JUDGMENT This is an application for recalling and/or setting aside the ex parte decree passed by a Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court on 9the December, 1996 and also for various consequential reliefs. 2. Defendant No.2 made this application on his behalf and on behalf of defendant No.1. The defendant No.3 is not party to this application. The petitioners/defendants contended that they came to know about the ex parte decree for the first time on 6th December, 1997 when the Receiver was appointed in the execution proceeding visited the premises for the purpose of taking delivery of the possession. 3. They further contended that in April 1996 the petitioners contacted with their the then Advocate-on-record, Mr. J. Roychowdhury of M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. who, in turn, briefed one of the Counsel of this Court to draw a written statement on their behalf. In early May 1996 the petitioner attended the office of M/s. M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. and signed the written statement and vokalatnama in favour of M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. 4. It was also contended that the petitioner was surprised to learn that Sri Roychowdhury died on 8th July, 1997 and M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. being a sole proprietorship firm stood dissolved. 5. The petitioners were also informed that Sri Roychowdhury being seriously ill, had not attended his office for about 7/8 months before the date of his demise. Nobody was able to furnish any particulars in the office of M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. as to whether the written statement had been filed or not. Thereafter he has made enquiry through another Advocate and ultimately found that the written statement had not been filed in this Court. 6. One important factor is that by virtue of a decree, the decree-holder is vested with a right and such decree holder is naturally in a privileged position before a Court of law than a defaulting party. Therefore an application by such defaulting party has to be armed with Material particulars. 7. There is no explanation forthcoming as to what the petitioners/defendants did in between May 1996 when they have signed the vokalatname in favour of M/s. M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. and decree passed on 9th December, 1996 as well as from the date of the decree and the date of death of J. Roychowdhury representing M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. on 8th July, 1997. and decree passed on 9th December, 1996 as well as from the date of the decree and the date of death of J. Roychowdhury representing M/s M.K. Roychowdhury & Co. on 8th July, 1997. Unless and until such explanations with its full force are for the coming application will be lacking with material particulars on account of sufficient cause. This is more important because it is duty of the petitioners to remove the cloud of suspicion from the mind of the Court. 8. The another important feature is applicability of principle of estoppel in the following circumstances. The defendant No.2 in the meeting held by the Receiver on 6th December, 1997 under an order of a Single Bench of this Hon’ble Court in an execution proceeding expressly stated that they would hand over the decreetal properties to the Special Officer by 31st March, 1998. The petitioners have made an averment in the reply that such undertaking was given under coercion and undue influence and he should not be held to the same. It is very difficult to accept such case and I am not at all convinced with such submission. I have a reason of disbelieving such submission. The Special Officer, after all, an Officer of the Court as such he cannot Perform an unjust duty which may cause prejudice to a litigant. Moreover, if at all the Special Officer purported to have been unjust he would have been unjust by immediate eviction but when Special Officer in the meeting dated 6th December, 1997 had given about 4 months time to the defaulting party i.e. upto 31st March, 1998 to hand over decreetal properties to him, such Special Officer cannot be said to be unjust. The another aspect is that the petitioner did not take the aforesaid plea in the application but as and when the respondent/decree-holder took such plea in the affidavit-in-opposition, for the first time, took such defence in the affidavit in reply. 9. On the question of estoppel I have been takes to a passage from Broom’s Legal Maxim (10th Edition) pages 103 and 104 and a judgment reported in (1) 19 Indian Appeal 203, Sarat Chunder Dey & Ors. Vs. Gopal Chunder Laha & Ors. 9. On the question of estoppel I have been takes to a passage from Broom’s Legal Maxim (10th Edition) pages 103 and 104 and a judgment reported in (1) 19 Indian Appeal 203, Sarat Chunder Dey & Ors. Vs. Gopal Chunder Laha & Ors. at pages 215-216 thereof, that if a man, either by words or by conduct has intimated that he consent to an act which has been done, and that he will offer no opposition to it, although it could not have been lawfully done without consent, and he thereby induces others to do that from which the otherwise might have abstained he cannot question the legality of the act he had so sanctioned to the prejudice of those who have so given faith to his words or to the fair inference to be drawn from his conduct. 10. Therefore, this Court does not feel that such ground is valid and cogent defence in the application. 11. There are various ways to proceed with the case. A diligent litigant always try to ascertain the position of the suit and/or any proceedings when It was pending before the Court of law. After filling the vokalatnama if a litigant wants to sleep with it for an indefinite period awaiting for an Information from the office of the Advocate-on-record, such litigants should not be given any grace. All office of a Solicitor and Advocate-on-record always maintain records. They maintain their day book. They also maintain various skilled staffs for the same. They, therefore, illness of Advocate representing such offcie cannot be valid ground for not getting information for the future course of action. Therefore such ground is also not acceptable by this Court. 12. Initially the law was like that a lay client should not be made to suffer for laches. inaction and/or negligence on the part of their Advocate and it seemed such rule was absolute. This point was thoroughly considered in a judgment reported in (2) 1993(2) SCC 185 and it was held that an Advocate is agent of the party. His acts and statements within the limits of authority give to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. Though in certain situation, the Court may. This point was thoroughly considered in a judgment reported in (2) 1993(2) SCC 185 and it was held that an Advocate is agent of the party. His acts and statements within the limits of authority give to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. Though in certain situation, the Court may. In the Interest of Justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the Advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its Advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would mike the working of the system extremely difficult. The observation made in (3) Rafik’s case reported In AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1400: 1981 (2) SCC 788 must be understood In the facts and circumstances of the case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. A case of a litigant being a rustic ignorant villager cannot be equated with a litigant being a company having office in the city. 13. Similarly in this case the concerned defendant/petitioner and his family members are residents of the city of Calcutta and engaged a skilled Solicitor's firm having office just outside the campus of Calcutta High Court cannot equated with a rustic ignorant villager who are very often can be seen in the High Court Corridor waiting for their learned Advocates. In this context it can be remembered that there is a lot of difference in between an Individual member of the Bar and a firm of Solicitor/Advocate having office In the territory as prescribed under the Original Side Rules of a charted High Court. A litigant engaged a Solicitor/Advocate firm can get each and every information from their office irrespective of the presence of the concerned Solicitor/Advocate. Division Bench of our High Court in (4) 99 CWN 189. Shalimar Paints Ltd. Vs. Smt. Asoka Deb and Another, adopted the similar principle as laid down by the Supreme Court as stated earlier apart from other paints which are also very relevant in this context. 14. Division Bench of our High Court in (4) 99 CWN 189. Shalimar Paints Ltd. Vs. Smt. Asoka Deb and Another, adopted the similar principle as laid down by the Supreme Court as stated earlier apart from other paints which are also very relevant in this context. 14. This is a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act which was filed in this Court on 9th December, 1981 and a decree was passed on 9th December, 1996, i.e. after 15 Years from the date of institution. It is very difficult accept any submission after considering such long lapse of time. Provision of Section 6 of the Act made for special and speedy remedy one should not forget the same. 15. Under the circumstances, I do not find any justification of recalling and/or setting aside the ex parte decree consequently the order of execution either in merit or in law as such the same is liable to be dismissed. 16. Therefore, this application is dismissed but no order is passed as to costs. 17. Parties are to act on a signed copy minute of the operative part of the order. 18. At the time of delivering the judgment the plaintiff produced a Terms of Settlement duly signed by the defendant No.2 on his behalf and on behalf of the defendant No.1 being the main contesting defendants. Under such Terms of Settlement the defendant No. 2 on his behalf and on behalf of the defendant No.1 handed over peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to Shri Kali Nath Dutta, plaintiff No.2, on or before 31st of March 1998 to the satisfaction of the decree. 19. Leave is granted to the plaintiff to file the Terms of Settlement in this Court after due compliance with all the formalities as to the stamping, punching etc. 20. The Special Officer is also present before this Court. He has also furnished a report as to the handing over or delivery of possession which is also kept with the record. 21. The plaintiff is directed to pay a further 300 G.Ms. to the Special Officer towards his final remuneration. All parties concerned including the Special Officer and the Department are to act on a xeroxed signed copy of the operative portion of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking.