Judgment 1. The petitioners are the accused in C.C.No.51 of 1997. 2. A case was registered in Crime No.176 of 1997, by the Inspector of Police, Kodumudi Police Station, under Secs.341, 323, 324, 506(ii) and 435 of I.P.C. on the complaint of one Palaniyammal against the petitioners herein. The complaint is that there was a dispute with regard to a pathway between the complainant and her brother. On 10.5.1997, at about 1 p.m., the complainant was proceeding in the disputed pathway for the purpose of drawing water. The sons of the complainant were taking food at that time. At that time, the 1st accused Duraisamy and his wife Arukkani, the second accused questioned the complainant as to how she could come by the said pathway, to which the complainant replied that she also had a right over the pathway. Immediately, the 1st accused took out a stick and hit the complainant, who sustained injury on her right back. Hearing the cry of the complainant, her sons came there and at that time, the 2nd accused Arukkani took out a iron rod and attacked Dakshinamoorthy, the son of the complainant and caused him bleeding injuries on his occipital region. When she again tried to hit Dakshinamoorthy, the complainant intervened and sustained injuries on her right hand. The younger son of the complainant viz., Maheswaran was fisted on his back by Duraisamy. Then Duraisamy threatened that he would do away with the family of the complainant and set fire to the hayrack kept hear to the house of the complainant. 3. On this complainant, investigation was made, charge sheet was laid on 21.6.1997 and the case was taken on file in C.C.No.51 of 1997 by the District Munsif cum Judicial Magistrate Kodumudi. 4. A complaint was given on 10.5.1997 by Arukkani against Palaniyammal, Dakshinamoorthy and Maheswaran, which was registered under Secs.341, 323, 325 and 324 of I.P.C. The complainant Arukkani alleged in the complaint that her husband had given 50 cents of land to Palaniammal for her residence. The complainant has laid pipeline for irrigation. When the accused wanted the complainant to allow them to take water through the said pipeline, the complainant refused and there was a talk about the same, on 10.5.1997. After the talks were over, the complainants husband along with the complainant went by TVS.50 to the field. The complainant has laid pipeline for irrigation. When the accused wanted the complainant to allow them to take water through the said pipeline, the complainant refused and there was a talk about the same, on 10.5.1997. After the talks were over, the complainants husband along with the complainant went by TVS.50 to the field. When the complainants husband neared the house of Palanaiammal, he was forcibly and unlawfully restrained by Palaniammal, her sons Dakshinamoorthy and Maheswaran, and they beat the complainants husband. When the complainant questioned them as to why they are attacking her husband, she was also attacked, and in that transaction, she sustained injuries on her right elbow, left elbow, left thigh, where she was attacked with knife. Accused Dakshinamoorthy cut her with aruval on her fore-head and caused bleeding injuries. The son of the complainant reported the matter to Chinnasamy, a relative of the complainant, who came there and took the complainant and her husband and admitted them into the Government Erode Hospital. 5. After investigation, chargesheet was laid on 21.6.1997, and the case was taken on file by the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Kodumudi in C.C.No.74 of 1997. Both the cases are now pending for trial before the court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the police failed to follow the direction specified in Madras Police Standing Orders 588-A and the police ought to have referred one of the cases as mistake of fact and charge sheeted the other case after finding who are the aggressors and that there cannot be two cases relating to the same transaction. Therefore, the act of the police in filing charge sheet in both the cases is against the provisions of 588-A of the Madras Police Standing Orders. Therefore, on this ground, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the proceedings in C.C.No.51 of 1997 has to be quashed. 7. Let me now reproduce the Madras Police Standing Order 588-A. ‘In a complaint and counter complaint obviously arising out of the same transaction the Investigating Officer should enquire into both of them and adopt one or the other of the two courses viz., (1) to charge the case whether the accused were the aggressors or (2) to refer both the cases if he should find them untrue. When the investigating officer proceeds on the basis of the complaint it is his duty to exhibit the counter complaint in the court and also to prove medical certificates of persons wounded on the opposite side. He should place before the court a definite case which he asks it to accept. The Investigating Officer in such cases should not accept one complaint and examine only witnesses who support it and give no explanation at all for the injuries caused to the other side. The truth in these cases is invariably not in strict conformity with either complaint and it is quite necessary that all the facts are placed before the court to enable it to arrive at the truth and a just decision. If the investigating officer finds that the choice of either course is difficult viz., to charge one of the two cases or to throw out both, he should seek the opinion of the Public Prosecutor of the District and act accordingly. A final report should be sent in respect of the case ref erred as mistake of law and the complainant or the counter-complainant, as the case may be should be advised about the disposal by a notice in F.96 and to seek remedy before the specified Magistrate, if he is aggrieved by the disposal of the case by Police’. (G.O.Ms.No.182, Home, dated 23.1.1958). 8. Standing Order is but a rule of instruction as to how a thing should be done. It is in the nature of a guideline. The buildings of this Court, on this aspect, about the effect of the compliance or noncompliance with the Standing Order 588-A is not uniform. Singaravelu, J., in the decision reported in Ranganathan, V.R. v. State Ranganathan, V.R. v. State, 1985 L. W. (Crl.) 86 had observed that the Police Standing Orders cannot be said a statue but only a set of rules framed for the guidance of the Investigating Officers and therefore, a violation of a Standing Order in the matter of investigation will not constitute an illegality and that a violation of the Police Standing Orders is not by itself a ground for quashing the criminal proceedings and it is a matter to be decided on the merits of the case after receiving evidence. 9. 9. A similar view was taken by Arunachalam, J. in the decision reported in Karthikeayan and four others v. Stage by S.I. of Police and eleven others Karthikeayan and four others v. Stage by S.I. of Police and eleven others , 1992 L.W. (Crl.) 74 He held that non-observance of Police Standing Orders will not constitute illegality as it has no statutory force and the provision is only directory and not mandatory. It is further observed by him that it is nothing more than administrative instruction and a failure to following the same cannot give rise to a right to get the proceedings quashed under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. 10. The Supreme Court has held in the decision reported in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal State of Andhra Pradesh v. Venugopal, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 33 as follows: “It is contended that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for investigation of crime are suspected by this Standing Order and so the Investigation by the Inspector, C.I.D., was illegal. In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. It appears to us that this Standing Order is nothing more than administrative instructions by the Government of Madras and has not the force of law. It is worth noticing in this connection that in the Madras Police Standing Orders as published by the Government of Madras, it is mentioned in the prefatory note that the orders marked with asterisk were issued by the Inspector General of Police under Sec.9 of the Madras District Police Act. The Standing Order 145 is not marked with asterisk and it could be safely held that it was not issued under Sec.9 of the Madras District Police Act. The marginal note against the order as pointed shows that it was issued by a Government Order of the Home Department dated October 12, 1955. It does not appear that this was done under any statutory authority. There can be no doubt that quite apart from the fact that the Government may and often should issue instructions to its officers* including police officers, such instructions have not, however, the authority of law. We are not satisfied, therefore, that the Standing Order No.145 had the force of law. We are further of opinion that, in any case, the requirement of this order was merely directory and not mandatory. We are not satisfied, therefore, that the Standing Order No.145 had the force of law. We are further of opinion that, in any case, the requirement of this order was merely directory and not mandatory. Non-compliance with the provisions of this order, therefore does not make the investigation of the case illegal“ 11. Paul, J., in the decision reported in A.R. Veerapandian v. State by the Collector of North Arcot at Vellore A.R. Veerapandian v. State by the Collector of North Arcot at Vellore , 1979 L.W. (Crl.) 165 has observed as follows: ‘The Madras Police Standing Orders do not show that they were rules framed under any statute. prima facie they appear to be administrative orders relating to the work of the police department. The Tamil Nadu District Police Act does not confer”any powers to frame rules under the Act. An enquiry under Order 145 of the Police Standing Orders which prescribes the procedure to be adopted in regard to charges of torture or causing death or hurt against police officials cannot be said to be a rule framed under Sec.50 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act.‘ 12. In his judgment, Arunachalam, J. after referring to the judgments reported in Vellapandy Thevar v. State Vellapandy Thevar v. State , 1984 L. W. (Crl.) 257. of Kader, J. Justin v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police Justin v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police , 1988 L.W. (Crl.) 467 of Janarthanam, J., and Ekambaram v. Sundaramurthy and another Ekambaram v. Sundaramurthy and another, (1989)1 Crimes. 458 ofDavid Annoussamy, J. held that the above decisions, considered only the procedure to be followed and did not consider the statutory force of the order. 13. S.T.Ramalingam, J. in the decision reported in 1989 L. W. (Crl) 400, after referring to the judgments of S.A.Kader, J., P.N.Ramaswami, J. and Singaravelu, J., ultimately concluded that Police Standing Orders 588-A has not statutory force and the non observance by the Investigating Officer to follow the said Police Standing Orders was not an illegality. 14. The Apex Court has held in the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Rajkumar State of Punjab v. Rajkumar, A.I.R. 1988S.C. 805 that the rules like the Police Standing Orders were notintend to replace and cannot certainly override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. 14. The Apex Court has held in the decision reported in State of Punjab v. Rajkumar State of Punjab v. Rajkumar, A.I.R. 1988S.C. 805 that the rules like the Police Standing Orders were notintend to replace and cannot certainly override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Administrative instructions were issued in Police Standing Orders 588-A following a decision of P.N.Ramaswami, J. in Ramakrishnayyas case. Therefore, merely because the provisions of the Standing Orders have not been followed by the Investigating Agency in a particular case, one cannot say merely on that basis hold that there is an illegality attached to the same which would give rise to the exercise the power under Sec.482 of the Crl.P.C. to quash the proceedings. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice the decision by a Bench of this Court reported in Ranganthan and others v. State Ranganthan and others v. State, 1996 L.W. (Crl.) 48 Though in the headnotes of the decision, a reference is made, I do not find the decision throwing any light upon the aspects of the case on hand. The decision of the Bench consisting of David Annousamy and Janarathanam, JJ.. reported in 1989 L.W. (Crl.) 415 only concerns the procedure to be adopted. The statutory force of at is not directly on the point not it was canvassed for consideration. It only sets out the duty cast upon the Investigation. It only sets out the duty cast upon the Investigating Officer under Police Standing Order 588-A and it has been observed that the Police Officer in that case has not proceeded according to the instructions given in the Madras Police Standing Orders. Therefore, on the strength of the same, the appeal was allowed. It is not a case where the legality of the order was questioned. 16. Similarly, the decisions reported in M.Krishnaraj and others (accused B party) v. State represented by the Sub Inspector of Police M.Krishnaraj and others (accused B party) v. State represented by the Sub Inspector of Police , 1992 L. W. (Crl.) 406 and Justin v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police7 Justin v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police7, 1988 L. W. (Crl.) 46 refer to the procedure to be adopted by a Police Officer in such cases. The same Bench consisting of David Annousamy and Janarthanam, JJ., again, in the decision reported in 1990 L.W. (Crl.) 151 observed the procedure to be adopted by the Police Officer concerned, It was a decision rendered on an appeal and it was not on a petition filed under Sec.482 of Crl.P.C. to quash the proceedings on the basis that failure to comply vitiates the proceedings. 17. Shivappa, J. has held in the decision reported in S.Jothilingam and fortysix others v. State, represented by D.S.P. (Crime Branch), C.I.D. CBE-12 S.Jothilingam and fortysix others v. State, represented by D.S.P. (Crime Branch), C.I.D. CBE-12 , (1995)2 L.W. (Crl.) 438 that allegation of failure on the part of the police in examining witnesses mentioned in the private complaint and on that ground petition filed to quash the proceedings alleging that police have not followed the procedure laid down in Standing Orders 588-A, will not justify the invocation of power under Sec.482 to quash the proceedings. 18. The Apex Court has held in the Ruling reported in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh (1994)3 S.C.C. 299 that provisionsrelating to public duties are generally directory, though the proposition was laid down in construing the provisions of NDRS Act. The Ruling of the Apex Court is directly on the point as it states clearly that it has to be construed as directory in nature. 19. Thus we find that Standing Order 588-A is not a mandatory one but directory in nature. Failure to follow the same will not bring in its wake any illegality. It is at best, non-compliance, of certain instructions issued by the head of the police department. Therefore, 1 am to hold that the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the proceedings should be quashed on the ground that an illegality has been committed by the investigating officer concerned, have no merit. Failure to comply with administrative instructions and circulars cannot be put on par with an act of illegality nor can be held to corrupt the entire proceedings. For guidance, certain procedure is indicated in the standing order. Therefore, which of the version is true and who is the aggressor is a matter to be decided by the Court as observed by Singaravelan, J. in his judgment. For guidance, certain procedure is indicated in the standing order. Therefore, which of the version is true and who is the aggressor is a matter to be decided by the Court as observed by Singaravelan, J. in his judgment. The investigating officer cannot take the role of a judge to decide as to which of the two version is correct. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not urge any other point for consideration. 20. In the result, the petition is dismissed. Consequently, Crl.M.P.Nos.7172 and 7173 of 1997 shall stand closed.