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1998 DIGILAW 151 (CAL)

CHAMELI SINGHA v. SHAM SUNDAR NAG

1998-03-30

BHASKAR BHATTACHARYA, S.B.SINHA

body1998
S. B. SINHA, J. ( 1 ) THE tenant-defendant has preferred this appeal against a judgment and decree dated 29th November, 1982 passed by Sri H. Kar, Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta, in Ejectment Suit No. 271/79 whereby and whereunder the said suit was decreed. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff-respondent filed the aforementioned suit against the appellant, inter alia, on the ground of personal necessity. The plea of personal necessity has been taken in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the plaint, which read thus :-"9. That the plaintiff is the head of the family of 7 members, consisting of himself, his wife Smt. Ganga moni nag two sons Kashinath (32) and Amarnath (24) and 2 daughters Smt. Chandrabati Dutta and Basanti Dutta and old mother Smt. Durgamoni Nag. Due to dearth of accommodation plaintiff's eldest son Kashinath is still unmarried. The youngest son Amarnath is a student. 10. That the plaintiff now resides in one room in 1st floor of premises No. 12/1, Beniatola Lane, Calcutta-9. The measurement of which is about 131/2 x 13' ft. The said premises No. 12/1, Beniatola Lane has been alotted to my two younger brother-Madan Mohan Nag and Cour Mohan Nag by a Regd. Deed of Gift by my father Late Dhirendra Krishna Nag. They are pressing very hard to vacate the same, at an early date. The plaintiff has no kitchen room. The plaintiff is separate in mess. He has to cook his food on the passage in the ground floor. 11. The due to shortage of accommodation two sons of plaintiff have to stay on the covered passage in front of the room. The plaintiff is in extreme and acute difficulty and inconvenience for want of bare accommodation for so many heads. The present accommodation has failed to solve the problem of space and the plaintiff has been living at a great discomfort and is practically living a substandard life. Because of all these the plaintiff has been reduced to such a plight that he is in urgent need of the said four rooms of the defendant, which are now in suit for having bare minimum space for the occupation of the plaintiff and his family. The plaintiff actually needs more rooms. " ( 3 ) THE appellant in her written statement denied and disputed the said allegations made in the plaint. The plaintiff actually needs more rooms. " ( 3 ) THE appellant in her written statement denied and disputed the said allegations made in the plaint. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed :-"1. Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree for khas possession of the suit premises by evicting the defendant therefrom? 2. Is the defendant a defaulter in payment of rent since July, 1978? 3. Does the plaintiff reasonably require the suit premises for his own use and occupation and for his family? 4. Is the Ejectment notice dated 22. 9. 1978 valid, sufficient and legal? 5. To what other reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?" ( 4 ) IT would appear that no specific plea was taken in the plaint in terms of section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act nor any issue has been framed therefor. ( 5 ) THE respondent appears to have filed an application before this court praying for taking into consideration certain subsequent events, inter alia, bringing to this court's notice the following facts. Shri Sham Sundar Nag died intasted leaving behind the present respondent. The wife of Sham Sundar Nag and the mother of the present respondents have also died. The grand-mother of the present appellant Durgamoni also died in the year 1983. It was further stated that the respondents No. 1 and 2 had to vacate the accommodation of premises No. 12/1, Beniatola Lane on and from 1st July, 1987 and they had to shift to a rented accommodation at 28,f, B. B, Sengupta Lane, P. S. Behala, Calcutta. The tenancy in question was a contractual tenancy. The appellants have stated that now daughters of the original plaintiffs are also married. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH the aforementioned application has been filed which is in the nature of Order 41 rule 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff has not been amended the plaint. ( 7 ) MR. S. P. Roychowdhury, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised the following questions in support of this appeal. The learned counsel firstly submitted that plaintiffs having not made any averments in the plaint in sub-section (1) (ff) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act nor any issue having been framed, the suit ought to have been dismissed. The learned counsel firstly submitted that plaintiffs having not made any averments in the plaint in sub-section (1) (ff) of section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act nor any issue having been framed, the suit ought to have been dismissed. It was further submitted that in any event the substituted plaintiffs themselves having brought to this court's notice the subsequent events, they can be permitted to lead evidence only in the event an application was filed for amendment of the plaint. ( 8 ) MR. Soumen Dasgupta, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the statements made in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the plaint should be read together. The learned counsel submits that the parties had fought out the suit with full knowledge about the fact of the matter involved therein and thus, they cannot be permitted to raise any technical objection at this stage. In support of his aforementioned contention the learned counsel has relied upon in Banka Behari Dutta v. Gour Mohan Dutta reported in AIR 1981 Cal 185 ; Babu Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Gavali and Ors. reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 698; Trilok Chandra Jain v. Hirendra Kumar Mitter and Ors. reported in 90 Calwn 1086 and Sourendra Nath Rudra v. Ashim Kumar Bhattacharjee and Ors, reported in 86 CWN 819. ( 9 ) IN view of the aforementioned submission of the learned counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for determination in this appeal :1. WHETHER the plaintiff-respondent having not made nay allegation in terms of section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the suit ought to have been dismissed? 2. Whether the plaintiffs have proved their bona fide requirements in view of the subsequent events? ( 10 ) BOTH the questions being interrelated are taken up together for consideration. ( 11 ) SECTION 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, reads thus:-"13. Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a ). . . . . Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely :- (a ). . . . . (ff) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3a), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. " ( 12 ) A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would show that a plea must be raised in terms thereof aforementioned. Although, there cannot be any doubt that in a given case a substantial compliance thereof may be held to be sufficient but in the instant case as noticed hereinbefore even no issue had been framed. ( 13 ) IN B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan reported in AIR 1975 SC 1146 , the apex court while considering the policy of the legislation which was brought into force by reason of Amending Act 34 of 1969 held :-"how do we work it out ? We do it by directing the plaintiffs in the two cases to file fresh pleadings setting out their grounds under clause (f) and/or (ff) of sub-section (1) if they so wish. On such pleading being filed we may legitimately hold that the transferee landlord institutes his suit on grounds mentioned in clause (f) or (ff) of sub-section (3a) of section 13 that we can say he has begun or instituted a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on that ground. Institution of a suit earlier has to be ignored for this purpose since that was not based on grounds covered by clause (f) and/or (ff) and is not attracted by sub-section (3a ). He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these grounds. In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading. He begins proceedings on these new grounds only when he puts in his pleading setting out these grounds. In spirit and in letter he institutes his suit for recovery on the new grounds only on the date on which he puts in his new pleading. We cannot be ritualistic in insisting that a return of the plaint and a representation thereof incorporating amendments is the sacred requirement of the law. On the other hand social justice and the substance of the matter find fulfilment when the fresh pleadings are put in, subject of course to the three-year interval between the transfer and the filing of the additional pleading. Section 13 of the Amendment Act speaks pf suits including appeals. It thus follows that these fresh pleadings can be put in by the plaintiff either in the suit, if that is pending, or in appeal or second appeal, if that is pending. Thereupon, the opposite party, tenant, will be given an opportunity to file his written statement and the court will dispose of it after giving both sides the right to lead additional evidence. It may certainly be open to the appellate court either to take evidence directly or to call for a finding. Expeditious disposal of belated litigation will undoubtedly be a consideration with the court in exercising this discretion. The proviso to sub-section (3a) can also be complied with if the plaintiff gets the permission of the Rent Controller in the manner laid down therein before filing his fresh pleading. " ( 14 ) THUS, the apex court has also permitted to amend the plaint. ( 15 ) IN Hasmat Rai and Anr. v Raghunath Prasad reported in (1981)3 SCC 103 , the apex court while considering the provision of section 12 (1) (f) of M. P Accommodation Control Act, 1961 held that the landlord must establish : (i) that he reqires bona fide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business: and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. It was futher held that the burden to establish both the requirements is squarely on the landlord. ( 16 ) IN that case an application for amendment of written statement was made. It was futher held that the burden to establish both the requirements is squarely on the landlord. ( 16 ) IN that case an application for amendment of written statement was made. The apex court, however, has held that such amendment was superfluous as the plaintiff had not been able to prove his case. In that case the apex court took tnto consideration the fact that the plaintiff had in possession of a building having 18 feet frontage on the main road and 19 feet depth of the suit premises. The court held that the appeal court can also take into consideration the subsequent events as appeal is a cintinuation of a suit and thus, the landlord's need must be shown at appellate stage. ( 17 ) IN West Bengal Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sailendra Nath Ghose and Anr. reported in 84 Calwn 221, a division bench of this court held:-"we have already pointed out that the case that was introduced in course of the recording of evidence was not made out in the plaint. If any evidence is adduced with a view to making out a case which was not disclosed in the plaint and particularly in the absence of any issue such evidence ought not to be relied upon, for , that would be doing injustice to the other party who would be taken by surprise. In Shri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore and Others AIR 1958 SC 255 , the law on this point has been very succinctly and clearly laid down in these words:-"the object of requiring a party to put forward his pleas in the pleadings is to enable the opposite party to controvert them and to adduce evidence in support of his case and it would be neither legal nor just to refer to evidence adduced with reference to a matter which was not actually in issue and on the basis of that evidence to come to a finding on a matter which was not in issue, and decide the rights of parties on the basis of that finding'. The court cannot, therefore, decide a case which is not pleaded. In the present case, there was no case made out in the plaint that the said letter and receipt contained incorrect statement. " ( 18 ) IN Sm. Bedana Devi and Ors. The court cannot, therefore, decide a case which is not pleaded. In the present case, there was no case made out in the plaint that the said letter and receipt contained incorrect statement. " ( 18 ) IN Sm. Bedana Devi and Ors. v. Abdul Jawab reported in 1986 (2) CHN page 92, a division bench of this court again held that a subsequent event as sought to be brought on record as additional evidence by the plaintiffs may ne permitted for proper adjudication of the suit. The court followed a single bench decision in Adhir Kumar Das v. Juthika Sen reported in AIR 1981 Cal 334 wherein it was held that in view of the amended provision of section 13 (1) (ff) of the Act, the plaintiff is required to prove that he is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. It also noticed that the said principles had been followed in Nirode Gopal Bhattacharyya v. Bela Kundu reported in 84 Calwn 776 and Bijan Behari Bhattacharyya v. Krishna Prakash Mitra reported in 82 Calwn 160. ( 19 ) IN Prasun Kumar Sen v. Nemai Chand Bhattacharya reported in 1997 All India High Court Cases, page 4075, it has been held:-"however, since the aforesaid additional need of the respondent as put forward by him his affidavit-in-opposition to the application for taking note of subsequent event, has been disputed by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant we cannot take into account the aforesaid alleged additional need of the appellant in the instant first appeal unless supporting materials are already on record. It is now well settled by the apex court right from Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 : 1981 (3) SCC 103 till the recent case of Babu Kashinath Bhimge v. Samat, 1994 (3) Supp SCC 698 that while considering a case for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement the appellate court should take into consideration the material subsequent events which have occurred after the institution of the suit. " ( 20 ) BANKA Behari Dutta v. Gour Mohan Dutta reported in AIR 1981 Cal 185 , the case stands on a different footing. In that case despite pleading, no issue had been framed but evidences had been adduced and thus, it was held that the decree passed was good in law. " ( 20 ) BANKA Behari Dutta v. Gour Mohan Dutta reported in AIR 1981 Cal 185 , the case stands on a different footing. In that case despite pleading, no issue had been framed but evidences had been adduced and thus, it was held that the decree passed was good in law. ( 21 ) IN Babu Kashinath Bhinge v. Samast Lingayat Cavali and Ors. reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 698, the apex court held on facts of the case that the bona fide requirement was pleaded and proved. It further came to the conclusion that no hardship had been caused to the appellant in passing a decree for partial eviction. ( 22 ) IN Trilok Chandra Jain v. Hirendra Kumar Mitter and Ors. reported in 90 Calwn 1086, again the plaintiff made requisite averments but no issue had been framed and in that situation it was held that the decree is not a nullity. ( 23 ) IN Sourendra Nath Rudra v. Ashim Kumar Bhattacharjee reported in 86 CWN 819, a learned single Judge took the same view in a similar fact situation. ( 24 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, however, has drawn our attention to a decision in Sibapada Roy v. Sudhangsu Kumar Sen reported in AIR 1980 Cal 90 , wherein a learned single Judge has held that in absence of any finding that the landlord was not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation the decree would be bad for want of inherent jurisdiction. ( 25 ) IT is not necessary for this court to consider the correctness of the said decision in view of the order proposed to be passed by us. The decisions referred to hereinbefore in no uncertain terms show that an opportunity should be given to the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as to bring his case within the four corners of section 13 (1) (ff) which has become all the more necessary in view of the subsequent event pleaded by the parties. Having regard to the subsequent events, we are of the opinion that an opportunity should be granted to the plaintiff to amend the plaint suitably so as to enable the court to frame an appropriate issue in terms of section 13 (1) (ff) as also an issue relating to the continuity of bona fide and reasonable requirement of the plaintiffs in the changed situation. As the substituted plaintiffs would have to amend their pleadings substantially which in turn, would entitle the defendant to file an additional written statement we are of the opinion that the entire suit should be remitted back to the learned trial Judge and the matter afresh be considered in the light of the issues which may be framed after the substituted plaintiffs amend their plaints, if any. ( 26 ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, the judgement and decree passed by the learned trial Judge is set aside and the appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned hereinbefore and the suit is remitted back to the learned trial Judge in terms of Order 41 rule 23a of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case the learned trial Judge is directed to conclude the hearing of the suit and dispose of the matter at an early date and preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of communication of this order. In the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. B. Bhattacharya, J.-I agree. Later : let the lower court's records be sent down immediately through a special messenger at the costs of the respondent. Such costs be paid within one week from date. Appeal allowed