In the writ application the legality and validity of the award dated 27. .9.0 passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Manipur in Claim Application No,12 of 1989 is challenged on the ground that he is not the authority as contemplated in section 15 (1) of the Payment of Wages Act. 2.1 have heard Sri N. Ibotombi Singh, learned Advocate for the petitioner, Shri N. Jotindro Singh, learned Advocate who assisted this Court as Amicus Curiae and Shri L. Shymkishor Singh, learned Govt.. Advocate for the respondents. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submits as follows: (i) The Deputy Labour Commissioner was never appointed as the authority under section 15 (1) of Payment Wages Act. (ii) That in the award benefits have been given to certain persons who are not entitled to this benefit. 3. It may be stated herein that an application was filed by 272 persons before the respondent No. 1 claiming it to be the authority under the Payment of Wages Act for the reliefs claimed in that application. That is Annexure A/1 to the writ application. In that application also the list of persons with the amount available to them was also annexed. The whole controversy in this case arose because of the orders by the Governor of Manipur vide Annexure A/2 to the writ application that is quoted below : "Government of Manipur :: Finance Department (Pay Implementation Cell) Orders by the Governor : Manipur Imphal, the 18th January 1988. No.3/9/86-PIC(Pt): In continuation of this Government's notification of even number dated 30.12.1987 regarding the Manipur Services (Revised Pay) Rules, 1987 the Governor of Manipur is pleased to order that the arrears of pay drawn by any Government servant in respect of the relevant period i.e. from 1.1.1986 to 31.10.1987, shall be deposited to the General Provident Fund Account of the Government servant and no withdrawal shall be allowed from this amount for a period of one year from the date of deposition to the General Provident Fund Account of the employee. However, the arrear amount of revised pay effective from 1.1.1986 shall be paid in cash to those employees who ceased to be in Government service during the relevant period. 2. However, the arrear amount of revised pay effective from 1.1.1986 shall be paid in cash to those employees who ceased to be in Government service during the relevant period. 2. It is further ordered that the said amount to be deposited/credited in the General Provident Fund Account of the Government servant should be the remaining balance after adjusting the outstanding Licence Fee (House Rent) if any, referred to under Finance Department's Officer Memorandum No.2/10/78-PIC dated 1.1.1988." 4. This order was also accepted by the Corporation. On 9.1.90 the authority issued a notice and on receipt of the notice the Addl Labour Officer of the Corporation appeared before the authority. No show cause was submitted to Addl Labour Officer and he examined himself and he admitted to the claim of the workmen and submitted the amount due shall be deposited. Thereafter, an inquiry was made by the authority and on inquiry it was found that no such amount was deposited as claimed by the Addl Labour Officer of the Corporation. Thereafter, the matter was heard and the award was passed. 5. To consider the first contention of learned Advocate for the petitioner, one should have a look at the notification dated 17th April, .1970, Annexure A/5 to the writ application by that notification certain Deputy Commissioners, as mentioned therein by notification, were appointed to be the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Thereafter on 14th September, 1971 a notification was issued by the authority that the persons appointed as Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Act shall be the authority to hear and decide under the said Payment of Wages Act, 1936, all claims arising out of deduction from the award or delay in the payment of wages to the persons/employee. Thereafter, on 4th November, 1984 vide Annexure A/7 the authority published a notification in the Gazette that whether the power which was earlier given to the Deputy Commissioner appointing them as Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act was withdrawn and the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Manipur was appointed as the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner for the whole of Manipur. This notification specially superseded the earlier order, Annexure A/5 to the writ application. But this order did not supersede the notification dated 14th September, 1971 meaning thereby that a person who is appointed as the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation shall also be deemed to be the Commissioner under the Payment of Wages Act. This notification specially superseded the earlier order, Annexure A/5 to the writ application. But this order did not supersede the notification dated 14th September, 1971 meaning thereby that a person who is appointed as the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation shall also be deemed to be the Commissioner under the Payment of Wages Act. So the Deputy Labour Commissioner has the authority under sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Payments of Wages Act. 6. This order also can be looked into from another angle. No objection was taken on this ground before the authority and the petitioner now cannot be allowed to challenge his jurisdiction. It is not a case where the impugned award can be deemed to nullity in the eye of law. In support of this contention Sri Jotindra Singh, learned Advocate for the respondents placed reliance on the following decisions: (i) (1989) 1 GLR155 (North West Transport Syndicate & others vs. State of Assam & others)( 1989(1) GLJ 244) wherein in paragraphs 6,7, 8 and 9 it was pointed out as follows : "6, The necessity and scope of the doctrine of de facto was examined in State of Haryana vs. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd. AIR 1977 SC 237 . In this case, mention was made of what has been stated in Cooley's 'A Treaties on the Constitutional Limitations,' In this authoritative work, distinction was made between an officer de jure and an officer de facto. As to the second type of officer, it was stated that it is one who by some colour of right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs his duties with public acquiescence though having no right in fact. It was further pointed out that for the sake of order and regularly and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and insecurity of private right, the act of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except under certain circumstances. 7. It was further pointed out that for the sake of order and regularly and to prevent confusion in the conduct of public business and insecurity of private right, the act of officers de facto are not suffered to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except under certain circumstances. 7. In Gokaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473 , the doctrine of de facto was explained as below in para 15 : "A Judge, de facto, therefore , is one who is not mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective, Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the power and functions of office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by Judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief." 8. In Puspa Devi vs. ML Ladhawani, AIR 1987 SC 1748 , the question examined was whether the recording of statement by a non-gazetted officer could be relied upon for the purpose of passing an order under the provisions of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. It was stated in para 21 of this judgment as below : "Where office exists under the law it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of its acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with insignia of the office and exercises its powers and functions. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, borne of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief." 9. The aid of this doctrine was also in Beapor Sahayak (P) Ltd vs. Vishwas Nath, AIR 1987 SC 2111 . In this case, a person had been appointed without his possessing the requisite experience. The aid of this doctrine was also in Beapor Sahayak (P) Ltd vs. Vishwas Nath, AIR 1987 SC 2111 . In this case, a person had been appointed without his possessing the requisite experience. It was held that such person could not be said to be holding the office as an usurper but would be deemed to be holding under the colour of lawful authority and being of this view the orders passed by such a person were held to be valid with the aid of de facto doctrine, (ii) 1993 Suppl (2) SCC 734 (Dr. AR Sircar vs. State of UP & others). There also the Supreme Court pointed the principle of de facto doctrine and reiterated its earlier view. 7. Accordingly, there is no merit in this writ application and the same is dismissed. However I leave the parties to bear their own costs