V. K. AGRAWAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal by the defendants/tenants who have been ordered to be evicted from the suit premises is directed against the judgment and decree dt. 2-12-87 by Vth Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Appeal No. 68-A/86, reversing the decree dt. 2-9-86 of IXth Civil Judge, Class II in Civil Suit No. 629-A/87. ( 2 ) IT is no longer in dispute that the plaintiff/respondent is the landlord of the suit premises bearing house No. 327/2 and 327/3 Gorakhpur, Jabalpur. The defendants/appellants are tenants therein on the monthly rent of Rs. 75/ -. The plaintiff/respondent served a notice dt. 11-8-81, which was amended vide notice dt. 13-8-81 on the defendants appellants for vacating the suit premises. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff/respondent averred that by virtue of deed of partition dt. 30-3-77 his father had partitioned the family property and in the said partition the suit premises had fallen in his share. Name of plaintiff/respondent also stands mutated in the Municipal records. It has been averred that Pannalal Jangde was the tenant in the suit premises and after the death of Pannalal Jangde, the defendants/appellants are the tenants therein on the monthly rent of Rs. 75/ -. It was further averred that the applicant is a Government contractor and supplier and is registered as such with the irrigation department, P. W. D. etc. He required the suit accommodation for establishing and starting his office. He also intends starting agency of automobile parts and requires the suit accommodation for that purpose also, and that he had no other suitable accommodation of his own for the purpose in Jabalpur city. The defendants/appellants did not vacate the suit premises despite notice, hence the suit was filed. ( 4 ) THE written statement was filed only on behalf of defendant/appellant No. 1. It was denied therein that the plaintiff/respondent is the sole landlord of the suit premises and it was averred that partition was sham and fictitious and was therefore inoperative in law. It was also denied that Pannalal was the tenant in the suit premises and it was averred that the defendant/appellant No. 1 was the sole tenant in the suit premises, and the remaining defendants were not necessary parties to the suit. It was also denied that Pannalal was the tenant in the suit premises and it was averred that the defendant/appellant No. 1 was the sole tenant in the suit premises, and the remaining defendants were not necessary parties to the suit. It was denied that the plaintiff/respondent required the suit premises bona fide for starting his office as contractor or starting automobile parts agency or that he has no accommodation for the purpose at Jabalpur. It was also pleaded by way of amendment that other accommodations were available to the plaintiff/respondent for the purpose. ( 5 ) BOTH the Courts below concurrently held that the plaintiff/respondent is the sole landlord of the suit premises as the same was allotted in his favour in the family partition and the defendants/appellants are the tenants therein. The learned trial Court however held that the plaintiff/respondent has failed to prove that he bona fide required the suit premises for starting his business, and therefore dismissed the suit of the plaintiff/respondent. However, the lower appellate Court after reappraisal of evidence and material in the case, reversed the above finding of trial Court and held that the suit house was required bona fide by the plaintiff and that he had no alternative accommodation for the purpose and accordingly decreed the suit under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act and ordered eviction of defendants/appellants. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been filed. ( 6 ) THIS second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law :"whether, there is variance between pleading and proof with regard to bona fide need and the impugned decree is vitiated because the need established is not the need of the landlord, but of the partnership firm constituted by him?" ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for appellants/tenants have urged that the bona fide requirement of plaintiff/respondent is not established. It has been urged in the above context that, though the plaintiff/respondent in his notice (Ex. P-7) dt. 11-8-81 alleged that the suit premises is required by him for starting office of contractor, but in para 3 of the plaint, he has pleaded that he not only required the suit premises for establishing or starting the office of a contractor, but also for starting automobile part agency. P-7) dt. 11-8-81 alleged that the suit premises is required by him for starting office of contractor, but in para 3 of the plaint, he has pleaded that he not only required the suit premises for establishing or starting the office of a contractor, but also for starting automobile part agency. It has further been urged that, the evidence led by the plaintiff would indicate that he is carrying on partnership business in the name and style of 'ma Sharda Trading Company' which is registered as contractor with the various Government Departments like P. W. D. and Jabalpur Development Authority, etc. The plaintiff/respondent has led evidence to the effect that the requirement of the suit premises is that of partnership and not of the plaintiff/respondent himself. ( 8 ) IT has therefore been urged by the learned counsel for defendants/appellants that there is variance between the pleading and proof in the above regard. Relying upon the case of Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand, AIR 1968 SC 1083 it has therefore been urged that such evidence could not be accepted and the lower appellate Court erred in acting upon the same and in decreeing the suit for eviction of the plaintiff/respondent. Learned counsel for appellants has also relied on D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR 1974 SC 1026 in support of above contention. ( 9 ) AS against this the learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent has urged that plaintiff/respondent by his evidence has proved and established his bona fide requirement of the suit premises. It was further urged that there is no variance between the pleading and proof in the above regard, in as much as business of partnership of plaintiff/respondent shall be deemed to be his business as he was admittedly active partner in the said partnership. Therefore, requirement of the said partnership was rightly held, in the impugned judgment as requirement of the plaintiff/respondent. It has further been urged that the plaintiff/ respondent has fully proved his need of opening automobile part agency and office for business of contractor by cogent evidence, and since he doesn't have any other suitable accommodation of his own for the purpose; his suit for eviction was rightly decreed by the impugned judgment. It has further been urged that the plaintiff/ respondent has fully proved his need of opening automobile part agency and office for business of contractor by cogent evidence, and since he doesn't have any other suitable accommodation of his own for the purpose; his suit for eviction was rightly decreed by the impugned judgment. Reliance in this connection has been placed by the learned counsel for plaintiff/respondent on D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR 1974 SC 1026 (supra), Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha, AIR 1987 SC 2199 ; Bhanwar Lal v. T. K. A. Abdul Karim through N. K. Mohd. Mustafa, AIR 1992 SC 2166 and Fazal Bhai v. Vijay Kumar Kaushal (1972 M. P. L. J. (NOC) 140 ). ( 10 ) IN view of the above contentions, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the plaintiff has established his bona fide requirement of the suit premises, or whether there is variance in the above regard between the pleadings and proof of the plaintiff respondent. In the above context, it will also have to be considered as to whether the need of partnership business of the plaintiff, could be treated as the need of the plaintiff/respondent ? ( 11 ) AS already noticed the plaintiff/respondent has pleaded that he requires the suit accommodation for establishing his office of contractor as also for starting agency of automobile parts. As far as his business as contractor is concerned, the plaintiff/respondent has admitted that he is carrying on contractorship business in partnership with Ishwar Singh. His aforesaid partnership under the name and style of 'ma Sharda Trading Company', is registered with the Irrigation Department, Public Works Department, Jabalpur Development Authority, etc. , as would be clear from the statements of V. K. Shrivastava (P. W. 1) Executive Engineer in the P. W. D. , H. N. Yadav (P. W. 2) and D. B. Rai (P. W. 3) clerk in the Public Works Department and Law Assistant in Jabalpur Development Authority and the documents of registration Ex. P-1a, Ex. P-2a and Ex. P-3a respectively proved by the above witnesses. It is therefore clear from the above evidence and also admission of the plaintiff that the plaintiff/respondent is carrying on his business as contractor in partnership with Ishwar Singh. P-1a, Ex. P-2a and Ex. P-3a respectively proved by the above witnesses. It is therefore clear from the above evidence and also admission of the plaintiff that the plaintiff/respondent is carrying on his business as contractor in partnership with Ishwar Singh. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, learned counsel for the appellant/defendant has urged that the need of partnership of the plaintiff as above, cannot be treated to be the need of the plaintiff/respondent himself. He has in this connection, placed strong reliance on the following observations regarding the scope and latitude of Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act in D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR 1974 SC 1026 (supra) :"having regard to the rigour of clause (f) of Section 12 (1) we think that the phrase "his business" should not receive a wide construction as to the class of persons who may be included in the possessive pronoun 'his' in the phrase, for it would be against legislative policy. "in the said case, the respondent had not filed the deed of partnership and it was therefore observed therein that the deed of partnership alone would have disclosed, as to whether the respondent was merely a sleeping partner or a partner who was entitled to manage the business of the partnership either solely or with other partners. It was held that if the plaintiff landlord was a sleeping partner, it could not be held that he required the suit accommodation for his business. ( 13 ) IN view of above, it would appear that the plaintiff/landlord can evict the tenant from the suit premises, if he establishes his requirement thereof for his partnership business also; if he is actively managing the partnership either solely or along with other partners; and is not merely a sleeping partner. ( 14 ) IN the above context the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent, placing reliance on Fazal Bhai v. Vijay Kumar Kaushal (1972 MPLJ (NOC) 140) (supra) has urged that partnership is not a legal entity and the firm name is merely a compendious name to describe its partners. ( 14 ) IN the above context the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent, placing reliance on Fazal Bhai v. Vijay Kumar Kaushal (1972 MPLJ (NOC) 140) (supra) has urged that partnership is not a legal entity and the firm name is merely a compendious name to describe its partners. In the above case, it was also held that the words 'his business' as they occur in Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, would not mean landlord's exclusive business, and therefore even if the landlord needs the accommodation for continuing or starting a partnership business, he is entitled to evict the tenant, under the said provision. ( 15 ) IN Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha, AIR 1987 SC 2199 (supra) provisions of Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 were considered and in that context, the proposition of law under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act as laid down in the case of D. N. Sanghavi and Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR 1974 SC 1026 (supra) was referred and the position of law was explained. ( 16 ) IT was considered therein whether the application for eviction under the said provision was liable to be dismissed solely on the ground that the landlord has chosen to file this application to accommodate a partnership firm in which his sons and some strangers are partners. It was observed therein that it is well settled that partnership is a compendious way of describing those who constitute the firm under Section 4 of the Partnership Act. It was held in that case that since sons of landlord were carrying on business along with other partners, the landlord was entitled to evict the tenant under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. ( 17 ) THUS the ratio of Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha, AIR 1987 SC 2199 (supra) is that if the members of the family are carrying on business in partnership as its active partners, a decree for eviction for such a need under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 can be passed. The above provision of Tamil Nadu Act is in pari materia with Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. The above provision of Tamil Nadu Act is in pari materia with Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act. Therefore it is clear that a decree under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act for eviction could be passed if the need of landlord for his business, which he may be carrying on with partners is established, provided that he is not a sleeping partner in the partnership. ( 18 ) AS already noticed the plaintiff is carrying on the business of contractor in partnership with Ishwar Singh and also is dealing in automobile parts. His need of the suit premises for carrying on the above businesses is amply established from the statement of Arun Kumar (P. W. 4) and the said need could not be specifically controverted by the defendants/appellants; and in fact the defendant No. 1 Govind Jangde has expressed his ignorance as to whether the plaintiff/respondent is carrying on the business of selling automobile parts, as has been stated by the latter. ( 19 ) IT may also be noticed that, though there was allegation by the appellants/ defendants that the plaintiff/respondent wanted to enhance the rent of suit premises and the suit has been filed for subserving that end. However, defendants/appellants have not led any cogent evidence in this regard. Therefore, the statement of plaintiff/respondent that he required the suit premises for carrying on his business of contractor as well as for opening an agency of automobile parts appears to be fully established, as has been held by the lower appellate Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that his need is fictitious in the circumstances. ( 20 ) FURTHER it is held that there is no variance between the pleading and proof with regard to the bona fide requirement of suit premises and the impugned decree is not vitiated simply because the plaintiff required the suit premises for his business as a contractor, which he is carrying on in partnership, as well as for opening the automobile parts agency. If that be so, the plaintiff/landlord was entitled to evict the defendants/appellants under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, as has been rightly held by the lower appellate Court in the impugned judgment. If that be so, the plaintiff/landlord was entitled to evict the defendants/appellants under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, as has been rightly held by the lower appellate Court in the impugned judgment. ( 21 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal has no merit and the impugned judgment and decree does not deserve to be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. .