Both these petitions have been heard together, learned counsel Mr. Khetri, appearing for the writ petitioners has advanced arguments common to both the petitions, as indeed, the legal question involved is the same. Therefore, both these petitions are being disposed of by a common judgment. However, so far as facts of both the petitions are concerned, they are being separately noted, although even on this count the basic facts are also common. 2. The fact of Civil Rule No.4744 of 1994 are so noted below. 3. The petitioner No; 1 joined service with effect from 11.3.61, the petitioner No.2 from 20.7.70. During the course of service, the petitioners were arrested on 15.12.79 and kept under Military custody and subsequently tried by the General Court Martial on several charges under sections 63 and 41 of the Army Act for allegedly parting with their belts and participating in a demonstration inside Eastern Base Workshop indulging threat, shouting of slogans, demanding release from arrest of a Machinist Shri Sachdeva of the unit, not complying with orders. The petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to suffer 18 months' rigorous imprisonment. They have been kept under suspension for long since 15.12.79. The petitioners approached this Hon'ble Court challenging applicability of the provisions of Army Act in the manner in which it was sought to be done and invoking the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try the petitioners. By the judgment dated 31.3.87 this Court passed in Writ Appeal Nos. 1,2 and 3 of 1980 observed as follows : 'We come to the last submission, namely that even if all their contentions fail, considering the fact that the appellants have undergone a long period under military custody, their sentences may be reduced to the period already undergone in each case if they are not acquitted. In this context we keep on record that Mr. PK Goswami, the learned counsel for the Union of India, states that if the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos. 1 and 2 of 1980 file applications under section 179 of the Act of remission of the unexpired portions of their sentences, the same shall be considered favourably by the authorities. There is no reason why this assurance will not be acted upon: By our order dated 13.3,87 we left it open to the appellants to act on that basis in the meantime. There is no reason why this assurance will not be acted upon: By our order dated 13.3,87 we left it open to the appellants to act on that basis in the meantime. Section 179 of the Act deals with pardons, remissions and suspensions. In view of the statement made by Mr. Goswami, we are sure that the applications if and when submitted by the appellants under that section shall be considered and the unexpired portions of the sentences shall be remitted. Till then the bail orders shall be continued in force and those shall merge in the orders passed on their respective applications under section 179." 4. Accordingly, petitioners submitted applications seeking remission of sentence of unexpired imprisonment without prejudice to the right of petitioners to approach the Apex Court by filing an SLR Although the applications were submitted to the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 2 stated to have considered the matter and remitted the unexpired portion of sentence of petitioners as it was informed to the petitioners as per letters dated 20.7.87 of the respondent No.4. 5. The petitioners also approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing an SLP and all further proceedings on the Memoranda were stayed by the Apex Court. Though leave was granted, Criminal Appeal No.620-22/87 arising therefrom were ultimately dismissed upholding the judgment dated 31.3.87 passed by this Court. That is why the respondent No. 4 acting under the direction and at the instance of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 made orders No.l451/GCM/109/ElD and No.l451/GCM/l 10/E1D, both dated 24.9.94 against petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 respectively thereby compulsorily retiring petitioners with effect from the date of expiry of three months from the date of service of the said orders purportedly made in exercise of Rule 19 (i) of the CCA Rules. \ 6. The respondent No. 3 is the disciplinary authority of the petitioners while the respondent No. 2 is the appellate authority and respondent No. 2 is the overall executive head of the GREF under whose directions and orders the respondents Nos 3 and 4 have been acting in the matter of imposition of so-called penalty under Rule 19 (i) of the Rules, as would appear from Memoranda dated 30.7.87, Annexure C and D. 7. It is the petitioners' case that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have discriminated against petitioners. It is the petitioners' case that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have discriminated against petitioners. Under their order, a similarly situated GREF personnel Sri SD Sharma was tried and found guilty by the General Court Martial and who before his release on parole in pursuance of orders of this Hon'ble Court passed in his writ application suffered the sentence of imprisonment with petitioners at District Jail, Tezpur, was fovoured to be reinstated in service by revoking his suspension order, thus enabling him to earn full service benefits whereas the petitioners have been suffering the prolonged suspension since 15.12.79 even though they were bailed out on bail as back as on 29.8.80 and their unexpired sentences were remitted as above stated. The dues of petitioners and their service benefits in terms of office memoranda dated 14.12.83 and 1.12.88 of the Govt. of India which a GREF employee is entitled to enjoy with effect from 1.12.83 as is held in the case of Shri Krishnan Raman as per the judgment of this Hon'ble Court dated 4.1.94 passed in Civil Rule No.543 of 1989 have not been paid and allowed to them and they are sought to be compulsory retired before regularising their suspension period and settling their service dues as aforestated. G/140635 W. Shri Bhupal Singh, Sanitary Inspector was compulsory retired by the respondent No.3 only after revoking suspension order on 27.4.92 and regularising the period of suspension as on duty. A copy of the judgment of this Court dated 4.1.94 is annexed as Annexure E. 8. The petitioners contended that the respondent No.4 has mechanically acted under the direction and at the instance of respondent Nos. 2/3 and has failed to apply his mind as disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case before making the order of compulsory retirement as penalty and pray that the orders imposing penalty deserve to be set aside, inasmuch as, the petitioners were not given any opportunity to explain their conduct vis-a-vis the proposed penalty of compulsory retirement. Petitioners were not afforded opportunity of hearing, therefore, the action of respondents in passing penal orders is illegal and of no legal effect. The respondent No. 4, miserably failed to consider the circumstances under which the sentence of unexpired imprisonment was remitted. Petitioners were not afforded opportunity of hearing, therefore, the action of respondents in passing penal orders is illegal and of no legal effect. The respondent No. 4, miserably failed to consider the circumstances under which the sentence of unexpired imprisonment was remitted. The prolonged suspension of the petitioners continuing from 15.12.79, persecution of petitioners arising out of the prosecution on charges relating to alleged breach of military discipline, long before the President of India declared the General Reserve Engineer Force to be an integral part of the Armed Forces of the Union as also the impact of a recent amendment to the Army Act incorporating section 169A providing for set off of preconviction period, 9. The respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition have categorically denied that the respondent No. 4 has been acting under the direction and/or at the instance of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the matter of imposition of penalty under Rule 19 (i) as alleged. The disciplinary authority had applied his mind properly and after taking into account the entire circumstances of the case and gravity of the offence committed by the petitioners, issued memoranda both dated 30.7.87 and passed the impugned orders of compulsory retirement both dated 24.9.94. Refuting the allegations of discrimination, the answering respondents have categorically denied that the respondents 2 and 3 are also discriminated against the petitioners as alleged. They have explained in this connection that the suspension orders in respect of Shri S.D. Sharma has been revoked vide Sectt. BRDS No.F. 80(5)/Vig/ BRDS/91 -Estt dated 13/20th November, 1991. But however, the suspension period has not been regularised so far, since the Court case Civil Rule No.890 of 1990 filed by Shri S.D. Sharma before the Court, has not yet been finalised. So far as the petitioners are concerned it is their case that order for regularising the period of suspension and to pay and allowance have already been issued vide Eastern Base Workshop (GREF) Letter No.l451/25/EID and 1451/267EID both dated 23.12.94. The charges against Shri S.D. Sharma, AEE (Civil) and Shri Amar Singh, AGM and another are not of similar nature. Similarly disciplinary authorities are also not the same. The charges against Shri S.D. Sharma, AEE (Civil) and Shri Amar Singh, AGM and another are annexed as Annexures 1 and 2. 10. The charges against Shri S.D. Sharma, AEE (Civil) and Shri Amar Singh, AGM and another are not of similar nature. Similarly disciplinary authorities are also not the same. The charges against Shri S.D. Sharma, AEE (Civil) and Shri Amar Singh, AGM and another are annexed as Annexures 1 and 2. 10. Civil Rule No.543 of 1989 filed by Shri Krishnan Raman was decided in his favour for effecting all the benefits available to him in terms of Circular dated 14.12.83 and 1.12.88 of Govt. of India and not for all GREF employees. The respondents have added that a case has been forwarded to Govt. by HQ DGBR for considering the benefits to other GREF employees also, and order from the Govt. were still awaited. But they also clarify that this has no relation with the compulsory retirement orders both dated 24.9.94 issued to the petitioners. They have categorically denied that the petitioners were not given any opportunity to explain their conduct vis-a-vis the proposed penalty of compulsory retirement and the respondents procured the penal order as alleged. It is their case that the petitioners were given an opportunity to offer their written explanation pursuant to which they had also given a written explanation (not filed) which had been duly considered by the respondent No. 4 before passing the impugned order. 11. Now coming to the connected petition, Civil Rule No.4745 of 1994 as already noted above, the basic facts are materially the same. The writ petitioner was employed as Superintendent B/R Grade I and under G/153949 under the respondents. 11. Now coming to the connected petition, Civil Rule No.4745 of 1994 as already noted above, the basic facts are materially the same. The writ petitioner was employed as Superintendent B/R Grade I and under G/153949 under the respondents. During the course of service as the Superintendent B/R under the direct control of the respondent No. 3, the petitioner was arrested on 15.12.79 and kept under military custody and subsequently tried by the General Court Martial on several charges under sections 63,39 (a) and 41 (1) of the Army Act for allegedly violating channel or correspondence in sending a letter on or about 22.11.79 direct to then Secretary, Borders Roads Development, shouting and attempting to obstruct the reading out of Unit Do by Camp Commandant to persons present at parade on 26.11.79, associating himself with an organisation named All India Border Roads Employees Association, absenting himself without leave the unit office till 11.30 hours on 13.12.79 and disobeying lawful command ordering to go to unit lines and not to leave unit lines on 14.12.79 as a consequence of which the petitioner was held guilty and sentenced to suffer 30 months' rigorous imprisonment. The petitioner was kept under suspension since 15.12.79. 12. On being put to trial by the General Court Martial, the petitioner filed a writ petition before this Court challenging applicability of the provisions of Army Act in the manner in which it was sought to be done and the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial to try the petitioner. The writ petition was ultimately came to be decided by judgment dated 31.3.87 by this Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1980. The following observation was made in paragraph 17 of the judgment: "We come to the last submission, namely that even if all their contentions fail, considering the fact that the appellants have undergone a long period under military custody, their sentences may be reduced to the period already undergone in each case if they are not acquitted. In this context we keep on record that Mr. PK Goswami, the learned counsel for the Union of India, states that if the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos 1 and 2 of 1980 file applications under section 179 of the Act for remission of the unexpired portions of their sentences, the same shall be considered favourably by the authorities. In this context we keep on record that Mr. PK Goswami, the learned counsel for the Union of India, states that if the appellants in Writ Appeal Nos 1 and 2 of 1980 file applications under section 179 of the Act for remission of the unexpired portions of their sentences, the same shall be considered favourably by the authorities. There is no reason why this assurance will not be acted upon. By our order dated 13.3.87 we left it open to the appellants to act on that basis in the meantime. Section 179 of the Act deals with pardons, remissions and suspensions. In view of the statement made by Mr. Goswami we are sure that the applications, if and when submitted by the appellants under that section shall be considered and the unexpired portions of the sentences shall be remitted. Till then the bail shall be continued in force and those shall merge in the orders passed on their respective applications under section 179." 13. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted an application seeking remission of sentence of unexpired imprisonment without prejudice to the night of the petitioner to approach the Apex Court by filing 311SLP and though the application was submitted to the respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 2 was stated to have considered the matter and remitted the unexpired portion of sentence of the petitioner as it was unformed to the petitioner as per letter No.l5425/110/107EI Con dated 16.7.87 of the respondent No.3. Subsequently thereafter, the petitioner having been served with memorandum No.l5425/ll/121/EI Con dated 21.7.87 of the respondent No.3 asking him to make representation against proposed penalty of removal from service in terms of Rule 19 (i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 submitted his representation on 13.8.87. Before the respondent could take any action in terms of his memorandum as aforestated, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing an SLP and all further proceeding on the Memorandum were stayed by the Apex Court. 14. Though leave was granted, Criminal Appeal Nos.623-24/87 arising therefrom were ultimately dismissed upholding the judgment dated 31.3.87 passed by this Court. Before the respondent could take any action in terms of his memorandum as aforestated, the petitioner approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing an SLP and all further proceeding on the Memorandum were stayed by the Apex Court. 14. Though leave was granted, Criminal Appeal Nos.623-24/87 arising therefrom were ultimately dismissed upholding the judgment dated 31.3.87 passed by this Court. The respondent No. 3 acting under the direction and at the instance of the respondent No. 2 passed order No.l5425/110/2167EI Con dated 19.9.94, Annexure A, thereby compulsorily retiring the petitioner with effect from the date of expiry of three months from the date of service of the said order purportedly made in exercise of Rule 19 (i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. 15. The respondent No.3 is the disciplinary authority of the petitioner while the respondent No.2 is the appellate authority and it is the petitioner's case that the respondent No.3 has been acting under the direction and/or at the instance of the respondent No.2 in the matter of imposition of so-called penalty under Rule 19 (i) as it would appear from the memorandum dated 21.7.87 Annexure B. 16. The respondent No.2 has further discriminated against the petitioner. Under his orders, a similarly situated GREF personnel Sri SD Sharma, who was similarly tried and found guilty by the General Court Martial and who before his release on parole in pursuance of orders of this Court passed on his writ petition suffered the sentence of imprisonment with the petitioner at District Jail, Tezpur, was favoured to be reinsted in service by revoking his suspension order, thus enabling him to earn full service benefits whereas the petitioner has been suffering the prolonged suspension since 15.12.79 even though he was bailed out as back as 29.8.80 and his unexpired sentence was remitted as above stated. The dues of the petitioner and his service benefits in terms of office memoranda dated 14.12.83 and 1.12.88 of the Govt. of India have not been paid and allowed to the petitioner and who has been compulsorily retired before regularising his suspension period and settling his service dues. 17. The dues of the petitioner and his service benefits in terms of office memoranda dated 14.12.83 and 1.12.88 of the Govt. of India have not been paid and allowed to the petitioner and who has been compulsorily retired before regularising his suspension period and settling his service dues. 17. It is petitioner's case that the respondent No.3 has mechanically acted under the directions and at the instance of the respondent No. 2 and has failed to apply his mind as disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case before making the order of compulsory retirement as penalty. The petitioner has further contended that upon consideration of facts and circumstances, no penalty whatsoever either of removal from service or of compulsory retirement deserves or deserved to be imposed on the petitioner in purpoted exercise of power under Rule 19 (i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. According to him the gravity of misconduct ought to have been considered in the light of the fact that the President of India in whom the Supreme Command of the Defence Forces of India vests, for the first time recognised and declared the GREF to be integral part of Armed Forces of the Union only in the month of August 1985 and merely on the basis of conviction by the General Court Martial as upheld by the Apex Court, penalty under Rule 19 (i) referred to above was not impossible on allegations of violation and breach of military discipline. The penalty as imposed is not proportionate to the charges levelled against him. 18. The respondents in their affidavit-in-opposition have taken substantially the same pleas as in Civil Rule No.4744 of 1994 already noted above. Added to it plea of statutory right of appeal available to the petitioner which has in fact availed of on 30.12.94 as per Annexure 5 to the affidavit-in-opposition and the same is still pending as the matter is subjudiced. 19. Let me first deal with the preliminary question taken by the learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India. So far as Civil Rule 4754 of 1994 is concerned, it relates to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is an undisputed position that ^statutory appeal (Annexure 5 to the affidavit-in-opposition) has in fact been preferred by the writ petitioner on 30th December, 1994. Few more clarificatory facts may be noted. So far as Civil Rule 4754 of 1994 is concerned, it relates to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is an undisputed position that ^statutory appeal (Annexure 5 to the affidavit-in-opposition) has in fact been preferred by the writ petitioner on 30th December, 1994. Few more clarificatory facts may be noted. The impugned order dated 19.9.94, Annexure A' to the writ petition was passed under Rule 19 (i) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, 1965, compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. Undisputably, it is appellable under the priviso to Rule 23 (2) of the said Rules, 1965. The present writ petition was filed on 29.11.94 without preferring an appeal against the impugned order, Annexure A. After issuance of Rule on 30.11.94, during pendency of the petition, the petitioner filed statutory appeal on 30th December, 1994. It is on this basis that the learned counsel placing strong reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Assistant Collector of Central Excise vs. Dunlop India Ltd, AIR 1985 SC 330 strongly contended that the petition is liable to be dismissed. It was a case where the respondent company claimed benefit of exemptions under certain notifications issued by the Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance (Deptt. of Revenue), in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 8 (1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 which provided for exemptions from certain percentage of excise duty to the extent the manufacturer had not availed themselves of the exemptions granted under certain other earlier notification. The manufacturing company claimed exemption to the tune of Rs.6.5 crores and filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking an interim order restraining the Central Excise authorities from the levy and collection of excise duty. The learned Single Judge took the view that a prima facie case had been made out in favour of the company and by an interim order allowed the benefit of exemptions to the tune of Rs. 2,73,85,000/ for which the company was called upon to furnish a bank guarantee. A Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise under clause (10) of the Letters Patent and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court confirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 2,73,85,000/ for which the company was called upon to furnish a bank guarantee. A Letters Patent Appeal was preferred by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise under clause (10) of the Letters Patent and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court confirmed the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the prescribed authority and even a second appeal to the Tribunal, the Supreme Court held that Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent the statutory procedure. Learned Standing Counsel is very right in placing reliance on the above judgment. The law on the point is well settled. 20. Mr. Khetri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners highlighted the efficaciousnesss of the alternative remedy by way of appeal available to the petitioner under the Rules and in this context invited attention to the pleaded case of the writ petitioner as contained in paragraphs 7,8 and 10 of the writ petition. The gist of this pleadings is that the disciplinary authority was all along acting under the directions and/or at the instance of the appellate authority. If such is the factual position, the lodging of appeal though available under the Rule's is rendered nugatory. Although the respondent No.3 in his affidavit-in-opposition has denied the allegation of acting under directions or at the instance of the respondent No. 2 as alleged, it remains to be seen how far the writ petitioner has made out his case in face of the denial of allegations by the respondent No.3. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Khetri, learned counsel for the petitioner, the impugned order, Annexure A, has been passed by Mr. Ganguly and he was the best person who could have refuted the allegations made by the writ petitioner while the affidavit-in-opposition is filed by Mr. Durga Singh Rawat denying the allegations. It is a matter of personal involvement, a denial by the third person of the allegations made by the writ petitioner is not much consequence and help to the respondents. Further as again pointed out by Mr. Khetri, paragraph 8 of. the impugned order refers to only one written explanation claimed to have been considered, whereas the fact of the matter is that the writ petitioner submitted, as many as, four explanations. Further as again pointed out by Mr. Khetri, paragraph 8 of. the impugned order refers to only one written explanation claimed to have been considered, whereas the fact of the matter is that the writ petitioner submitted, as many as, four explanations. The first one is on 13.8.87, followed by 2.12.91, 6.4.92, 25.7.94 and 30th August, 1994- which of these explanation was considered, is not indicated and there is a direct allegation of discrimination against the officer concerned. It was for him to have refuted the allegations made by the writ petitioner. It is nobody's case that Mr. Ganguly who passed the impugned order, Annexure Ai was not available to the respondents for swearing an affidavit. In this state of fact it would not be proper to dismiss the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. 21. The rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is. a rule of convenience and discretion, a self-imposed restraint on the Court, rather than of la\y. It does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In the instant case the order under challenge is said to have been passed by the disciplinary authority at the instance or under the direction of the appellate authority. At any rate the writ-petitioner has been able to make out a case for entertainment of his petition, the petition cannot be thrown out on the ground that an appeal lies and in fact has been preferred to the higher officer or authority, it cannot be said to provide in all situational fact an efficacious alternative effective remedy as has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ram & Shyam Co vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 . In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly, AIR 1986 SC 1571 , the Supreme Court held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would be more efficacious than a civil suit when it was a service matter. In the instant case in face of the allegations as made by the writ petitioner and having not been refuted by the authority nor explanation offered for nor filing of his affidavit, the alternative remedy of statutory appeals would be futile. (See Filterco vs. CST, AIR 1986 SC 626 ). 22. Mr. In the instant case in face of the allegations as made by the writ petitioner and having not been refuted by the authority nor explanation offered for nor filing of his affidavit, the alternative remedy of statutory appeals would be futile. (See Filterco vs. CST, AIR 1986 SC 626 ). 22. Mr. Sarma, learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India argued that this Court will not embark on roving enquiry into the allegations and counter allegations as discrimination In the matter of punishment meted out to other employees, punishment itself being outside the scope the interference in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution, more so in face of dismissal of SLPs 623-624/87 by the Apex Court on 19.9.94. Considering the gravity of the offences charged, in the Court Martial proceedings which stand confirmed but Mr. Khetri, learned counsel for the petitioners has a point which he has attempted to formulate with reference to certain facts and events. (1) The order of compulsory retirement was passed without affording the petitioners any opportunity of hearing against proposed punishment. The representations submitted by the petitioners have not been considered. 23. In this connection clause (i) of Rule 19 of the CCA Rules needs to be noted: "19. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 14 to 18 - (i) where any penalty is imposed on a Govt. servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or ... ...... the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit: Provided that the Govt. servant may be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed before any order is made in a case under clause (i): Provided further that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary before any orders are made in any case under this rule." 24. The proviso as quoted above, requiring giving opportunity to the Govt. The proviso as quoted above, requiring giving opportunity to the Govt. servant of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed was inserted in the Rule as per Amendment Rules, 1987 vide Ministry of Personnel PG & Pensions (Department of Personnel & Training) Notification No.80830 dated 11.3.87 published in the Gazette of India, Part II, section 3 (ii) dated 28.3.87 P. 1270 after the law laid down in TR Challappan's case (AIR ,1975 SC 2216) was overruled in Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel as reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 , which become redundant in the face of the new proviso. 25. The amendment to the rule thus makes it obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to give opportunity to the deliquent to represent against the penalty proposed and place the entirety of the circumstances for 'consideration' within the meaning of Rule 19. This right to make representation cannot be snatched away, or could not have been denied to the petitioners at the time the impugned order imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement was sought to be imposed. 26. Further proceeding on the notice to show cause was stayed by the Supreme Court in view of the SLPs referred to above. No notice to show cause against the proposed penalty of 'compulsory retirement' was served before making the impugned order. This Court in 1980 Crl LJ 1241 P. Chandramouli & others vs. Union of India & others having held that personnel of GREF could not be regarded as members of Armed forces within the meaning of Article 33 of the Constitution of India,1950, the petitioners notwithstanding their conviction were honestly led to believe that they were not subject to military discipline. 27. The Presidential notification No.F.81/(l)/64-Estt/70463/DGBR/E2A (T&G) dated 14.8.85 whereby the President of India declared the GREF to be integral part of the Armed Force of India that the employees could be held liable to military discipline. 28. The Presidential notification dated 14.8,85 was issued in the light of R. Viswan & others vs. Union of India & others as reported in AIR 1983 SC 658 holding the GREF to be an integral part of the Armed forces of the Union of India, thus subject to military discipline. This Court in its judgment had observed that the respondents could in view of section 179 of the Army Act remit the sentence. This Court in its judgment had observed that the respondents could in view of section 179 of the Army Act remit the sentence. It was therefore necessary for the authority to consider all these circumstances before imposing the penalty of compulsory retirement. Referring to the discrimi­nation meted out to similarly situated employees Mr. Khetri referred to a judgment dated 16.7.96 of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 2683 of 1994 and 980 of 1990, the respondent authorities, in case of SD Sharma an Executive Officer, had withdrawn the suspension order and re-instated him in service. The learned Standing Counsel for the Union of India of course made an attempt to distinguish the case on the ground of the nature of the charges but the fact remains that this Officer, SD Sharma was re-instated in service. Similarly in case of a Sanitary Inspector, Bhupal Singh, the period of suspension was regulated in such a manner as to confer on him the punishment of being in continuous service. He craves comparison of Annexure 3 in petitioner Chandramani's case and Annexure 4 in case of Bhopal Singh. Mr. Sarma, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India placing strong reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court as reported in Air India vs. Nergees Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 submitted that there can be no justification in insisting for a similar punishment when the charges are materially different. This case relates to different conditions of service of Air Hostesses employed by Air India and the service regulations, particularly Regulation 46 (1) (c) which provide for retirement of Air Hostesses either on attaining the age of 35 years or on marriage taking place within 4 years of service and on first pregnancy. We are not concerned here with the conditions of service. The point raised is the discrimination in imposing penalty. Of course, there can be no arithmetical uniformity in the matter of sentence, the criteria/yardstick applied must be uniform. 29. While it is true that a writ Court is not a Court of appeal to go into the question of quantum of punishment but at the same time it can also not be disputed that it is not immune from judicial review as has been held by the Supreme Court in BC Chaturvedi's case. 29. While it is true that a writ Court is not a Court of appeal to go into the question of quantum of punishment but at the same time it can also not be disputed that it is not immune from judicial review as has been held by the Supreme Court in BC Chaturvedi's case. Bishan Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 10 SCC 461 is a case where the admitted fact as noted by the Apex Court were as follows: "The admitted facts are that three appellants along with 27 others had gone in a procession, in spite of the prohibitory order, to represent to the Superintendent of Police at his residence, their grievance of inadequate accommodation and other facilities not provided to them. That was done after their duty was over in the evening. For the making of such representation and for violating the prohibitory order, an enquiry was conducted against the three appellants who had taken initiative and led the procession, making a charge that they were guilty of grave misconduct under Rule 16 (2) of the Punjab Police Rules which is held to have been proved; resultantly, they were dismissed from service. The order of dismissal was confirmed on appeal. Thereafter, the appellants filed a suit for declaration that the order of dismissal was null and void and inoperative; the suit was decreed on 7.4.1979. On appeal, it was dismissed on 20.2.1980. In the second appeal, the High Court reversed the decision and dismissed the suit. Thus this appeal by special leave." 30. In face of the above facts, the Apex Court held as follows : "It is true that the appellants are disciplined members of the Police force. The grievance of inadequate accommodation provided to them is a legitimate grievance to be represented to the officer for its redressal. No doubt, prohibitory order was issued and there is violation thereof; however, the appellants marched peacefully to make their representation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that they have committed misconduct warranting extreme penalty of dismissal from service. Accordingly, the order of the High Court is set aside. However, the respondents are directed to impose penalty of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect." 31. In view of the foregoing discussion and following the Bishan Singh (supra), the penalty of compulsory retirement, as imposed, cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the order of the High Court is set aside. However, the respondents are directed to impose penalty of stoppage of one increment without cumulative effect." 31. In view of the foregoing discussion and following the Bishan Singh (supra), the penalty of compulsory retirement, as imposed, cannot be sustained in law. It is liable to be quashed and is accordingly quashed. The petitioners are entitled to the consequential benefits of service including re-instatement, if not already superannuated. It is open to the authorities to impose any other suitable punishment lesser that the compulsory retirement after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. The petitions are allowed in terms of the order indicated above.