Judgment :- S.S. SUBRAMANI J. This revision is filed under article 227 of the Constitution of India, by the third respondent in Transferred Application No. 100 of 1996, on the file of the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Madras. The respondent herein filed C.S. No. 852 of 1989 on the original side of this court. When the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 came into force, the suit was transferred before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, and was numbered as Transferred Application No. 100 of 1996. The respondent filed the suit against the defendant for recovery of more than Rs. 21 lakhs and interest at quarterly rests, and for consequential reliefs. From the body of the plaint, it could be seen that the first defendant-company availed of financial assistance in the nature of term loan and cash credit facilities, as per application dated January 19, 1985. The same was sanctioned by the respondent as per sanction letter dated December 30, 1985. As security for the loan, machineries were hypothecated, computers, floppies, ribbons software and computer systems were also hypothecated. The first defendant-company was not satisfied with the amount advanced, and it again requested the respondent-bank for further and additional loan in the nature of cash credit pledge, inland letter of credit and import letter of credit. As per sanction letter dated October 28, 1986, those facilities were also granted, and existing security already given continued as collateral securities for the additional facilities also, apart from other securities. There was default in payment, and on enquiry, it was found that the first defendant is not even doing any business. The sales tax authorities had also attached the machineries, and the first defendant challenged the attachment before judgment by the sales tax authorities before this court, and the same was vacated. On enquiry, it was further found that the first defendant had violated many terms and conditions of the loan which necessitated the filing of the suit for recovery of more than Rs. 21 lakhs.After the case was transferred to the Tribunal, the third defendant filed I.A. No. 143 of 1997, contending that the transfer application was not maintainable before the Tribunal and, therefore, the matter has to be sent back to the High Court. The reason was that the loan was granted under two transactions and the same constitutes two different causes of action. The reason was that the loan was granted under two transactions and the same constitutes two different causes of action. Under rule 10 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993, an application must be confined to one cause of action, and if so made, the claim will be under Rs. 10 lakhs only and, therefore, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction. Only for the purpose of getting jurisdiction to the Tribunal, both the causes of action have been combined and a demand is made for more than Rs. 21 lakhs. It is contended that the loan was granted under two sanction letters and the defendants have executed separate documents and, therefore, the suit is bad for misjoinder of causes of action. The suit cannot be tried by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. A detailed counter-affidavit was filed by the respondent-bank. According to it, in the main application, the loan was granted for two facilities and the additional loan was granted only for the purpose of helping the defendant to establish an industry. Even though the loan was under two transactions, the intention was to treat the same as one cause of action. It is also said that the guarantee deeds are the same, and so long as there is only one security, the causes of action cannot be split up. Therefore, the suit is maintainable, and the Tribunal has got jurisdiction to dispose of the case. By the impugned order, the Tribunal held that the application is maintainable and dismissed the I.A. The same is challenged under article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner reiterated the contentions that were raised before the Tribunal. Learned counsel submitted that the loan was granted under two different documents and it was also sanctioned in two different years. Therefore, both these transactions cannot be clubbed together and a demand cannot be made for more than Rs. 21 lakhs, so as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Learned counsel relied on rule 10 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993.As against the said contention, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that rule 10 has to be read along with section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which deals with "transfer of pending cases". Learned counsel relied on rule 10 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993.As against the said contention, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that rule 10 has to be read along with section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, which deals with "transfer of pending cases". Learned counsel also submitted that even under rule 10, there is an exception, and the case on hand comes under that exception. Learned counsel also submitted that the cause of action referred to in rule 10 should not be strictly construed as is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner. I heard learned counsel for both parties in detail. Rule 10, referred to above, reads thus : "10. Plural remedies. - An application shall not seek relief or reliefs based on more than a single cause of action in one single application unless the reliefs prayed for are consequential to one another." The important section that has to be taken into consideration is, section 31 of the Act, which reads thus : "31. Transfer of pending cases. - (1) Every suit or other proceeding pending before any court immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal shall stand transferred on the date to such Tribunal : Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court. (2) Where any suit or other proceeding stands transferred from any court to a Tribunal under sub-section (1), - (a) the court shall, as soon as may be after such transfer, forward the records of such suit or other proceeding to the Tribunal; and (b) the Tribunal may, on receipt of such records, proceed to deal with such suit or other proceeding, so far as may be, in the same manner as in the case of an application made under section 19 from the stage which was reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may be deem fit." The purpose of the enactment is to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. Accordingly, the Debt Recovery Tribunals were established by the Central Government. They were directed to frame their own procedure. It was further said that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code may not apply. In the "preamble" portion of the Act, we get the Objects and Reasons of the Act. The relevant portion of the preamble reads thus : "Banks and financial institutions at present face considerable difficulties in recovering the dues from the clients and enforcement of security charged to them due to the delays in the legal processes. A significant portion of the funds of the banks and financial institutions is thus blocked in unproductive assets, the values of which keep deteriorating with the passage of time. Banks also incur substantial amounts of expenditure by way of legal charges which add to their overheads. The question of speeding up the process of recovery was examined in great detail by a Committee set up by the Government under the chairmanship of the late Sri Tiwari. The Tiwari Committee recommended, inter alia, the setting up of special Tribunals which could expedite the recovery process". In a recent decision of the Karnataka High Court in Smt. Gerty Suvarna v. Union of India 1998 (92) CC 782 ; ILR 1998 Kar 1131, a similar question came up for consideration. In that case, two loans were availed of by the debtor, one a housing loan and the other a car loan. Both these loans were clubbed together and an application was filed before the Tribunal for recovery of the amount due to the bank, by sale of the mortgaged properties. Even though two loans were availed of, the security was the same. Two questions were raised before the High Court, namely (1) what is "cause of action" or "single cause of action"? and (2) whether the application violates rule 10 ? The learned judge said that housing loan and car loan are governed by two loan documents executed by the petitioner and there are two distinct and separate transactions under different contracts even though the creditor and debtor are the same. The learned judge further said that a single relief does not mean a single cause of action, nor do several reliefs necessarily signify several causes of action. The learned judge further said that a single relief does not mean a single cause of action, nor do several reliefs necessarily signify several causes of action. The learned judge further went on and said that there can be several reliefs based on a single cause of action and a single relief based on several causes of action. The court held that the bank's application is based on more than a single cause of action. Then the learned judge considered the second question, namely, whether the application violates rule 10 ? The learned judge said that rule 10 consists of two parts. The first part requires that the relief or reliefs claimed in the application should be based on a single cause of action, which implies a bar on filing a single application on the basis of several causes of action. The second part of the rule contains the exception to the said rule. It provides that where the reliefs prayed for are consequential to each other, then the application may relate to more than a single cause of action. The learned judge considered as to what is meant by the expression "consequential to each other". It was held thus (pages 788-90) : "The word 'consequential' means 'happening as a direct result of an event or situation [Collins Co-build English Dictionary. It is the correlative of the word 'cause' and is the 'result following in natural sequence from an event which is adapted to produce, or to aid in producing such result' (Black's Law Dictionary)] - the effect of the second part of rule 10 is that where the relief's cannot be split, and seeking a particular relief or set of reliefs necessarily involves enforcing more than one cause of action, then it is permissible to file a single application in regard to more than a single cause of action. The words 'reliefs prayed for are consequential to one another' are not to be confused with the words 'consequential reliefs'. Consequential relief is a relief which flows directly, as a natural sequence from, and incidental to, the main and substantive relief. It is not something that is claimed independently as a substantive relief. It is wholly connected to the main or substantive relief and, therefore, arises from the same cause of action which gives rise to the substantive relief. Consequential relief is a relief which flows directly, as a natural sequence from, and incidental to, the main and substantive relief. It is not something that is claimed independently as a substantive relief. It is wholly connected to the main or substantive relief and, therefore, arises from the same cause of action which gives rise to the substantive relief. A consequential relief is covered by and included in the first part of rule 10 which enables an application being filed seeking 'relief or reliefs' based on a 'single cause of action'. On the other hand, the words 'consequential to one another', mean that each of the reliefs may be a main and substantive relief which need not flow from the other and which may be based on different causes of action, but which are connected or linked, and claiming of one necessarily involves or requires claiming of the other or vice versa. The second part of rule 10, therefore, permits reliefs, based on more than one cause of action being claimed in an application, provided they are so connected that seeking of one, requires seeking of the other, either as of necessity or on account of a statutory mandate.A typical illustration in regard to the exception contained in the second part of rule 10 is, where the borrower has given a common security to two separate loans, by creating two mortgages or by a single mortgage. In such an event, even though non-payment of the two loans may give rise to two causes of action, the common relief claimed is enforcing the mortgage; and enforcement of the mortgage in regard to one loan requires enforcement of the mortgage in regard to the other loan, having regard to section 67A of the Transfer of Property Act, even though the causes of action for the two loans are different. Where different loans (furnishing different causes of action) are secured by two or more mortgages of the same property, section 67A of the Transfer of Property Act, compels the mortgagee to sue on all the mortgages in respect of which the mortgage money has become due, by bringing a single action. Where different loans (furnishing different causes of action) are secured by two or more mortgages of the same property, section 67A of the Transfer of Property Act, compels the mortgagee to sue on all the mortgages in respect of which the mortgage money has become due, by bringing a single action. That is, as a consequence of seeking the relief of enforcement of the mortgage in respect of one loan (which is the subject of one cause of action), the mortgagee is required to seek the relief of enforcing the other mortgage in regard to the other loan (non-payment of which furnishes a different cause of action). Thus, the reliefs in regard to two separate loans covered by two mortgages of the same property, become consequential to one another. Therefore, a single original application under section 19 to recover the amounts due under two or more accounts (giving rise to more than a single cause of action) is not barred by rule 10 where the amounts due are covered by two or more mortgages of the same immovable property. The position would be no different even if two or more loans are secured by a single mortgage instead of several mortgages." The very same question came for consideration in Jay Jee Service Station. v. Syndicate Bank wherein the decision in Gerty Suvarna (Smt.) v. Union of India 1998 (92) CC 782 (Kar) was also considered. That was a case where the suit was filed on the original side of the High Court and subsequently transferred as in the case before me. The question was, whether the Tribunal has got jurisdiction, and, what is the scope of section 31(1) of the Act. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, a learned judge of the Karnataka High Court has considered as to what is meant by the expression "cause of action". It was held thus (page 431) : "The expression 'cause of action' has not been defined either by the Act or the Procedure Rules framed thereunder. Even the Civil Procedure Code does not provide any definition for that expression. There is all the same a profusion of judicial authority as to the meaning that can be assigned to the expression. Generally speaking, the expression has been understood to mean the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in support of his right to the judgment. Even the Civil Procedure Code does not provide any definition for that expression. There is all the same a profusion of judicial authority as to the meaning that can be assigned to the expression. Generally speaking, the expression has been understood to mean the bundle of facts which the plaintiff must prove in support of his right to the judgment. The expression has a dual meaning, one relevant to the jurisdiction of the court and the other to the basis of claim. When seen in the context of the basis of a claim, the expression has a restricted meaning whereas if used in relation to the jurisdiction of the court, it enjoys a wider meaning. In the restricted sense, it includes facts, constituting infringement of the right and is thus the cause which is the foundation of the suit whereas in the wider sense it includes the facts constituting the right itself - Jaharlal Pagalia v. Union of India, 1959 AIR(Cal) 273." In paragraph 12, the learned judge has considered three situations that may arise in relation to suits that may be transferred in terms of section 31 of the Act. Situation (1) is, suits in which more than one cause of action have been joined by the plaintiff but the debt claimed on the basis of each one of such causes of action is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal being more than Rs. 10 lakhs or such other amount as the Central Government may by a notification specify. The learned judge has said that in such cases there would be no difficulty either in the transfer of the suits or trial thereof by the Tribunals. Situation (2) is, of cases in which one of the causes of action joined by the plaintiff in the civil suit is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but the rest being for a lesser amount are not. Even in such cases in the absence of any provision which may require the Tribunal to reject the plaint or direct the splitting of the cause of action for separate trials, the transfer of the entire suit including the causes of action which have been joined and which may not otherwise have been within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be permissible. The learned judge further said that the third category of cases is, where the debts claimed on the basis of different transactions individually are for amounts less than the one prescribed under section 1(4) of the Act, but cumulatively go beyond the amount prescribed by the said provision. The real difficulty is encountered only in this class of cases, for it is here that not only does the expression "cause of action" appearing in section 31 assumes importance, but even the question whether different transactions constitute one single cause of action arises for determination. The learned judge went on and said thus (page 433) : "A liberal interpretation notwithstanding if what is joined in the suit are distinctly different causes of action, each one of which is for a debt less than the amount prescribed under section 1(4), such a suit may not be transferable simply because the total amount claimed is for an amount beyond the minimum. Even the widest of interpretations of the term 'cause of action' cannot support the argument that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try the same should be determined by reference to the sum total of the claims based on all the causes of action available against the defendant no matter that each such cause of action is unconnected with the other and would not have been triable by the Tribunal if the same had arisen after its establishment. This is however, subject to the caveat, that the causes of action joined in the suit are different. This difference must be real and not just superficial. Just because the borrower has taken more than one facilities or executed more than one set of documents may not be conclusive of the matter. Such transactions or series of transactions may be no more than links in the chain of an overall scheme which the bank or the financial institution may have agreed to or conceived in relation to a particular project or business. Whether or not, therefore, different facilities extended to the defendant would constitute different transactions independent of each other so as to give rise to different causes of action will have to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case. It is too broad a proposition to say that execution of separate documents or grant of separate banking facilities can in no situation constitute one single cause of action. It is too broad a proposition to say that execution of separate documents or grant of separate banking facilities can in no situation constitute one single cause of action. Take for instance, a case in which the banks or the financial institution grants, a loan on the basis of a project report submitted to it for the purchase of land and machinery. Any such loan may be a part of an overall or a broader financial scheme or arrangement, whereunder the bank may also undertake to grant an overdraft facility for enabling the enterpreneur to carry on his business or an advance by way of working capital. The two transactions even though apparently independent may have an intrinsic co-relation with each other for one may be granted for the success of the other. In any such situation just because two sets of documents have been executed or two transactions have taken place at two different points of time that may not by itself give rise to two causes of action. When viewed in the wider perspective, such transactions may constitute one single cause of action capable of being brought before the Tribunal in a single action for recovery of the debt claimed. Suffice it to say that the question whether two or more than two different transactions constitute one cause of action shall have to be viewed in the context of the averments made in the plaint and the co-relation which is established between such transactions so as to give rise to a single cause of action." In view of these decisions which I feel, give the correct interpretation of the section, I do not think that the application could be rejected or cannot be maintained before the Tribunal. What the first defendant wanted was a package with the bank for the purpose of an industry under the name and style of "SIGA Computer Technologies Private Limited". It is for establishing the said industry. The loan was availed of before the bank. When the first facility was availed of, it was found to be not sufficient. Additional facilities were sought for only for the purpose of fulfilment of the earlier claim. The bank agreed to provide additional facilities. It is for establishing the said industry. The loan was availed of before the bank. When the first facility was availed of, it was found to be not sufficient. Additional facilities were sought for only for the purpose of fulfilment of the earlier claim. The bank agreed to provide additional facilities. In view of the decision in Jay Jee Service Station v. Syndicate Bank this case could be treated only on the basis of a single cause of action though different sets of documents have been executed at two different times, under separate sanction letters. Rule 10 is not violated since the case comes under an exception, even if it is treated to be under different causes of action. The securities are the same, and the facilities were availed of under a single deed of guarantee. If that be so, on the basis of Smt. Gerty Suvarna v. Union of India 1998 (92) CC 782 (Kar) this case also could be brought under the exception, and again it comes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In either way, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained. The civil revision petition is liable to be dismissed, and I do so. No costs. C.M.P. No. 17215 of 1997 for stay is also dismissed consequently.