JUDGMENT R.L.Khurana, J.: This execution petition was preferred by one Shri Parkash Chand Sharma, for the enforcement of, the order dated 25.11.1981, passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 72 of 1974, Parkash Chand Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. The said Shri Parkash Chand died during the pendency of the present proceedings on 20.5.1996. On an application having been made under Section-146, read with Order 22 Rule 12, Code of Civil Procedure, being O.M.P. No. 297 of 1996, Smt. Sudershan Sharma, (widow), Shri Rajiv Sharma (son) and Smt. Madhu Mehta (daughter) of the deceased were brought on the record, as his legal representative, vide order dated 9.9.1996. For the sake of brevity the above named Parkash Chand Sharma and his legal representatives are being hereinafter referred to as the petitioner. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are these. The petitioner filed a writ petition, being Civil Writ Petition No. 72 of 1974, mter-alia. claiming for a direction to assign him the year of allotment in the Indian Administrative Service, keeping in view his officiating service rendered with effect from September 5, 1962. The said writ petition was decided on 25.11.1981. The operative part of the judgment reads : "The result is that I find that the petitioners name was borne on Ac select list continuously and that he was also officiating against or in the senior cadre posts of I.A S unto 13th February, 1971. The petitioner is, therefore, allowed and respondent No. 1 is directed to re-assign the year of allotment to the petitioner keeping in view the fact that the name of the petitioner was continuously bome on the Select List and he was continuously officiating against or in the senior cad re post of A.S. The petitioner will has his costs from respondent No.l. Lawyers fee Rs. 300/-". 3. The respondent No.l, Union of India, preferred an appeal (L.P.A. No. 2 of 1982) against the judgment dated 2^.11.1981. While admitting the appeal, the operation of the judgment dated 25.11.1981 was never stayed. Since, respondent No.l, failed to implement the direction contained in the judgment dated 25.11.1981. The petitioner moved an application before the/ Court IB L.P.A. No. 2 of 1982. Vide order dated 27.8.1982, respondent No.l/ Union of India, was directed to initiate steps for working out the year of allotment without in effect assigning it. Since, respondent No.l, failed to implement the direction contained in the judgment dated 25.11.1981. The petitioner moved an application before the/ Court IB L.P.A. No. 2 of 1982. Vide order dated 27.8.1982, respondent No.l/ Union of India, was directed to initiate steps for working out the year of allotment without in effect assigning it. No action was, however, taken by the respondent No.l Consequently on 3.3.1985, pre-emptory directions were issued to implement the order dated 27.8.1982, on or before 31.3.19,85. Respondent No. !, placed on record of the appeal, a letter of the Central Government to the effect that the petitioner was entitled to 1958 as the year of allotment. Accordingly, respondent No.2, State of Himachal Pradesh was ordered to work out the consequential benefits. Such consequential benefit up to the date of retirement of the petitioner notionally worked out at Rs. 61.393.50 paise. On 29.7.1985, the Court directed that the said sum of Rs. 61,393.50 paise along with pensionary benefits notionally revised and the difference of pensionary benefits be deposited in the Registry. Respondent No.2, accordingly deposited the following amounts with the Registry - (a) Rs. 61,393.50 Paise vide F.D.R. No. 104863 dated 8.2.1985, (b) Rs. 2921/-vide F.D.R. No.lC4876, dated 3.10.1985; arid (c) Rs. 1,62.50 Paise, vide FJD.R.No.104878 dated 3.10.1985. 4. The amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity (for short DCRG) was not paid b} respondent No.2 and it was withheld on the plea that the petitioner had n t repaid the amount of Rs. 30,000/-, which was taken by him as House Building Advance in 1973. The petitioner, therefore, moved an application before the Court in L.P.A. No. 2 of 1982 being CM.P. No. 37 of 1992. This application was ordered to be listed along with L.P.A. 5. The appeal, L.P.A. No.2 of 1982, preferred by respondent No.l was dismissed on 8.11.1994, as being not maintainable. However, while dismissing the apper1 no orders were passed in C.M.P. No. 37 of 1992, made by the petitioner, with regard to the wrong withholding of the amount of DCRG by be listed along w K. No.2 of 1982 respondent No.2. The amounts deposited by respondent No.2, as detailed above, were ordered to be paid to the petitioner. 6. However, while dismissing the apper1 no orders were passed in C.M.P. No. 37 of 1992, made by the petitioner, with regard to the wrong withholding of the amount of DCRG by be listed along w K. No.2 of 1982 respondent No.2. The amounts deposited by respondent No.2, as detailed above, were ordered to be paid to the petitioner. 6. After the dismissal of L.P.A. No. 2 of 1982, the present petition has come to be made on 21.6.1995, by the petitioner seeking the enforcement of the writ order, dated 25.11.1981, in the following terms: Respondents be directed: (a) to issue a notification assigning 1958 as the year of allotment in the I.A.S.; (b) to pay difference between the pensionary benefits and to which the petitioner is entitled after assigning of 1958 as the year of allotment from 29.7.1985 up to-date with interest at the rate of 18% per annum; (c) to issue the revised pension payment order to the petitioner keeping in view 1958 as year of allotment in IAS and fixation of his pay as a result thereof; and (d) to release the amount of DCRG to the petitioner along with interest at the rate of 18% from the date of retirement to the actual date of payment. 7. Respondent No. 1, Union of India, in its reply-affidavit submitted that the direction contained in the writ order dated 25.11.1981 with regard to as signing 195 8 as the year of allotment in I A. S. to the petitioner was complied with vide office order dated 9.11.1995. In this regard, a copy of the letter No. 25/24/74-AIS(I) dated 9.11.1995, from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Personnel and Training Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, has also been placed on record. 8. In this regard, a copy of the letter No. 25/24/74-AIS(I) dated 9.11.1995, from the Under Secretary to the Government of India, in the Department of Personnel and Training Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension addressed to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, has also been placed on record. 8. Respondent No.2, the State of Himachal Pradesh, vide its reply affidavit also submitted that the direction contained in the writ order dated 25.11.1981 stands complied with by respondent No.l and the petitioner has been assigned 1958 as the year of allotment in I.A.S., vide order dated 9.11.1995 and necessary correction stands made in the gradation list It was further submitted that the monetary benefits up to the date of retirement, difference of leave encashment and difference of pensionary benefits were deposited with the Court and the same stand paid to the petitioner. As regard non-payment of DCRG amounting to Rs. 36,000/-, it was submitted that the said amount was adjusted against the outstanding amount of House Building Advance drawn by the petitioner in 1973, since the petitioner failed to replay the said amount during his service. 9 In its supplementary reply-affidavit, it has been submitted by respondent No.2 that a further sum of Rs. 36,252/-, on account of arrears of revision of pension stands paid to Smt. Subarshan Sharma, petitioner, on 24.2.1997, by way of credit of the amount in her bank account. Similarly, another sum of Rs. 9,917/- as commuted pension also stands credited to the account of Smt. Sudarashan Sharma on 3.7.1997; 10. It was, therefore, submitted that writ order stands complied with and nothing remains to be done or complied with. 11. In the rejoinder, the petitioner has not denied that amounts paid to him as detailed by respondent No.2. It was also not disputed that the necessary direction with regard to assigning the year of allotment in I.A.S. stands complied with. The petitioner re-asserted his claim with regard to the amount of DCRG and interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum, an account of wrong withholding of the said amount. It was pleaded that the entire amount of House Building Advance received by the petitioner, in four installments, was repaid by him in lump sum before the drawal of pay for the month of March, 1974, while he was posted as Director of Welfare. 12. It was pleaded that the entire amount of House Building Advance received by the petitioner, in four installments, was repaid by him in lump sum before the drawal of pay for the month of March, 1974, while he was posted as Director of Welfare. 12. During the course of hearing, two contentions were raised by the learned Assistant Advocate General, namely:- (i) the execution petition is barred by time; and (ii) the writ order dated 25.11.1981 stands complied with. The learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand, has contended that no period of limitation has been prescribed for enforcement of a writ order and that the claim of the petitioner is in the nature of consequential benefits arising out of the implementation of the writ order and as such the petitioner is entitled to the amounts claimed by him. 13. As stated above, the writ order, which is sought to be enforced by the petitioner was passed on 25.11.1981. The present petition was made on 21.6.1995, that is, after about 13-1/2 years of the passing of the order sought to be enforced. 14. So far as the writs issued, orders passed or directions given, by the Apex Court are concerned the provisions contained in Articles 142 and 144, Constitution of India, are amply clear. These articles enact mat such writs, orders and directions run and are binding throughout the country. These confer powers on the Apex Court to pass such orders, decrees, or to issue such directions, as. may be necessary for doing complete justice, in the cause or matter. The orders, decrees or directions passed are enforceable throughout India and all authorities, civil and judicial, in India have to act in the aid of the Apex Court. 15. In so far as writ orders and directions passed by the High Court, in exercise of powers under Article 226, Constitution of India, are concerned, the rules framed by the concerned High Court provide for the execution of such writ orders and directions. Generally, such an order passed by the High Court, can be executed as if it were a decree passed by the Court, in exercise of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Code, that is, in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. Generally, such an order passed by the High Court, can be executed as if it were a decree passed by the Court, in exercise of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the Code, that is, in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 16. Under the relevant rules framed by this High Court, governing the ,issue of writs of Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Certiorari, under Article 226, Constitution of India, no period of limitation has been prescribed for the enforcement of a writ order passed in a particular case. Therefore, the provisions contained in and the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. will have to be resorted to. 17. Article 136. Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the period of limitation of twelve years for the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting mandatory injunction ) or order of any civil Court. 18. Before the enactment of the Limitation Act., 1963, limitation for purposes of execution was dealt with in Section 48 of the Code of civil Procedure and Articles 182 and 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 19. It may be useful at this stage to extract the two provisions of Articles 182 and 1S3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, in so far as they are relevant for the present case :- Description of application. For the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court, not provided for by Art. 183 or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 To enforce a judgment, decree ororder of any Court established by Royal Charter in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; or any order of the Supreme Court. Article 182 Description of application Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run For the execution of a decree or order of any civil court, not provided for by Art. 183 or by Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Three years; or where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered -Six years The date of the decree. Article 183 To enforce a judgement , decree or order of any court established by Royal Charter in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; or any order of the Supreme Court. Twelve years. Article 183 To enforce a judgement , decree or order of any court established by Royal Charter in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction; or any order of the Supreme Court. Twelve years. When a present right to enforce the judgment, decree or order accrues to some person capable of realising right. 20. The scope and ambit of Articles 182 and 183, Limitation Act, 1908, came up for consideration before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in K. Venkata Subbayya v. District Collector, Chittoor, AIR 1969 AP 3 81, in a civil revision arising out of the order passed in the execution proceedings, seeking to enforce the writ order passed by the High Courts . 21. The short facts of the said case are these. The writ filed by revision petitioner was-dismissed with costs by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on 4.9.1959. To execute the order awarding costs to the respondents, a civil miscellaneous application was made for transmission of the decree and the decree was transmitted to the Court of District Munsif, Kalahasti. The respondents then preferred an exection application before the said District Munsif on 28.10.1963. A contention was raised by the judgment - debtor (revision petitioner) that since the decree was passed on 4.9.1959, and the execution application was made on 28.10.1963, the same was barred by limitation under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The respondents, on the other hand, contended that the decree was passed by a Court established by Royal Charter and as such the period of limitation would be governed by Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908. The District Munsif held that the High Court of Judicature, Madras, was established by Royal Charter and the Andhra Pradesh High Court is the successor High Court to the former High Court and as such, Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908, would apply. The execution petition was, thus, held to be within time. On the matter having been carried before the High Court by way of a revision petition, it was held that High Court of Andhra Pradesh was established and constituted under section 28 of the Andhra State Act, 1953, with effect from 5.7.1954 and not under the Letters Patent Act of 1865. Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908, was held to be applicable. Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908, was held to be applicable. It was observed in para 14 of the report (A.I.R. 1969 A.P. 381), as under: "The writ jurisdiction which the High Court exercises on its original side is not by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by Clause 13 of the Letters Patent, but by reason of the jurisdiction conferred upon on vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution. The fact that his jurisdiction is construed as special or extraordinary jurisdiction is only to distinguish it from the ordinary original civil jurisdiction which the High Court possesses under the Letters Patent The clause decree or order of any Civil Court not provided for by Article 183 mentioned in Article 182 does not apply to a decree or order of the High Court so long as that decree is made by it in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution. Clauses 11 to 14 of the amended letters Patent given under the heading Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court comprise of both ordinary and extraordinary original jurisdiction. The extraordinary original jurisdiction referred to in Clause 13 is distinct and different from the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While Clause 13 of the Letters Patent empowers the High Court to sit as a Court of extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, where it withdraws suits to its file, Article 226 of the Constitution vests jurisdiction in the High Court indisputably on its original civil side. It is in respect of orders or decrees made with regard to suits removed and tried under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent that Art. 182 of the Limitation Act applies. All other decrees or orders made by the High Court will be governed by Article 183 of the Limitation Act" 22. It was further observed that special jurisdiction is a jurisdiction possessed by the High Court by virtue of Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, notwithstanding that the High Court exercises special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is all the same a jurisdiction on the original civil side. 23. It was further observed that special jurisdiction is a jurisdiction possessed by the High Court by virtue of Article 226 of the Constitution and, therefore, notwithstanding that the High Court exercises special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is all the same a jurisdiction on the original civil side. 23. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Saty-anarayanamurti v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras, AIR 1957 AP 123, while dealing with the question of nature of jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has held : "It is settled law that the High Court was issuing writs in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari in exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction as contrasted with the appellate jurisdiction. Article 226 of the Constitution conferred express power of the High Court to issue the writs mentioned therein throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court extends throughout the State of Andhra Pradesh, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court under the Article may be conveniently described as extraordinary original jurisdiction as distinguished from the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of a High Court." 24. In Hamid Hasan v. BanwarilalRoy, AIR 1947 PC 90, it was held by the Privy Council that the powers to issue writ in the nature of quo warranto is a civil proceeding and arises in exercise of ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. It was observed:- "Any original civil jurisdiction possessed by the High Court and not in express terms conferred by the Letters Patent or later enactments falls within the description of oridinary original civil jurisdiction". 25. The High Court of Calcutta in Budge Budge Municipality v. Mongru, AIR 1953 Cal 433, has held that the jurisdiction exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution is original as, distinguished from appellate or revisional jurisdiction and that although the jurisdiction is original, it is a special jurisdiction and should not be confused with the ordinary civil jurisdiction under the Letters Patent. 26. The scope of Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908, also came to be considered by the High Court of Calcutta in Manmatha Nalh v. Gopee Bailor, AIR 1951 Cal. 170. 26. The scope of Article 183, Limitation Act, 1908, also came to be considered by the High Court of Calcutta in Manmatha Nalh v. Gopee Bailor, AIR 1951 Cal. 170. That was a case where a suit was transferred from Alipore Court to the High Court, under clause 13 of the Letters Patent. The suit was tried by the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction by virtue of clause 20 of the Letters Patent. Since, clause 20 also governed the execution proceedings arising out of such transferred suit, it was held that the law of limitation applicable to execution proceedings of the Court in which such suit was originally instituted will also apply to" execution proceedings arising out of such transferred suit, and the fact that the suit was transferred to the High Court and disposed of in its extraordinary original jurisdiction did not attract Article 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 27. As stated above, before the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Limitation for the purposes of execution was being dealt with under section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Articles 182 and 183 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Article 183 governed the applications for the execution of decrees and orders of the Courts established by Royal Charter and of the Supreme Court. Article 182 was inapplicable to-such cases. A decree or order falling under Article 182 could be kept alive indefinitely. Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it then existed, and Article 182 covered the execution-of decrees and orders of all other civil Courts. Section 48 provided that "where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting injunction, has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the decree sought to be executed." Section 48, thus, provided a maximum period of twelve years before the expiry of which any fresh application for execution had to be made. A decree ceased to be enforceable after twelve years. Article 182, Limitation Act, 1908, governed the first and the successive execution applications which the decree-holder could make within such maximum period under the Code of Civil Procedure. A decree ceased to be enforceable after twelve years. Article 182, Limitation Act, 1908, governed the first and the successive execution applications which the decree-holder could make within such maximum period under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was provided by Article 182 that such applications should be made within a period of three years from the various points of time specified in the Article. 28. The question of revision of Limitation Act, 1908, was taken up by the Law Commission of India, in its third Report submitted on 21.7.1956. While dealing with the question of revision of Articles 182 and 183. Limitation Act, 1908 it was, inter-alia, recommended that:- (a) Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be deleted and its provision should be incorporated in the Limitation Act; (b) Article 183 should be deleted and the decree of the High Court should be placed on the same footing as decrees of other Courts; and (c) there was no justification for making a distinction between decrees or orders passed by the High Court, in exercise of their original civil jurisdiction or orders of the Supreme Court and other decrees. 29. The Law Commission in para 170 of its report has made the following of servations : "Article ! 82 has been a very fruitful source of litigation and is a weapon in the hands of both the dishonest decree-holder and the dishonest judgment -debtor It has given rise to innumerable decisions. The commentary in Rustomjis Limitation Act (5th Edn.) on this article itself covers nearly 200 pages In our opinion the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court should be 12 years from the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree) or where the decree of subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made a: a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree. There is, therefore, no need for a provision compelling the decree-).older to keep the decree, alive by making an application every three years. There is, therefore, no need for a provision compelling the decree-).older to keep the decree, alive by making an application every three years. There exists a provision already in section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code that a decree ceases to be enforceable after a period of 12 years. In England also the time fixed for enforcing a judgment in 12 years. Either the decree-holder succeeds in realising his decree within this period or he fails and there should be no provision enabling the execution of a decree after that period. To this provision an exception will have to be made to the effect that the Court may order the execution of a decree upon an application presented after the expiration of the period of 12 years, where the judgment debtor has, by fraud or force, prevented the execution of the decree at some time within the twelve years immediately preceding the date of the application. Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code may be deleted and its provisions may be incorporated in this Act. Article 183 should be deleted and the decrees of the High Court must be placed on the same footing as decrees of other Courts. There is no justification for making a distinction between decrees or orders passed by the High Court in the exercise of their original civil jurisdiction or orders of the Supreme Court and other decrees. As a consequence of the foregoing changes, sections 19 and 20 will require to be altered in the manner indicated in paragraph 52 above. We do not, however, consider it necessary to make any change in the application of Sections 14 and 15, to execution applications. The period of 12 years will, of course, not apply to decrees granting a perpetual injunction. This has been provided for in Section 48 C.P.C. This exemption should apply only in the case of perpetual injunctions. In the case of mandatory injunctions, we recommend that a period of limitation of 3 years should be provided. 30. The Limitation Act, 1963, came to be enacted taking into consideration recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its "Third eport of Limitation Act, 1908. In the case of mandatory injunctions, we recommend that a period of limitation of 3 years should be provided. 30. The Limitation Act, 1963, came to be enacted taking into consideration recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its "Third eport of Limitation Act, 1908. The Statement of Objects and Reasons attached to the Limitation reads:- "Existing Article 183 has been a fruitful source of litigation and therefore, the proposed Article 135 (now Article 136) in lieu thereof provides that the maximum period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court It shall be twelve years am the date when the decree or order became enforceable (which is usually the date of the decree or order), or, where the decree or subsequent order direct any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, from the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree or orders. There is no reason why a decree should be kept alive for more than twelve years. In England also the time fixed for enforcing a judgment is twelve years. Where, however, the judgment-debtor has by fraud or force prevented the execution of a decree without the prescribed period, suitable provisions of extending the period are being made in clause 16 of the Bill of the lines of Section 48(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Existing Article 183, which makes special provision for decrees and order established by Royal Charter, is no longer necessary. it is also provided that the period of 12 years will not apply to decrees granting perpetual injunctions." 31. Existing Article 183, which makes special provision for decrees and order established by Royal Charter, is no longer necessary. it is also provided that the period of 12 years will not apply to decrees granting perpetual injunctions." 31. The note worthy changes effected by the Limitation Act, 1963, with re Lard to the execution of decrees or orders of the Court, are :- (i) The Limitation Act, 1963, does not contain a provision corresponding to Article 182 of the Limitation Act, 1908; (ii) The present Limitation Act, 1963, repeals section 48, Code of Civil Procedure and replaces the former Articles 182 and 183 by the present Article 136; (iii)The present Article 136 substantially reproduces the provisions of former section 48(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure by providing only one period of limitation for an application for execution of nil decrees and orders instead of having separate periods of limitation for the different execution applications a decree-holder could make under the Code of Civil Procedure, within that period. 32. Thus, after the re-enactment of the Limitation Act, under the Limitation Act, 1963, Article 136 shall be applicable to the execution of all decree and orders of the Court, capable of being executed, including the decree or orders passed or directions issued by the High Court, in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 33. The present application for the execution/enforcement of the writ order dated 25.11.1981 having been made after the expiry of requisite period of 12 years, as prescribed under Article 136, Limitation Act, 1963, is, therefore, barred by time. 34. The next question arising for determination is whether the writ order dated 25.11.1981 stands complied with ? 35. The only direction given in the writ order dated 25.11.1981 was to the effect that the petitioner was to be re-assigned the year of allotment in the Indian Administrative Service keeping in view the fact that his name was continuously borne on the Select List and he was continuously officiating against or in the senior cadre post of such service. 36. In compliance of such direction, respondent No.l, Union of India, upon re- consideration assigned 1958 as the year of allotment to the petitioner in the Indian Administrative Service and the necessary corrections were carried out in the gradation list by giving proper placement in such list to the petitioner. 36. In compliance of such direction, respondent No.l, Union of India, upon re- consideration assigned 1958 as the year of allotment to the petitioner in the Indian Administrative Service and the necessary corrections were carried out in the gradation list by giving proper placement in such list to the petitioner. The requisite office order in this regard also stands issued. 37. By virtue of the present execution petition, the petitioner also seeks to recover the amounts of :- (i) difference between the pensionary benefits consequent upon assigning of 1958 as the year of allotment to him from 29.7.1985, along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum; (ii) the amount of DCRG along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of retirement till the date of payment; and (iii)for direction to the respondents to issue revised pension payment order in view of 1958 being the year of allotment, assigned to the petitioner. 38. It is significant to note that in the writ order dated 25.11.1981, no further direction was given by the Court that as a consequence of re- assignment of the year of allotment, the petitioner shall be paid the consequential benefits like difference in pay and/or the pensionary benefits. 39. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mangilal Sharma, JT 1997 (10) SC 345, the respondent was posted as Grade -I Clerk at Gandhi Nagar in the Irrigation Department. He was transferred to Jabalpur. He handed over his charge at Gandhi Nagar. He represented to the authorities that due to acute illness of his father, he might be transferred to Mandsore, a place near his home town, to enable him to look after his father. His request was not acceded to, which led him to submit his resignation. He was not informed if his resignation was accepted. Though there had been some correspondence in late sixties but there was no clear reply from the State Government, if the resignation submitted had been accepted. All this period, the respondent did not join duty and remained present at his hometown. He sometime in the year 1979 filed a suit for declaration against the State Government that he continued to be in service. Such suit was decreed on 1.10.1982 by Civil Judge, II Class, Nee-much. All this period, the respondent did not join duty and remained present at his hometown. He sometime in the year 1979 filed a suit for declaration against the State Government that he continued to be in service. Such suit was decreed on 1.10.1982 by Civil Judge, II Class, Nee-much. The decree passed in favour of the respondent was to the following effect :- "It is ordered and declared that -(a) plaintiffs suit is decreed with costs and this is declared that the plaintiff is still in continuance service of defendant and his services are not terminated. Defendant will also bear the costs of the suit along with its own costs and that the sum of Rs. 63.50 P. be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff on account of costs of this suit with interest thereon at the rate of (illegible) per cent per annum from this date to the date of realisation." 40. The first appeal preferred by the State Government before the District Judge and the second appeal before the High Court were dismissed. The respondent-plaintiff then preferred execution application in the Court in Civil respondent-plaintiff then preferred execution application in the Court of Civil Judge, Neemuch, claiming all the consequential benefits, salary, dearness allowance, promotion etc. of the service and also costs of the application. Such execution was opposed by the State Government on the grounds that no decree for reinstatement of the respondent-plaintiff on the post was passed. Nor any decree for payment of any salary to him was passed. In the suit, no prayer for reinstatement in service and for arrears of salary was also made. The objections preferred by the State Government were dismissed by the executing Court. A revision preferred before Additional District Judge, Neemuch, was also dismissed on 11.1.1988. The State Government then preferred a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed on 29.4.1988. This matter thus reached the Apex Court by way of an appeal by the State Government. The Apex Court held : "A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the decree holder vis-a-vis the judgment debtor and does not in terms direct the judgment debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. This matter thus reached the Apex Court by way of an appeal by the State Government. The Apex Court held : "A declaratory decree merely declares the right of the decree holder vis-a-vis the judgment debtor and does not in terms direct the judgment debtor to do or refrain from doing any particular act or thing. Since in the present case decree does not direct reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary the executing Court could not issue any process for the purpose as that would be going outside or beyond the decree. Respondent as a decree holder was free to seek his remedy for arrears of salary in the suit for declaration. The executing Court has no jurisdiction to direct payment of salary or grant any other consequential relief which does not flow directly and necessarily from the declaratory decree. It is not that if in a suit for declaration where the plaintiff is able to seek further relief he must seek that relief though he may not be in need of that further relief. In the present suit the plaintiff while seeking relief of declaration would certainly have asked for other reliefs like the reinstatement, arrears of salary and consequential benefits. He was, however, satisfied with a relief of declaration knowing that the Government would honour the decree and would reinstate birr .” 41. The Apex Court went on to hold that, the respondent-plaintiff could not have sought execution of the declaratory decree when no relief was granted to him towards arrears of salary and other "consequential benefits. 42. In State of Punjab v. Krishan Dayal Sharma, AIR 1990 SC 2177, the plaintiff therein had obtained a decree that he was entitled to be promoted from die post of Inspector of Police to that of Deputy Superintendent of Police, with effect from the date when his juniors were promoted and further claimed relief for all consequential benefits, rights and privileges. The suit was decreed. In the execution of application filed by the plaintiff, in addition to the benefits flowing from the decree, he also claimed compound interest at die rate of 12 per cent annum on the amounts found due to him. Such claim was allowed by the executing Court. 43. The suit was decreed. In the execution of application filed by the plaintiff, in addition to the benefits flowing from the decree, he also claimed compound interest at die rate of 12 per cent annum on the amounts found due to him. Such claim was allowed by the executing Court. 43. The Apex Court noticed that the decree, which was put to execution did not contain any order or direction for payment of any interest on the amount, which was payable to the plaintiff consequent to the declaration made by the Court, while decreeing the suit. It was also not disputed that no relief for interest had been claimed by the plaintiff in his suit nor any such claim was either dismissed or awarded by the Court, it was, therefore, held by die Apex Court that the executing Court was bound by the terms of the decree and could not add or alter the decree on its notion of fairness or justice. It was further observed that though the Courts had power to award interest on the arrears of salary or pension or other amount to which a Government servant was found entitled to having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case but that power could not be accused by the executing Court in the absence of any direction in the decree . 44. In the present case, admittedly, neither any consequential benefits were claimed by the petitioner in his writ petition nor such benefits were discussed and allowed by the Court, while allowing the writ on 25.11.1981. The only direction given in the writ order was to re-assign the year of allotment to the petitioner in the Indian Administrative Service keeping in view the fact that the name of the petitioner was continuously borne on the Select List and he was continuously officiating against or in die senior cadre post of LA.S. Such direction, as observed above, stands complied with by respondent No.l Union of India. Therefore following the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred to cases, it is held that writ order dated 25.11.1981 stands complied with and that the petitioner could not have sought the execution of the writ order for recovery of the amounts and interest and other consequential benefits when no such relief was granted to him in the writ order dated 25.11.1981. 45. 45. As a result, the present execution petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.