Honble VERMA, J.–Rajasthan Pharmacy Council is constituted under the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, 1948. Council Members are nominated as well elected as per the provisions of Section 19 of the Act for a period of five years. The petitioner was one of the elected member having been so notified vide Rajasthan Gazette dated 7.1.1988. There is a State Council constituted who has to perform various statutory functions as per the provisions of the Act. One of the function is to register the Pharmacists by the Council from amongst the Pharmacists who hold and possess the qualifications. If the registration is denied to any such Pharmacist, he has a right to file a statutory appeal under Section 33. The decision of the State Council is final in the matter of registration of the applicant as Pharmacist. A dispute is said to have arisen in regard to the registration of the fresh pharmacist which dispute was even taken up right upto the High Court by the Rajasthan Pharmacists Association through its Secretary in Civil Writ Petition No. 683/83. Ultimately, the Division Bench of this Court in D.B. Civil Special Appeal No. 319/84 had dismissed the writ petition as well the appeal. Certain matter was again taken up right upto the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 214/89 by Mukut Bihari Lal Sharma in Public Interest Litigation. It was alleged in the writ petition filed by Mr. Sharma that the registration by the State Council was not being done in accordance with law. Certain irregularities and illegalities were also alleged. The High Court ultimately had not agreed to the submissions made by said Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma. It is stated and alleged by the petitioner that despite the fact that even the High Court had not found any irregularity and illegality in the registration of the pharmacists, but still certain persons with vested interest had been levelling allegations against the Council. It is stated by the Counsel for the petitioner that as soon as the writ pe- tition was dismissed, to harass and victimise the petitioner, one Deputy Superintendent of Police got an FIR recorded being FIR No. 95./90 on 28.8.1990 in Special Wing of Police i.e. Anti Corruption Department. It is stated by the Counsel for the petitioner that as soon as the writ pe- tition was dismissed, to harass and victimise the petitioner, one Deputy Superintendent of Police got an FIR recorded being FIR No. 95./90 on 28.8.1990 in Special Wing of Police i.e. Anti Corruption Department. The FIR is said to have been recorded for committing the offence of Sections 161, 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120-B of the IPC and Section 5D(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. It is stated that the petitioners name has not been mentioned in the FIR nor any allegation of corruption, forgery or fabrication or even of conspiracy has been narrated in the FIR but still according to the petitioner, for the malafide reasons, the petitioner being elected member of the State Council was being harassed and victimised in the garb of the aforesaid FIR. Being forced and compelled, the petitio- ner approached this court for quashing of the FIR under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. (2). It is settled law that the High Court is not to interfere for quashing the FIR unless there are some facts and circumstances showing that no offence whatsoever has been made out in the contents of the FIR or that the proceedings have been started as a lever to misuse the process of law by the complainant against the accused. The well settled principles have been laid- down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and others (1). The well settled principles have been laid- down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and others (1). Counsel for the petitioner relies on the principles and illustrations as enumerated in paras 102, 111 and 140 in Bhajan Lals case which amongst others read as under- ``The following categories of cases can be stated by way of illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised : (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima- facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2)................... (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4).................... (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6).................... (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (6).................... (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. The FIR as recorded reads as under - ekU;oj] lwpuk feyus ij fd jktLFkku QkesZlh dkSfUly ds jftLVªkj o ekQZr ps;jeSu us vkil esa fydj /kujkfk izkIr dj ,sls O;fDr;ksa dk jftLVªsku fd;k gS tks fu;ekuqlkj okafNr ;ksX;rk ugha j[krs gSa tkWap dh x;h rks ik;k fd jktLFkku QkesZlh dkSfUly ds jftLVªkj us LFkkuh; nSfud lekpkj i= jk"Vªnwr esa fn- 18 vxLr] 1978 dks vf/klwpuk ua- 21 jkihlh@78 fnukad 17-8-78 dks izdkfkr djk dj QkesZlh ,DV dh /kkjk 32¼ch½¼11½¼1½ ds vUrxZr izkFkZuk i= vkeaf=r fd;s ftlesa vkosnu izkIr djus dh vfUre frfFk 31-8-78 fufpr dh x;h FkhA bl vf/klwpuk dks izdkfkr djkus dk vf/kdkj dkSfUly vFkok jftLVªkj nksuksa esa ls fdlh dks ugha FkkA D;ksafd fnukad 13-8-78 dks jkT; ljdkj us vf/klwpuk tkjh gh ugha fd;k FkkA vr% dkSfUly ds jftLVªkj us ;g foKfIr fnukad 17-8-78 dks vius vf/kdkj {ks= ls ckgj tkdj izdkfkr djokbZA jktLFkku QkesZlh dkSafly us jftLVªkj ds ek/;e ls LFkkuh; lekpkj i= jk"Vªnwr o vU; lekpkj i=sa esa foKfIr Øekad 438@vkj-ih-lh-@78 fnukad 23-11-79 dks izdkfkr dj mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 32¼1½ ds vUrxZr vkosnu i= vkeaf=r fd;sA blh izdkj dh foKfIr ml le; fcuk fdlh vfUre frfFk nkkZ;sa izdkfkr dh x;h tks fd fu;e fo:) gS D;ksafd mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 30¼2½ ds vUrxZr frfFk fufpr djus dk vf/kdkj dsoy jkT; ljdkj dks gh gSA jftLVªkj }kjk QkesZlh ,DV ds jftLVªsku gsrq vuqHko ds vk/kkj ij vkosnu i= vkeaf=r fd;s x;s mudh vfUre frfFk 31-8-1978 j[kh x;h] bl foKfIr esa vkosnu i= mDr ,DV dh /kkjk 32¼1½ ds vUrxZr vkeaf=r fd;s x;s rFkk jftLVªsku ds fy;s ;ksX;rk,a fu/kkZfjr dh x;haA bu ;ksX;rkvksa ds vuqlkj jkT; ljdkj }kjk cuk;s x;s fu;e 3¼5½ ds vUrxZr 16 o"kZ dh vk;q ds ckn gh de ls de 5 o"kZ dk nok forj.k djus dk vuqHko gksuk vko;d FkkA ;g fu;e fnukad 28-3-68 dks jkT; ljdkj us jkT; i= esa Hkh izdkfkr fd;k FkkA izkIr vkosnu i=ksa esa vkosndksa dh vk;q 18-19 o"kZ dh Fkh tks mDr fu;eksa ds vuqlkj jftLVªsku gsrq fu/kkZfjr ;ksX;rk ugha j[krs gSaA ijarq dkSfUly us vf/kfu;eksa o fu;eksa dh mis{kk djrs gq, ,sls O;fDr;ksa ds Hkh voS/k jftLVªsku fd;s tks loZFkk fu;e fo:) FksA QkesZlh ,DV dh /kkjk 32¼2½ ds vuqlkj izkIr vkosnu i=ksa ij izFke fu.kZ; jftLVªkj }kjk fy;s tkus dk izko/kku gS rFkk /kkjk 33¼3½ ds vuqlkj gh izkFkZuk i=ksa dks vLohd`r fd;k tkrk gS muds vkosndksa dks 90 fnol dh vof/k ds vUnj dkSfUly dks vihy djus dk vf/kdkj fn;k x;k gS] ftl ij dkSfUly dk fu.kZ; vfUre gSA fnukad 31-8-91 rd izkIr vkosnu i=ksa ij jktLFkku QkesZlh dkSfUly }kjk xfBr fLØfuax lc desVh }kjk dkQh la[;k esa izkFkZuk i=ksa dks voS/k ik;s tkus dk fu.kZ; fd;k ,oa vLohd`r izkFkZuk i=ksa dh vihy ij fu.kZ; dkSfUly }kjk xfBr ,DthD;wfVo desVh }kjk fy;k x;k tks lEiw.kZr;k voS/k ,oa nqHkkZoukiw.kZ gS D;ksafd bu desfV;ksa esa dqN ,sls lnL; Hkh lfEefyr Fks tks lEcfU/kr fLØfuax desVh ds Hkh lnL; Fks ftUgksaus vkosndksa ds izkFkZuk i= iwoZ esa vLohd`r fd;s Fks ysfdu vihy desVh esa jgrs gq, mUgksaus bUgha izkFkZuk i=ksa dks fcuk dksbZ dkj.k vafdr fd;s Lohdkj dj fy;k vkSj vius in dk nq:i;ksx dj Lo;a vuqfpr ykHk igqWapk dj cgqr ls vkosndksa dk jftLVªsku vuqfpr :i ls dj mUgsa ykHk igWaqpk;kA bl izdkj dkSfUly esa mDr vof/k esa fu;qDr nksuksa jftLVªkj loZ Jh eksgEn bkkd o Jh lqHkk"kpUn iar o vU; vf/kdkfj;ksa us dsfUnz; vf/kfu;e QkesZlh ,DV 1948 o jkT; ljdkj }kjk cuk;s x;s fu;eksa dk [kqyk mYya?ku dj fu;e fo:) dk;Z Lo;a dks vkfFkZd ykHk igqWapkus ds mís; ls fd;kA vr% tkWap o miyC/k fjdkMZ ds vk/kkj ij jktLFkku QkesZlh dkSfUly ds mijksDr inkf/kdkfj;ksa ds fo:) izFke n`"Vr;k vijk/k vUrxZr /kkjk 161] 420] 467] 468] 471] 120-ch Hkk-n-la- o lifBr /kkjk 5¼1½¼Mh½¼2½ ih-lh- ,DV] 1947 ik;k tkrk gSA fjiksVZ dkuwuh dk;Zokgh o izdj.k iathc) fd;s tkus izsf"kr gSA ,l-Mh- vij iqfyl v/kh{kd] fofo/k vuqla/kku bdkbZ] Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd foHkkx] jktLFkku] t;iqjA iz/kku vkj{kh dsUnz] Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd foHkkx jkt- t;iqj esa mijksDr ntZdj Øekafdr fd;k tkosA vfxze vuqlU/kku vij iqfyl v/kh{kd Hkz-fu-fo- t;iqj dks lqiqnZ fd;k tkrk gSA g- egkfunskd iqfyl dk;Zokgh fcuk uEcjh izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ vij iqfyl v/kh{kd fofk"V vuqla/kku bdkbZ Hkz-fu-fo- jkt-] t;iqj ls Jh eksgEn bkkd ,oa Jh lqHkk"kpUn iar ,oa vU; jkt- QkesZlh dkSfUly ds fo:) izkIr gksus ij Jheku~ egkfunskd egksn;] Hkz-fu-fo- jkt-] t;iqj ds vknskkuqlkj vijk/k la[;k 95@90 fn- 20-8-90 vUrxZr /kkjk 161] 420] 467] 471] 120-ch Hkk-n-la- o lifBr /kkjk 5¼1½¼Mh½¼2½ ih-lh- ,DV esa iz-vkj- ds Hkz-fu-fo- jkt-] t;iqj esa iathd`r fd;k tkdj vfxze vuqla/kku gsrq vij iqfyl v/kh{kd fo-vuq-bZ-Hkz-fu-fo- jkt-] t;iqj dks lqiqnZ fd;k x;k gSA izFke lwpuk fjiksVZ dh izfrfyfi;kWa fu;ekuqlkj izsf"kr gSA g- oh-ds- xksfndk (3). From the bare reading of the FIR, there is no allegation whatsoever of any type of corruption falling within the definition of section 161 IPC read with Sec, 5(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act nor any ingredients of any of the offence of Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 are alleged in the FIR itself. What has been stated in the FIR is that on the information received it is suspected that certain registrations have been made by the Registrar through the Chairman of the Council by registering the Pharmacists who were not qualified to be registered. It is stated that the applications were invited through publication made in the month of August 1978 for registration of Pharmacists. It is further stated that the Registrar or the Chairman had no authority to call for such applications and, therefore, such publication made by the Registrar or Chairman was without jurisdiction. Similarly, such an act was repeated by the registrar and Chairman in November 1979 and was in violation of Section 30(2) of the Act. It was mentioned in the report that as per rules constituted by the State certain experience was also fixed wherein age had also been prescribed. It is stated that the applications so invited by the Registrar or the Chairman have prescribed the age which was not in accordance with the rules. It was further mentioned in the body of the FIR that if any person is aggrieved for or against the registration, he had a right to file an appeal to the Council within 90 days. It is alleged that many registrations were cancelled by the Council for being not registered in accordance with law and, therefore, it was alleged in the FIR that the criminal offences as enumerated above are said to have been committed. (4). After going through the contents of the FIR it is very clear that for certain registrations of the Pharmacists inviting applications in the year 1978 or 1979, some irregularities or illegalities might have been committed which became the subject matter of the statutory appeals but from the reading of the FIR none of the ingredients of the alleged criminal offences are borne out. (5). (5). It is further vehemently urged by the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was elected as member of the council for the first time in the year 1987 which fact is not denied and in any case he could not be concerned of any registration done legally or illegally in the year 1978 or 1979 and, therefore, it is apparent that he is being harassed because of the malafides intentions and on the ground as mentioned in the writ petition. There seems to be some truth in the submission of the counsel for the petitioner for alleging malafides, but there is har- dly any necessity to go into this aspect of the argument. (6). It is settled law that unless and until some offence is borne out from the bare reading of the FIR, no offence is made out and the accused is not to be made victim of the imaginative offences. The dictum of law and the guidelines as enumerated by the Honble Supreme Court in Bhajan Lals case is fully applicable in the present case. (7). The petitioner had impleaded the State Agencies as respondents and rightly so for the reason that the petitioner was praying for quashing the FIR registered on behalf of the State. However, an application had been made by Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma for to be impleaded as respondent which application was al- lowed. Said Shri Mukut Bihari Sharma had earlier been taking up the matter against Pharmacy Council or its members by filing a writ petition in Public Interest Litigation and had failed to get any relief from the Court. He is being represented through Shri V.S. Gurjar Advocate. No relief is claimed by the petitioner against the added respondent, however, counsel for the added respondent states that direct writ peti- tion under Article 226 or Art. 227 of the Constitution of India was not maintainable and the petitioner ought to have filed the petition u/S. 482 Cr.PC. His submission is that if alternative specific remedy is available, remedy under the Constitutional power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be availed off. The counsel for the respondent relies on State of M.P Vs. His submission is that if alternative specific remedy is available, remedy under the Constitutional power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be availed off. The counsel for the respondent relies on State of M.P Vs. Pirthi Chand and another (2) wherein in para 11 of the judgment, the Honble Supreme Court had held as under- ``In State of Haryana V. Bhajan Lal, a two Judge Bench of this Court laid down certain broad tests to exercise the inherent power or extraordinary power of the High Court. It is not necessary to reiterate the guidelines. Suffice to state that they are only illustrative. The High Court should sparingly and only in exceptional cases, in other words, in rarest of rare cases, and not merely because it would be appealable to the learned Judge, be inclined to exercise the power to quash the FIR/charge- sheet/complaint. In that case the Court held that the FIR should not be quashed since it disclosed prima-facie cognizable offences to proceed further in the investigation. In Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill JT (1995) 7 SC 299 this Court reiterated the above view and held that when the complaint or charge-sheet filed disclosed prima-facie evidence the court would not weigh at that stage and find out whether offence could be made out. The order of the High Court exercising the power under Article 256 was accordingly set-aside. (8). However, it was also observed that when the remedy under Section 482 Cr.PC. is available, the High Court would be loath and circumspect to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 since efficacious remedy under Section 482 of the Code is available. (9). In Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (3) this very question was raised before the Apex Court and referring to the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) it was observed as under: ``In the context of the reasons given by the High Court for quashing the FIR and the complaint and the respective stands of the learned counsel for the parties in relation there to, we have to ascertain whether the case presented before the case presented before us co- mes under categories (1), (3) and (5) above. Besides, it raises the applicability of Section 95 IPC. Besides, it raises the applicability of Section 95 IPC. Since the answers to the above three questions have to be found out from the FIR itself we need to look into the contents thereof. (10). However a note of caution was stressed to the fact that the power of qua- shing a criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare case. In R.D. Bajajs case it was held that the court is to ascertain whether the case before the court comes under any of the categories/illustrations as enumerated in Bhajan Lals case and answers to those questions are to be found out from the FIR itself and, therefore, the contents of the FIR have to be looked into. After going into the facts as narrated in the FIR in R.D. Bajajs case it was found that the offence had been made out and FIR could not have been quashed by the High Court. In Bhajan Lals case the Honble Supreme Court had observed that the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. can be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to laid down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines. In the latest case of M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & another vs. Special Judicial Magistrate and others (4), it was held as under- ``It is settled that High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others JT 1990 (4) SC 650 = 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, this Court examined the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution and also the- inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to followed by the courts. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulae to followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegation made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226. Some of the decisions of this Court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under Article 226 and 227 may be referred to. (11). From the reading of the above quoted law, if the contents of the FIR/complaint fall under any of the illustrations as enumerated in Bhajan Lals case by the Honble Supreme Court the petition is maintainable. The objection of the added respondent has no force and it is held that if the offence is not made out from the bare reading of the contents of the FIR and the allegations even if they are taken at their face value, but do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the accused, the writ petition is maintainable. In the present case after reading the contents of the FIR and even assuming the face value of the contents of FIR to be true, no offence in any of the offence enumerated in FIR are made out and, therefore, the case of the petitioner does fall under the illustration No. 1 in Bhajan Lals case. (12). The further investigation had already been stayed by this Honble Court in November 1991 and virtually there is no progress even otherwise in the present case. State has not chosen to be represented even before this court. The added res- pondent who has no interest whatsoever and none of his right is involved is present through his counsel and it seems that after having failed for getting the relief in the writ petition, an indirect method is said to have been adopted by the persons interested against the Council for invoking the criminal proceedings by lodging the said FIR. It is also interesting to note that despite the fact that alleged registrations involved in the FIR are said to be of the year 1978 or 1979, but still not a single instance of any such irregularity or illegality have been committed has been quoted in the FIR. It seems that the complainant was out to misuse the process of law by lodging the said FIR. (13). For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is to be allowed and is allowed and the FIR is quashed on the ground that from the reading of the contents of the FIR prima-facie no offence is made out under any of the sections enumerated in the FIR itself. For the reasons that the State is not being represented, there would be no orders as to costs. ...End of the Volume 1998(3)