevant to consider that the effect of exhibit A-4 in invoking the bank guarantee becomes eclipsed in the light of exhibit A-6, whereunder the appellant-bank has clearly extended the bank guarantee up to March 31, 1978. It is further relevant to consider that under exhibit A-7, Indecor has filed a suit O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 on the file of the court of the VIth Assistant judge, City Civil Court, Madras, against the respondent-Corporation to restrain him from invoking the bank guarantee and against the appellant-bank to restrain them from making the remittance and has obtained an order of status quo, which stood as an obstacle in the way of the respondent-Corporation in implementing its scheme under exhibit A-1 agreement. Further, under exhibit A-8 order in Application No. 1924 of 1978 in C.S. No. 206 of 1978 on the file of the High Court, Madras, it comes to be known that at the instance of the respondent-Corporation, all further proceedings in O.S. No. 3266 of 1978 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, filed by Indecor have been stayed. From exhibit A-11 letter written by the appellant-bank to the respondent-Corporation, we are given to understand that the appellant-bank would only contend that it cannot extend the period of the bank guarantee without the instructions of Indecor and the extension of the bank guarantee could, only be at the request of Indecor, thus expressing their inability to comply with the request of the Corporation, regarding the extension of the bank guarantee. Even at that stage, it is relevant to note that on August 7, 1981, the bank was not at all bothered to question the validity of the Corporation to seek for the extension of the bank guarantee, on ground of limitation, since even at that highly belated stage, as per the stand taken by the appellant-bank, the limitation question was not raised. Hence, it could be safely presumed that on August 7, 1981, only the question of extension of bank guarantee was denied by the appellant-bank and the continuation of the bank guarantee till date was not at all made the subject-matter, thereby admitting the continuation of the guarantee even on that day, thus ultimately meaning that there had been no termination of contract, so as to resort to the subjective clause, thereby limiting the Corporation to make its claim within six months and thereafter to say that such claim is not hit by section 28 of the Contract Act.Even according to the plaint, regarding the question of limitation, the bank guarantee in exhibit A-1 is enforceable till all the dues are paid. In the written statement filed by the appellant-bank, it would be contended that as the suit is based on the guarantee, pending enforcing the terms thereof, the same should have been filed on or before March 31, 1981, and since the suit has been filed in September, 1981, it is barred by limitation. But, no claim has been made on the subjective clause of exhibit A-1 at that stage. In short, it would be appropriate to say that regarding the limitation point, based on the subjective clause, there was no pleading at all by the appellant-bank before the trial court and the same has been agitated only during the arguments on appeal. But, no claim has been made on the subjective clause of exhibit A-1 at that stage. In short, it would be appropriate to say that regarding the limitation point, based on the subjective clause, there was no pleading at all by the appellant-bank before the trial court and the same has been agitated only during the arguments on appeal. Hence, it is safe to conclude that there has been no termination of the contract under exhibit A-1, nor could the respondent-Corporation be restrained from filing the suit after the expiry of six months from the so-called termination of the contract, which is a non-existent one, nor regarding the terms and undertaking by the appellant-bank, could it be said that any limitation has been imposed, since it is clearly worded that under the agreement, the bank guarantee shall continue to be enforceable till all the dues of the Corporation have been fully paid and its claim satisfied or discharged, which has not at all happened and since the appellant-bank has also given an undertaking not to revoke the guarantee during its currency, except with the previous consent of the Corporation in writing, which has also not been obtained by the bank from the Corporation. Therefore, on such clear terms, the suit filed by the respondent-Corporation, cannot under any stretch of imagination be termed to have been time-barred or barred by limitation much less under pretext of the subjective clause employed in exhibit A-1, which has relevance, only on termination of the contract, which has not at all taken place by either of the parties throughout. Hence, it is safe to conclude that the appellant has no case on point of limitation and the provision of law that becomes applicable at this juncture is article 55 of the Limitation Act and hence the appellant has miserably failed to establish that the suit filed by the respondent-Corporation before the lower court was in any manner barred by limitation to the satisfaction of the court and to the expectations of law and hence the point of limitation has to be decided only in favour of the respondent-Corporation and against the appellant-bank.Though the lower court has not discussed the question of limitation in length, in the context of the decided cases and the proposition of law it has arrived at the right conclusion in deciding that the suit filed by the respondent-Corporation was not barred by limitation and hence the interference by this court into the decision of the lower court, in decreeing the suit, is unnecessary, unwarranted and uncalled for. However, allowing interest at 20 per cent. on the guaranteed sum of Rs. 40, 000 from August 7, 1981, till the date of decree by the trial court is not based on reasons. Just for the simple reason that of late under exhibit A-4 notice, the plaintiff has claimed interest of 20 per cent., it does not mean that it should be awarded, especially attributing the reason that the other side has not come forward to rebut the same in time. Whether it is rebutted by the appellant/defendant or not, should not be the parameter for the court to arrive at the conclusion but the court should consider the points that whether such claim is based on any valid principles of law or other norms and how the plaintiff has established the same. Hence, allowing interest at 20 per cent. is nothing but arbitrary and unreasonable on the part of the lower court and, therefore, the same is hereby set aside. The order of the lower court regarding granting of interest at 20 per cent. per annum on Rs. 40, 000 is hereby modified and the same is limited to 12 per cent. per annum from August 7, 1981, till the date of passing of decree by the lower court, i.e., till November 9, 1983, and thereafter at 6 per cent. per annum till the date of realisation of the amount. per annum on Rs. 40, 000 is hereby modified and the same is limited to 12 per cent. per annum from August 7, 1981, till the date of passing of decree by the lower court, i.e., till November 9, 1983, and thereafter at 6 per cent. per annum till the date of realisation of the amount. In the result, subject to the above modification in the rate of interest (in para. No. 27 supra), the above appeal suit fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated November 9, 1983, made in O.S. No. 9313 of 1981 by the VIth Additional judge, City Civil Court, Madras, are hereby confirmed, subject to the above modification.However, in consideration of the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.