Judgment :- 1. This revision is filed by the defendants in O.S. No. 213 of 1998 on the file of District Munsif Court, Kuzhithurai. The Revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order in I.A. 346 of 1998. 2. Third petitioner is the third defendant in the suit. She was appointed as Physical Instructor in the second respondent School. There is another candidate by name Ms. Pushpalatha for the same post but she was not selected. She filed a suit in O.S. No. 142 of 1998 on the file of District Munsif Court, Kuzhithurai on 7.4.1998 seeking for declaration that she alone was eligible for appointment to the post and the third petitioner herein is not eligible to be appointed and the appointment is null and void and also for mandatory injunction directing the school management to appoint her to the post. In that suit, she also filed I.A. No. 305 of 1998 seeking for interim injunction. But no interim order was granted. 3. Pushpalathas brother Thambiraj is the Joint Secretary in Parish Counsel Elavuvilai. The Secretary of the said Parish Counsel thereafter filed the present suit as O.S. No. 213 of 1998 for the same relief. It is stated in the plaint that so far as appointment in Catholic Schools are concerned the first defendant who is the Bishop has formulated Rules and Regulations, according to which whenever vacancies arise in any Catholic Schools, the Seniority list of respective Parish among the qualified candidate s is to be prepared by the Parish Priest in consultation with the concerned Parish Council. It is said that priority shall be given to the senior most qualified candidate. It is the case of the respondent herein that third petitioner is not a member of the Elavuvilai, Parish since she got married with Williams on 9.12.1989, who is of a nearby locality. It ‘is said that third petitioner seems to be a member of the said Parish in view of her marriage and therefore she cannot be in the list of members of Elavuvilai Parish and lost her rights. Without considering the said fact, second respondent has appointed third petitioner as physical Education Teacher. It is according to the respondent, against the rules prepared by Bishop himself and as Secretary of the Parish Council, he is entitled to challenge the act. Without considering the said fact, second respondent has appointed third petitioner as physical Education Teacher. It is according to the respondent, against the rules prepared by Bishop himself and as Secretary of the Parish Council, he is entitled to challenge the act. It is his further case that other eligible candidates’ rights have been affected and therefore the suit was filed to declare the appointment of third petitioner in the above school as null and void and for a decree for mandatory injunction, directing petitioners I and 2 herein to prepare Seniority list as contemplated as per the Rules and appoint eligible qualified candidate as Physical Education Teacher. 4. Along with the suit, interim application was filed and ad interim injunction was granted in which the management is not made a party. In the injunction application, third petitioner was alone impleaded initially. But as per the direction of the Court in a revision filed by the very same petitioners, the ad interim injunction was vacated and the lower Court was directed to dispose of the injunction application on merits within a specified time. Thereafter the impugned order was passed. 5. Since Caveat was entered by the respondent, the entire revision was heard at the time of admission itself. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that respondent has no locus standi to institute the suit and he is not an aggrieved person. Even according to the respondent what he wanted is only to prepare a seniority list as per the rules and therefore there cannot be any injunction against third petitioner so long as it is not prepared. It is further contended that for a suit for declaration plaintiff must show the ingredients under Section Relief Act and the same is absent. That apart respondent herein is only a puppet in the hands of other plaintiff Pushpalatha, who has already filed a suit and failed to apply interim application. Pushpalathas brother is the Joint Secretary in the Parish Council and respondent is the Secretary, and he readily obliged the request of Pushpalatha land her brother in filing the suit. 7. Even on merits, it is contended that the so called marriage of third petitioner was not in accordance with Cannons Law. It was on the basis of mutual agreement third petitioner declared herself as wife of one Williams and subsequently by another agreement, the arrangement was also discontinued. 7. Even on merits, it is contended that the so called marriage of third petitioner was not in accordance with Cannons Law. It was on the basis of mutual agreement third petitioner declared herself as wife of one Williams and subsequently by another agreement, the arrangement was also discontinued. So long as third petitioner is not the legally wedded wife in accordance with Cannon Law she can continue as a member of Elavuvilai Parish and she is the senior must member and Bishop was right in declaring that her marriage is invalid and she is entitled to all rights as member of the Parish and second petitioner is also competent to appoint her to the post. 8. As against the said contention, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the revision itself is not maintainable under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. According to him, petitioners have effective remedy of appeal under Order 43, Code of Civil Procedure and the jurisdiction of this Court should not be invoked. It is further contended that respondent has locus standi to institute the suit as Secretary of the Parish Council. It is for the Parish to maintain the seniority list and when he is the custodian of the records, he is entitled to agitate the rights of the Parish. He prayed for dismissal of the revisions. 9. The fact that Pushpalata filed a suit as O.S. 142 of 1998 on the file of very same Court is admitted by the respondent also. She was denied appointment and she is the aggrieved person. When she filed the suit and wanted interim order, the same was not granted. Immediately thereafter, the present suit is filed by the Secretary of the Parish Council. What is his interest in the appointment is not disclosed, except to state that he has got locus standi and custodian of the records. It is here the contention of petitioner will have to be considered. 10. Pushpalathas brother is the Joint Secretary and plaintiff is the Secretary of the same Parish Council. The request of Pushpalatha and her brother was readily obliged by the Secretary of the Parish Council in instituting the suit. It is here the contention of petitioner will have to be considered. 10. Pushpalathas brother is the Joint Secretary and plaintiff is the Secretary of the same Parish Council. The request of Pushpalatha and her brother was readily obliged by the Secretary of the Parish Council in instituting the suit. When the aggrieved person failed in her attempt to get interim order and another person was asked to file the suit for the same purpose, in which he has no personal interest, it could be assumed that he is only a puppet in the hands of the aggrieved person. Such a suit can never be treated as instituted bona fide. The Court should not be misused for vexatious litigations and to protect some others under the guise of bona fide action. So long as plaintiff is not interested in the suit and when he is not seeking appointment, he is incompetent to file the suit. His status as Secretary of the Parish Council, will not give him locus standi to institute this suit. As rightly contended, respondent herein is only name lender for Pushpalatha and real plaintiff is Pushpalatha herself. 11. I hold that the suit is filed only with the intention of getting interim order through process of Court and the action is not bona fide. 12. According to the respondent is not entitled to content about the merits of the case. But since he argued the matter on merits, and the same was accepted by lower Court by granting injunction. I am bound to consider the same. 13. According to respondent, third petitioner ceased to be member, since she is married to a member of another Parish. It is his case of automatical cessation of membership and her name cannot be included in this Parish. There is a rule according to him that Bishop himself formed certain rules regarding appointment and now to consider seniority. On the basis of those rules, third petitioner cannot be considered to be a senior and there are other eligible persons to be considered for appointment. As against the said contention, it is represented that a member will cease to be a member only on her marriage. In this case, third petitioner is not married and there was only agreement. That is not a marriage according to Christian Law. As against the said contention, it is represented that a member will cease to be a member only on her marriage. In this case, third petitioner is not married and there was only agreement. That is not a marriage according to Christian Law. It is one an agreement between a man and woman to live as husband and wife. Subsequently, that agreement as also revoked and they are living apart. According to the Counsel such an arrangement is never treated as marriage under Christian Law and even if there was an agreement that was also put an end to by another agreement and third petitioner all along continued to be the member of the Parish. It is also said that the Bishop considered this question in consultation with various Cannonists and declared that the third petitioner still continues as member of the Parish. It is also said that the Rules framed by the Bishop has no force of Law and the same cannot be enforced in a Court of Law. The institution is run by an Educational Agency and it is for the Agency to decide as to who is to be appointed taking into consideration the qualifications. 14. After having considered these contentions. I feel that the Petitioners” argument is only to be accepted. The self-framed Rules of Bishop cannot be enforced in a Court of Law. What is the nature of those instructions and how far they could be enforced in a Court of Law, could not be explained by the learned Counsel for the respondent. At the most, it could be said as guidelines of Self-imposed instructions. Regarding an appointment to a recognised School, we are onh concerned about the qualification and eligibility and that must be in accordance with relevant Statue. It is not the case of the respondent that third petitioner is not eligible to be appointed taking into consideration her qualifications as per the Statute. The Educational Agency is entitled to appoint a qualified person and that is nothing to concern about the so called” instructions issued by the Bishop. 15. Even the other contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioners that there was no marriage between the third petitioner and Williams, is only to be accepted. Under Christian Law marriage is a Sacrament and not a contract. It cannot be solemnized by executing documents. 15. Even the other contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioners that there was no marriage between the third petitioner and Williams, is only to be accepted. Under Christian Law marriage is a Sacrament and not a contract. It cannot be solemnized by executing documents. If a man and woman live under the same roof, that can only be treated as cohabitation by a man and woman and not as husband and wife. It is only an agreement to cohabit with no legal sanctions. It is only by virtue of marriage the right of the third petitioner as a member of the Parish (would cease. In fact Clause 10 of the so called instructions of the Diocese of Kottar read thus, Tamil According to me, even without considering this aspect, third petitioner is entitled to be appointed so long as she is eligible under the Statute. 16. In a case where third petitioner has been appointed as Physical Education Teacher, can her appointment be injected on the basis of interim order? I do not think that the lower Court was justified in passing the impugned order under Order 39, Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure. Even when other party is heard, the lower Court will have to consider about the urgency of the matter and also the balance of convenience. In this case. Plaintiff who has no locus standi to file the suit cannot say that he got prima facie case. Naturally the other two grounds, balance of convenience and irreparable injury lose its importance when plaintiffs has no locus standi to file the suit and no prima facie case. 17. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that petitioners got right of appeal and that will bar the entertaining of revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot be accepted in this case. What petitioners allege is that the Court process is being misused for getting the interim order by a person who has no locus standi to file the suit. If it is the case of misuse of Court process, it is the duty of the Court to see that such actions are stopped for ever. That could be exercised only under judicial supervision of this Court. Even though appeal could be taken, it is not speedy raced. In this case. If it is the case of misuse of Court process, it is the duty of the Court to see that such actions are stopped for ever. That could be exercised only under judicial supervision of this Court. Even though appeal could be taken, it is not speedy raced. In this case. I find that plaintiff has misused the Court procedure and the suit is filed only at the instance of another person the details of which I have discussed supra. 18. As was held in 1998 AIR SCW 1166 ( K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi ), the Court has inherent powers to strike out the plaint in case where the machinery of the Court is being misused. In paragraph 43 of the judgment, their Lordships said thus, “The Court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed but depend on all the relevant circumstances . And for this purpose considerations of public policy and the interest of justice may be very material.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. In this case, if the plaintiff is allowed to continue with the suit, will it be in the interest of Justice? I do not think so. It amounts to harassment of the petitioners herein, especially when plaintiff has no locus standi to institute the suit. 20. Since I have held that plaintiff is only a puppet in the hands of Pushpalatha and her brother and the suit itself is instituted for their benefit and at their instance, the plaint is also liable to be struck off and I do so. I direct the lower Court to strike off the plaint. 21. In the result. I allow the Civil Revision Petition with cost, setting aside the interim order. The interim application filed by the respondent is dismissed. Advocate fees Rs. 2.500/- Consequently. C.M.P. No. 16051 of 1998 is closed.“